Add LDAP-over-HTTPS API, agent secrets/IAM engines, and join key management

See CHANGELOG.md for the full breakdown. Summary:

- POST /api/v1/ldap/{bind,search}: LDAP-over-HTTPS so a client stops
  speaking raw LDAP and instead calls the SSO, which binds/searches its
  own OpenLDAP on the caller's behalf (DESIGN.md §3).
- LDAP byte-pump relay (utils/ldap_tunnel.js): forwards raw LDAP bytes
  from an agent's local socket into OpenLDAP over the existing agent WSS
  channel; the SSO never parses LDAP (DESIGN.md §4).
- POST /api/v1/agent/secrets: node-scoped OpenBao secret fetch for
  agents, enforced to each agent's own secret/data/nodes/<id>/* prefix
  (DESIGN.md §5).
- iam_apply signed command: push node-scoped IAM config (sudo rules, SSH
  keys, access control, revocation) to an agent (DESIGN.md §6).
- Agent capability badges on the Directory Metrics tab, sourced from the
  agent's own discovery frame.
- Join key management: GET /api/agent/join-keys/:id/agents (which hosts
  enrolled through a key) plus a Manage join keys table in the Install
  Agent modal with Revoke/Delete actions, confirmed inline per-row rather
  than a blocking native confirm() or the shared app.messages.confirm()
  banner (which desyncs across concurrent rows -- see CHANGELOG).
- docs/agents.md: capability matrix updated for the three new
  capabilities, a full secrets-engine walkthrough with screenshots
  (bash + Node consuming a rendered secret, plus the direct-API
  alternative), and the join-key reuse/UI/audit questions answered.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

nodejs/routes/api_agent.js

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ const middleware = require('../middleware/auth');
 const permission = require('../utils/permission');
 const agentManager = require('../utils/agent_manager');
 const agentKeys = require('../utils/agent_keys');
+const ldapTunnel = require('../utils/ldap_tunnel');
 const { Agent, AgentJoinKey } = require('../models/agent');
 
 const ADMIN_GROUPS = ['app_sso_admin', 'app_super_admin', 'app_sso_directory_admin'];
@@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ const ADMIN_GROUPS = ['app_sso_admin', 'app_super_admin', 'app_sso_directory_adm
 // Commands that can change or run code on the host. They are signed with the
 // SSO's persisted Ed25519 key and the agent verifies against the key pinned in
 // its agent.yml.
-const HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS = ['reboot', 'service_restart', 'configure_ldap', 'arbitrary_bash', 'update_binary'];
+const HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS = ['reboot', 'service_restart', 'configure_ldap', 'arbitrary_bash', 'update_binary', 'render_secrets', 'iam_apply'];
 
 // ── REST API (mounted synchronously in app.js, BEFORE the 404 catch-all) ──
 // This is a plain Express Router exported directly so app.js can
@@ -183,6 +184,23 @@ router.get('/join-keys', async (req, res, next) => {
   } catch (err) { next(err); }
 });
 
+// Which hosts enrolled through a given key. There is no stored relation --
+// join keys are exchanged for a per-agent token immediately, and from then on
+// the agent's own identity is what matters -- so this matches on the
+// human-readable trace `Agent.enroll` already leaves in `description`
+// ("Self-enrolled with join key <prefix>") rather than a foreign key. Prefixes
+// are 12 random hex chars, so a collision is not a practical concern.
+router.get('/join-keys/:id/agents', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const key = await AgentJoinKey.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!key) return res.status(404).json({ status: 'error', message: 'join key not found' });
+    const marker = `join key ${key.keyPrefix}`;
+    const agents = await Agent.list();
+    const matches = agents.filter(a => (a.description || '').includes(marker));
+    res.json({ status: 'ok', agents: matches.map(a => a.toPublic(agentManager.liveState(a.id))) });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
 router.post('/join-keys', async (req, res, next) => {
   try {
     const { label, expiresInDays } = req.body || {};
@@ -358,6 +376,11 @@ module.exports.initAgentWebSockets = function initAgentWebSockets(app) {
             await agentManager.handleResponse(current, payload);
             if (app.io) app.io.emit('agent.response', { agentId: current.id, payload });
             break;
+          case 'ldap_tunnel':
+            // Raw LDAP bytes from the agent's local socket → relay into OpenLDAP
+            // and pipe the response back (DESIGN.md §4).
+            ldapTunnel.handleTunnel(current.id, ws, payload);
+            break;
           default:
             console.log(`[Theta Agent] Received message type '${data.type}' from ${current.id}`);
         }
@@ -369,6 +392,7 @@ module.exports.initAgentWebSockets = function initAgentWebSockets(app) {
     ws.on('close', () => {
       console.log(`[Theta Agent] "${agent.name}" (${agent.id}) disconnected`);
       agentManager.unregisterAgent(agent.id, ws);
+      ldapTunnel.cleanup(agent.id);
     });
 
     // Send initial welcome/config payload. When this connection enrolled via a

nodejs/routes/api_agent_ops.js

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Agent-facing operations (DESIGN.md §5, §6). These are NOT admin-gated: the
+// caller is the agent itself, authenticated by its own token (the same one it
+// presents on its WSS channel). Mounted at /api/v1/agent.
+
+const express = require('express');
+const baoConf = require('@simpleworkjs/bao-conf');
+const { authenticateAgent } = require('../utils/agent_auth');
+
+const router = express.Router();
+
+// POST /secrets — fetch node-scoped OpenBao secrets for the agent's own node.
+//
+//   { paths: ["secret/data/nodes/<agent-id>/db"] }
+//   -> { status: "ok", secrets: { "secret/data/nodes/<agent-id>/db": { key: value } } }
+//
+// The agent may only read under its own node prefix (secret/data/nodes/<id>/*),
+// so a compromised agent cannot reach other nodes' or shared secrets. The SSO
+// fetches with its own OpenBao access (SSO_VAULT_TOKEN); the agent never holds a
+// Vault token.
+router.post('/secrets', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const agent = await authenticateAgent(req);
+		if (!agent) return res.status(401).json({ status: 'error', message: 'unauthorized' });
+
+		const { paths } = req.body || {};
+		if (!Array.isArray(paths) || paths.length === 0) {
+			return res.status(400).json({ status: 'error', message: 'paths (array) is required' });
+		}
+
+		const nodeScope = `secret/data/nodes/${agent.id}/`;
+		const secrets = {};
+		for (const p of paths) {
+			if (typeof p !== 'string' || !p.startsWith(nodeScope)) {
+				return res.status(403).json({ status: 'error', message: `path outside node scope: ${p}` });
+			}
+			const r = await baoConf.request('GET', p);
+			if (r.ok) {
+				const body = await r.json().catch(() => ({}));
+				secrets[p] = (body.data && body.data.data) || {};
+			} else {
+				// Missing secret: return an empty object for that path rather than
+				// failing the whole batch; the agent renders what it can.
+				secrets[p] = {};
+			}
+		}
+
+		return res.json({ status: 'ok', secrets });
+	} catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;

nodejs/routes/api_ldap.js

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// LDAP-over-HTTPS API (DESIGN.md §3).
+//
+// The whole point of this API is that a client stops speaking LDAP and instead
+// does an HTTPS call to the SSO, where the directory is reachable. That kills
+// the hostname / cross-network / LDAPS-cert-chain pain: no LDAP protocol, no
+// cert to trust, no firewall rule.
+//
+//   POST /api/v1/ldap/bind    {username, password} -> 200 {dn, uid} | 401
+//   POST /api/v1/ldap/search  {base_dn, scope, filter, attributes} -> 200 {entries}
+//
+// Caller auth: a Bearer token in the Authorization header. Two kinds of caller
+// are accepted, reusing existing credentials:
+//   - an agent token (the same one the agent presents on its WSS channel) — the
+//     caller is a node acting for SSSD;
+//   - a self-service API token (PAT, `sso_...`) — the caller is a user/app.
+// The API authorizes the *caller*; OpenLDAP enforces the actual directory ACLs.
+//
+// Security note on /search: it runs under the directory admin bind (withClient),
+// so it can read the whole tree. It is therefore restricted to agent callers
+// (the SSSD user/group-resolution use case) and must eventually move to a
+// scoped read-only service account rather than the admin bind. See DESIGN.md §9.
+
+const express = require('express');
+const { createLdapClient } = require('@simpleworkjs/ldap');
+const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf').ldap;
+const { Agent } = require('../models/agent');
+const { ApiToken } = require('../models/api_token');
+
+const router = express.Router();
+const ldap = createLdapClient(conf);
+
+// Resolve a Bearer token to a caller identity, or null. Tries the agent token
+// first, then a PAT. Every failure collapses to null so a probing caller learns
+// nothing about which credential was wrong.
+async function authenticateCaller(req) {
+  const auth = req.headers['authorization'] || '';
+  const m = /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i.exec(auth);
+  if (!m) return null;
+  const token = String(m[1]).trim();
+  if (!token) return null;
+
+  try {
+    const agent = await Agent.authenticate(token);
+    if (agent) return { kind: 'agent', id: agent.id, name: agent.name };
+  } catch (_) {}
+
+  try {
+    const pat = await ApiToken.authenticate(token);
+    if (pat) return { kind: 'user', id: pat.created_by };
+  } catch (_) {}
+
+  return null;
+}
+
+// POST /bind — authenticate a username/password against the directory.
+router.post('/bind', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const caller = await authenticateCaller(req);
+    if (!caller) return res.status(401).json({ status: 'error', message: 'unauthorized' });
+
+    const { username, password } = req.body || {};
+    if (!username || !password) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ status: 'error', message: 'username and password are required' });
+    }
+
+    // Resolve the username to a DN, then simple-bind as that DN. A missing user
+    // and a wrong password both surface as 401 (no user-existence oracle).
+    const user = await ldap.getUser(String(username));
+    if (!user) return res.status(401).json({ status: 'error', message: 'invalid credentials' });
+
+    const ok = await ldap.checkPassword(user.dn, String(password));
+    if (!ok) return res.status(401).json({ status: 'error', message: 'invalid credentials' });
+
+    return res.json({ status: 'ok', dn: user.dn, uid: user.uid });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// POST /search — run a directory search. Agent callers only (see header note).
+router.post('/search', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const caller = await authenticateCaller(req);
+    if (!caller) return res.status(401).json({ status: 'error', message: 'unauthorized' });
+    if (caller.kind !== 'agent') {
+      return res.status(403).json({ status: 'error', message: 'search is restricted to agents' });
+    }
+
+    const { base_dn, scope, filter, attributes } = req.body || {};
+    if (!filter) return res.status(400).json({ status: 'error', message: 'filter is required' });
+
+    const entries = await ldap.withClient(async (client) => {
+      const { searchEntries } = await client.search(base_dn || conf.userBase, {
+        scope: scope || 'sub',
+        filter: String(filter),
+        attributes: Array.isArray(attributes) && attributes.length ? attributes : undefined,
+      });
+      return searchEntries;
+    });
+
+    return res.json({ status: 'ok', entries });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;