# Changelog

All notable changes to the `theta-agent` daemon will be documented in this file.

The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).

## [v1.5.0] - 2026-08-06

Join-key enrollment (protocol v1.2.0 §1.1). Installing the agent with one key is now all it takes to add a host.

### Added
- **`join_key` config field.** Presented while `auth_token` is empty. The SSO exchanges it for this agent's own token and the public key it must pin, both delivered in the `config` frame; the agent writes them into `agent.yml` and blanks the join key. No value has to be copied between two machines by hand any more.
- `ConfigManager.PersistEnrollment` rewrites only the credential lines, line-based rather than a YAML round-trip, so operator comments, the capability matrix and formatting survive. Re-reads the file afterwards, so the new credential is live without a restart, and keeps the file at `0600`.
- `Config.Credential()` — the agent's own token when it has one, otherwise the join key.
- The connect URL carries `?hostname=`, so a self-enrolling host is named after itself instead of a generated placeholder.
- `install.sh --join-key`.

### Fixed
- The agent now refuses to connect (with a clear message and a long back-off) when it has neither an `auth_token` nor a `join_key`, rather than repeatedly presenting an empty credential.

## [v1.4.0] - 2026-08-05

Implements **Protocol v1.2.0**. See `PROTOCOL.md` §1.1, §5.1–5.3.

### Security
- **Fail-closed signature verification.** `verifySignature` returned `true` when no `public_key` was configured, logging "skipping signature verification". Combined with an installer that never wrote a `public_key`, that meant a default install would execute `reboot`, `service_restart`, `configure_ldap`, `arbitrary_bash` and `update_binary` **unverified** from anything that could reach its socket. An agent that cannot verify a high-risk command now refuses it.
- **The token must be issued by the server.** The SSO now rejects tokens it did not mint (close code `4001`). Agents carrying a token generated by the old browser-side installer will not connect until re-enrolled.

### Fixed
- **Canonicalization mismatch broke signatures for most real scripts.** Go's `encoding/json` escapes `<`, `>` and `&` by default; the server's `JSON.stringify` does not. Any payload containing them — an `arbitrary_bash` script using `>` redirection or `&&`, which is most of them — hashed differently on each side and failed verification. `canonicalize()` now uses `json.Encoder` with `SetEscapeHTML(false)` and trims the encoder's trailing newline.
- **Auth failures no longer hot-loop.** A rejected credential was retried every 5 seconds forever, flooding the SSO and its audit log. Close codes `4001`/`4003`/`4004` now back off for 5 minutes and log what to do about it.
- **The auth token no longer appears in logs.** The connect line logged the full URL, including `?token=...`. It now logs only host + path, and the token is URL-escaped.

### Added
- Close-code handling for the SSO's enrollment signals: `4001` unauthorized, `4002` superseded, `4003` revoked, `4004` token rotated.
- `install.sh --public-key <base64>`, written into the generated `agent.yml`. The installer warns loudly when no public key is configured, since such an agent can report telemetry but will refuse every high-risk command.
- Tests: fail-closed with no key, wrong key, payload tampered after signing, shell metacharacters (`>`, `&&`, `<`) round-tripping, and canonical-form equality with the server. `interop_check_test.go` verifies a signature produced by the live SSO against the agent's own verifier (skipped unless `INTEROP_FIXTURE` is set).

### Changed
- Existing tests no longer rely on verification being skipped; high-risk cases now sign with a real test key.
- `agent.yml.example`, `README.md`, `INSTALL.md`: enrollment is a prerequisite, and `public_key` is the base64 of the **raw 32-byte** Ed25519 key — not a PEM body. The previous documented example (`MCowBQYDK2VwAyEA...`) decodes to 44 bytes and would have been rejected.

## [v1.3.0] - 2026-08-04

### Fixed
- **Silently ignore `heartbeat_ack`** — the server replies to the agent's own periodic heartbeat with `heartbeat_ack`. The agent had no case for it, so it fell through to the unknown-command handler, logged `Unknown command type: heartbeat_ack` every minute, and answered with a spurious error response. Heartbeat acks are fire-and-forget; the agent now ignores them silently.

## [v1.2.0] - 2026-08-03

### Added
- **Protocol v1.1.0 Compliance**: Full alignment with `PROTOCOL.md` (v1.1.0) specification.
- **Ed25519 Cryptographic Verification**: Verification of Ed25519 Base64 signatures for high-risk C2 commands (`reboot`, `service_restart`, `configure_ldap`, `arbitrary_bash`, `update_binary`).
- **Enhanced Journal Log Fetcher (`fetch_logs`)**: Support for querying service-specific systemd logs (`service` parameter) with configurable line count (`lines` parameter).
- **Pure Go Self-Update Engine (`update_binary`)**: Replaced shell script execution with pure Go HTTP client fetching, SHA256 verification, atomic file replacement, and clean daemon restart.

### Fixed
- **Goroutine Leak Prevention**: Added `stopCh` lifecycle management to terminate background telemetry and heartbeat tickers upon WebSocket disconnection.
- **Dynamic Config Rerenders**: Resolved data races when toggling capabilities or reloading `agent.yml` via `reload_config`.
- **Config Path Uniformity**: Standardized canonical configuration file path across codebase, installer, and documentation to `/etc/theta42/agent.yml`.

## [v0.1.0] - 2026-08-01

### Added
- Initial release of `theta-agent` Go daemon replacing legacy bash metric scripts.
- Persistent outbound WebSocket telemetry and local capability matrix enforcement.
