It linked to fixed personal infrastructure (718it.biz, vm42.us,
git.theta42.com) with an admin's name in one label — not appropriate for
what should be a generic, publicly-releasable template. Flagged in
theta42/sso-manager-node#45, tracked as #46; resolves that issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
theta42/proxy fronts an arbitrary number of hosts behind SSO, each with its
own callback URL (https://<host>/__proxy_auth/callback) — proxy's own code
comment already assumed "a wildcard redirect URI covers all", but no
wildcard matching existed here, so every proxied host's callback had to be
registered on the shared OAuth client individually or /oauth/authorize
would reject it with InvalidRedirectURI.
Add `*` (one hostname label) / `**` (any number of labels) wildcard support
to redirect_uri matching, e.g. `https://**.example.com/__proxy_auth/callback`
now covers every host proxy fronts under example.com. Exact matches still
work exactly as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Replace the separate Profile/API Tokens nav items with a single link
showing the logged-in user's name, pointing at their own profile.
- Merge admin.ejs + notifications.ejs into a new dashboard.ejs page.
/admin and /notifications now 301-redirect to /dashboard.
- Fold the API Tokens page into profile.ejs as a self-service-only
section, gated on isOwnProfile so it never appears when an admin
views another user's profile via /users/:uid. /api-tokens 301s to /.
- Fix: the section must not carry class="row" — app-base.js runs a
page-wide $('div.row').fadeIn() on every page load that would reveal
it regardless of the isOwnProfile check, since it fires before this
page's own gating logic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Auditing mobile/responsive views turned up two classes of bug:
1. Missing .table-responsive wrapper (token.ejs and profile.ejs's other
table already had it): admin.ejs (2 tables), invites.ejs (6 columns),
notifications.ejs (5 columns), users.ejs (7 columns — the worst case).
Without it these overflow the page horizontally on narrow viewports
instead of scrolling within the table.
2. groups.ejs's search/sort/count toolbar was a plain `d-flex` (no
flex-wrap) containing a search input, a <select> with a hard
min-width:175px, and a nowrap count span — on a narrow viewport
there's nowhere for that content to go but off-screen. Added
flex-wrap and gave the search input a flex-basis so it wraps onto
its own line first when space is tight.
Verified: EJS compiles for all five templates, npm test 192/192 pass,
and fetched each route from a running instance to confirm the fixes
are present in the served HTML.
- api_tokens.ejs: created_on/last_used_on come back from Redis as strings
(model-redis only coerces fields with an explicit `type`), so `new Date(ms)`
yielded "Invalid date". Use `moment(ms, "x")` (the hosts.ejs/dns.ejs
precedent) which parses a numeric string-or-number as a Unix-ms timestamp.
- api_tokens.ejs: `isExpired` is a class getter not serialized to the client
JSON, so the "expired" badge never showed — compute expiry in the view via
`Date.now() > Number(expires_at)`. Also guard the `last_used_on: 0` / falsy
case (string "0" is truthy) so unset timestamps render "—" not "1970".
- middleware/auth.js: authIO did `checkToken(socket.handshake.auth.token || 0)`,
so any socket connect without a token (login page, pre-login) did an
`AuthToken.get(0)` lookup and logged a noisy `EntryNotFound` trace. Guard:
reject the socket with a generic 401 when there's no token (behavior-
preserving — unauth sockets were already rejected; just no Redis lookup / 404).
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Personal access tokens so scripts/CI can call the management API without a
browser session. Each logged-in user mints their own token; it authenticates as
the creator (carries their LDAP group permissions, re-resolved live), so the
existing permission.byGroup checks apply unchanged.
- models/api_token.js: new ApiToken model (sso_<id>_<secret> format; id is the
lookup key, secret bcrypt-hashed + isPrivate, shown once). add()/rotate()/
authenticate(); optional expires_at; best-effort last_used_on. No _ttl
(persists; lifetime via expires_at).
- routes/api_token.js: self-service CRUD (list/get/update/delete/rotate),
owner-scoped (created_by === req.user.uid, 403 otherwise).
- middleware/auth.js + models/auth.js: accept `Authorization: Bearer sso_...`
(precedence over the auth-token session header); checkApiToken collapses
every failure to one generic 401 (no existence/secret/expiry leak).
- views/api_tokens.ejs + routes/index.js (GET /api-tokens): self-service page
(forceLogin, no group gate) — create (token shown once), edit, rotate, revoke.
- views/top.ejs: "API Tokens" nav entry visible to all logged-in users.
- public/js/app.js: app.apiToken client module.
- DEPLOYMENT.md + docs/deployment.md: API tokens section.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly
