Reported: fallback SSL doesn't work in the Docker build. Reproduced —
it's worse than the fallback specifically: TLS was broken for nearly
every connection, including ones with no SNI at all:
$ curl -vk https://127.0.0.1/
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS alert, internal error (592)
* OpenSSL/3.0.13: error:0A000438:SSL routines::tlsv1 alert internal error
Root cause: targetinfo.lua's M.get() is shared by two call sites in
two incompatible nginx phases —
- proxy.conf's access_by_lua_block (a normal HTTP request phase,
where ngx.exit() is valid)
- nginx.conf's request_domain callback, which runs during the TLS
handshake itself (ssl_certificate_by_lua*), where ngx.exit() is
NOT a supported API
M.get() called ngx.exit() on every lookup failure (no domain/SNI, a
Redis error, or an unregistered host). When invoked from the SSL
phase, that aborted the handshake with a bare "internal error" alert
and produced no log output anywhere — silent and total, not limited
to the unregistered-domain case, since even a connection with no SNI
hits the same code path immediately.
Fix: M.get() no longer calls ngx.exit() itself — it returns
(nil, httpStatus) on failure. proxy.conf now checks the return value
and calls ngx.exit() itself (the phase where that's actually
supported). nginx.conf's request_domain guards the now-possibly-nil
result before indexing it, and leaves ngx.ctx.toAllow unset on
failure so allow_domain() correctly denies issuance and auto-ssl
falls through to the static fallback cert in autossl.conf.
Verified end to end against a running Docker build (deployed the
changed files into a live container and reloaded, rather than relying
on a full rebuild each iteration):
- No SNI at all: TLS now completes; HTTP layer correctly returns 406
(previously: broken handshake, no response at all)
- Unregistered SNI: same — TLS completes, 406, and openssl s_client
confirms the cert served is genuinely the fallback
(CN=sni-support-required-for-valid-ssl)
- A real registered Host: TLS completes and proxies through to the
backend correctly (confirms the success path is unaffected)
- npm test: 192/192 pass
permissions.ejs (6 columns), users.ejs (3 columns incl. an inline
password-change form), and profile.ejs's domain-permissions table had
no .table-responsive wrapper, so on narrow/mobile viewports they'd
either overflow the page horizontally or force zoomed-out, unreadable
text instead of scrolling within the table. hosts.ejs already had the
wrapper — these three didn't.
Verified: EJS compiles, npm test 192/192 pass, and fetched each route
from a running instance to confirm the wrapper is present in the
served HTML.
Two compounding bugs, both hit while adding a DuckDNS provider:
1. Domain.get() normalized every lookup via tldExtract before
checking Redis. model-redis' Table.create() stores the new record
under the literal key it's given, then calls this.get() internally
to return the created instance — so for any domain tldExtract
doesn't recognize as a shared/public suffix (e.g. a DuckDNS name
like "myhost.duckdns.org", which tldExtract naively normalizes to
"duckdns.org"), that final read-back always missed and create()
threw EntryNotFound, despite the record having just been written
successfully. In other words: no *.duckdns.org domain could ever
be created. Fixed by trying the exact string first and only
falling back to the tldExtract-normalized parent if no exact
record exists — preserving the original "look up an arbitrary
hostname, find the Domain that governs it" behavior for real
lookups, while fixing create()'s own read-back of what it just
wrote.
2. create() saves the DnsProvider row first, then calls
updateDomains() as a separate step. If updateDomains() throws —
e.g. a Domain collides with a stale/orphaned record left over from
an earlier failed attempt (exactly what bug 1 was silently
producing) — the already-saved provider row was never cleaned up,
leaving a broken, domain-less provider behind despite the API
returning an error. Fixed by wrapping updateDomains() in its own
try/catch and removing the provider on failure.
That fix has its own subtlety: `instance` (from super.create())
has its `domains` relation resolved by super.create()'s own
internal get() call, which runs BEFORE updateDomains() creates any
Domain rows — so instance.domains is permanently stale (always
empty), on both the success and failure paths. Removing `instance`
directly would delete the provider but silently leave behind
whatever domains updateDomains() did manage to create. Fixed by
re-fetching (this.get(instance.id)) before both the success return
and the failure-path remove(), so relations are current in both
cases — the returned/API-response instance and the rollback's
cascade-delete.
Manually verified against a live Redis (this project's test
philosophy explicitly excludes Redis-ORM-dependent tests from the
automated suite — see test/README.md "Philosophy"):
- A pre-existing orphaned Domain (simulating bug 1's fallout) now
produces an accurate "already exists" error instead of a confusing
EntryNotFound for the wrong (normalized) domain name, and the
failed create() leaves zero orphaned providers behind.
- A genuinely new *.duckdns.org domain now creates successfully,
correctly links to its provider, and is fully cascade-deleted when
the provider is removed.
- npm test: 192/192 pass.
Reported error when adding a DuckDNS provider with
subdomains="nl-theta42.duckdns.org" (the full name, as DuckDNS's own
site displays it):
{"name": "EntryNotFound", "message": "Domain:duckdns.org does not exists"}
listDomains() blindly appended ".duckdns.org" to whatever was entered,
turning "nl-theta42.duckdns.org" into
"nl-theta42.duckdns.org.duckdns.org". tld-extract doesn't know
duckdns.org is a shared suffix, so it parsed that malformed string
down to domain "duckdns.org" — surfacing as a confusing EntryNotFound
two layers away from the actual cause (Domain.create's internal
lookup).
Add __normalizeLabel() to strip a trailing ".duckdns.org" (and
lowercase) before use, so both "myhost" and "myhost.duckdns.org" work
identically. Also make __label()'s existing suffix-strip
case-insensitive to match.
Reported error when adding a DuckDNS provider:
TypeError: this.domains.map is not a function
at Proxy.updateDomains (models/dns_provider.js:185:37)
DnsProvider.__intraModel merges `{...DnsProvider._keyMap,
...Provider._keyMap}`, so a provider-defined field with the same name
as one of DnsProvider's own (created_by, updated_by, name,
dnsProvider, domains, id) silently overwrites it. DuckDNS defined a
`domains` field (the operator-supplied comma-separated subdomain
list), which replaced DnsProvider's `domains` relation (rel: 'many' to
Domain, populated by updateDomains()) — so `this.domains` stopped
being the array relation and became DuckDNS's raw string instead.
Rename the field to `subdomains` throughout (model, docs, tests). Add
a comment on __intraModel documenting the collision risk for future
providers, and a regression test asserting no registered provider's
_keyMap redefines one of DnsProvider's reserved field names.
The target ("ip") field validator required at least two dot-separated
labels, rejecting legitimate single-label hostnames like Docker Compose
service names ("sso-manager"), /etc/hosts entries, or anything resolved
via a search domain. This was enforced identically client-side
(public/lib/js/val.js) and server-side (utils/hostname_validate.js,
routes/host.js), so there was no way to set one through the UI or API
— only by writing to the Host model directly, bypassing validation
entirely (which is how theta-env's setup.sh registers sso-manager as a
target today, working only because it calls Host.create() directly).
Relax HOSTNAME in both places to accept either a bare single label or
the existing dotted-FQDN pattern. Flips the one existing test that
codified the old behavior (isValidHostname('localhost') was asserted
false) and adds coverage for the reported case.
Expands the README with a fuller feature description, a "why this over
the alternatives" comparison against Nginx Proxy Manager/Traefik/Caddy/etc,
and a three-tier quick start (unified theta-env stack, standalone Docker,
bare metal) instead of the single "Quick Install" section.
DuckDNS's API is smaller than the other providers' (no list/read API,
no arbitrary sub-records, one A/AAAA + one TXT record per domain), so
domains are entered by the operator instead of auto-discovered, and
getRecords reads from public DNS since there's nothing else to query.
Documented as a free option in the README and DNS provider docs.
Prepares the docs for the public release announcement: removes obsolete/dead
material, fixes drift between the API reference and the actual routes, and
standardizes on the default GitHub Pages URL.
- Remove Vagrant entirely: delete Vagrantfile, docs/dev_setup.md, and stale
vagrant references in .gitignore/.dockerignore; rewrite openresty/README.md
to describe the actual (currently unused) directory and point to
ops/nginx_conf/ for the real OpenResty config.
- Delete docs/Update 4.11.md (personal scratch changelog) and drop both its
and dev_setup.md's references from docs/README.md's Legacy Documentation
section.
- Remove checkmark emoji from docs/contributing.md's PR Requirements list.
- Bring the auth model docs up to date with the code: document
GET /api/auth/oidc/start + /callback, the /api/permission and /api/group
RBAC routers, the /api/dns/dynamic/* sub-API, and /api/api-token (self
-service PATs) in both nodejs/api.md and docs/api.md; add the missing
"Clear Host Cache" section; drop the invite-token/SSH-key endpoints that no
longer exist in nodejs/routes/user.js; note admin-only routes. Mention
OIDC/LDAP/RBAC as core features in README.md.
- Keep nodejs/api.md and docs/api.md fully in sync (same body, differing only
in Jekyll front matter / relative links) instead of letting them drift.
- Fix Node.js version references (20.x -> 22.x) in README.md and
docs/installation.md to match ops/install.sh and the Dockerfile.
- Note that the manual nginx-conf/systemd install steps in README.md and
docs/installation.md won't auto-track repo changes the way install.sh's
symlink approach does, and recommend install.sh.
- Update the stale test/unit file lists in docs/contributing.md and
nodejs/test/README.md to match the actual directory contents.
- Add npm run test:integration to README.md's Running Tests section.
- Add nodejs/conf/, nodejs/controller/, and nodejs/migrations/ to the project
structure diagrams in README.md, docs/architecture.md, and
docs/contributing.md.
- Standardize "CloudFlare" -> "Cloudflare" everywhere to match the actual API
value in nodejs/models/dns_provider.js.
- Add the missing app_auth__adminGroups row to DEPLOYMENT.md's app_* table.
- Delete docs/CNAME (custom domain) so GitHub Pages serves from the default
https://theta42.github.io/proxy/, matching docs/README.md.
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to #121: the repo line still used the live codename + "main", but
the openresty.org Debian tree only publishes up to bookworm (no trixie) and
uses the "openresty" component, not "main". Verified against the repo:
/package/debian/dists/ -> bookworm bullseye buster jessie stretch (no trixie)
bookworm Release -> Components: openresty
/package/ubuntu/dists/ -> noble jammy focal ... ; Components: main
So:
- Debian: distro = host codename when published (jessie..bookworm), else
bookworm (binary-compatible with trixie, same OpenSSL 3 era); component
"openresty".
- Ubuntu/Mint: distro = host codename; component "main" (unchanged).
Produces the working line on a trixie host:
deb [...] http://openresty.org/package/debian bookworm openresty
docs/installation.md manual steps updated to match.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two issues on Debian 13 (Trixie):
1. apt's sequoia GPG backend now rejects SHA-1 signatures, and the OpenResty
repo signing key is still SHA-1 — so `apt-get update` fails to verify the
repo. When /usr/share/apt/default-sequoia.config is present (Debian 13+),
install a back-end override that extends the SHA-1 acceptance window to
2028 (the OpenResty key is expected to rotate to a stronger algorithm;
revisit before then). No-op on older Debian/Ubuntu. Idempotent on re-run.
2. The repo path was hardcoded to /package/ubuntu with the host codename,
which worked on older Debian by coincidence. trixie lives under
/package/debian, so pick the tree by distro ID (debian -> /package/debian,
else -> /package/ubuntu).
docs/installation.md: mirror both changes in the manual install steps, with a
note that install.sh applies the sequoia override automatically.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- api_tokens.ejs: created_on/last_used_on come back from Redis as strings
(model-redis only coerces fields with an explicit `type`), so `new Date(ms)`
yielded "Invalid date". Use `moment(ms, "x")` (the hosts.ejs/dns.ejs
precedent) which parses a numeric string-or-number as a Unix-ms timestamp.
- api_tokens.ejs: `isExpired` is a class getter not serialized to the client
JSON, so the "expired" badge never showed — compute expiry in the view via
`Date.now() > Number(expires_at)`. Also guard the `last_used_on: 0` / falsy
case (string "0" is truthy) so unset timestamps render "—" not "1970".
- middleware/auth.js: authIO did `checkToken(socket.handshake.auth.token || 0)`,
so any socket connect without a token (login page, pre-login) did an
`AuthToken.get(0)` lookup and logged a noisy `EntryNotFound` trace. Guard:
reject the socket with a generic 401 when there's no token (behavior-
preserving — unauth sockets were already rejected; just no Redis lookup / 404).
- dns_provider.js: drop a stray `console.log('currentDomains:', ...)` debug
line in updateDomains() (unrelated, noticed while investigating).
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Personal access tokens so scripts/CI can call the management API without an
OIDC browser session. Each logged-in user mints their own token; it
authenticates as the creator (groups snapshotted at mint, mirroring the proxy's
browser AuthToken), and the existing authz layer (Permission.effectiveFor /
roles.resolveEffective) applies unchanged. Local groups and owned-domain rights
are recomputed live; only SSO/LDAP group membership is the mint-time snapshot.
- models/api_token.js: new ApiToken model (prx_<id>_<secret> format; id is the
lookup key, secret bcrypt-hashed + isPrivate, shown once). add()/rotate()/
authenticate(); optional expires_at; best-effort last_used_on; groups
snapshot. No _ttl (persists). Deliberately NOT wrapped in ModelPs (so the
last_used_on write on the auth path doesn't spam the socket).
- routes/api_token.js: self-service CRUD (list/get/update/delete/rotate),
owner-scoped (created_by === reqUsername(req), 403 otherwise).
- middleware/auth.js + models/auth.js: accept `Authorization: Bearer prx_...`
(precedence over the auth-token session header). Builds a synthetic req.token
that satisfies the only three req.token reads (auth.js .user/.groupsArray,
authz.js reqUsername .created_by) so the authz layer works unchanged.
checkApiToken collapses every failure to one generic 401 (no leak).
- views/api_tokens.ejs + routes/render.js (GET /api-tokens): self-service page
(forceLogin, no admin gate) — create (token shown once), rotate, revoke.
- views/top.ejs: "API Tokens" nav entry visible to all logged-in users.
- public/js/app.js: app.apiToken client module.
- DEPLOYMENT.md + docs/docker.md: API tokens section.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lossless upgrades + config story for the all-in-one proxy image.
Redis persistence (Part A):
- Replace in-memory `--save "" --appendonly no` with AOF + RDB persisted to
/data. Host records, permissions, DNS creds, local users, AND the
lua-resty-auto-ssl Let's Encrypt certs now all survive container recreation
(persisting Redis persists the cert store — no LE re-issue / rate-limit on
rebuild).
- Add the `proxy-data` named volume -> /data in docker-compose.yml; fix the
stale "in-memory, lost on recreation" comment.
Config from ./config/proxy-secrets.js (Part B):
- docker-entrypoint.sh: when /config/proxy-secrets.js is mounted, symlink it to
/app/conf/secrets.js so @simpleworkjs/conf reads the oidc/ldap/auth config
from the file. No app_* env should then be passed (app_* beats secrets.js).
Falls back to app_* env when the file is absent (standalone still works).
- docker-compose.yml: drop all app_oidc__* / app_ldap__* / app_auth__* env and
add `./config:/config:ro`. Keep RESOLVER/REAL_IP_FROM/NODE_ENV/NODE_PORT
(OpenResty-runtime / process env, not app_* config). No env_file.
- New secrets.js.example (the proxy had none): oidc (enabled, endpoints,
clientId/clientSecret, redirectUri, scopes, claims), ldap (url, bindDN,
bindPassword, searchBase, userFilter, tlsOptions), auth (adminGroups,
adminUsers, groupRoleMap), plus an orchestrator-only `stack` key.
Backup/restore docs:
- Full "Backups and restore" runbook in DEPLOYMENT.md (what lives where, manual
backup, Redis restore with the AOF-vs-RDB note — AOF wins on startup so the
AOF must be deleted before an RDB load; restoring Redis restores cert state
at snapshot time; migrations note). Update the Setup + Auto-SSL sections.
- docs/docker.md: update Quick start + How configuration works + Auto-SSL for
the new ./config/ approach (app_* env now advanced/optional).
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Document how to get logs when running the all-in-one image: docker compose
logs for app + OpenResty (stdout/stderr), and the nginx access/error logs
which go to /var/log/nginx on the proxy-logs volume (not docker logs).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- hostfeatures.lua: replace basic-auth-only enforcement with a combined
apply_auth() that allows if EITHER basic auth OR a valid SSO session passes.
A "Basic" Authorization header takes the basic path (401 on failure);
otherwise a browser is 302'd to /__proxy_auth/start. SSO sessions are read
straight from Redis (proxy_SsoSession_<sid>, sid from the __proxy_sso cookie,
character-restricted) and matched to the host.
- proxy.conf: add a /__proxy_auth/ location (outside the gate) that forwards to
the nodejs app so the OIDC flow can run and set the cookie on every host.
- nginx.conf: add the proxy_auth_backend upstream (defaults to 127.0.0.1:3000).
Needs live verification on an OpenResty box (no Lua/nginx runtime in CI here).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Default the "Parent Wildcard" challenge type when a wildcard parent exists.
- Split Authentication (basic auth + SSO) into its own tab; Access keeps IP
allow/deny.
- Add GET /api/host/auth-suggestions (authenticated host editors, not just
admins) and datalist-backed "type to search + Add" pickers for the SSO
allowed-users/groups lists.
Verified in a browser (tab present, datalist populated, picker appends deduped).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the dense always-open add panel + inline edit card with a single
Bootstrap modal (shared by Add and Edit) organized into tabs: General, TLS &
Wildcard, Traffic, Headers, Access (IP + basic auth + SSO). Adds per-field
explanations, a full-width proxy list, and an "Add host" button. Preserves all
field names/ids, the challenge-type detection JS, and formAJAX wiring; drops the
form-clone edit mechanism in favor of populating the one modal. Verified in a
browser (add + edit, tab navigation, field population).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both were dead/incomplete: POST /api/user/key called a nonexistent
User.addSSHkey, and the invite flow (POST /api/user/invite, User.invite,
User.addByInvite, InviteToken) had no consumer or UI. Drop the routes, the
InviteToken model, and the per-backing invite methods.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds opt-in basic auth per Host, following the existing per-host controls
pattern:
- Host fields basicauth_enabled / basicauth_realm / basicauth_users
({user: base64(sha1(pw))}). Credentials are parsed to plaintext by the pure
host_features normalizer and hashed at the route layer (utils/basicauth.js),
so plaintext never reaches Redis.
- ops/nginx_conf/hostfeatures.lua enforces it in access phase: verifies the
Authorization header against base64(sha1(password)), fails closed with a 401
WWW-Authenticate challenge.
- hosts.ejs gains an enable toggle, realm, and a username:password textarea
(passwords never echoed back; blank keeps the current set).
Unit tests cover hashing (matches the htpasswd {SHA} vector), credential
parsing, and normalization. Note: the Lua path needs verification on a live
OpenResty box.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause of "can't log in with new credentials": routes/user.js POST called
User.add, which doesn't exist on the redis User model (it has create) — so every
API-created account threw and was never persisted. Switch to User.create and make
the Add button a submit.
Replace the broken password rule (rejected strong "@123Caplowercase", accepted
weak "lowercase1") with a clear policy in utils/password_policy.js: >= 8 chars and
either 12+ chars or 3-of-4 character classes. Enforced server-side on create and
password changes, mirrored in public/lib/js/val.js, with unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The host scheduler already checked wildcard cert expiry; add the second half of
the scheduler controller — DnsProvider.refreshAllDomains() re-syncs every
provider's domain list (get -> updateDomains, per-provider errors isolated),
scheduled 30s after start and every 24h alongside the cert check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend (utils/hostname_validate.js, enforced in routes/host.js on create/update):
- host: IPv4 or a wildcard pattern whose labels may be normal, "*" (one
fragment) or "**" (any depth, incl. a bare "**" catch-all) — matching
Host.lookUp. Lowered Host.host min length to 1 so "**"/"*" pass the model.
- target (ip): IPv4 or a strict hostname, no wildcards.
- Both reject scheme, "/", ":" and whitespace; 422 with per-field keys.
Frontend (val.js) mirrors the rules: host/target validators + hosts.ejs fields
point at them. Unit tests in test/unit/hostname_validate.test.js.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Rename Grant -> Permission end-to-end (model, routes, view, frontend,
bootstrap) and add an idempotent redis migration for existing records.
- utils/roles.js: glob domain matching (* = one label, ** = any depth) against
the full host; authz passes the full hostname.
- Local groups: LocalGroup model + admin routes/UI; membership merged into
Permission.effectiveFor so app groups behave like SSO groups.
- Subject autocomplete via GET /api/permission/subjects (users + derived groups).
- User profile page (/profile) and username in the navbar; /api/user/me now
returns merged/local/external groups.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Host and Last-updated columns were blank because they relied on a jq-repeat
parseData hook that the rest of the app doesn't actually use for display (working
rows derive dates from the .momentFromNow class, not parseData).
- Derive fqdn server-side via DynamicRecord.toJSON so it flows through both the
REST list and websocket payloads; the template uses {{fqdn}} directly.
- Render last-updated with the .momentFromNow class (data-date) like the rest of
the app instead of a parseData-computed string.
- apply() now clears last_status on success so the UI only surfaces real errors.
- Redesign the section: prominent public-IP badge, cleaner add form, and a
Bootstrap list-group of records (fqdn, IP badge, "updated N ago", inline error)
with outline refresh/remove buttons.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
For deployments on WAN DHCP, operators can declare A records in the DNS section
that the app updates to this box's current public IP every 4 hours (and
immediately on create).
- utils/public_ip.js: getPublicIp() queries external echo services (ipify +
fallbacks, configurable) with pure isIPv4/extractIp helpers.
- utils/dns_records.js: pure planARecordUpdate() reconciliation decision.
- models/dns_provider.js: Domain.upsertARecord(name, ip) — provider-agnostic
upsert via getRecords + deleteRecordById + createRecord (createRecord alone is
not a reliable cross-provider upsert). Apex ('@') handling added to each
provider (CloudFlare uses the domain name, Porkbun an empty name, DigitalOcean
'@') via a new DnsApi.apexName().
- models/dynamic_record.js: DynamicRecord model (deterministic id per host,
apply()/refreshAll()), registered + ModelPs-wrapped for live UI updates.
- services/dynamic_dns.js + conf: 4h scheduler mirroring host_scheduler.
- routes/dns.js: /dynamic CRUD + /dynamic/ip, gated to domain managers/admins.
- views/dns.ejs: "Dynamic A Records (WAN IP)" card with add form + list.
- test/unit/dynamic_record.test.js: public-IP parsing + reconciliation logic.
Verified end-to-end against a live Porkbun domain (create, idempotent, IP-change,
cleanup) plus unit suite (111 pass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DigitalOcean.listDomains ran the API response through __parseRes, which does
not map anything to `.domain` and additionally rewrites each item's `.name` to
its subdomain via tld-extract. DO's /v2/domains returns objects keyed `name`
with no zone id, so the domain objects had no usable `.domain` and Domain.create
threw ObjectValidateError ("domain is not string type"), aborting the sync.
Map name -> domain the way CloudFlare.listDomains does and skip __parseRes (it
is for record responses). DO has no zone id; the earlier zoneId-omit fix covers
that. Also request per_page=200 so accounts with >20 domains aren't truncated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
updateDomains passed `zoneId: domain.zoneId` unconditionally. Providers with
no zone concept (Porkbun, DigitalOcean) return domains without a zoneId, so
this sent an explicit `undefined`, which model-redis' processKeys rejects
("zoneId is not string type") and aborts the whole sync with a 422. Cloudflare
was unaffected because its domains carry a real zoneId string.
DnsProvider.create's catch only re-threw UnauthorizedDnsApi and swallowed
everything else, returning undefined — so the route then crashed on
`item.id` with an opaque "Cannot read properties of undefined" instead of the
real validation error.
- Omit zoneId from the Domain payload when the provider doesn't supply one.
- Re-throw non-Unauthorized errors from create so failures surface properly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bump proxy_cache_valid from 10m to 48h and match proxy_cache_path
`inactive` (must be >= the TTL or entries evict before expiring).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every proxied request flows through one shared OpenResty location whose
behavior is chosen at request time from the host's Redis hash. Add per-host
controls as new Host fields enforced in Lua rather than static nginx config
(which can't key off a per-request variable):
- Rate limiting: per-client-IP token bucket via resty.limit.req
(ratelimit_enabled/rate/burst), backed by a new `ratelimit` shared dict.
- Response caching: opt-in per host via a global proxy_cache zone gated by
$skip_cache (respcache_enabled). Off by default; upstream Cache-Control
still honored.
- Custom/security headers: req_headers (upstream) + resp_headers (client) and
hsts_enabled, applied in access/header_filter phases.
- IP allow/deny CIDR lists via resty.ipmatcher (deny wins; non-empty allow is
default-deny).
New ops/nginx_conf/hostfeatures.lua holds the enforcement; proxy.conf's
access_by_lua string becomes a block that calls it, plus a header_filter block.
nodejs/utils/host_features.js is the pure, unit-tested normalize/validate layer
(header/CIDR parsing, range clamping, injection-safe values) applied in
routes/host.js and mirrored by the hosts.ejs edit form. install.sh gains the
ipmatcher rock, the cache dir, and the hostfeatures.lua symlink.
Per-host cache TTL is intentionally deferred (global default only) — see the
plan's limitations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly