Reported: creating any user via the API failed with
{"name":"InvalidSyntaxError","message":"gidNumber: value #0 invalid per syntax Code: 0x15"}
Root cause: addPosixGroup() computes the next gidNumber as
`Math.max(...groups.map(i => i.gidNumber)) + 1`. theta-env's
bootstrap.js creates the first admin via raw ldapadd with a hardcoded
uidNumber/gidNumber (10000) directly on the user entry, but never
creates a matching posixGroup entry -- so on a theta-env-bootstrapped
directory there are zero posixGroup entries, `Math.max()` on an empty
array is `-Infinity` in JS (not 0), and `-Infinity + 1` stringifies to
"-Infinity" -- an invalid LDAP integer, rejected by the directory. This
broke every single user creation, not just this one.
Separately: the reporter's intended scheme is for organically-created
users to start at uidNumber/gidNumber 1500, distinct from the
bootstrap admin's reserved 10000. Fixing the crash with a bare "floor
of 1500" alone wouldn't achieve that, since addPosixAccount's own
Math.max() would still find the admin's posixAccount entry (uidNumber
10000, found via a different, correctly-indexed search) and allocate
10001 for the next user.
Added a shared nextPosixId(entries, key) helper: takes the highest
existing value strictly below conf.ldap.uidGidReservedFloor (default
9000) plus one, or conf.ldap.uidGidMin (default 1500) if there are no
such entries. Ids at/above the reserved floor -- like the bootstrap
admin's 10000 -- are ignored entirely when computing the next
available number, so real users always start at 1500 and grow upward
regardless of the admin's reserved id.
Verified against a real theta-env deployment end to end:
- Reproduced the exact reported crash on a fresh bootstrap
- After the fix: first real user gets uidNumber/gidNumber "1500",
second gets "1501" -- admin's 10000 never enters the calculation
- New unit tests (nodejs/tests/posix_id.test.js, no LDAP required):
6/6 pass, covering the empty-array case, the reserved-floor
exclusion, and the NaN-from-missing-value case
- npm test: 18/18 passing tests still pass (unchanged); the other 155
failures are pre-existing/environmental (no LDAP server in this
sandbox) -- confirmed via git stash before starting this fix
* README: rewrite with feature overview, comparison, and tiered quick start
Expands the README with a fuller feature description, a "why this over
the alternatives" comparison against Keycloak/Authentik/Authelia/Zitadel,
an architecture diagram, and a three-tier quick start (unified theta-env
stack, standalone Docker, bare metal) instead of the old OpenLDAP-setup-
first structure.
* docs/index.md: fix stale setup.env quickstart snippet (.env -> setup.env, CFG_DOMAIN)
Personal access tokens so scripts/CI can call the management API without a
browser session. Each logged-in user mints their own token; it authenticates as
the creator (carries their LDAP group permissions, re-resolved live), so the
existing permission.byGroup checks apply unchanged.
- models/api_token.js: new ApiToken model (sso_<id>_<secret> format; id is the
lookup key, secret bcrypt-hashed + isPrivate, shown once). add()/rotate()/
authenticate(); optional expires_at; best-effort last_used_on. No _ttl
(persists; lifetime via expires_at).
- routes/api_token.js: self-service CRUD (list/get/update/delete/rotate),
owner-scoped (created_by === req.user.uid, 403 otherwise).
- middleware/auth.js + models/auth.js: accept `Authorization: Bearer sso_...`
(precedence over the auth-token session header); checkApiToken collapses
every failure to one generic 401 (no existence/secret/expiry leak).
- views/api_tokens.ejs + routes/index.js (GET /api-tokens): self-service page
(forceLogin, no group gate) — create (token shown once), edit, rotate, revoke.
- views/top.ejs: "API Tokens" nav entry visible to all logged-in users.
- public/js/app.js: app.apiToken client module.
- DEPLOYMENT.md + docs/deployment.md: API tokens section.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lossless upgrades + config story for the all-in-one image.
Redis persistence (Part A):
- Replace in-memory `--save "" --appendonly no` with AOF + RDB persisted to /data
(--appendonly yes, periodic saves, --dbfilename dump.rdb). OAuth clients,
tokens, and other model-redis state now survive container recreation.
- Add the `sso-data` named volume -> /data in docker-compose.yml.
Config from ./config/sso-secrets.js (Part B):
- docker-entrypoint.sh: when /config/sso-secrets.js is mounted, symlink it to
/app/conf/secrets.js and read the server-side LDAP vars (base DN, admin pass,
org, domain, cert CN, JWT) from the file via one `node` call (base64-decoded,
no eval/quoting hazards). No app_* env is exported in this mode, so the file
is authoritative (@simpleworkjs/conf precedence: base < env < secrets.js <
app_* env). Falls back to the existing LDAP_* env-var mode when the file is
absent (standalone/bare-metal still works).
- docker-compose.yml: trim `environment:` to NODE_ENV/NODE_PORT only and add
`./config:/config:ro`. Removing the app_* env is required — any leftover
app_* would silently override secrets.js.
- secrets.js.example: add orchestrator-only `stack`, `bootstrap`, and
`serviceAccountPass` keys (ignored by the app; read by the entrypoint, the
theta-env bootstrap, and setup.sh).
Backup/restore docs:
- Full "Backups and restore" runbook in DEPLOYMENT.md (what lives where,
manual backup, full / Redis-only / LDAP-only restore, AOF-vs-RDB note,
upgrades). Restore uses slapadd -f (static slapd.conf), and RDB restore
requires deleting the AOF first (AOF wins on startup).
- Pointers in docs/deployment.md and docs/ldap.md; update the Docker Setup
section for the new ./config/ approach (env vars now advanced/optional).
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Document how to get logs when running the all-in-one image: docker compose
logs for the app + slapd (both stdout/stderr, slapd runs -d 0), plus a direct
ldapsearch health check. Added to README.md, DEPLOYMENT.md (Method 1), and the
GitHub Pages docs/deployment.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly