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Author SHA1 Message Date
wmantly d9a3cb6044 Merge pull request #101 from theta42/release/v1.3.2
Release 1.3.2 — fix OAuth client API client_id serialization (bootstrap-breaking)
2026-07-23 16:09:37 -04:00
wmantly 0ee6825a01 fix: OAuth client API returned client_id: undefined; unknown id 500'd
The ORM Model.toJSON() serializes only schema fields, so the mapped
client_id/scopes/redirect_uris/... that OAuthClient.get() attaches to
the wrapped Resource were stripped from GET /api/oauth/client[/:id]
responses. client_id came back undefined; the theta-env bootstrap then
POSTed /api/oauth/client/undefined/rotate and got a 500, aborting stack
bring-up whenever proxy-secrets.js lacked a usable secret.

- OAuthClient.get() now emits an explicit public toJSON (client_id, name,
  slug, scopes, redirect_uris, allowed_groups, token_lifetime, is_valid),
  deliberately omitting client_secret_hash so it can't leak over the API.
- OAuthClient.get() null-guards Resource.get() (which returns null, not
  throws) and returns a clean 404 for an unknown/undefined id instead of
  crashing on r.kind.
- Regression tests: list/get expose client_id + hide the secret hash, the
  list-then-rotate bootstrap path, and unknown-id -> 4xx not 500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 16:06:55 -04:00
wmantly 14b6ed5ae0 Merge pull request #97 from theta42/spec/directory-consumers
Directory spec: readiness review of the five planned consumers
2026-07-23 03:37:00 -04:00
wmantly fd98854628 spec: readiness review of the five planned directory consumers
Records what each planned consumer of the directory data needs — end-user
catalog + access requests, SSH jump host, firewall rule generation/drift
testing, local DNS/mDNS, and host access control — what the current
model/API already covers, and the concrete gaps.

Verdict: the graph model is sufficient for all five. Gaps are one new
model (AccessRequest), service-token auth for the read API, documented
metadata conventions (portMappings, sshPort, dnsNames, icon, ...), and
cheap change detection (updated_on/etag). Also flags a real issue found
while auditing: /api/discovery/resources exposes full metadata —
including OAuth client_secret_hash — to any authenticated user; a
metadata privacy projection tops the work list.

Also updates the spec's stale status line (it still said "no code yet").

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 03:33:19 -04:00
wmantly 3babf18fe4 Merge pull request #96 from theta42/release/v1.3.1
Release 1.3.1
2026-07-23 03:29:01 -04:00
wmantly d78f1dfabf Release 1.3.1
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 03:24:23 -04:00
wmantly c3c206b830 Merge pull request #95 from theta42/docs/directory-doc
Surface the Directory documentation — register in-app and link
2026-07-23 03:20:05 -04:00
wmantly 0a21dce0d7 docs: surface the Directory doc — register in-app, link from UI and site
docs/directory.md existed but was orphaned: not in the /docs registry,
not linked anywhere. Now:

- registered as /docs/directory ("Directory & Inventory")
- help icon on the Directory page header links to it (same pattern as
  users/groups/profile pages)
- linked from the docs site index feature list
- extended with the shared slug conventions (site_<name>, host_<hostname>),
  the automatic registration story (theta-env stack seeding, ldap-client
  Linux host enrollment), and the admin + read-only API surface (the
  read-only graph routes live at /api/discovery, not /api/directory).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 03:17:50 -04:00
wmantly 5940880d9b Merge pull request #94 from theta42/docs/ldap-not-legacy
docs: direct LDAP binds are first-class, not "legacy"
2026-07-23 02:57:20 -04:00
wmantly 17fcf2fed0 docs: direct LDAP binds are first-class, not "legacy"
Linux hosts are a primary consumer of the directory — PAM/SSSD login,
LDAP-backed sudo rules (sudoRole), and SSH public keys (openssh-lpk) —
which is exactly what the custom schemas exist for. Describe LDAPS /
StartTLS consumers as "Linux hosts and LDAP-native apps" instead of
"legacy apps" across README, DEPLOYMENT, docs, and the Dockerfile.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 02:55:11 -04:00
14 changed files with 315 additions and 19 deletions
+14
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@@ -4,6 +4,20 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented here. Format loosely
follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); versions follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); versions
correspond to git tags (`vX.Y.Z`) and `nodejs/package.json`'s `version`. correspond to git tags (`vX.Y.Z`) and `nodejs/package.json`'s `version`.
## [1.3.2] - 2026-07-23
### Fixed
- **OAuth client management API returned `client_id: undefined` on every GET.** The ORM's `Model.toJSON()` only serializes schema fields, so the mapped `client_id`/`scopes`/`redirect_uris`/… that `OAuthClient.get()` attaches to the wrapped Resource were stripped from `GET /api/oauth/client` and `GET /api/oauth/client/:id` responses. The theta-env bootstrap (which lists clients and rotates by the returned `client_id`) then called `/api/oauth/client/undefined/rotate` and got a 500, aborting stack bring-up when `proxy-secrets.js` had no usable secret. `OAuthClient.get()` now emits an explicit public JSON shape (and deliberately omits `client_secret_hash`, so the secret hash no longer leaks over the API).
- `OAuthClient.get()` no longer 500s on an unknown/`undefined` client id: `Resource.get()` returns `null` (it doesn't throw), which was dereferenced as `r.kind`. It now returns a clean 404.
## [1.3.1] - 2026-07-23
### Added
- The Directory documentation (`docs/directory.md`) is now surfaced: registered in-app at `/docs/directory` ("Directory & Inventory"), help-linked from the Directory page header, and linked from the docs-site index. Extended with the shared slug conventions (`site_<name>`, `host_<hostname>` — as used by ldap-client and the theta-env seed), the automatic-registration story (theta-env stack seeding, ldap-client Linux host enrollment), and the API surface (admin at `/api/directory-admin`, read-only graph at `/api/discovery`).
### Changed
- Direct LDAP binds are described as first-class, not "legacy", across README, DEPLOYMENT.md, docs, and the Dockerfile: Linux hosts are a primary consumer of the directory (PAM/SSSD login, LDAP-backed `sudo` via `sudoRole`, SSH public keys via openssh-lpk) — exactly what the custom schemas exist for.
## [1.3.0] - 2026-07-23 ## [1.3.0] - 2026-07-23
### Added ### Added
+3 -3
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@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ bare-metal / advanced standalone use; most deployments should use the file.
- Health check: `http://localhost:3001/health``{"status":"ok"}` - Health check: `http://localhost:3001/health``{"status":"ok"}`
- OIDC discovery: `http://localhost:3001/.well-known/openid-configuration` - OIDC discovery: `http://localhost:3001/.well-known/openid-configuration`
- LDAP (internal, app↔slapd): `ldap://localhost:389` (not mapped to the host) - LDAP (internal, app↔slapd): `ldap://localhost:389` (not mapped to the host)
- LDAPS (for legacy apps / direct binds): `ldaps://<host>:636` (TLS) - LDAPS (direct binds: Linux hosts, LDAP-native apps): `ldaps://<host>:636` (TLS)
### API tokens (personal access tokens) ### API tokens (personal access tokens)
@@ -483,8 +483,8 @@ netstat -tlnp | grep 389
2. **Use LDAPS / StartTLS** for any LDAP connection that crosses the network. The 2. **Use LDAPS / StartTLS** for any LDAP connection that crosses the network. The
bundled slapd listens on `ldaps:///` (636, TLS) and `ldap:///` (389, plain + bundled slapd listens on `ldaps:///` (636, TLS) and `ldap:///` (389, plain +
StartTLS); port 389 is not mapped to the host by default so LAN clients can't StartTLS); port 389 is not mapped to the host by default so LAN clients can't
bind in cleartext. Direct-LDAP apps (legacy services, `theta42/proxy`) should bind in cleartext. Direct-LDAP consumers (Linux hosts, LDAP-native apps,
use `ldaps://…:636` or StartTLS. `theta42/proxy`) should use `ldaps://…:636` or StartTLS.
3. **Persist `JWT_SECRET`** — if the Docker image auto-generates one and you don't 3. **Persist `JWT_SECRET`** — if the Docker image auto-generates one and you don't
set `JWT_SECRET`, issued tokens invalidate on container recreation. set `JWT_SECRET`, issued tokens invalidate on container recreation.
4. **Don't expose the UI's HTTP port to the internet** — terminate TLS at a front 4. **Don't expose the UI's HTTP port to the internet** — terminate TLS at a front
+2 -1
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@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ COPY ops/schema/openssh-lpk.schema /etc/openldap/schema/openssh-lpk.schema
# 3001: SSO Manager web interface (HTTP — terminate TLS at the front proxy) # 3001: SSO Manager web interface (HTTP — terminate TLS at the front proxy)
# 389: LDAP (plain + StartTLS) — used internally by the app; map to host only # 389: LDAP (plain + StartTLS) — used internally by the app; map to host only
# if you want LAN clients to bind without TLS (not recommended). # if you want LAN clients to bind without TLS (not recommended).
# 636: LDAPS — for legacy apps / direct LDAP binds over the network (TLS) # 636: LDAPS — direct LDAP binds over the network (TLS): Linux host auth
# (PAM/SSSD, sudo, SSH keys) and LDAP-native apps
EXPOSE 3001 389 636 EXPOSE 3001 389 636
# Health check # Health check
+5 -4
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@@ -41,9 +41,10 @@ phone-home, no hosted control plane, and no per-user pricing.
- **Web management UI** — manage users, groups, and OAuth clients from a - **Web management UI** — manage users, groups, and OAuth clients from a
browser; invite and password-reset flows over email; user self-service for browser; invite and password-reset flows over email; user self-service for
profile and API tokens. profile and API tokens.
- **LDAPS for legacy apps** — apps that bind LDAP directly (Gitea, Emby, and - **Direct LDAP binds** — Linux hosts (PAM/SSSD login, LDAP-backed `sudo`
anything else that speaks LDAP) use LDAPS (636) or StartTLS against the same rules, SSH public keys via openssh-lpk) and LDAP-native apps (Gitea, Emby,
directory, so you don't maintain a second user database for them. and anything else that speaks LDAP) use LDAPS (636) or StartTLS against the
same directory, so you don't maintain a second user database for them.
- **Personal access tokens** — any user can mint a long-lived bearer token to - **Personal access tokens** — any user can mint a long-lived bearer token to
drive the management API from scripts or CI, scoped to their own permissions. drive the management API from scripts or CI, scoped to their own permissions.
- **All-in-one Docker image** — app + OpenLDAP + Redis in one container, or run - **All-in-one Docker image** — app + OpenLDAP + Redis in one container, or run
@@ -151,7 +152,7 @@ details, including env var overrides (`LDAP_BASE_DN`, `SKIP_LDAP`, ...), in
┌────────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────────┐
│ OpenLDAP (slapd) │ │ OpenLDAP (slapd) │
│ - users / groups │ │ - users / groups │
│ - LDAPS :636 │─── legacy apps bind directly │ - LDAPS :636 │─── Linux hosts + LDAP apps bind directly
│ - StartTLS :389 │ │ - StartTLS :389 │
└────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────┘
``` ```
+149 -2
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@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
# Home-Lab Directory / Inventory — Design Spec # Home-Lab Directory / Inventory — Design Spec
Status: **Draft / agreed direction** (no code yet) Status: **Implemented** (v1.2.1+: model, admin API, UI; v1.3.x: automatic
registration from theta-env + ldap-client). §9 adds the planned-consumer
readiness review.
Owner: wmantly Owner: wmantly
Last updated: 2026-07-02 Last updated: 2026-07-23
--- ---
@@ -220,3 +222,148 @@ Write endpoints (POST/PUT/DELETE) are **out of scope for v1**; population is man
for auth, SQL for inventory. for auth, SQL for inventory.
4. **Read-visibility policy:** confirm option (a) vs (b) in §5. 4. **Read-visibility policy:** confirm option (a) vs (b) in §5.
5. **Service token scope:** Currently `ApiToken` shares the creator's full permissions. A future enhancement could scope tokens specifically to the Directory API. 5. **Service token scope:** Currently `ApiToken` shares the creator's full permissions. A future enhancement could scope tokens specifically to the Directory API.
---
## 9. Planned consumers — data-model & API readiness
Five consumers the directory data should be able to power. None are being
built yet; this section records what each needs, what already exists, and the
gaps to close so the model/API never paints us into a corner.
The recurring theme: **the graph model itself (Resource / ResourceEdge /
ResourceGroup + LDAP groups) is sufficient for all five.** The gaps are
(a) one new model (access requests), (b) machine-to-machine auth for the read
API, (c) documented metadata conventions instead of new columns, and
(d) change detection for the drift/sync consumers.
### 9.1 End-user exploration ("Netflix-style" catalog + request access)
A user browses everything that exists — part advertisement, part
documentation — sees what they already have, and requests access to the rest.
Already there:
- `/api/discovery/me` (`getMyAccess`) — the "My Services" half.
- `Resource.owner` + `<slug>_access` / `<slug>_admin` ResourceGroup links —
who approves, and which group an approval means joining.
- The Notification model — the approval-request delivery mechanism.
Gaps:
1. **Catalog projection with metadata privacy.** `/api/discovery/resources`
returns full `metadata` to any authenticated user — including the OAuth
kind's `client_secret_hash`, and operator notes that may name internal
IPs. Needed: a per-kind public projection (name, description, kind,
subType, icon, address, hasAccess, requestable) and a private-key
convention for the rest (e.g. only `app_sso_directory_admin` sees full
metadata). This is a **fix worth doing before any catalog UI exists**.
2. **`AccessRequest` model** — the one genuinely new model:
`{id, uid, resourceId, groupCn, status: pending|approved|denied, note,
requestedOn, decidedBy, decidedOn}`. Approval = LDAP group add + notify.
Endpoints: user POST/GET own; resource owner / directory admin
list/approve/deny.
3. **Catalog metadata conventions**: `icon`, `tagline` (card-length blurb),
`requestable: false` for resources that shouldn't be advertised.
### 9.2 SSH jump host (`username_-_{hostname-or-ip}@publicHost`)
A public jump host parses the target out of the SSH username, checks the user
may reach that host, and proxies the connection (WinSCP-friendly: one
username string, no interactive menu needed — though an interactive picker on
plain `username@` login is the same query).
Already there:
- Hosts carry `ip` (and `host_<hostname>` slugs to resolve by name).
- Access is already group-based (`<slug>_access`), checkable via LDAP alone —
the jump host can run entirely off LDAP (SSSD) + one directory query.
- User SSH keys are in LDAP (openssh-lpk) — the jump host authenticates the
real user without local accounts.
Gaps:
1. **Machine auth for the access query.** The jump host must ask "may user X
reach host Y" / "list hosts user X may reach" *about another user*.
`getMyAccess` only answers for the calling user. Needed: a
service-token-authenticated endpoint (`GET
/api/discovery/access/:uid[/:slug]`). `ServiceToken` already exists and
is even linked to a resource (`resource_id`) — what's missing is an auth
middleware that accepts it and a permission rule ("service tokens may
read access info, scoped read-only").
2. **Connection metadata conventions** on hosts: `sshPort` (default 22),
optional `fqdn` (when IP is dynamic), optional `jumpVia` edge relation if
multi-hop topologies ever appear.
3. Document the username grammar (`{uid}_-_{host-slug-or-ip}`) here so the
seed/ldap-client keep host slugs DNS-safe (they already are: slugify
strips everything but `[a-z0-9-]`).
### 9.3 Firewall port-forward rules (build / update / drift-test)
An automation renders the public firewall's forwarding table from the
directory, applies it, and alerts on drift in either direction.
Already there:
- `metadata.port` / `metadata.externalPort` / `metadata.ip` /
`metadata.isExternalReachable` — the core mapping data, already seeded for
the stack's own services.
Gaps:
1. **Port-mapping convention is too thin for real rules**: no protocol, no
multi-port services. Adopt `metadata.portMappings: [{proto: "tcp"|"udp",
external: n, internal: n, comment}]` as the authoritative form
(`port`/`externalPort` stay as the simple single-mapping case).
2. **Drift detection needs cheap change polling**: an `updated_on` timestamp
on resources surfaced in the graph API, or a graph-level etag/hash, so
the runner can poll without diffing full payloads. (The ORM already
publishes create/update events internally — a future push feed can ride
that; polling comes first.)
3. Same **service-token read auth** as 9.2 — automation must not run on a
human's session token.
### 9.4 Local DNS / mDNS
A DNS (or mDNS advertiser) zone is generated from the directory: hosts get
A records from `metadata.ip`, services get CNAMEs/records from their
addresses, sites map to zones.
Already there:
- `host_<hostname>` + `ip` covers A records; `site_<name>` is a natural zone
boundary; service `address` yields names.
Gaps:
1. **Name conventions**: `metadata.dnsNames: []` for extra aliases, and a
documented rule for which name wins (slug vs `address` hostname). TTL
only if someone actually needs per-record TTLs — default is fine.
2. Same **change detection** as 9.3 (poll `updated_on` / etag; push later).
3. Nothing else — this consumer is nearly free once 9.3's conventions land.
### 9.5 Access control for hosts
Who may log in to / sudo on which machine, driven by the directory.
Already there — this is the original point of the system:
- `<slug>_access` / `<slug>_admin` groups are auto-provisioned per host;
ldap-client configures SSSD/PAM against the directory; `sudoRole` and
openssh-lpk schemas cover sudo and SSH keys.
Gaps:
1. **Close the loop in ldap-client**: joined hosts should set an SSSD access
filter (`access_provider = ldap`, filter on `host_<hostname>_access`
membership) so directory group membership *is* login permission, not just
identity. Today the registration exists but enforcement is host-side
convention.
2. **`accessLevel` granularity**: ResourceGroup's `member`/`owner` maps to
login/admin today; if finer roles emerge (e.g. `login` vs `sudo` vs
`admin`), extend the enum — the join-table shape already supports it.
### 9.6 Consolidated work list (model/API only, no consumers)
Ordered by how much they unblock:
1. **Metadata privacy projection** on the read API (blocks 9.1; fixes the
`client_secret_hash` exposure regardless of any consumer).
2. **Service-token auth for `/api/discovery/*`** + `access/:uid` endpoint
(blocks 9.2, 9.3; ServiceToken model already exists).
3. **`AccessRequest` model + endpoints** (blocks 9.1's request half).
4. **Metadata conventions doc entries** (`sshPort`, `portMappings`,
`dnsNames`, `icon`, `tagline`, `requestable`) in `docs/directory.md`
conventions, not schema changes; the json column already holds them.
5. **`updated_on` in graph output / graph etag** (blocks drift/DNS
freshness; trivial once surfaced).
+38
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@@ -57,3 +57,41 @@ Resources carry a flexible `metadata` JSON object that can store essential conte
## Navigating the UI ## Navigating the UI
The Directory Management interface provides a **Tree View** toggle that visually nests your resources, making it easy to comprehend your network topography at a glance. You can also filter, search, and sort your entire infrastructure inventory. From the tree view, you can click the green `+` icon next to any resource to instantly add a child resource beneath it. The Directory Management interface provides a **Tree View** toggle that visually nests your resources, making it easy to comprehend your network topography at a glance. You can also filter, search, and sort your entire infrastructure inventory. From the tree view, you can click the green `+` icon next to any resource to instantly add a child resource beneath it.
## Slug conventions
Slugs are the stable identifiers automation keys off, so the tooling around the SSO Manager follows a shared convention:
- **Sites**: `site_<name>` — e.g. `site_local`, `site_us-east`
- **Hosts**: `host_<hostname>` — e.g. `host_pve1`, `host_web01`
- **Services/apps**: a plain slug or `app_<name>` — e.g. `sso-manager`, `app_emby`
The auto-created LDAP groups derive from the slug (`<slug>_access` / `<slug>_admin`), so keep slugs stable once access groups are in use.
## Automatic registration
You don't have to build the graph by hand — the theta42 tooling registers itself:
### The stack itself (theta-env)
[theta-env](https://github.com/theta42/theta-env)'s `./setup.sh` seeds the directory on every run with the stack it deploys:
- a **site** (name from `CFG_SITE_NAME` in `setup.env`, default `local` → slug `site_local`) marked as the current site
- the **host** the stack runs on (`host_<hostname>`), with IP, MAC address, OS, and kernel collected from the machine
- the **services** it composes — SSO Manager, Proxy (management UI), OpenLDAP Directory (the LDAPS endpoint Linux hosts and LDAP-native apps bind to), and OpenResty Edge (the 80/443 data plane) — each with its address, internal port, and git repo
- the proxy's auto-registered **OAuth client**, linked under its service
The seed is idempotent and non-destructive: a resource whose slug already exists is considered operator-owned — the seed only fills in metadata fields you haven't set, and never overwrites your values.
### Linux hosts (ldap-client)
The `ldap-client` join script enrolls a Debian/Ubuntu machine for LDAP login (SSSD/PAM), LDAP-backed `sudo`, and SSH keys from the directory — and, when given an SSO API token, registers the machine as a `host_<hostname>` resource with its IP, MAC, OS, and kernel, parented to the site named by its configured location.
## API
All of the above uses the same admin API the UI does (group `app_sso_directory_admin` or `app_sso_admin`):
- `GET/POST /api/directory-admin/resources`, `PUT/DELETE /api/directory-admin/resources/:id`
- `GET/POST/DELETE /api/directory-admin/edges` — parent/child links (`hosts`, `oauth` relations)
- `GET/POST/DELETE /api/directory-admin/groups` — resource ↔ LDAP group links
- Read-only graph views (any authenticated user): `GET /api/discovery/resources`, `/api/discovery/resources/:slug`, `/api/discovery/graph`, `/api/discovery/me`
+4 -2
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@@ -52,11 +52,13 @@ backend, that's the niche.
- **Web management UI** — users, groups, and OAuth clients from a browser; - **Web management UI** — users, groups, and OAuth clients from a browser;
invite and password-reset flows over email; self-service profile + API invite and password-reset flows over email; self-service profile + API
tokens. tokens.
- **LDAPS for legacy apps** — anything that binds LDAP directly (Gitea, - **Direct LDAP binds** — anything that binds LDAP directly (Linux hosts
Emby, …) uses LDAPS/StartTLS against the same directory. via PAM/SSSD, Gitea, Emby, …) uses LDAPS/StartTLS against the same
directory.
- **All-in-one Docker image** — app + OpenLDAP + Redis in one container, or - **All-in-one Docker image** — app + OpenLDAP + Redis in one container, or
run the pieces separately via `app_*` env config. run the pieces separately via `app_*` env config.
- **Geo-Location Scaling** — built-in support for N-Way Multi-Master OpenLDAP [replication](replication.html) across physical sites. - **Geo-Location Scaling** — built-in support for N-Way Multi-Master OpenLDAP [replication](replication.html) across physical sites.
- **[Directory & Inventory](directory.html)** — map sites, hosts, and services as a graph with rich metadata (IP/MAC, OS/kernel, ports, git repos), auto-provisioned access groups, and automatic registration from theta-env and ldap-client.
## Get it ## Get it
+3 -2
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@@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ description: SSO Manager's bundled OpenLDAP directory — schema, service accoun
SSO Manager runs an OpenLDAP directory holding your users and groups. The app SSO Manager runs an OpenLDAP directory holding your users and groups. The app
authenticates against it over `localhost:389` (inside the all-in-one container) authenticates against it over `localhost:389` (inside the all-in-one container)
and exposes **LDAPS** (`ldaps://…:636`, TLS) for legacy apps that bind LDAP and exposes **LDAPS** (`ldaps://…:636`, TLS) for anything that binds LDAP
directly — Gitea, Emby, the theta42/proxy, etc. directly — Linux hosts (PAM/SSSD, sudo rules, SSH keys), Gitea, Emby, the
theta42/proxy, etc.
## Directory layout ## Directory layout
+33 -2
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@@ -44,13 +44,21 @@ class OAuthClient {
return r; return r;
} }
static async get(client_id) { static async get(client_id) {
const notFound = () => {
const e = new Error('OAuthClient not found');
e.status = 404;
return e;
};
let r; let r;
try { try {
r = await Resource.get(client_id); r = await Resource.get(client_id);
} catch (_) { } catch (_) {
throw new Error('OAuthClient not found'); throw notFound();
} }
if (r.kind !== 'oauth') throw new Error('OAuthClient not found'); // Resource.get() returns null (does not throw) for a missing id —
// guard it so a bad/undefined client_id is a clean 404, not a
// "Cannot read properties of null (reading 'kind')" 500.
if (!r || r.kind !== 'oauth') throw notFound();
// Map metadata to top-level properties to satisfy routes/oauth.js without rewriting it // Map metadata to top-level properties to satisfy routes/oauth.js without rewriting it
r.client_id = r.id; r.client_id = r.id;
r.client_secret_hash = r.metadata.client_secret_hash; r.client_secret_hash = r.metadata.client_secret_hash;
@@ -69,6 +77,29 @@ class OAuthClient {
return raw_secret; return raw_secret;
}; };
// The ORM Model.toJSON() only serializes schema fields, so the mapped
// properties above (client_id, scopes, redirect_uris, …) would be
// stripped from any res.json() — that's why GET /api/oauth/client
// returned client_id: undefined and the bootstrap's rotate blew up.
// Emit the public shape explicitly. client_secret_hash is deliberately
// omitted so it never leaks over the API.
r.toJSON = function () {
return {
client_id: r.id,
id: r.id,
kind: r.kind,
name: r.name,
slug: r.slug,
owner: r.owner,
description: r.description,
redirect_uris: r.redirect_uris,
scopes: r.scopes,
allowed_groups: r.allowed_groups,
token_lifetime: r.token_lifetime,
is_valid: r.is_valid,
};
};
// proxy update to handle metadata correctly // proxy update to handle metadata correctly
const originalUpdate = r.update.bind(r); const originalUpdate = r.update.bind(r);
r.update = async (data) => { r.update = async (data) => {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{ {
"name": "t42-sso-manager", "name": "t42-sso-manager",
"version": "1.3.0", "version": "1.3.2",
"lockfileVersion": 3, "lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true, "requires": true,
"packages": { "packages": {
"": { "": {
"name": "t42-sso-manager", "name": "t42-sso-manager",
"version": "1.3.0", "version": "1.3.2",
"license": "MIT", "license": "MIT",
"dependencies": { "dependencies": {
"@fortawesome/fontawesome-free": "^7.3.0", "@fortawesome/fontawesome-free": "^7.3.0",
+1 -1
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{ {
"name": "t42-sso-manager", "name": "t42-sso-manager",
"version": "1.3.0", "version": "1.3.2",
"description": "A very simple LDAP management and SSO system", "description": "A very simple LDAP management and SSO system",
"author": [ "author": [
{ {
+1
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@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ const DOCS = {
accounts: {title: 'Accounts, Groups & Managers', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/concepts-accounts.md')}, accounts: {title: 'Accounts, Groups & Managers', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/concepts-accounts.md')},
'oauth-apps': {title: 'Connecting Apps (SSO)', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/concepts-oauth-apps.md')}, 'oauth-apps': {title: 'Connecting Apps (SSO)', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/concepts-oauth-apps.md')},
'api-tokens': {title: 'API Tokens', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/concepts-api-tokens.md')}, 'api-tokens': {title: 'API Tokens', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/concepts-api-tokens.md')},
directory: {title: 'Directory & Inventory', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/directory.md')},
overview: {title: 'Overview', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../README.md')}, overview: {title: 'Overview', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../README.md')},
changelog: {title: 'Changelog', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../CHANGELOG.md')}, changelog: {title: 'Changelog', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../CHANGELOG.md')},
+59
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,65 @@ afterAll(async () => {
} }
}); });
describe('OAuth client management API — /api/oauth/client', () => {
// Regression: the ORM Model.toJSON() strips non-schema fields, so the
// mapped client_id/scopes/etc. used to vanish from GET responses —
// client_id came back undefined and the theta-env bootstrap's rotate
// crashed with a 500. GET must expose client_id (and never the secret hash).
test('GET / list exposes client_id and hides client_secret_hash', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/oauth/client/')
.set('auth-token', token);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const mine = res.body.results.find((c) => c.client_id === clientId);
expect(mine).toBeDefined();
expect(mine.client_id).toBe(clientId);
expect(mine).toHaveProperty('scopes');
expect(mine).not.toHaveProperty('client_secret_hash');
});
test('GET /:id exposes client_id', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get(`/api/oauth/client/${clientId}`)
.set('auth-token', token);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.results.client_id).toBe(clientId);
expect(res.body.results).not.toHaveProperty('client_secret_hash');
});
test('list then rotate a client by its returned client_id (the bootstrap path)', async () => {
// Reproduces exactly what the theta-env bootstrap does: create, list,
// find by name, rotate by the client_id from the list response. Uses a
// throwaway client so the shared flow client's secret is untouched.
const created = await request(app)
.post('/api/oauth/client/')
.set('auth-token', token)
.send({ name: 'rotate-regression', redirect_uris: REDIRECT_URI });
expect(created.status).toBe(200);
const list = await request(app).get('/api/oauth/client/').set('auth-token', token);
const found = list.body.results.find((c) => c.name === 'rotate-regression');
expect(found).toBeDefined();
expect(found.client_id).toBeTruthy(); // was undefined before the fix
const rotated = await request(app)
.post(`/api/oauth/client/${found.client_id}/rotate`)
.set('auth-token', token);
expect(rotated.status).toBe(200);
expect(rotated.body.client_secret).toBeTruthy();
await request(app).delete(`/api/oauth/client/${found.client_id}`).set('auth-token', token);
});
test('GET /:id unknown id returns 404, not 500', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/oauth/client/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000')
.set('auth-token', token);
expect(res.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
expect(res.status).toBeLessThan(500);
});
});
describe('OIDC Discovery', () => { describe('OIDC Discovery', () => {
test('GET /.well-known/openid-configuration returns required fields', async () => { test('GET /.well-known/openid-configuration returns required fields', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/.well-known/openid-configuration'); const res = await request(app).get('/.well-known/openid-configuration');
+1
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@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
<div class="card-header actionMessage" style="display:none"></div> <div class="card-header actionMessage" style="display:none"></div>
<div class="p-3 pb-0 text-muted small border-bottom"> <div class="p-3 pb-0 text-muted small border-bottom">
<i class="fa-solid fa-circle-info"></i> Manage infrastructure, services, and their relationships. <i class="fa-solid fa-circle-info"></i> Manage infrastructure, services, and their relationships.
<a href="/docs/directory" class="text-reset float-end" title="Help"><i class="fa-solid fa-circle-question"></i></a>
</div> </div>
<div class="table-responsive"> <div class="table-responsive">
<table class="card-body table table-striped mb-0"> <table class="card-body table table-striped mb-0">