docs: remove standalone deployment and docs folder
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---
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layout: default
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title: Architecture
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description: How the jump host authenticates users, resolves reachable hosts from the directory, injects per-user keys, and bridges SSH — plus the web UI and audit model.
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---
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# Architecture
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The jump host is a Node.js service (using [`ssh2`](https://github.com/mscdex/ssh2)
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as both an SSH **server** and **client**) with two faces: the SSH front door
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(default `:2222`) and a web UI/API (`:3002`). It holds no user database of its
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own — identity, authorization, and onward credentials all come from the shared
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directory.
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```
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┌────────────────────── jump host ──────────────────────┐
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ssh │ ssh2 Server (:2222) │ ssh2 Client
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─────┼─▶ 1. authenticate user ──▶ LDAP (sshPublicKey / bind) │ ───────────▶ downstream
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user │ 2. resolve target ──▶ SSO /api/discovery │ sshd (as the
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│ 3. inject key ──▶ LDAP (add sshPublicKey) │ real user)
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│ 4. bridge channels ◀───────────────────────────────▶ │
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│ web UI/API (:3002) ──▶ audit + metrics (redis) │
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└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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```
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## 1. Inbound authentication
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When a user connects, the jump host authenticates them against LDAP:
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- **Public key** — it looks up the user's `sshPublicKey` values in the directory
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and matches the offered key (handling ssh2's probe-then-sign two-phase
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publickey auth). The jump host's *own* injected key (identified by its comment
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marker) is deliberately excluded from this match — only the jump host may hold
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that private key, so accepting it inbound would be a bypass.
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- **Password** — an LDAP simple bind as the user's DN. Policy is configurable:
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`off` (keys only — recommended for a public host), `local` (passwords only
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from loopback/RFC1918 clients, keys-only from the internet), or `all`.
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Every attempt — success or failure, with method and reason — is audited.
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## 2. Access & target resolution
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The hosts a user may reach are computed from the directory, not a local list:
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1. The user's LDAP group memberships (`(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(member=…))`).
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2. For each group, the SSO's
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`GET /api/discovery/resources?group=<cn>` (authenticated with an API token),
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unioned and filtered to `kind: host`.
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Each host's dial address is `metadata.ip` (or the hostname from
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`metadata.address`) and port `metadata.sshPort` (default 22). Results are cached
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briefly per user and shared by both the grammar path and the TUI picker.
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Target matching tries, in order: exact slug → `host_`-prefixed slug → display
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name → IP → address hostname. A raw IP that isn't an accessible directory host
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is refused unless explicitly allowed.
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> The directory auto-creates `<slug>_access` / `<slug>_admin` groups for every
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> host and service (see the SSO's
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> [Directory & Inventory](https://theta42.github.io/sso-manager-node/directory.html)
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> docs), which is exactly what this authorization reads.
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## 3. Per-user key injection {#per-user-key-injection}
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The jump host holds **one** keypair. To connect downstream *as the user*
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without asking them for anything, it must present a key the downstream `sshd`
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will accept for that user. Downstream hosts (joined via
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[ldap-client](https://github.com/theta42/ldap-client)) serve authorized keys
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straight from LDAP via `AuthorizedKeysCommand`. So on a user's first connection,
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the jump host appends its own public key to that user's `sshPublicKey` attribute
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in LDAP — comment-marked so it's recognizable — then connects downstream with
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its private key.
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- Idempotent: the key is added once; a redis flag skips the LDAP round-trip
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afterwards.
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- The jump host's bind account therefore needs **write access to the
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`sshPublicKey` attribute** on user entries (an OpenLDAP ACL — see the README).
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In the bundled theta-env deployment this is handled for you.
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- Because the marker key is excluded from inbound auth (step 1), it grants only
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the jump host's onward path, never inbound impersonation.
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## 4. Bridging
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Once the upstream connection is ready, the jump host splices SSH channels
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between the two connections:
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- **shell / exec** — piped both ways, with window-change and exit-status
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forwarded.
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- **SFTP subsystem** — the two subsystem channels are raw-piped as opaque bytes;
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no SFTP protocol parsing is needed, which is why WinSCP and `sftp` work
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unchanged.
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- Channel requests that arrive before the upstream is ready are buffered and
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replayed, so nothing is dropped during the connect.
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- The downstream host key's SHA256 fingerprint is recorded in the audit event
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(trust-on-use in v1).
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Byte counts per direction are tallied cheaply for the audit record.
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## Web UI, API & audit
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An Express + EJS + Bootstrap app on `:3002` — the same front-end stack and
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look/feel as the SSO Manager and Proxy. Login is OIDC against the SSO plus a
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local anti-lockout admin (`auth.adminUsers`), with admin access gated by
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`auth.adminGroups`. It exposes:
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- `GET /health` — open; `{status, activeSessions, version}`
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- `GET /api/sessions` — active sessions
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- `GET /api/audit?page=&uid=&target=&status=` — the paged audit log
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- `GET /api/metrics` — counters (total, failures, top users/hosts)
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Audit events and counters live in redis. Each event captures: user, auth method,
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mode (grammar/picker), target slug/address/port, channel type, client IP,
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success + failure reason, downstream host-key fingerprint, timing, and bytes in/out.
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## Standalone mode
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Everything above describes the default backend. Set `standalone.enabled: true`
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and two modules become conditional facades, swapping their entire
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implementation at `require` time based on that flag — nothing else in the
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codebase (`ssh_server.js`, `bridge.js`, `key_inject.js`, `tui_picker.js`, the
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web UI) changes or even knows which mode it's running in:
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- **`models/user_ldap.js`** — LDAP client, or `models/user_file.js` (an
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[@simpleworkjs/orm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@simpleworkjs/orm)-backed
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store implementing the same `getUser` / `getGroups` / `checkPassword` /
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`addSshKey` interface).
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- **`utils/access.js`** — LDAP groups + SSO `/api/discovery`, or
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`utils/hosts_file.js` (same ORM package, same `accessibleHosts()` interface).
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In standalone mode there's no group-based authorization: every stored host
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is accessible to every stored user.
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The ORM is Sequelize underneath, defaulting to a local SQLite file but
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accepting any Sequelize-supported dialect via `conf.orm`. See
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[Installation](installation.html#standalone-mode) for config and how to add
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users/hosts (there's no admin UI for standalone data yet).
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## Where it sits in the stack
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- **[SSO Manager](https://theta42.github.io/sso-manager-node/)** — provides the
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OpenLDAP directory (users, groups, `sshPublicKey`) and the inventory API this
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jump host reads.
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- **[ldap-client](https://github.com/theta42/ldap-client)** — enrolls the
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downstream Linux hosts (SSSD/PAM + `AuthorizedKeysCommand`) that the jump host
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connects into.
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- **[Proxy](https://theta42.github.io/proxy/)** — fronts the jump host's web UI
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under TLS.
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- **[theta-env](https://theta42.github.io/theta-env/)** — wires it all together.
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