- OAuth Apps and LDAP Info are both "how do other apps/hosts plug into
this SSO" concerns -- merged into a single /integrations page with
tabs, replacing the two separate nav items with one. /oauth-clients
and /ldap-info 301-redirect there for compat.
- Add a Service Accounts section under the LDAP tab: bind-only LDAP
identities (organizationalRole + simpleSecurityObject, no
posixAccount) for apps/hosts, as opposed to real people. Create,
rotate password, and delete, all from the UI -- previously the only
such account (theta-env's bootstrap-created cn=ldapclient) was
invisible to the Users page entirely (filtered out by
conf.ldap.userFilter) and had no GUI way to see or rotate it; the new
ServiceAccount model uses the exact same objectClasses bootstrap.js
already creates cn=ldapclient with, so it recognizes and manages that
account too, not just ones created through this UI.
- The ldap-client bash snippet now points at "create one under Service
Accounts above" instead of a bare textual example.
Verified against a real LDAP server (not just the dev sandbox's usual
unreachable one): created a service account, confirmed it binds
successfully with the generated password, rotated its password, and
deleted it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The admin UI is a traditional multi-page app that loads ~13 separate
vendor/app JS+CSS files on every full navigation; none were compressed and
Cache-Control was max-age=0 (Express's default), forcing a revalidation
round-trip for every asset on every page view. Add gzip (compression
middleware) and sane Cache-Control (7d for vendor libs under
/static-modules, 1h for the app's own /static JS/CSS, which isn't
cache-busted). Matches the equivalent fix in theta42/proxy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Personal access tokens so scripts/CI can call the management API without a
browser session. Each logged-in user mints their own token; it authenticates as
the creator (carries their LDAP group permissions, re-resolved live), so the
existing permission.byGroup checks apply unchanged.
- models/api_token.js: new ApiToken model (sso_<id>_<secret> format; id is the
lookup key, secret bcrypt-hashed + isPrivate, shown once). add()/rotate()/
authenticate(); optional expires_at; best-effort last_used_on. No _ttl
(persists; lifetime via expires_at).
- routes/api_token.js: self-service CRUD (list/get/update/delete/rotate),
owner-scoped (created_by === req.user.uid, 403 otherwise).
- middleware/auth.js + models/auth.js: accept `Authorization: Bearer sso_...`
(precedence over the auth-token session header); checkApiToken collapses
every failure to one generic 401 (no existence/secret/expiry leak).
- views/api_tokens.ejs + routes/index.js (GET /api-tokens): self-service page
(forceLogin, no group gate) — create (token shown once), edit, rotate, revoke.
- views/top.ejs: "API Tokens" nav entry visible to all logged-in users.
- public/js/app.js: app.apiToken client module.
- DEPLOYMENT.md + docs/deployment.md: API tokens section.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly
