Reported: fallback SSL doesn't work in the Docker build. Reproduced —
it's worse than the fallback specifically: TLS was broken for nearly
every connection, including ones with no SNI at all:
$ curl -vk https://127.0.0.1/
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS alert, internal error (592)
* OpenSSL/3.0.13: error:0A000438:SSL routines::tlsv1 alert internal error
Root cause: targetinfo.lua's M.get() is shared by two call sites in
two incompatible nginx phases —
- proxy.conf's access_by_lua_block (a normal HTTP request phase,
where ngx.exit() is valid)
- nginx.conf's request_domain callback, which runs during the TLS
handshake itself (ssl_certificate_by_lua*), where ngx.exit() is
NOT a supported API
M.get() called ngx.exit() on every lookup failure (no domain/SNI, a
Redis error, or an unregistered host). When invoked from the SSL
phase, that aborted the handshake with a bare "internal error" alert
and produced no log output anywhere — silent and total, not limited
to the unregistered-domain case, since even a connection with no SNI
hits the same code path immediately.
Fix: M.get() no longer calls ngx.exit() itself — it returns
(nil, httpStatus) on failure. proxy.conf now checks the return value
and calls ngx.exit() itself (the phase where that's actually
supported). nginx.conf's request_domain guards the now-possibly-nil
result before indexing it, and leaves ngx.ctx.toAllow unset on
failure so allow_domain() correctly denies issuance and auto-ssl
falls through to the static fallback cert in autossl.conf.
Verified end to end against a running Docker build (deployed the
changed files into a live container and reloaded, rather than relying
on a full rebuild each iteration):
- No SNI at all: TLS now completes; HTTP layer correctly returns 406
(previously: broken handshake, no response at all)
- Unregistered SNI: same — TLS completes, 406, and openssl s_client
confirms the cert served is genuinely the fallback
(CN=sni-support-required-for-valid-ssl)
- A real registered Host: TLS completes and proxies through to the
backend correctly (confirms the success path is unaffected)
- npm test: 192/192 pass
Follow-up to #121: the repo line still used the live codename + "main", but
the openresty.org Debian tree only publishes up to bookworm (no trixie) and
uses the "openresty" component, not "main". Verified against the repo:
/package/debian/dists/ -> bookworm bullseye buster jessie stretch (no trixie)
bookworm Release -> Components: openresty
/package/ubuntu/dists/ -> noble jammy focal ... ; Components: main
So:
- Debian: distro = host codename when published (jessie..bookworm), else
bookworm (binary-compatible with trixie, same OpenSSL 3 era); component
"openresty".
- Ubuntu/Mint: distro = host codename; component "main" (unchanged).
Produces the working line on a trixie host:
deb [...] http://openresty.org/package/debian bookworm openresty
docs/installation.md manual steps updated to match.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two issues on Debian 13 (Trixie):
1. apt's sequoia GPG backend now rejects SHA-1 signatures, and the OpenResty
repo signing key is still SHA-1 — so `apt-get update` fails to verify the
repo. When /usr/share/apt/default-sequoia.config is present (Debian 13+),
install a back-end override that extends the SHA-1 acceptance window to
2028 (the OpenResty key is expected to rotate to a stronger algorithm;
revisit before then). No-op on older Debian/Ubuntu. Idempotent on re-run.
2. The repo path was hardcoded to /package/ubuntu with the host codename,
which worked on older Debian by coincidence. trixie lives under
/package/debian, so pick the tree by distro ID (debian -> /package/debian,
else -> /package/ubuntu).
docs/installation.md: mirror both changes in the manual install steps, with a
note that install.sh applies the sequoia override automatically.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- hostfeatures.lua: replace basic-auth-only enforcement with a combined
apply_auth() that allows if EITHER basic auth OR a valid SSO session passes.
A "Basic" Authorization header takes the basic path (401 on failure);
otherwise a browser is 302'd to /__proxy_auth/start. SSO sessions are read
straight from Redis (proxy_SsoSession_<sid>, sid from the __proxy_sso cookie,
character-restricted) and matched to the host.
- proxy.conf: add a /__proxy_auth/ location (outside the gate) that forwards to
the nodejs app so the OIDC flow can run and set the cookie on every host.
- nginx.conf: add the proxy_auth_backend upstream (defaults to 127.0.0.1:3000).
Needs live verification on an OpenResty box (no Lua/nginx runtime in CI here).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds opt-in basic auth per Host, following the existing per-host controls
pattern:
- Host fields basicauth_enabled / basicauth_realm / basicauth_users
({user: base64(sha1(pw))}). Credentials are parsed to plaintext by the pure
host_features normalizer and hashed at the route layer (utils/basicauth.js),
so plaintext never reaches Redis.
- ops/nginx_conf/hostfeatures.lua enforces it in access phase: verifies the
Authorization header against base64(sha1(password)), fails closed with a 401
WWW-Authenticate challenge.
- hosts.ejs gains an enable toggle, realm, and a username:password textarea
(passwords never echoed back; blank keeps the current set).
Unit tests cover hashing (matches the htpasswd {SHA} vector), credential
parsing, and normalization. Note: the Lua path needs verification on a live
OpenResty box.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bump proxy_cache_valid from 10m to 48h and match proxy_cache_path
`inactive` (must be >= the TTL or entries evict before expiring).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every proxied request flows through one shared OpenResty location whose
behavior is chosen at request time from the host's Redis hash. Add per-host
controls as new Host fields enforced in Lua rather than static nginx config
(which can't key off a per-request variable):
- Rate limiting: per-client-IP token bucket via resty.limit.req
(ratelimit_enabled/rate/burst), backed by a new `ratelimit` shared dict.
- Response caching: opt-in per host via a global proxy_cache zone gated by
$skip_cache (respcache_enabled). Off by default; upstream Cache-Control
still honored.
- Custom/security headers: req_headers (upstream) + resp_headers (client) and
hsts_enabled, applied in access/header_filter phases.
- IP allow/deny CIDR lists via resty.ipmatcher (deny wins; non-empty allow is
default-deny).
New ops/nginx_conf/hostfeatures.lua holds the enforcement; proxy.conf's
access_by_lua string becomes a block that calls it, plus a header_filter block.
nodejs/utils/host_features.js is the pure, unit-tested normalize/validate layer
(header/CIDR parsing, range clamping, injection-safe values) applied in
routes/host.js and mirrored by the hosts.ejs edit form. install.sh gains the
ipmatcher rock, the cache dir, and the hostfeatures.lua symlink.
Per-host cache TTL is intentionally deferred (global default only) — see the
plan's limitations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The installer is meant to be run by CI/CD with no human writes on prod, so
updates should mirror the repo exactly rather than refuse on local drift:
- Replace `git pull --ff-only` with fetch + `checkout -B origin/$BRANCH` +
`reset --hard` + `clean -fd` so the box always matches origin/$BRANCH.
- Set GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 so a missing/expired credential fails fast in CI
instead of hanging on a prompt.
- npm ci --omit=dev (lockfile, production-only) with a plain-install fallback.
- Allow REPO_URL / REPO_DIR / BRANCH to be overridden from the environment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rework the installer so it doubles as an updater:
- Idempotent throughout: `install -d` for dirs, apt source lists rewritten
in place, `gpg --dearmor --yes`, fallback cert generated only if missing,
repo cloned or fast-forwarded, and `ln -sfn` symlinks.
- Config is now symlinked straight from the checked-out repo instead of
wget-ing raw files from GitHub. /etc/openresty/{nginx.conf,autossl.conf,
sites-enabled/000-proxy}, the targetinfo.lua lualib, and the systemd unit
all point at $REPO_DIR/ops, so an update is just `git pull` + reload with
no re-copying. This also drops the external t42-common raw-file
dependency (autossl.conf / proxy.conf now come from this repo).
- Validate `openresty -t` before reloading so a bad config can't take the
proxy down; reload if running else restart.
- Fix prior bugs: stray `curl sudo apt-get update`, duplicate openssl cert
line, and `cd ../nodejs` (now cd $REPO_DIR/nodejs). Require root; add a
BRANCH override (default master).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hosts that share one wildcard cert (e.g. hassio.718it.biz and
metrics.718it.biz under *.718it.biz) resolve to the same IP, so browsers
coalesce them onto a single HTTP/2 connection. The SSL request_domain
phase resolves the connection's first host and caches it in
ngx.ctx.targetInfo; the unguarded `if targetInfo then return targetInfo`
then handed that first host's target to every coalesced request on the
connection -- e.g. hassio.718it.biz served from metrics' 192.168.1.8:8088.
Confirmed via debug logging: for GET requests to hassio.718it.biz on a
coalesced connection, ngx.ctx already held metrics' IP and the function
short-circuited to it.
Guard the reuse by host: only return the cached target when
ngx.ctx.targetInfo_domain matches the requested domain, and record that
domain whenever a target is resolved. A coalesced request for a different
host now re-resolves against its actual Host header.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- host.remove() now deletes the cert under the host key instead of the
Domain relation object, so certs are actually removed from redis
- targetinfo.lua returns the redis connection to the pool via
set_keepalive instead of leaking one connection per request
- autossl.conf drops TLSv1/1.1 and 3DES, adds TLSv1.3
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly
noot
