- /api/vault proxy now injects X-Vault-Token: the proxy declared its request
hook with http-proxy-middleware v3 syntax (on: { proxyReq }), which the
installed HPM v2 silently ignores — so every vault call reached OpenBao
unauthenticated (the recurring 403). Rewritten as v2 onProxyReq.
- Header injection ordered before fixRequestBody (the body write flushes
headers; setting X-Vault-Token after it failed on every POST/PUT).
- initORM add-only schema heal: sequelize.sync() never ALTERs, so newer columns
(PluginInstance.lastLog) are now added via describeTable + addColumn.
- Long-lived external-app tokens via sso-app role (768h periodic); VaultAppToken
stores each app token's accessor and renews it at boot + every 6h; re-minting
revokes the previous token via its accessor.
- Wire-level tests for the vault proxy + app-token accessor lifecycle.
- package.json + lockfile bumped to 1.23.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- vault_broker: always reconcile policy content before serving a cached
token (compare-and-skip), so stale stored policies can't cause a recurring
403 'permission denied'; policy content is parsed live by OpenBao, so edits
apply to existing tokens immediately.
- Shared secrets: publish to secret/shared/<owner>/<slug>; grant read to users
and apps by editing the grantee's policy content (live-applied). New
SharedSecret/SharedSecretGrant ORM models, /api/shared-secrets router, and a
Shared tab in the vault UI.
- package.json + lockfile bumped to 1.21.0 to match the tag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Generalize the half-built discovery plugins into a real plugin system: plugin
TYPES (the plugins/<category>/<type>.js modules with manifests) and loadable,
configurable, multi-copy plugin INSTANCES (PluginInstance ORM model) managed
from a dedicated /plugins page and /api/plugins API, with per-instance secrets
in OpenBao at secret/plugins/<id>/conf.
- plugin_registry.js: getTypes/getModule/splitConfig/mask + required-field helpers
- PluginInstance model (Sequelize): id/pluginType/category/name/slug(unique)/
enabled/cron/config(json, non-secret)/lastRun*; registered in models/index.js
- plugin_secrets.js: read/write/remove/mergeForRun over @simpleworkjs/bao-conf
- scheduler.js: schedules from the DB registry; per-instance stable BullMQ
JobScheduler ids (plugin:<id>) for load/unload; legacy migration from
conf.discovery.plugins on first boot (idempotent, empty-table-guarded)
- api_plugins.js (replaces routes/plugins.js): types/list/get/create/update/
secrets/test/load/unload/run/delete/runs; admin-gated; secrets always masked
- /plugins page (plugins.ejs) + nav; Agents & Scheduler tab removed from
/directory; /docs/agents aliased to /docs/plugins
- proxmox/unifi/nmap gained manifests (configSchema/validate/run alias)
- tests/plugins.test.js: registry unit + plugin_secrets (mocked bao-conf) +
PluginInstance model round-trip/unique-slug
- docs (plugins.md, vault.md, _config.yml, API.md) + 1.16.1 -> 1.17.0
Requires theta-suite >= v1.30.1 for the sso-broker secret/plugins/* grant;
fails-soft with a clear error if absent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the end-user half of the directory and adds nested LDAP groups.
The directory could describe the lab but could not tell anyone what they had
or how to reach it, and several of the paths meant to do so were silently
returning nothing:
- GET /api/discovery/me resolved groups from req.user.groups, which does not
exist (req.user carries memberOf), so it returned only isPublic resources
for every human caller -- "My Services" was blank for everyone. The same
read made isDirectoryAdmin() false for real admins.
- The portal's "Discover More Services" called the admin-gated endpoint and
swallowed the 403, so it never rendered for non-admins at all.
- Services reported no address, because /me had reimplemented getMyAccess
without its parent-walking resolution.
Adds the catalog at /, self-service access requests, and admin access
visibility (per-resource counts, and the reverse "what can this user reach").
Nested groups come in two halves. groupOfNames.member already accepts a group
DN, so nesting needs no schema -- what it needs is resolution, which no
released OpenLDAP performs. The all-in-one image therefore builds slapd from a
pinned master commit for the nestgroup overlay, and the app computes the
closure itself when pointed at a server without it. Both paths are covered.
member-values is deliberately left out of nestgroup-flags: it expands `member`
when reading a group, which destroys the distinction between "listed here" and
"reachable through a nested group" and is not recoverable afterwards.
Full suite green in both resolution modes: 215 passed, 2 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Use published @simpleworkjs/orm ^0.2.8 (fixes redis adapter write path)
and model-redis ^1.6.0 instead of a local file: link that broke docker
npm ci with a misleading "no lockfile" error.
- OtpToken.issue/verify: replace nonexistent find()/listDetail() with
list({where}).
- routes/auth.js: ImpersonationToken.listDetail() -> list({where}).
- routes/token.js: drop listDetail() call; 404 on missing token instead
of returning {results: null} with 200 (orm get() returns null, does
not throw like model-redis Table.get did).
- OAuthClient: Resource has no is_valid column, so every client read as
disabled and all /oauth/authorize requests 400'd — validity now lives
in metadata (absent = valid). Also generate a unique slug on create
(Resource.slug is required+unique) and use Resource.get() for lookup.
- User.login: 401 cleanly when neither uid nor username is supplied.
- models/index.js: log ORM init and surface init failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Personal access tokens so scripts/CI can call the management API without a
browser session. Each logged-in user mints their own token; it authenticates as
the creator (carries their LDAP group permissions, re-resolved live), so the
existing permission.byGroup checks apply unchanged.
- models/api_token.js: new ApiToken model (sso_<id>_<secret> format; id is the
lookup key, secret bcrypt-hashed + isPrivate, shown once). add()/rotate()/
authenticate(); optional expires_at; best-effort last_used_on. No _ttl
(persists; lifetime via expires_at).
- routes/api_token.js: self-service CRUD (list/get/update/delete/rotate),
owner-scoped (created_by === req.user.uid, 403 otherwise).
- middleware/auth.js + models/auth.js: accept `Authorization: Bearer sso_...`
(precedence over the auth-token session header); checkApiToken collapses
every failure to one generic 401 (no existence/secret/expiry leak).
- views/api_tokens.ejs + routes/index.js (GET /api-tokens): self-service page
(forceLogin, no group gate) — create (token shown once), edit, rotate, revoke.
- views/top.ejs: "API Tokens" nav entry visible to all logged-in users.
- public/js/app.js: app.apiToken client module.
- DEPLOYMENT.md + docs/deployment.md: API tokens section.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly