Per-host SSO: OpenResty gate + auth location (#57)

- hostfeatures.lua: replace basic-auth-only enforcement with a combined
  apply_auth() that allows if EITHER basic auth OR a valid SSO session passes.
  A "Basic" Authorization header takes the basic path (401 on failure);
  otherwise a browser is 302'd to /__proxy_auth/start. SSO sessions are read
  straight from Redis (proxy_SsoSession_<sid>, sid from the __proxy_sso cookie,
  character-restricted) and matched to the host.
- proxy.conf: add a /__proxy_auth/ location (outside the gate) that forwards to
  the nodejs app so the OIDC flow can run and set the cookie on every host.
- nginx.conf: add the proxy_auth_backend upstream (defaults to 127.0.0.1:3000).

Needs live verification on an OpenResty box (no Lua/nginx runtime in CI here).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-11 15:44:30 -04:00
parent 87c0d024d5
commit 952c9434a4
3 changed files with 114 additions and 25 deletions
+96 -27
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
-- ip_allow / ip_deny (JSON arrays of CIDRs)
-- basicauth_enabled / basicauth_realm
-- basicauth_users (JSON object {username: base64(sha1(password))})
-- sso_enabled -- gate on a __proxy_sso session (established by /__proxy_auth)
local cjson = require "cjson.safe"
@@ -82,45 +83,113 @@ local function apply_ratelimit(res, host, ip)
end
end
-- Per-host HTTP basic auth. Credentials are stored as {user: base64(sha1(pw))}
-- (htpasswd "{SHA}" scheme; hashed server-side in nodejs). Fails closed: any
-- misconfig or bad credential returns 401 with a WWW-Authenticate challenge.
local function apply_basicauth(res)
if res["basicauth_enabled"] ~= "true" then return end
-- ---- Per-host authentication (basic auth OR SSO) -----------------------
--
-- Both are optional. If either is enabled, a request must satisfy at least one.
-- A "Basic" Authorization header routes to the basic-auth path (401 challenge on
-- failure); otherwise a browser is redirected into the SSO login. Basic-auth
-- creds are stored as {user: base64(sha1(pw))} (htpasswd "{SHA}"; hashed in
-- nodejs). SSO relies on a Redis-backed session established by /__proxy_auth
-- (nodejs); the allow-list was enforced there, so here we only confirm a valid
-- session for this host.
-- True when the request carries valid basic-auth credentials for this host.
local function basic_auth_ok(res)
local users = decode_table(res["basicauth_users"])
if not users then return false end
local header = ngx.var.http_authorization
if not header then return false end
local b64 = header:match("^%s*[Bb]asic%s+(%S+)%s*$")
if not b64 then return false end
local decoded = ngx.decode_base64(b64)
if not decoded then return false end
local user, pass = decoded:match("^([^:]*):(.*)$")
if not user or user == "" then return false end
local stored = users[user]
if not stored then return false end
local sha1 = require "resty.sha1"
local hasher = sha1:new()
if not hasher then return false end
hasher:update(pass or "")
return ngx.encode_base64(hasher:final()) == stored
end
local function basic_challenge(res)
local realm = res["basicauth_realm"]
if not realm or realm == "" then realm = "Restricted" end
realm = realm:gsub('[\r\n"]', "") -- defense in depth for the header
local function deny()
ngx.header["WWW-Authenticate"] = 'Basic realm="' .. realm .. '"'
return ngx.exit(401)
end
local users = decode_table(res["basicauth_users"])
if not users then return deny() end -- enabled but no users -> deny all
-- Read an SSO session hash from Redis. Returns the table or nil. The sid comes
-- from a cookie (attacker-controlled), so it is character-restricted before use.
local function sso_get_session(sid)
if not sid or not sid:match("^[%w_%-]+$") then return nil end
local header = ngx.var.http_authorization
if not header then return deny() end
local b64 = header:match("^%s*[Bb]asic%s+(%S+)%s*$")
if not b64 then return deny() end
local redis = require "resty.redis"
local red = redis:new()
red:set_timeout(1000)
local ok, err = red:connect("127.0.0.1", 6379)
if not ok then
ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "hostfeatures: sso redis connect ", err)
return nil
end
local decoded = ngx.decode_base64(b64)
if not decoded then return deny() end
local user, pass = decoded:match("^([^:]*):(.*)$")
if not user or user == "" then return deny() end
local arr = red:hgetall("proxy_SsoSession_" .. sid)
local sess = arr and red:array_to_hash(arr) or nil
red:set_keepalive(10000, 100)
local stored = users[user]
if not stored then return deny() end
if sess and next(sess) ~= nil then return sess end
return nil
end
local sha1 = require "resty.sha1"
local hasher = sha1:new()
if not hasher then return deny() end
hasher:update(pass or "")
local computed = ngx.encode_base64(hasher:final())
-- True when a valid SSO session cookie exists for THIS host. (The session
-- auto-expires via Redis TTL; a missing key reads as no session.)
local function sso_session_ok()
local sid = ngx.var.cookie___proxy_sso
if not sid or sid == "" then return false end
local sess = sso_get_session(sid)
if not sess or not sess["sub"] then return false end
if sess["host"] ~= ngx.var.host then return false end
return true
end
if computed ~= stored then return deny() end
-- authenticated: fall through to the rest of the request
-- Send a browser into the SSO login, preserving where it was headed. Non-idempotent
-- methods get a 401 instead of a redirect they couldn't safely replay.
local function sso_redirect()
local m = ngx.req.get_method()
if m ~= "GET" and m ~= "HEAD" then
return ngx.exit(401)
end
local rd = ngx.var.scheme .. "://" .. ngx.var.host .. ngx.var.request_uri
return ngx.redirect("/__proxy_auth/start?rd=" .. ngx.escape_uri(rd), 302)
end
-- Enforce whichever auth methods are enabled; allow if EITHER passes.
local function apply_auth(res)
local basic_on = res["basicauth_enabled"] == "true"
local sso_on = res["sso_enabled"] == "true"
if not basic_on and not sso_on then return end
if basic_on and basic_auth_ok(res) then return end
if sso_on and sso_session_ok() then return end
-- Not authenticated. Pick the right challenge for the client.
local auth = ngx.var.http_authorization
local has_basic_header = auth and auth:match("^%s*[Bb]asic%s") ~= nil
if sso_on and not has_basic_header then
return sso_redirect()
end
if basic_on then
return basic_challenge(res)
end
return sso_redirect()
end
-- Extra request headers sent to the upstream.
@@ -140,7 +209,7 @@ function M.access(ngx_, res)
apply_ip_access(res, ip)
apply_ratelimit(res, host, ip)
apply_basicauth(res)
apply_auth(res)
apply_req_headers(res)
-- Cache gate for proxy_no_cache / proxy_cache_bypass. Opt-in per host.
+7
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,13 @@ http {
resolver 8.8.4.4 8.8.8.8;
# Backend for per-host SSO endpoints (/__proxy_auth, see proxy.conf). Point
# this at the nodejs app that serves the admin UI. Default assumes it is
# colocated on this box; change the address for a split deployment.
upstream proxy_auth_backend {
server 127.0.0.1:3000;
}
init_by_lua_block {
auto_ssl = (require "resty.auto-ssl").new()
+13
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@@ -12,6 +12,19 @@ server {
real_ip_header X-Real-IP;
real_ip_recursive on;
# Per-host SSO endpoints (#57), served on EVERY proxied host by the nodejs app.
# This location deliberately sits OUTSIDE the auth gate in `location /` (so the
# login flow itself is never gated) and forwards to the app, which runs the
# OIDC flow and sets the __proxy_sso session cookie for this host.
location /__proxy_auth/ {
proxy_pass http://proxy_auth_backend;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location / {
set $target '';