- api_tokens.ejs: created_on/last_used_on come back from Redis as strings
(model-redis only coerces fields with an explicit `type`), so `new Date(ms)`
yielded "Invalid date". Use `moment(ms, "x")` (the hosts.ejs/dns.ejs
precedent) which parses a numeric string-or-number as a Unix-ms timestamp.
- api_tokens.ejs: `isExpired` is a class getter not serialized to the client
JSON, so the "expired" badge never showed — compute expiry in the view via
`Date.now() > Number(expires_at)`. Also guard the `last_used_on: 0` / falsy
case (string "0" is truthy) so unset timestamps render "—" not "1970".
- middleware/auth.js: authIO did `checkToken(socket.handshake.auth.token || 0)`,
so any socket connect without a token (login page, pre-login) did an
`AuthToken.get(0)` lookup and logged a noisy `EntryNotFound` trace. Guard:
reject the socket with a generic 401 when there's no token (behavior-
preserving — unauth sockets were already rejected; just no Redis lookup / 404).
- dns_provider.js: drop a stray `console.log('currentDomains:', ...)` debug
line in updateDomains() (unrelated, noticed while investigating).
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Personal access tokens so scripts/CI can call the management API without an
OIDC browser session. Each logged-in user mints their own token; it
authenticates as the creator (groups snapshotted at mint, mirroring the proxy's
browser AuthToken), and the existing authz layer (Permission.effectiveFor /
roles.resolveEffective) applies unchanged. Local groups and owned-domain rights
are recomputed live; only SSO/LDAP group membership is the mint-time snapshot.
- models/api_token.js: new ApiToken model (prx_<id>_<secret> format; id is the
lookup key, secret bcrypt-hashed + isPrivate, shown once). add()/rotate()/
authenticate(); optional expires_at; best-effort last_used_on; groups
snapshot. No _ttl (persists). Deliberately NOT wrapped in ModelPs (so the
last_used_on write on the auth path doesn't spam the socket).
- routes/api_token.js: self-service CRUD (list/get/update/delete/rotate),
owner-scoped (created_by === reqUsername(req), 403 otherwise).
- middleware/auth.js + models/auth.js: accept `Authorization: Bearer prx_...`
(precedence over the auth-token session header). Builds a synthetic req.token
that satisfies the only three req.token reads (auth.js .user/.groupsArray,
authz.js reqUsername .created_by) so the authz layer works unchanged.
checkApiToken collapses every failure to one generic 401 (no leak).
- views/api_tokens.ejs + routes/render.js (GET /api-tokens): self-service page
(forceLogin, no admin gate) — create (token shown once), rotate, revoke.
- views/top.ejs: "API Tokens" nav entry visible to all logged-in users.
- public/js/app.js: app.apiToken client module.
- DEPLOYMENT.md + docs/docker.md: API tokens section.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Authentication previously implied full authorization: any valid token
could manage every host, DNS provider, domain, and user. This adds SSO
login and a per-domain rights model.
OIDC login (authorization_code + PKCE):
- conf.oidc + conf.auth blocks; clientSecret in (gitignored) secrets.js.
- utils/oidc.js (state/PKCE, code exchange, userinfo) using global fetch.
- models/oidc_state.js: short-lived state store, auto-expiring via
model-redis 1.5 per-key TTL.
- routes/auth.js: GET /auth/oidc/start + /auth/oidc/callback; JIT-provisions
a local user, mints an AuthToken carrying the SSO groups, hands the token to
the browser via a URL fragment. "Log in with SSO" button on the login page.
Authorization (groups + app overrides, per-domain, with ownership):
- models/grant.js + utils/roles.js (pure, unit-tested): effective rights from
conf.auth (admin users/groups, group->role map), Grant records
(user|group -> global|domain -> viewer|manager|admin), and ownership
(created_by). Roles rank admin > manager(owner) > viewer.
- AuthToken stores session groups; middleware/auth.js exposes req.groups.
- middleware/authz.js: requireAdmin, requireDomainRole(minRole, resolveDomain),
filterViewable. Applied across routes: host mutations need manager on the
host's domain; reads are filtered to visible domains; DNS providers, user
management, and grant management are global-admin-only; certs need viewer.
- routes/grant.js: admin CRUD for grants. Anti-lockout via conf.auth.adminUsers
plus migrations/grant_bootstrap.js.
Frontend: /me returns effective rights; nav gates Users/Grants to admins;
grants management page; OIDC token-fragment handling in app-base.js.
Tests: utils/roles and utils/oidc unit-tested (no redis); wired into the test
scripts. Full suite 89 pass. Also verified end-to-end against redis (grant
resolution, middleware allow/deny/403, list filtering) and the OIDC pure flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly
