The Integrations page's Service Accounts (bind-only, organizationalRole)
don't cover the other real use case: an account something actually runs
as on a Linux host -- a media manager, a torrent client, Emby -- with a
real uidNumber/gidNumber that owns files, and a group other accounts
join for write access (e.g. a `stuff_manager` group granting write
rights to a media library). That needs a real posixAccount, which the
bind-only model can't be.
- New well-known group `app_sso_service_account`, seeded the same way as
app_sso_admin/app_sso_invite/app_sso_oauth_admin (docker-entrypoint.sh,
ops/ldap-setup.sh). Not a permission gate -- a marker.
- "Add new user" form gets a "This is a service account" checkbox: swaps
the person-shaped fields (first/last name, birthday, ToS agreement)
for a single account-name field, since none of those make sense for a
non-person account. On create, the route adds the user to
app_sso_service_account.
- User.listDetail() annotates each user with isServiceAccount (checked
against the marker group's member list once per call, not the memberof
overlay's reverse attribute -- not reliably returned by every LDAP
server this app might point at, confirmed against a real external
directory during testing). Users page shows a "service" badge.
- Notification broadcasts (filter_type=all/all_active) exclude service
accounts by default -- nobody reads mail as `stuff_manager`.
- Fixed a real, previously-unrelated bug this surfaced: addPosixAccount
unconditionally set `mail: data.mail` in the LDAP entry even when
undefined, and ldapts/slapd reject an attribute given an explicit
undefined value ("no values for attribute type") rather than treating
it as absent. This meant creating ANY user without an email already
failed outright -- not something a service account (which commonly has
no real mailbox) could route around. Made mail conditional, matching
how mobile/sshPublicKey/dob already work.
- docs/ldap.md now explains both kinds of service account side by side
and when to use which.
Verified end-to-end against a real external LDAP server (not a local
sandbox): created a service account with no email, confirmed it's
correctly flagged and excluded from broadcast recipient resolution,
confirmed a normal user is unaffected, confirmed the code degrades
gracefully if the marker group doesn't exist yet (pre-upgrade
deployments).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
It's mapped to the host by default for LAN/VPN direct-LDAP clients
(ldap-client hosts, apps with their own LDAP auth settings), not for
exposure through a router/firewall -- LDAP simple-bind has no rate
limiting the way the HTTP login endpoints do. Recommend a VPN for
remote direct-LDAP clients instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reported: creating any user via the API failed with
{"name":"InvalidSyntaxError","message":"gidNumber: value #0 invalid per syntax Code: 0x15"}
Root cause: addPosixGroup() computes the next gidNumber as
`Math.max(...groups.map(i => i.gidNumber)) + 1`. theta-env's
bootstrap.js creates the first admin via raw ldapadd with a hardcoded
uidNumber/gidNumber (10000) directly on the user entry, but never
creates a matching posixGroup entry -- so on a theta-env-bootstrapped
directory there are zero posixGroup entries, `Math.max()` on an empty
array is `-Infinity` in JS (not 0), and `-Infinity + 1` stringifies to
"-Infinity" -- an invalid LDAP integer, rejected by the directory. This
broke every single user creation, not just this one.
Separately: the reporter's intended scheme is for organically-created
users to start at uidNumber/gidNumber 1500, distinct from the
bootstrap admin's reserved 10000. Fixing the crash with a bare "floor
of 1500" alone wouldn't achieve that, since addPosixAccount's own
Math.max() would still find the admin's posixAccount entry (uidNumber
10000, found via a different, correctly-indexed search) and allocate
10001 for the next user.
Added a shared nextPosixId(entries, key) helper: takes the highest
existing value strictly below conf.ldap.uidGidReservedFloor (default
9000) plus one, or conf.ldap.uidGidMin (default 1500) if there are no
such entries. Ids at/above the reserved floor -- like the bootstrap
admin's 10000 -- are ignored entirely when computing the next
available number, so real users always start at 1500 and grow upward
regardless of the admin's reserved id.
Verified against a real theta-env deployment end to end:
- Reproduced the exact reported crash on a fresh bootstrap
- After the fix: first real user gets uidNumber/gidNumber "1500",
second gets "1501" -- admin's 10000 never enters the calculation
- New unit tests (nodejs/tests/posix_id.test.js, no LDAP required):
6/6 pass, covering the empty-array case, the reserved-floor
exclusion, and the NaN-from-missing-value case
- npm test: 18/18 passing tests still pass (unchanged); the other 155
failures are pre-existing/environmental (no LDAP server in this
sandbox) -- confirmed via git stash before starting this fix
* docs: cleanup for public release (fix stale/wrong API docs, LICENSE, versions)
Documentation cleanup ahead of the public release announcement. Fixes a set
of confirmed issues from a prior audit:
- LICENSE: fill in MIT template placeholders (theta42, 2026).
- README.md: fix broken API docs link (api.md -> API.md), correct required
Node.js version (13.x -> 20.x), add the missing app_sso_invite group to
the LDAP groups table, scrub hardcoded dc=theta42,dc=com to the generic
dc=example,dc=com used elsewhere, add a "Recommended: Docker or
install.sh" section pointing to DEPLOYMENT.md/docs before the manual
OpenLDAP walkthrough, and drop an emoji from a warning callout.
- nodejs/api.md: deleted — it was a stale/legacy doc with wrong routes,
wrong request bodies, and endpoints that are dead/commented-out code.
The root API.md is the accurate, current reference; README now links
there directly.
- API.md: add the missing app_sso_invite permission group, fix the
documented invite response to match the real {token, link, mail_sent}
payload, document the previously-undocumented GET/PUT/DELETE
/api/user/invite endpoints, add the real allowed_groups field to the
OAuth client management examples, and document POST /api/oauth/authorize
(the endpoint that actually issues the code after consent).
- nodejs/routes/auth.js + API.md: fix "emaill address" typo in the
password-reset response message (source and docs kept in sync).
- DEPLOYMENT.md: fix the top-level summary to mention Redis, matching
docs/deployment.md and the entrypoint behavior it already documents.
Flagged, not changed: tos.md reads like a personal home-lab acceptable-use
policy (Emby/Gitea/Proxmox/Discord/Signal, first-person "the admin") rather
than generic OSS docs. Left in place pending a manual decision to
genericize, relocate, or remove it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: genericize tos.md template, track runtime-editable terms in #39
Removes operator-specific references (Emby, Gitea, Proxmox, Discord,
Signal, first-person "the admin") so the shipped tos.md reads as a
neutral starting template rather than one operator's internal policy.
Actual runtime editability (admin/legal editing terms without a code
change) is tracked in issue #39, not implemented here.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The base DN (stack.ldapBaseDn) is the single place the domain is set; the
LDAP DNs (bindDN/userBase/groupBase) and oauth.issuer all derive from it and
must stay consistent. Drifting them apart (leaving bindDN at dc=example,dc=com
while ldapBaseDn is the real domain) makes the SSO bind against a non-existent
root DN and every login fails with Invalid Credentials.
- secrets.js.example: clarifying comment at ldapBaseDn
- DEPLOYMENT.md: "domain entered once as the base DN" note + theta-env
setup.env cross-link (merged the two duplicate theta-env blockquotes)
- README.md: cross-link to DEPLOYMENT.md from "Server set up"
Docs only; no app/secrets-structure change.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Personal access tokens so scripts/CI can call the management API without a
browser session. Each logged-in user mints their own token; it authenticates as
the creator (carries their LDAP group permissions, re-resolved live), so the
existing permission.byGroup checks apply unchanged.
- models/api_token.js: new ApiToken model (sso_<id>_<secret> format; id is the
lookup key, secret bcrypt-hashed + isPrivate, shown once). add()/rotate()/
authenticate(); optional expires_at; best-effort last_used_on. No _ttl
(persists; lifetime via expires_at).
- routes/api_token.js: self-service CRUD (list/get/update/delete/rotate),
owner-scoped (created_by === req.user.uid, 403 otherwise).
- middleware/auth.js + models/auth.js: accept `Authorization: Bearer sso_...`
(precedence over the auth-token session header); checkApiToken collapses
every failure to one generic 401 (no existence/secret/expiry leak).
- views/api_tokens.ejs + routes/index.js (GET /api-tokens): self-service page
(forceLogin, no group gate) — create (token shown once), edit, rotate, revoke.
- views/top.ejs: "API Tokens" nav entry visible to all logged-in users.
- public/js/app.js: app.apiToken client module.
- DEPLOYMENT.md + docs/deployment.md: API tokens section.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lossless upgrades + config story for the all-in-one image.
Redis persistence (Part A):
- Replace in-memory `--save "" --appendonly no` with AOF + RDB persisted to /data
(--appendonly yes, periodic saves, --dbfilename dump.rdb). OAuth clients,
tokens, and other model-redis state now survive container recreation.
- Add the `sso-data` named volume -> /data in docker-compose.yml.
Config from ./config/sso-secrets.js (Part B):
- docker-entrypoint.sh: when /config/sso-secrets.js is mounted, symlink it to
/app/conf/secrets.js and read the server-side LDAP vars (base DN, admin pass,
org, domain, cert CN, JWT) from the file via one `node` call (base64-decoded,
no eval/quoting hazards). No app_* env is exported in this mode, so the file
is authoritative (@simpleworkjs/conf precedence: base < env < secrets.js <
app_* env). Falls back to the existing LDAP_* env-var mode when the file is
absent (standalone/bare-metal still works).
- docker-compose.yml: trim `environment:` to NODE_ENV/NODE_PORT only and add
`./config:/config:ro`. Removing the app_* env is required — any leftover
app_* would silently override secrets.js.
- secrets.js.example: add orchestrator-only `stack`, `bootstrap`, and
`serviceAccountPass` keys (ignored by the app; read by the entrypoint, the
theta-env bootstrap, and setup.sh).
Backup/restore docs:
- Full "Backups and restore" runbook in DEPLOYMENT.md (what lives where,
manual backup, full / Redis-only / LDAP-only restore, AOF-vs-RDB note,
upgrades). Restore uses slapadd -f (static slapd.conf), and RDB restore
requires deleting the AOF first (AOF wins on startup).
- Pointers in docs/deployment.md and docs/ldap.md; update the Docker Setup
section for the new ./config/ approach (env vars now advanced/optional).
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Document how to get logs when running the all-in-one image: docker compose
logs for the app + slapd (both stdout/stderr, slapd runs -d 0), plus a direct
ldapsearch health check. Added to README.md, DEPLOYMENT.md (Method 1), and the
GitHub Pages docs/deployment.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly