The OIDC provider sends an unauthenticated authorize request through
/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…; dropping the query there
loses the whole authorization request. The ?redirect= form is unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
formAJAX always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a
DELETE-method form (the host/DNS delete buttons) landed its callback in
the data slot and never ran.
The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch
touched an element further down the same page, which threw when
isLoggedIn answered before the parser got there (it always did without a
stored token). It now runs on DOM ready.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
views/top.ejs, views/bottom.ejs and public/lib/js/app-base.js are now
byte-identical across sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host. Everything
per-app moved into utils/ui.js, exposed to every render as `ui` via
app.locals (nav items + their group gates, footer repo/docs/ToS links,
favicon, profile/logout targets, update-banner on/off + label).
Client framework changes:
- One gating model everywhere: app-base.js reveals .group-required-<cn>
for each of the current user user/me groups. sso-manager-node sends LDAP
DNs in memberOf, the OIDC clients send CNs in groups; both normalise to
CNs, and the clients isAdmin flag becomes a synthetic `admin` group, so
proxy nav-admin items are now group-required-admin.
- user/me is fetched once per page load and cached (app.auth.loadUser);
nav, forceLogin and group-required elements all read that one promise.
- isLoggedIn is dual-mode (Promise + node-style callback), so the async
and callback call styles both work from one shared top.ejs.
- forceLogin no longer uses $.holdReady (removed in jQuery 4): it redirects
to /login?redirect=<path>, and still enforces required groups.
- logOut only clears the session; the caller decides where to go next.
- post/put/delete are dual-mode Promise/callback, which also removes the
undefined `callback2` reference that threw on a non-function callback.
Dependencies: jquery ^4.0.0 and ejs ^3.1.10 in all three apps.
proxy specifics:
- .group-required base rule added to styles.css; the admin nav items lost
their inline display:none in favour of it.
- The brand link points at / instead of #.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The target ("ip") field validator required at least two dot-separated
labels, rejecting legitimate single-label hostnames like Docker Compose
service names ("sso-manager"), /etc/hosts entries, or anything resolved
via a search domain. This was enforced identically client-side
(public/lib/js/val.js) and server-side (utils/hostname_validate.js,
routes/host.js), so there was no way to set one through the UI or API
— only by writing to the Host model directly, bypassing validation
entirely (which is how theta-env's setup.sh registers sso-manager as a
target today, working only because it calls Host.create() directly).
Relax HOSTNAME in both places to accept either a bare single label or
the existing dotted-FQDN pattern. Flips the one existing test that
codified the old behavior (isValidHostname('localhost') was asserted
false) and adds coverage for the reported case.
Root cause of "can't log in with new credentials": routes/user.js POST called
User.add, which doesn't exist on the redis User model (it has create) — so every
API-created account threw and was never persisted. Switch to User.create and make
the Add button a submit.
Replace the broken password rule (rejected strong "@123Caplowercase", accepted
weak "lowercase1") with a clear policy in utils/password_policy.js: >= 8 chars and
either 12+ chars or 3-of-4 character classes. Enforced server-side on create and
password changes, mirrored in public/lib/js/val.js, with unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend (utils/hostname_validate.js, enforced in routes/host.js on create/update):
- host: IPv4 or a wildcard pattern whose labels may be normal, "*" (one
fragment) or "**" (any depth, incl. a bare "**" catch-all) — matching
Host.lookUp. Lowered Host.host min length to 1 so "**"/"*" pass the model.
- target (ip): IPv4 or a strict hostname, no wildcards.
- Both reject scheme, "/", ":" and whitespace; 422 with per-field keys.
Frontend (val.js) mirrors the rules: host/target validators + hosts.ejs fields
point at them. Unit tests in test/unit/hostname_validate.test.js.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Rename Grant -> Permission end-to-end (model, routes, view, frontend,
bootstrap) and add an idempotent redis migration for existing records.
- utils/roles.js: glob domain matching (* = one label, ** = any depth) against
the full host; authz passes the full hostname.
- Local groups: LocalGroup model + admin routes/UI; membership merged into
Permission.effectiveFor so app groups behave like SSO groups.
- Subject autocomplete via GET /api/permission/subjects (users + derived groups).
- User profile page (/profile) and username in the navbar; /api/user/me now
returns merged/local/external groups.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every proxied request flows through one shared OpenResty location whose
behavior is chosen at request time from the host's Redis hash. Add per-host
controls as new Host fields enforced in Lua rather than static nginx config
(which can't key off a per-request variable):
- Rate limiting: per-client-IP token bucket via resty.limit.req
(ratelimit_enabled/rate/burst), backed by a new `ratelimit` shared dict.
- Response caching: opt-in per host via a global proxy_cache zone gated by
$skip_cache (respcache_enabled). Off by default; upstream Cache-Control
still honored.
- Custom/security headers: req_headers (upstream) + resp_headers (client) and
hsts_enabled, applied in access/header_filter phases.
- IP allow/deny CIDR lists via resty.ipmatcher (deny wins; non-empty allow is
default-deny).
New ops/nginx_conf/hostfeatures.lua holds the enforcement; proxy.conf's
access_by_lua string becomes a block that calls it, plus a header_filter block.
nodejs/utils/host_features.js is the pure, unit-tested normalize/validate layer
(header/CIDR parsing, range clamping, injection-safe values) applied in
routes/host.js and mirrored by the hosts.ejs edit form. install.sh gains the
ipmatcher rock, the cache dir, and the hostfeatures.lua symlink.
Per-host cache TTL is intentionally deferred (global default only) — see the
plan's limitations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Open redirect / client-side XSS (app-base.js): the post-login `redirect`
read from the URL fragment was assigned straight to window.location. Add a
same-origin guard (safeInternalPath) that rejects absolute URLs,
protocol-relative "//host"/"/\\host", and scheme targets like
"javascript:". Apply it in consumeTokenFragment and logInRedirect.
- Server-side defense in depth: sanitize `redirect` when storing OidcState
and when building the callback fragment (utils/safe_redirect.js, shared +
unit-tested).
- Missing rate limiting: throttle the unauthenticated auth endpoints
(/login, /oidc/start, /oidc/callback) with express-rate-limit (60/IP/15m).
Set `trust proxy: 1` so req.ip reflects the real client behind OpenResty.
Adds test/unit/safe_redirect.test.js; unit suite 77 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
jQuery 4 removed $.isFunction and $.holdReady. Replace the isFunction
checks with typeof and drop the holdReady calls (the redirect already
guards the page). Mirrors the master hotfix (#108) so this branch is
testable on jQuery 4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Authentication previously implied full authorization: any valid token
could manage every host, DNS provider, domain, and user. This adds SSO
login and a per-domain rights model.
OIDC login (authorization_code + PKCE):
- conf.oidc + conf.auth blocks; clientSecret in (gitignored) secrets.js.
- utils/oidc.js (state/PKCE, code exchange, userinfo) using global fetch.
- models/oidc_state.js: short-lived state store, auto-expiring via
model-redis 1.5 per-key TTL.
- routes/auth.js: GET /auth/oidc/start + /auth/oidc/callback; JIT-provisions
a local user, mints an AuthToken carrying the SSO groups, hands the token to
the browser via a URL fragment. "Log in with SSO" button on the login page.
Authorization (groups + app overrides, per-domain, with ownership):
- models/grant.js + utils/roles.js (pure, unit-tested): effective rights from
conf.auth (admin users/groups, group->role map), Grant records
(user|group -> global|domain -> viewer|manager|admin), and ownership
(created_by). Roles rank admin > manager(owner) > viewer.
- AuthToken stores session groups; middleware/auth.js exposes req.groups.
- middleware/authz.js: requireAdmin, requireDomainRole(minRole, resolveDomain),
filterViewable. Applied across routes: host mutations need manager on the
host's domain; reads are filtered to visible domains; DNS providers, user
management, and grant management are global-admin-only; certs need viewer.
- routes/grant.js: admin CRUD for grants. Anti-lockout via conf.auth.adminUsers
plus migrations/grant_bootstrap.js.
Frontend: /me returns effective rights; nav gates Users/Grants to admins;
grants management page; OIDC token-fragment handling in app-base.js.
Tests: utils/roles and utils/oidc unit-tested (no redis); wired into the test
scripts. Full suite 89 pass. Also verified end-to-end against redis (grant
resolution, middleware allow/deny/403, list filtering) and the OIDC pure flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly