- Add SSO-style error page (views/error.ejs) and render it for browser
navigation in the error handler (API still returns JSON).
- DNS page admin-only: forceLogin(['admin']) + nav groups ['admin'].
- Navbar: username not underlined; only the active nav link is bold+underlined.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- All pages now wrap their content in <div class="container mt-4">,
matching sso-manager-node's width instead of rendering full-bleed inside
the fluid shell.
- Users and Permissions pages converted from bare <table>s to the same
card-grid convention already used on the Groups page.
- Users backed by SSO/OIDC login (backing === 'oidc', set by the redis
user model's JIT-provisioning path) are now marked "External (SSO)" and
their password-change control is hidden; PUT /password/:username also
rejects with 403 server-side for such users. Deletion stays allowed.
Redis-backend only -- LDAP/PAM deployments have no per-record marker for
this today.
- app-base.js (byte-identical across the 3 apps): added
app.util.revealItem(), wired into the Users/Permissions create flows.
- Bumped @simpleworkjs/frontend to ^0.2.7.
Same fix as sso-manager-node: formAJAX's loading indicator passed a raw
<div class="spinner-border"> string to app.messages.action, which
HTML-escapes its message by design (@simpleworkjs/frontend) -- so every
form submit briefly showed the literal markup as text instead of a
spinner. Replaced with plain text ("Saving…").
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Same swap as sso-manager-node/jump-host: vendored app.util.actionMessage/
actionConfirm replaced by @simpleworkjs/frontend's app.messages.action/
confirm (real HTML-escaping, toast fallback); vendored val.js replaced by
the package's app.validate.js.
proxy's host/target/hostname validation rules (mirrored from the backend's
utils/hostname_validate.js — wildcard DNS patterns, not something other
apps need) move to public/js/app.js, registered via $.validateSettings,
since they're proxy-specific and don't belong in the shared package's
generic rule set (eq/user/password/ip).
app.api/app.auth/app.pubsub/app.socket in app-base.js are untouched, same
reasoning as sso-manager-node's PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The OIDC provider sends an unauthenticated authorize request through
/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…; dropping the query there
loses the whole authorization request. The ?redirect= form is unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
formAJAX always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a
DELETE-method form (the host/DNS delete buttons) landed its callback in
the data slot and never ran.
The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch
touched an element further down the same page, which threw when
isLoggedIn answered before the parser got there (it always did without a
stored token). It now runs on DOM ready.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
views/top.ejs, views/bottom.ejs and public/lib/js/app-base.js are now
byte-identical across sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host. Everything
per-app moved into utils/ui.js, exposed to every render as `ui` via
app.locals (nav items + their group gates, footer repo/docs/ToS links,
favicon, profile/logout targets, update-banner on/off + label).
Client framework changes:
- One gating model everywhere: app-base.js reveals .group-required-<cn>
for each of the current user user/me groups. sso-manager-node sends LDAP
DNs in memberOf, the OIDC clients send CNs in groups; both normalise to
CNs, and the clients isAdmin flag becomes a synthetic `admin` group, so
proxy nav-admin items are now group-required-admin.
- user/me is fetched once per page load and cached (app.auth.loadUser);
nav, forceLogin and group-required elements all read that one promise.
- isLoggedIn is dual-mode (Promise + node-style callback), so the async
and callback call styles both work from one shared top.ejs.
- forceLogin no longer uses $.holdReady (removed in jQuery 4): it redirects
to /login?redirect=<path>, and still enforces required groups.
- logOut only clears the session; the caller decides where to go next.
- post/put/delete are dual-mode Promise/callback, which also removes the
undefined `callback2` reference that threw on a non-function callback.
Dependencies: jquery ^4.0.0 and ejs ^3.1.10 in all three apps.
proxy specifics:
- .group-required base rule added to styles.css; the admin nav items lost
their inline display:none in favour of it.
- The brand link points at / instead of #.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix TLS handshake failure for any host without a cached target
Reported: fallback SSL doesn't work in the Docker build. Reproduced —
it's worse than the fallback specifically: TLS was broken for nearly
every connection, including ones with no SNI at all:
$ curl -vk https://127.0.0.1/
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS alert, internal error (592)
* OpenSSL/3.0.13: error:0A000438:SSL routines::tlsv1 alert internal error
Root cause: targetinfo.lua's M.get() is shared by two call sites in
two incompatible nginx phases —
- proxy.conf's access_by_lua_block (a normal HTTP request phase,
where ngx.exit() is valid)
- nginx.conf's request_domain callback, which runs during the TLS
handshake itself (ssl_certificate_by_lua*), where ngx.exit() is
NOT a supported API
M.get() called ngx.exit() on every lookup failure (no domain/SNI, a
Redis error, or an unregistered host). When invoked from the SSL
phase, that aborted the handshake with a bare "internal error" alert
and produced no log output anywhere — silent and total, not limited
to the unregistered-domain case, since even a connection with no SNI
hits the same code path immediately.
Fix: M.get() no longer calls ngx.exit() itself — it returns
(nil, httpStatus) on failure. proxy.conf now checks the return value
and calls ngx.exit() itself (the phase where that's actually
supported). nginx.conf's request_domain guards the now-possibly-nil
result before indexing it, and leaves ngx.ctx.toAllow unset on
failure so allow_domain() correctly denies issuance and auto-ssl
falls through to the static fallback cert in autossl.conf.
Verified end to end against a running Docker build (deployed the
changed files into a live container and reloaded, rather than relying
on a full rebuild each iteration):
- No SNI at all: TLS now completes; HTTP layer correctly returns 406
(previously: broken handshake, no response at all)
- Unregistered SNI: same — TLS completes, 406, and openssl s_client
confirms the cert served is genuinely the fallback
(CN=sni-support-required-for-valid-ssl)
- A real registered Host: TLS completes and proxies through to the
backend correctly (confirms the success path is unaffected)
- npm test: 192/192 pass
* Fix footer not sticking to the bottom on short pages
body had no sticky-footer layout at all (sso-manager-node already had
this; proxy never did), so on any page with little content (e.g.
/login) the footer sat right after the content instead of at the
bottom of the viewport, leaving a large gap below it.
Added the same flex-based pattern already used in sso-manager-node:
body is a column flex container, #spa-shell grows to fill the
remaining space, pushing the footer (the next sibling) to the bottom.
Verified visually (screenshot) and via computed layout
(footer.getBoundingClientRect().bottom === window.innerHeight) before
and after.
* Fix commit hash not showing in Docker builds
build_info.js computed buildHash via `git rev-parse --short HEAD` at
runtime, but the final image intentionally has no git binary and no
.git directory (kept lean, per .dockerignore) — so this always failed
silently and the footer's version line showed "unknown" for every
Docker deployment. Working correctly only for bare-metal/dev, where
git + .git are actually present.
Added a throwaway gitinfo build stage that reuses the main base image
(no extra pull) with git installed just for this stage, reads .git
from the build context (now no longer excluded — see .dockerignore),
and bakes the resolved short hash into a small file that IS copied
into the final image. build_info.js reads that file first, falling
back to the old git-rev-parse behavior (still needed for bare-metal).
Verified against a real build: `docker exec proxy cat
/app/.build_commit` matches `git rev-parse --short HEAD` on the host,
and the footer now shows the real hash instead of "unknown".
* Allow the local anti-lockout admin's initial password to be configured
The local "proxyadmin2" bootstrap account was always created with
username == password == "proxyadmin2" — a hardcoded, publicly-known
default with no way to set it to something else before first boot.
Fine for a quick local test, not for anything exposed publicly, and
orchestrators like theta-env's setup.sh (which already generates a
random password for the SSO admin) had no way to do the same here.
Added conf.auth.localAdminPass (proxy-secrets.js / app_auth__localAdminPass):
if set, it's used as the initial password instead of the hardcoded
default. Only read on first creation — once the account exists this
is never consulted again, so it's safe to leave set. Falls back to
the previous behavior (password == username) when unset, so this is
fully backward compatible.
Verified: with app_auth__localAdminPass set, login with the new
password succeeds and the old default ("proxyadmin2") is correctly
rejected. Confirmed in a real Docker build too (secrets.js
auth.localAdminPass), and npm test 192/192 pass.
* Support GIT_COMMIT build-arg override for submodule builds
The gitinfo stage from the previous commit works for a standalone
clone (.git is a real directory) but not when this repo is built as a
git submodule (e.g. from theta-env): a submodule's .git is a pointer
FILE, not a directory — the real object database lives in the
superproject's .git/modules/, outside this repo's own directory and
therefore outside Docker's build context entirely. `git rev-parse`
can never resolve it from in here no matter what, so builds via
theta-env still baked in "unknown" despite the earlier fix.
Add an optional GIT_COMMIT build-arg that, when set, wins over the
in-context git resolution. theta-env's setup.sh now computes it on the
host (where the submodule DOES resolve correctly) and passes it via
docker-compose.yml's build.args.
Verified via theta-env's actual setup.sh end to end: rebuilding with
this change, `docker exec proxy cat /app/.build_commit` now matches
`git -C proxy rev-parse --short HEAD` on the host (previously:
"unknown", confirmed via the "[Warning] One or more build-args
[GIT_COMMIT] were not consumed" message before this fix synced into
the docker-compose.yml side).
The target ("ip") field validator required at least two dot-separated
labels, rejecting legitimate single-label hostnames like Docker Compose
service names ("sso-manager"), /etc/hosts entries, or anything resolved
via a search domain. This was enforced identically client-side
(public/lib/js/val.js) and server-side (utils/hostname_validate.js,
routes/host.js), so there was no way to set one through the UI or API
— only by writing to the Host model directly, bypassing validation
entirely (which is how theta-env's setup.sh registers sso-manager as a
target today, working only because it calls Host.create() directly).
Relax HOSTNAME in both places to accept either a bare single label or
the existing dotted-FQDN pattern. Flips the one existing test that
codified the old behavior (isValidHostname('localhost') was asserted
false) and adds coverage for the reported case.
Personal access tokens so scripts/CI can call the management API without an
OIDC browser session. Each logged-in user mints their own token; it
authenticates as the creator (groups snapshotted at mint, mirroring the proxy's
browser AuthToken), and the existing authz layer (Permission.effectiveFor /
roles.resolveEffective) applies unchanged. Local groups and owned-domain rights
are recomputed live; only SSO/LDAP group membership is the mint-time snapshot.
- models/api_token.js: new ApiToken model (prx_<id>_<secret> format; id is the
lookup key, secret bcrypt-hashed + isPrivate, shown once). add()/rotate()/
authenticate(); optional expires_at; best-effort last_used_on; groups
snapshot. No _ttl (persists). Deliberately NOT wrapped in ModelPs (so the
last_used_on write on the auth path doesn't spam the socket).
- routes/api_token.js: self-service CRUD (list/get/update/delete/rotate),
owner-scoped (created_by === reqUsername(req), 403 otherwise).
- middleware/auth.js + models/auth.js: accept `Authorization: Bearer prx_...`
(precedence over the auth-token session header). Builds a synthetic req.token
that satisfies the only three req.token reads (auth.js .user/.groupsArray,
authz.js reqUsername .created_by) so the authz layer works unchanged.
checkApiToken collapses every failure to one generic 401 (no leak).
- views/api_tokens.ejs + routes/render.js (GET /api-tokens): self-service page
(forceLogin, no admin gate) — create (token shown once), rotate, revoke.
- views/top.ejs: "API Tokens" nav entry visible to all logged-in users.
- public/js/app.js: app.apiToken client module.
- DEPLOYMENT.md + docs/docker.md: API tokens section.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause of "can't log in with new credentials": routes/user.js POST called
User.add, which doesn't exist on the redis User model (it has create) — so every
API-created account threw and was never persisted. Switch to User.create and make
the Add button a submit.
Replace the broken password rule (rejected strong "@123Caplowercase", accepted
weak "lowercase1") with a clear policy in utils/password_policy.js: >= 8 chars and
either 12+ chars or 3-of-4 character classes. Enforced server-side on create and
password changes, mirrored in public/lib/js/val.js, with unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend (utils/hostname_validate.js, enforced in routes/host.js on create/update):
- host: IPv4 or a wildcard pattern whose labels may be normal, "*" (one
fragment) or "**" (any depth, incl. a bare "**" catch-all) — matching
Host.lookUp. Lowered Host.host min length to 1 so "**"/"*" pass the model.
- target (ip): IPv4 or a strict hostname, no wildcards.
- Both reject scheme, "/", ":" and whitespace; 422 with per-field keys.
Frontend (val.js) mirrors the rules: host/target validators + hosts.ejs fields
point at them. Unit tests in test/unit/hostname_validate.test.js.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Rename Grant -> Permission end-to-end (model, routes, view, frontend,
bootstrap) and add an idempotent redis migration for existing records.
- utils/roles.js: glob domain matching (* = one label, ** = any depth) against
the full host; authz passes the full hostname.
- Local groups: LocalGroup model + admin routes/UI; membership merged into
Permission.effectiveFor so app groups behave like SSO groups.
- Subject autocomplete via GET /api/permission/subjects (users + derived groups).
- User profile page (/profile) and username in the navbar; /api/user/me now
returns merged/local/external groups.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every proxied request flows through one shared OpenResty location whose
behavior is chosen at request time from the host's Redis hash. Add per-host
controls as new Host fields enforced in Lua rather than static nginx config
(which can't key off a per-request variable):
- Rate limiting: per-client-IP token bucket via resty.limit.req
(ratelimit_enabled/rate/burst), backed by a new `ratelimit` shared dict.
- Response caching: opt-in per host via a global proxy_cache zone gated by
$skip_cache (respcache_enabled). Off by default; upstream Cache-Control
still honored.
- Custom/security headers: req_headers (upstream) + resp_headers (client) and
hsts_enabled, applied in access/header_filter phases.
- IP allow/deny CIDR lists via resty.ipmatcher (deny wins; non-empty allow is
default-deny).
New ops/nginx_conf/hostfeatures.lua holds the enforcement; proxy.conf's
access_by_lua string becomes a block that calls it, plus a header_filter block.
nodejs/utils/host_features.js is the pure, unit-tested normalize/validate layer
(header/CIDR parsing, range clamping, injection-safe values) applied in
routes/host.js and mirrored by the hosts.ejs edit form. install.sh gains the
ipmatcher rock, the cache dir, and the hostfeatures.lua symlink.
Per-host cache TTL is intentionally deferred (global default only) — see the
plan's limitations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Open redirect / client-side XSS (app-base.js): the post-login `redirect`
read from the URL fragment was assigned straight to window.location. Add a
same-origin guard (safeInternalPath) that rejects absolute URLs,
protocol-relative "//host"/"/\\host", and scheme targets like
"javascript:". Apply it in consumeTokenFragment and logInRedirect.
- Server-side defense in depth: sanitize `redirect` when storing OidcState
and when building the callback fragment (utils/safe_redirect.js, shared +
unit-tested).
- Missing rate limiting: throttle the unauthenticated auth endpoints
(/login, /oidc/start, /oidc/callback) with express-rate-limit (60/IP/15m).
Set `trust proxy: 1` so req.ip reflects the real client behind OpenResty.
Adds test/unit/safe_redirect.test.js; unit suite 77 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
jQuery 4 removed $.isFunction and $.holdReady. Replace the isFunction
checks with typeof and drop the holdReady calls (the redirect already
guards the page). Mirrors the master hotfix (#108) so this branch is
testable on jQuery 4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Authentication previously implied full authorization: any valid token
could manage every host, DNS provider, domain, and user. This adds SSO
login and a per-domain rights model.
OIDC login (authorization_code + PKCE):
- conf.oidc + conf.auth blocks; clientSecret in (gitignored) secrets.js.
- utils/oidc.js (state/PKCE, code exchange, userinfo) using global fetch.
- models/oidc_state.js: short-lived state store, auto-expiring via
model-redis 1.5 per-key TTL.
- routes/auth.js: GET /auth/oidc/start + /auth/oidc/callback; JIT-provisions
a local user, mints an AuthToken carrying the SSO groups, hands the token to
the browser via a URL fragment. "Log in with SSO" button on the login page.
Authorization (groups + app overrides, per-domain, with ownership):
- models/grant.js + utils/roles.js (pure, unit-tested): effective rights from
conf.auth (admin users/groups, group->role map), Grant records
(user|group -> global|domain -> viewer|manager|admin), and ownership
(created_by). Roles rank admin > manager(owner) > viewer.
- AuthToken stores session groups; middleware/auth.js exposes req.groups.
- middleware/authz.js: requireAdmin, requireDomainRole(minRole, resolveDomain),
filterViewable. Applied across routes: host mutations need manager on the
host's domain; reads are filtered to visible domains; DNS providers, user
management, and grant management are global-admin-only; certs need viewer.
- routes/grant.js: admin CRUD for grants. Anti-lockout via conf.auth.adminUsers
plus migrations/grant_bootstrap.js.
Frontend: /me returns effective rights; nav gates Users/Grants to admins;
grants management page; OIDC token-fragment handling in app-base.js.
Tests: utils/roles and utils/oidc unit-tested (no redis); wired into the test
scripts. Full suite 89 pass. Also verified end-to-end against redis (grant
resolution, middleware allow/deny/403, list filtering) and the OIDC pure flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly
