wg_iface.removePeer() previously just did `wg set ... remove` -- the
kernel routes setPeer() adds for a peer's AllowedIPs (since wg itself
only configures crypto-routing, not kernel routes -- see setPeer's own
comment) were never cleaned up, a real TODO flagged in code but never
exercised because nothing removed a mesh peer at all.
- removePeer() now queries the peer's current AllowedIPs (`wg show
<iface> allowed-ips`) BEFORE removing it -- once gone, wg no longer
knows what to clean up -- and issues `ip route del` for each.
- New DELETE /api/mesh/gateways/:id (models/mesh_gateway.js gained
remove()) actually calls removePeer(), so the fix has a real caller;
previously there was no removal path anywhere in the mesh feature at
all. Refuses to remove the local "(self)" entry. Does not reach out
to the remote gateway to remove the reciprocal peer -- that side
needs the same action taken independently.
- Mesh UI: remove button per non-self peer row, using app.messages.confirm
(not native confirm() -- caught by this repo's own no-native-dialogs
test, which failed on first pass and is now green).
Verified for real with a live WireGuard interface in a container: routes
for a peer's AllowedIPs present after setPeer, confirmed gone after
removePeer, while the interface's own local route correctly survives.
Rolls up this pass's mesh work: real site-to-site WireGuard tunnels
(kernel-first, wireguard-go fallback), join-token bootstrap, mDNS
local-discovery announcer, and a UI for all of it. Verified with real
two-container tests (actual encrypted tunnel passing traffic, real
multicast discovery cycle), which caught two real bugs -- see
CHANGELOG.md for detail.
The mesh API (routes/mesh.js) had zero UI -- minting a join token,
joining a remote gateway, or seeing what's meshed all required calling
the API directly. New Mesh page (nav: Dashboard/Sessions/WireGuard/
Mesh/Audit):
- This Gateway card: interface name, kernel-vs-userspace WireGuard mode
(wireguard-go fallback), meshed-gateway count.
- Mint a Join Token: calls POST /api/mesh/join-tokens, shows the
single-use token once.
- Join a Remote Gateway's Mesh: calls POST /api/mesh/join with a remote
endpoint + token.
- Meshed Gateways table: site, mesh index, mesh subnet, endpoint, public
key, last seen -- including this gateway's own self-entry.
EJS compile verified; jump-host's existing test suite (34 tests) still
passes. Not yet visually driven in a browser the way sso-manager-node's
modal was (jump-host's OIDC-based admin auth is a heavier lift to stand
up for a one-off check) -- route registration, EJS compilation, and the
API layer underneath are verified; the actual click-through is not.
The announcer half of AGENT_LOCAL_DISCOVERY_SPEC.md / MULTI_SITE_SPEC.md
Appendix B -- advertises which public hostnames this site fronts (and at
what local IP) via mDNS, so a theta-agent on the same LAN segment with
prefer_local_directory enabled can skip the relay/WAN path.
Opt-in via THETA_LOCAL_DISCOVERY_HOSTS (comma-separated); no-op if unset,
so this changes nothing for an install that doesn't configure it. Only
ever advertises which hostnames map to which local IP -- no identity/
trust information -- consistent with the hard rule on the listening side
(theta-agent) that local-discovery may change DNS resolution but must
never touch certificate validation.
Verified end-to-end against the real theta-agent Go binary: announce,
discover, apply, and clean revert on disappearance all confirmed working
over real multicast between two containers.
The existing WireGuard code (models/wg_site.js, routes/wireguard.js) is the
roaming-client/exit-node feature -- individual peer configs an admin hands
out, not gateway-to-gateway mesh peering. This adds the latter, per
MULTI_SITE_SPEC.md §4: two theta-gateway instances mesh by one calling the
other's POST /api/mesh/register with a join token (minted via
POST /api/mesh/join-tokens, admin-gated); both sides end up with a live
wg0 peer for the other, mesh-indexed per Appendix A's addressing
(172.24.<idx>.0/16 + 10.<idx>.0.0/16, idx 1-254).
- utils/wg_iface.js: brings up the local interface, preferring in-kernel
WireGuard (ip link add type wireguard) and falling back to userspace
wireguard-go when the kernel module isn't available. Both packages
added to the Dockerfile.
- utils/mesh_addressing.js: pure addressing math, unit tested
(test/unit/mesh_addressing.test.js).
- models/mesh_gateway.js: Redis-backed registry of known peer gateways
(same pattern as wg_site.js), assigns + persists mesh indexes.
- utils/mesh_join_token.js: single-use bootstrap credential, same
GETDEL-on-Redis pattern already used on the theta-directory side.
- routes/mesh.js: /join-tokens (admin), /register (bearer token, no
session -- called by a remote gateway), /join (admin, initiates from
this side), /gateways (admin, list).
Verified with a REAL two-container test (not mocked): two independent
containers, each running this actual code, meshed via a live join-token
handshake, brought up real kernel WireGuard interfaces, and passed ICMP
traffic across the resulting encrypted tunnel end to end (0% packet
loss). That test caught a real bug worth calling out: `wg set ... peer
... allowed-ips` only configures WireGuard's own crypto-routing table --
it does NOT add a kernel route for that destination (wg-quick normally
does this as a separate step; we don't use wg-quick). A real encrypted
handshake completed between the two containers with the route missing,
and ping still showed 100% loss until setPeer() was fixed to add the
corresponding `ip route add <allowed-ip> dev <iface>` itself.
README no longer offers Standalone Docker / Bare metal install instructions,
which contradicted the Deployment section's own "exclusively via Docker
Compose within Theta Suite" claim. Links to sso-manager-node/theta-env's old
per-repo GitHub Pages sites now point at the unified theta-suite docs site.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(wireguard): WireGuard peer manager UI with QR, .conf download, and per-client exit node selection
- models/wg_peer.js — Redis-backed peer store with auto IP allocation (10.100.0.x)
- models/wg_site.js — Redis-backed exit node store (admin-managed sites)
- utils/wg_keys.js — X25519 keypair gen via Node crypto (no wg binary needed)
- utils/wg_conf.js — client wg0.conf renderer
- routes/wireguard.js — REST API: CRUD sites/peers, GET /conf, GET /qr (QRCode PNG)
- views/wireguard.ejs — full dark-mode UI: exit node table, peer table, QR modal,
.conf download, exit node picker per client
- conf/base.js — conf.wireguard block (serverPublicKey, serverEndpoint, dns, poolBase)
- Nav: WireGuard link added (admin-gated)
- No wg binary dep in Node process — key gen is pure JS X25519
* fix(test): update test script to run unit tests without native bcrypt binary dependency in CI
* fix(ui): replace native browser alert/confirm with app.messages in WireGuard view
README.md and docs/architecture.md described authorization as a client-side
loop over each of a user's LDAP groups, calling the SSO's
GET /api/discovery/resources?group=<cn> once per group. The actual code
(utils/access.js, accessibleHosts()) makes a single call to the SSO's
GET /api/discovery/access/:uid, which resolves the user's groups
server-side and returns the full access projection in one response.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0113gCdnfSCuZr6xvPDxTo3D
isManagedHost() treated a missing metadata.managed flag as permission, so
any host the SSO merely discovered -- an unpromoted Proxmox guest, a UniFi
client -- was offered in the TUI picker and accepted by the username
grammar.
Replaced with isCatalogHost(), mirroring the rule the SSO Directory's own
listing applies: a resource carrying discovery_sources but never promoted
is excluded; hand-created hosts and promoted ones are included; an
explicit managed:false is always excluded.
The two copies of this rule have now drifted apart once. If a third
consumer needs it, hoist it into @simpleworkjs/directory-schema rather
than copying again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add SSO-style error page (views/error.ejs) and render it for browser
navigation in the error handler (API still returns JSON).
- Navbar: username not underlined; only the active nav link is bold+underlined.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
bao-conf 1.0.0's init() threw when VAULT_TOKEN was unset, crashing boot
(.catch -> process.exit(1)) in any deployment without an OpenBao sidecar
(standalone Docker, bare metal). 1.0.1 makes init() fail-soft on a
missing token (warn + continue from CONF_SECRETS). The theta-env stack
is unaffected (it always sets a scoped VAULT_TOKEN).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
bin/www now runs bao-conf.init({ path: 'jump-host' }) before
require('../models'), so the OIDC clientSecret captured at require time
inside createOidcClient sees the OpenBao-merged config. Authenticates to
OpenBao with a scoped VAULT_TOKEN (policy jump-host), never the root
token; fail-soft to CONF_SECRETS if OpenBao is unreachable.
config/jump-secrets.js becomes an operator-edit seed artifact (OpenBao
authoritative). README gains a Secrets section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Box-drawing header with cyan/magenta/green color treatment
- Per-row coloring with alternating cyan shades
- Environment badges (PROD in red, DEV in dim)
- Green inverse selection with '◄ SELECTED ►' indicator
- Yellow filter text and footer separator
- Title changed to 'SSO Manager'
- app_super_admin (cross-app, also recognized by sso-manager-node/proxy)
and a new app_jump_admin group are added to conf.auth: super admins are
full admins here same as app_sso_admin; jump admins get audit page/data
access without other admin rights (isJumpAdmin/requireJumpAdmin in
middleware/auth.js, wired into routes/api.js's audit-data gate and the
/audit page's client-side forceLogin -- previously the page shell
rendered for any logged-in user, only the data was gated).
- Dashboard: moved the stat boxes and Top hosts/Top users cards to the
Audit page (audit is now the admin-facing metrics home; dashboard stays
focused on "hosts I can reach"). Renamed "All hosts" to "My hosts".
- Host list now shows Last connection/Last failed connection columns and
highlights rows green (live session, from session_registry) or yellow
(most recent attempt failed) -- backed by new per-host last-success/
last-fail timestamps in models/metrics.js, populated by ssh_server.js
(which now attributes grammar/TUI connect failures to the resolved host
when one was found, not just aggregate counters) and surfaced through
GET /api/user/hosts (routes/user.js).
- Dashboard, Sessions, and Audit pages now wrap their content in
<div class="container mt-4">, matching sso-manager-node/proxy's width
instead of rendering full-bleed inside the fluid shell.
- Audit's nav entry now carries groups: ['admin'] (utils/ui.js), reusing
the existing synthetic-admin-group nav-gating convention -- the API
route was already server-side admin-gated, this closes the last gap by
hiding the nav link/page for non-admins too.
- app-base.js (byte-identical across the 3 apps): added
app.util.revealItem() and the --sw-content-offset sticky-positioning
variable, carried over from the same round of changes in
sso-manager-node/proxy. Not yet called anywhere in this app -- no
sticky/reveal use case here yet -- but keeps the shared file in sync.
app.modal.close() called immediately before showToken()'s app.modal.open()
in the same tick collides with Bootstrap's hide-transition guard on the
singleton modal, so the reveal never appears. open() alone already
overwrites the already-visible modal's content in place. Same root cause
as the OAuth-secret-reveal race fixed in sso-manager-node (v1.8.2) and the
create-token race fixed in proxy (v1.7.0), found while auditing this
exact pattern across all 3 apps this round.
The self-service API-token UI was inconsistent across all 3 apps
(sso-manager-node/proxy used a card grid with Edit/Rotate/Revoke and a
description field; jump-host used a bare table with no Edit action, no
description field anywhere in the UI, and icon-only buttons -- even though
its model and PUT route already fully supported both). jump-host is first
since it needed the least backend work (none -- description and the PUT
handler already existed, just unexposed) and the most view work, proving
the pattern before porting it to proxy/sso-manager-node.
- Card grid (jq-repeat="apiTokenCard") replacing the table, matching
sso-manager-node's exact template: name + truncated token-id, optional
description, a <dl> of Token ID/Created/Last used/Expires, and labeled
Edit/Rotate/Revoke buttons.
- New Edit modal (app.modal, footer shows "Created by X on Y" via the
token's existing created_by/created_on) -- net-new UI on top of the
already-existing PUT /:id route.
- Create modal gained a Description field and now uses
app.modal.footerButtons() for its Cancel/Create pair.
- Standardized status badges on Bootstrap 5's text-bg-* classes.
- Bumped @simpleworkjs/frontend to ^0.2.6 (footer/footerButtons support;
this app was still on ^0.2.5) and added the missing app.apiToken.update()
client wrapper (list/add/remove/rotate already existed).
Found and fixed a real bug along the way: the planned "flash a checkmark on
copy" touch (porting sso-manager-node's copyField pattern) silently does
nothing once FontAwesome replaces <i> icons with inline <svg> -- there's no
<i> left to swap classes on. Renamed the existing copySshCommand() (already
used by the Quick Jump feature, toast-based, unaffected by that FA
behavior) to copyFieldValue() and reused it for the token-reveal copy
button instead of introducing a second, broken copy mechanism.
Verified live: card grid renders with truncated token ID; Edit modal shows
real created-by/on data, saves a description change, and the card
refreshes; Create modal's new description field round-trips; secret-reveal
copy button fires the toast correctly for a real (non-programmatic) click.
The uid_-_target grammar-mode SSH command was documented in the README but
nowhere in the UI itself -- users had to remember/reconstruct the format by
hand. Adds a "Quick Jump" card with a one-click-copy command for the
interactive-picker form, plus a copy button on every row of "Hosts you can
reach" that copies the exact grammar-mode command for that specific host
(using the logged-in user's own uid, so it's ready to paste and run as-is).
conf.ssh.listenPort is now passed to the dashboard view so the command can
include the right -p flag when the SSH front door isn't on the default port
22 (theta-env, for example, exposes it on 2222).
Verified live: logged in as the local admin user, confirmed the Quick Jump
command and a per-host command both populate correctly and copy to the
clipboard (toast confirmation), and that the per-host command matches the
exact uid_-_target grammar the SSH server's parseUsername expects.
resolveAndConnect discarded the actual error from connectUpstream
(ECONNREFUSED, ETIMEDOUT, an ssh2 auth failure, ...) and replaced it with
the generic reason string 'upstream-unreachable', so the audit log gave no
way to tell a network-layer failure from an auth failure -- which is why
"Could not reach 192.168.1.206" for the emby host couldn't be root-caused
without live host-shell access. Now the real error message is captured and
surfaced as failDetail, shown as a tooltip on the audit table's fail badge.
request failed" / "shell request failed"
runTuiSession awaited audit.create() (a Redis round-trip) and then
accessibleHosts() (a directory API call) BEFORE calling runTui(), which
is where the pty/shell/exec/subsystem listeners actually get attached to
the session. The client sends its pty-req and shell requests immediately
after opening the session -- if either await took long enough for those
requests to arrive first, ssh2 auto-rejects any channel request with no
listener (CHANNEL_FAILURE), which is exactly what OpenSSH reports as
"PTY allocation request failed on channel 0" / "shell request failed on
channel 0". The connection then just sat there, since nothing was left
to drive it.
runGrammar already has this exact fix (see its own comment); runTuiSession
never got the equivalent treatment. Fixed the same way: register the
session listeners synchronously, before any await, by having runTui take
a Promise for the hosts list instead of the resolved list -- the shell
handler awaits it internally once the client actually sends a shell
request, which by construction happens only after the listener already
exists.
Verified: publickey auth against a real deployment succeeds (confirms
the earlier ldaps:// fix holds), and the failure reproduces with the
exact reported error strings for a bare `ssh user@host` (TUI/picker mode,
no target) connection. Full suite: 50/50 passing, no regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Same fix as sso-manager-node/proxy: formAJAX's loading indicator passed a
raw <div class="spinner-border"> string to app.messages.action, which
HTML-escapes its message by design (@simpleworkjs/frontend). Replaced
with plain text ("Saving…").
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Native confirm() blocks all further browser events on the page (found
live, mid browser-automation testing, on sso-manager-node's equivalent
secret-rotate flow -- it froze the tab). This app has no such call sites
(never did); this static check (scans views/ and public/js|lib/js for
bare alert(/confirm(/prompt() calls) keeps it that way.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
jump-host had zero API-token support: no model, no route, no UI, and
Auth.checkApiToken was explicitly absent from the createOidcClient() call
(per the comment it left behind). proxy and sso-manager-node both have
this; jump-host didn't.
Ports proxy's models/api_token.js + routes/api_token.js pattern (jmp_
prefix instead of prx_), wires checkApiToken into createOidcClient(), adds
Bearer-token support to middleware/auth.js, and adds a token management
card to dashboard.ejs (create/list/rotate/revoke) using app.modal/
app.messages.
Scope note: a jump-host token carries no group claims (unlike proxy's,
which snapshots the creator's groups), so it authenticates as its creator
for non-admin routes (e.g. GET /api/user/hosts) but can never pass
requireAdmin — a deliberate, conservative default rather than recomputing
live admin status per-request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Same swap as sso-manager-node/proxy: vendored app.util.actionMessage/
actionConfirm replaced by @simpleworkjs/frontend's app.messages.action/
confirm; vendored val.js replaced by the package's app.validate.js.
jump-host's views don't call actionMessage/actionConfirm/alert directly,
so no view changes are needed beyond the script includes.
app.api/app.auth/app.pubsub/app.socket in app-base.js are untouched, same
reasoning as the other two apps' PRs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New GET /api/user/hosts (auth-only): all hosts for admins, group-filtered
list for everyone else.
- accessibleHosts() accepts a pre-resolved user.groups, so the web UI's
OIDC session skips a redundant LDAP getGroups(dn) call.
- Dashboard shows a "Hosts you can reach" / "All hosts" table.
- @simpleworkjs/ldap 1.0.1 fixes addSshKey's ObjectClassViolationError on
accounts predating the ldapPublicKey objectClass -- was aborting key
injection (and the SSH connection) on affected accounts.
- Bump to 1.5.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add README/docs/secrets.js.example coverage for the new
@simpleworkjs/orm-backed standalone mode (no LDAP/SSO), and promote the
CHANGELOG's Unreleased entry to 1.4.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly