The per-host "Allowed groups" field suggested only local groups,
permission subjects and conf.auth maps. None of those can ever match an
SSO-gated host: its allow-list is checked against the `groups` claim the
SSO issues (utils/host_sso.js), so only SSO groups are candidates.
Adds a conf.sso block (url + read-only apiToken, minted by theta-suite's
bootstrap) and a cached /api/group lookup merged into the suggestions.
Degrades silently to the previous local-only list when unset, and never
fails the request.
Authenticates with `Authorization: Bearer <token>` -- the SSO's
`auth-token` header is for browser session UUIDs and rejects a minted
API token.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- All pages now wrap their content in <div class="container mt-4">,
matching sso-manager-node's width instead of rendering full-bleed inside
the fluid shell.
- Users and Permissions pages converted from bare <table>s to the same
card-grid convention already used on the Groups page.
- Users backed by SSO/OIDC login (backing === 'oidc', set by the redis
user model's JIT-provisioning path) are now marked "External (SSO)" and
their password-change control is hidden; PUT /password/:username also
rejects with 403 server-side for such users. Deletion stays allowed.
Redis-backend only -- LDAP/PAM deployments have no per-record marker for
this today.
- app-base.js (byte-identical across the 3 apps): added
app.util.revealItem(), wired into the Users/Permissions create flows.
- Bumped @simpleworkjs/frontend to ^0.2.7.
Migrates proxy's hostModal (the modal this session's app.modal tabs/footer/
url support was originally modeled on) off its old always-in-DOM static
element and onto the shared app.modal component (@simpleworkjs/frontend
0.2.6), continuing the entity-modal standardization started with
sso-manager-node's resource modal.
Unlike the resource modal, this one already had 6 tabs and Host's audit
trail (created_by/created_on/updated_by/updated_on) already existed and was
already populated correctly by routes/host.js -- no model or route changes
needed there. The tab markup itself is kept as one hand-built bodyHtml
string rather than going through app.modal's own `tabs` array option: that
option builds the tab-content div itself, and there'd be no way to wrap a
<form> around just that piece without extending app.modal again, whereas
this modal's tabs already are exactly the pattern app.modal's own tabs
option was modeled on.
Key correctness points, found and handled:
- The one JS binding that was unsafe under DOM rebuild -- a `keyup` handler
driving the Let's-Encrypt challenge-type/wildcard visibility, previously
bound once directly against a captured selector -- is now delegated via
app.modal.on(), the same bug class already found and fixed in the
resource modal.
- hostLoadAuthSuggestions() (fills the SSO allow-list autocomplete
datalists) now re-runs on every modal open, not just once at page load,
since the datalists are rebuilt fresh (empty) each time.
- .actionMessage moved from a sibling of the old modal's <form> into a
descendant of it: formAJAX's error/success target resolution
(app.messages.action's closest('div.card') then a find('.actionMessage')
fallback) only succeeds via the fallback path once app.modal owns the
DOM, since app.modal's .modal-content carries no 'card' class.
- The footer's audit dates needed the explicit 'x' (unix ms) format token
for moment() -- Host's created_on/updated_on come back as redis-hash
strings, and moment's bare fallback parser silently produces "Invalid
date" for a numeric string without it (this app's own hostParseRow
already does this correctly elsewhere; the new footer code needed the
same treatment).
Also adds GET /hosts/:host (mirroring sso-manager-node's /directory/:slug)
plus a client-side deep-link check, threaded through a new onLoaded
callback on hostPopulate().
Verified live against the running dev stack: all 6 tabs render and save
correctly; the footer shows real created/updated-by/on dates; the SSO
autocomplete has options on a second modal open (not just the first);
the challenge-type keyup logic fires correctly on a second-ever modal
open (confirmed via the actual GET /api/host/wildcard-parent/... network
request); the address bar updates to /hosts/{host} and reverts on close;
a direct load of /hosts/{host} auto-opens the right host's modal; and a
real save (PUT) closes the modal and live-updates the row via the existing
pubsub subscription, end to end.
Same swap as sso-manager-node/jump-host: vendored app.util.actionMessage/
actionConfirm replaced by @simpleworkjs/frontend's app.messages.action/
confirm (real HTML-escaping, toast fallback); vendored val.js replaced by
the package's app.validate.js.
proxy's host/target/hostname validation rules (mirrored from the backend's
utils/hostname_validate.js — wildcard DNS patterns, not something other
apps need) move to public/js/app.js, registered via $.validateSettings,
since they're proxy-specific and don't belong in the shared package's
generic rule set (eq/user/password/ip).
app.api/app.auth/app.pubsub/app.socket in app-base.js are untouched, same
reasoning as sso-manager-node's PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rewire onto the shared @simpleworkjs/oidc-client, /ldap, and /app-stack
packages (deleting the byte-identical local forks of the same code), close the
LDAP filter-injection in User.get by routing the username through escapeFilter
(RFC 4515), align model-redis ^1.6.0 and ldapts ^8.1.8, and unify build_info to
{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}. package-lock regenerated from the npm
registry (no file:/link:), so npm ci is clean in docker builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Replace isomorphic-dompurify with xss to avoid ESM-only jsdom/htmlparser2
transitive deps that break the existing Jest test suite.
- Keep rendered docs HTML sanitized via xss() in routes/docs.js.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add isomorphic-dompurify to sanitize rendered docs HTML
- Tighten SocketServerJson socket permissions from 777 to 660
- Keep package.json version at 1.1.16
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New docs/concepts-{hosts,dns,access,api-tokens}.md -- plain-language
guides aimed at less technical readers, each linking onward to the
existing system-design-level doc for anyone who wants that detail.
Card help links (Proxy List, Add/Edit host, DNS Provider cards,
Users/Permissions/Groups cards) now point here instead of straight at
Installation/Architecture.
- The "New API Token" card had no help link at all -- added, pointing to
the new API Tokens doc.
- Fixed the in-app docs viewer rendering every docs/*.md page with a
garbled heading + stray <hr> at the top: Jekyll front matter (meant
only for the GitHub Pages build) was never stripped before being
handed to the markdown renderer.
- Fixed cross-doc links never resolving in-app, since this viewer serves
docs at /docs/<slug> with no .html suffix: rewritten to the correct
in-app URL, first by registered slug, falling back to the doc's real
filename (the correct, working link form on the Jekyll/GitHub Pages
build) -- same idea as the existing image-path fix, and lets one link
written in a doc work on both targets.
Bumps to v1.1.13.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KDEx8ghuZR61pqPXc6da9C
- The edit form's "Parent Wildcard" option stayed greyed out even when a
valid wildcard existed, since hostEditOpen() never ran the eligibility
check (only the host field's keyup handler did, which setting .val()
programmatically doesn't fire) -- and the check itself, GET
/host/lookup/:item, had the same self-match bug as the recently-fixed
Host.prototype.update() case: it resolves an already-existing host to
its own record instead of a sibling wildcard. Added a dedicated
/host/wildcard-parent/:item route combining lookUp() (handles a
brand-new subdomain) with lookUpWildcardParent() (handles an
already-existing host), and hostEditOpen() now actually runs it.
- Migrated ops/nginx_conf/autossl.conf's deprecated "listen ... http2"
directive to the standalone "http2 on;" directive (nginx 1.25.1+).
Bumps to v1.1.12.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KDEx8ghuZR61pqPXc6da9C
- A ? icon in the top-right header deep-links to the doc most relevant to
the current page (client-side path mapping, same pattern already used
for top-nav active-link highlighting -- no server-side "current section"
local exists to key off of instead). Falls back to the docs index.
- GET /docs/search does a plain line-substring search over the existing
allowlisted doc set. No new dependency, stays usable with no internet
access.
Bumps to v1.1.10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KDEx8ghuZR61pqPXc6da9C
<title>, the navbar brand text, and the logo were all hardcoded
"Proxy - Theta 42"/"Dynamic Proxy". New conf.name/conf.logo keys
(defaults matching current text/asset) thread through the existing
values object pattern in routes/render.js and routes/docs.js, and
top.ejs now renders <%- name %>/<%- logo %> for the title and a new
navbar logo image.
Footer (copyright, theta42.com link, GitHub/license links) and the
existing favicon.svg are left as-is -- open-source attribution and a
distinct, already-working icon asset, not deployment branding.
GitHub Releases already carried real changelog notes per tag, but
those require internet access to view -- exactly what the /docs
route exists to avoid. CHANGELOG.md is a committed, Keep-a-Changelog
style file (backfilled from the v1.1.0/v1.1.1/v1.1.2 release notes),
linked from README and served at /docs/changelog alongside the rest
of the project's docs.
GitHub Releases already carried real changelog notes per tag, but
those require internet access to view -- exactly what the /docs
route exists to avoid. CHANGELOG.md is a committed, Keep-a-Changelog
style file (backfilled from the v1.1.0/v1.1.1/v1.1.2 release notes),
linked from README and served at /docs/changelog alongside the rest
of the project's docs.
Public route reading from disk on every request with no throttling
-- add a per-IP limiter matching the routes/auth.js/routes/host.js
convention already used elsewhere in this repo.
Air-gap:
- DynamicRecord.refreshAll() called getPublicIp() (api.ipify.org,
icanhazip.com, ifconfig.me) every 4h on a timer regardless of
whether any dynamic records were configured -- the one background
call in the repo not actually gated by feature use. Now skips the
lookup entirely when there's nothing to refresh.
- Removed the stray, unauthenticated GET /test page (a leftover
jq-repeat demo) that loaded jQuery + Mustache from external CDNs.
- Removed a dead IE<9-only html5shim script tag pointing at a domain
that no longer resolves.
Docs:
- New GET /docs (index) and /docs/:slug routes render this project's
own README, DEPLOYMENT, api.md, and docs/*.md server-side via
marked (new dependency) -- so the documentation is readable from
the running app with no route to GitHub Pages, where it otherwise
only lives. Public, no auth, same tier as the health endpoint.
- .dockerignore/Dockerfile updated: docs/, DEPLOYMENT.md, and
nodejs/api.md were previously excluded from the image entirely
("served via GitHub Pages, not from the image") -- now copied in
alongside README.md/tos.md-style, since they're needed at runtime.
ops/backup.sh snapshots Redis (BGSAVE, dynamic RDB path lookup) and
./config for standalone deployments, with retention. A background
service polls GitHub releases every 24h and surfaces an admin-only
banner in the UI when a newer version is published.
CodeQL flagged POST/PUT/DELETE /api/host* as missing rate limiting despite
performing authorization -- same authLimiter pattern routes/auth.js already
uses, applied here with a higher ceiling since legitimate admin work (bulk
edits) is expected on these routes.
CodeQL also flagged utils/basicauth.js's SHA-1 hashing as reachable from the
new basicauth-user route -- this is the existing, documented htpasswd-
compatible {SHA} scheme (see the comment on hashPassword), not something
this PR changes; left as-is per that comment's existing "follow-up" note,
since swapping it requires a coordinated change to
ops/nginx_conf/hostfeatures.lua's verification and a migration path for
already-stored hashes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Auth tab is now a single choice (Off / Basic auth / SSO) instead of two
independent toggles that could both be on at once, which made it
ambiguous which gate actually protected a request. Enforced both in the
UI and server-side (POST/PUT), accounting for partial PUT updates against
the existing record.
- Add per-user basic-auth management (change password, delete) so an admin
no longer has to blow away and retype the whole user list to remove or
rotate one account.
- Fix: `Model.errors.ObjectValidateError(...)` is a constructor and was
being called without `new` everywhere in this codebase. Without `new`,
`this` inside it was the module's shared `errors` object (mutated in
place) and the call evaluated to `undefined` — so every
`throw Model.errors.ObjectValidateError(...)` actually threw `undefined`,
which Express's `next(undefined)` treats as "no error" and silently
falls through to the catch-all 404 handler. Every host/user/group/
permission/dns-provider validation error (bad hostname, bad IP, etc.) was
showing a confusing "Page not found" instead of the real message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Nav bar already showed the logged-in user's name linking to /profile
(cl-username); just removed the separate "Profile" and "API Tokens"
nav items now that Profile covers both.
- Merge api_tokens.ejs into profile.ejs as a section below the existing
profile card. /api-tokens 301-redirects to /profile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Personal access tokens so scripts/CI can call the management API without an
OIDC browser session. Each logged-in user mints their own token; it
authenticates as the creator (groups snapshotted at mint, mirroring the proxy's
browser AuthToken), and the existing authz layer (Permission.effectiveFor /
roles.resolveEffective) applies unchanged. Local groups and owned-domain rights
are recomputed live; only SSO/LDAP group membership is the mint-time snapshot.
- models/api_token.js: new ApiToken model (prx_<id>_<secret> format; id is the
lookup key, secret bcrypt-hashed + isPrivate, shown once). add()/rotate()/
authenticate(); optional expires_at; best-effort last_used_on; groups
snapshot. No _ttl (persists). Deliberately NOT wrapped in ModelPs (so the
last_used_on write on the auth path doesn't spam the socket).
- routes/api_token.js: self-service CRUD (list/get/update/delete/rotate),
owner-scoped (created_by === reqUsername(req), 403 otherwise).
- middleware/auth.js + models/auth.js: accept `Authorization: Bearer prx_...`
(precedence over the auth-token session header). Builds a synthetic req.token
that satisfies the only three req.token reads (auth.js .user/.groupsArray,
authz.js reqUsername .created_by) so the authz layer works unchanged.
checkApiToken collapses every failure to one generic 401 (no leak).
- views/api_tokens.ejs + routes/render.js (GET /api-tokens): self-service page
(forceLogin, no admin gate) — create (token shown once), rotate, revoke.
- views/top.ejs: "API Tokens" nav entry visible to all logged-in users.
- public/js/app.js: app.apiToken client module.
- DEPLOYMENT.md + docs/docker.md: API tokens section.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Default the "Parent Wildcard" challenge type when a wildcard parent exists.
- Split Authentication (basic auth + SSO) into its own tab; Access keeps IP
allow/deny.
- Add GET /api/host/auth-suggestions (authenticated host editors, not just
admins) and datalist-backed "type to search + Add" pickers for the SSO
allowed-users/groups lists.
Verified in a browser (tab present, datalist populated, picker appends deduped).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both were dead/incomplete: POST /api/user/key called a nonexistent
User.addSSHkey, and the invite flow (POST /api/user/invite, User.invite,
User.addByInvite, InviteToken) had no consumer or UI. Drop the routes, the
InviteToken model, and the per-backing invite methods.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds opt-in basic auth per Host, following the existing per-host controls
pattern:
- Host fields basicauth_enabled / basicauth_realm / basicauth_users
({user: base64(sha1(pw))}). Credentials are parsed to plaintext by the pure
host_features normalizer and hashed at the route layer (utils/basicauth.js),
so plaintext never reaches Redis.
- ops/nginx_conf/hostfeatures.lua enforces it in access phase: verifies the
Authorization header against base64(sha1(password)), fails closed with a 401
WWW-Authenticate challenge.
- hosts.ejs gains an enable toggle, realm, and a username:password textarea
(passwords never echoed back; blank keeps the current set).
Unit tests cover hashing (matches the htpasswd {SHA} vector), credential
parsing, and normalization. Note: the Lua path needs verification on a live
OpenResty box.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause of "can't log in with new credentials": routes/user.js POST called
User.add, which doesn't exist on the redis User model (it has create) — so every
API-created account threw and was never persisted. Switch to User.create and make
the Add button a submit.
Replace the broken password rule (rejected strong "@123Caplowercase", accepted
weak "lowercase1") with a clear policy in utils/password_policy.js: >= 8 chars and
either 12+ chars or 3-of-4 character classes. Enforced server-side on create and
password changes, mirrored in public/lib/js/val.js, with unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend (utils/hostname_validate.js, enforced in routes/host.js on create/update):
- host: IPv4 or a wildcard pattern whose labels may be normal, "*" (one
fragment) or "**" (any depth, incl. a bare "**" catch-all) — matching
Host.lookUp. Lowered Host.host min length to 1 so "**"/"*" pass the model.
- target (ip): IPv4 or a strict hostname, no wildcards.
- Both reject scheme, "/", ":" and whitespace; 422 with per-field keys.
Frontend (val.js) mirrors the rules: host/target validators + hosts.ejs fields
point at them. Unit tests in test/unit/hostname_validate.test.js.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Rename Grant -> Permission end-to-end (model, routes, view, frontend,
bootstrap) and add an idempotent redis migration for existing records.
- utils/roles.js: glob domain matching (* = one label, ** = any depth) against
the full host; authz passes the full hostname.
- Local groups: LocalGroup model + admin routes/UI; membership merged into
Permission.effectiveFor so app groups behave like SSO groups.
- Subject autocomplete via GET /api/permission/subjects (users + derived groups).
- User profile page (/profile) and username in the navbar; /api/user/me now
returns merged/local/external groups.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
For deployments on WAN DHCP, operators can declare A records in the DNS section
that the app updates to this box's current public IP every 4 hours (and
immediately on create).
- utils/public_ip.js: getPublicIp() queries external echo services (ipify +
fallbacks, configurable) with pure isIPv4/extractIp helpers.
- utils/dns_records.js: pure planARecordUpdate() reconciliation decision.
- models/dns_provider.js: Domain.upsertARecord(name, ip) — provider-agnostic
upsert via getRecords + deleteRecordById + createRecord (createRecord alone is
not a reliable cross-provider upsert). Apex ('@') handling added to each
provider (CloudFlare uses the domain name, Porkbun an empty name, DigitalOcean
'@') via a new DnsApi.apexName().
- models/dynamic_record.js: DynamicRecord model (deterministic id per host,
apply()/refreshAll()), registered + ModelPs-wrapped for live UI updates.
- services/dynamic_dns.js + conf: 4h scheduler mirroring host_scheduler.
- routes/dns.js: /dynamic CRUD + /dynamic/ip, gated to domain managers/admins.
- views/dns.ejs: "Dynamic A Records (WAN IP)" card with add form + list.
- test/unit/dynamic_record.test.js: public-IP parsing + reconciliation logic.
Verified end-to-end against a live Porkbun domain (create, idempotent, IP-change,
cleanup) plus unit suite (111 pass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every proxied request flows through one shared OpenResty location whose
behavior is chosen at request time from the host's Redis hash. Add per-host
controls as new Host fields enforced in Lua rather than static nginx config
(which can't key off a per-request variable):
- Rate limiting: per-client-IP token bucket via resty.limit.req
(ratelimit_enabled/rate/burst), backed by a new `ratelimit` shared dict.
- Response caching: opt-in per host via a global proxy_cache zone gated by
$skip_cache (respcache_enabled). Off by default; upstream Cache-Control
still honored.
- Custom/security headers: req_headers (upstream) + resp_headers (client) and
hsts_enabled, applied in access/header_filter phases.
- IP allow/deny CIDR lists via resty.ipmatcher (deny wins; non-empty allow is
default-deny).
New ops/nginx_conf/hostfeatures.lua holds the enforcement; proxy.conf's
access_by_lua string becomes a block that calls it, plus a header_filter block.
nodejs/utils/host_features.js is the pure, unit-tested normalize/validate layer
(header/CIDR parsing, range clamping, injection-safe values) applied in
routes/host.js and mirrored by the hosts.ejs edit form. install.sh gains the
ipmatcher rock, the cache dir, and the hostfeatures.lua symlink.
Per-host cache TTL is intentionally deferred (global default only) — see the
plan's limitations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Open redirect / client-side XSS (app-base.js): the post-login `redirect`
read from the URL fragment was assigned straight to window.location. Add a
same-origin guard (safeInternalPath) that rejects absolute URLs,
protocol-relative "//host"/"/\\host", and scheme targets like
"javascript:". Apply it in consumeTokenFragment and logInRedirect.
- Server-side defense in depth: sanitize `redirect` when storing OidcState
and when building the callback fragment (utils/safe_redirect.js, shared +
unit-tested).
- Missing rate limiting: throttle the unauthenticated auth endpoints
(/login, /oidc/start, /oidc/callback) with express-rate-limit (60/IP/15m).
Set `trust proxy: 1` so req.ip reflects the real client behind OpenResty.
Adds test/unit/safe_redirect.test.js; unit suite 77 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Authentication previously implied full authorization: any valid token
could manage every host, DNS provider, domain, and user. This adds SSO
login and a per-domain rights model.
OIDC login (authorization_code + PKCE):
- conf.oidc + conf.auth blocks; clientSecret in (gitignored) secrets.js.
- utils/oidc.js (state/PKCE, code exchange, userinfo) using global fetch.
- models/oidc_state.js: short-lived state store, auto-expiring via
model-redis 1.5 per-key TTL.
- routes/auth.js: GET /auth/oidc/start + /auth/oidc/callback; JIT-provisions
a local user, mints an AuthToken carrying the SSO groups, hands the token to
the browser via a URL fragment. "Log in with SSO" button on the login page.
Authorization (groups + app overrides, per-domain, with ownership):
- models/grant.js + utils/roles.js (pure, unit-tested): effective rights from
conf.auth (admin users/groups, group->role map), Grant records
(user|group -> global|domain -> viewer|manager|admin), and ownership
(created_by). Roles rank admin > manager(owner) > viewer.
- AuthToken stores session groups; middleware/auth.js exposes req.groups.
- middleware/authz.js: requireAdmin, requireDomainRole(minRole, resolveDomain),
filterViewable. Applied across routes: host mutations need manager on the
host's domain; reads are filtered to visible domains; DNS providers, user
management, and grant management are global-admin-only; certs need viewer.
- routes/grant.js: admin CRUD for grants. Anti-lockout via conf.auth.adminUsers
plus migrations/grant_bootstrap.js.
Frontend: /me returns effective rights; nav gates Users/Grants to admins;
grants management page; OIDC token-fragment handling in app-base.js.
Tests: utils/roles and utils/oidc unit-tested (no redis); wired into the test
scripts. Full suite 89 pass. Also verified end-to-end against redis (grant
resolution, middleware allow/deny/403, list filtering) and the OIDC pure flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly