Completes the mDNS local-discovery feature on Windows (was Linux-only since
v2.1.2). Three parts:
1. Windows hosts override (hosts_override_windows.go): %SystemRoot%...\\hosts,
CRLF-aware read/write, ipconfig /flushdns after each change. The agent runs
as a SYSTEM service so elevation is a non-issue. hosts_override.go split
into shared rewrite logic + platform files; the hosts tests now run the real
Windows write path on CI instead of skipping.
2. Local route pinning (local_route*.go): the hosts override only fixes name
resolution -- the packet path is the routing table's job. If the WG mesh
tunnel is up with AllowedIPs covering the LAN (or full-tunnel 0.0.0.0/0) it
swallows the direct connection. Discovery now pins a /32 host route via the
owning local interface (route.exe metric 1 on Windows, ip route replace on
Linux) and drops it on revert. Closes a gap in the shipped Linux path too.
3. Prompt reconnect: apply/revert signals the WS loop so it reconnects
immediately instead of waiting out the 5s backoff.
Route/hosts code is injectable + unit tested; go test passes natively on
Windows (this machine), and linux/amd64 + windows/arm64 cross-builds are clean.
Adds the CHANGELOG entry for this pass's mDNS work (local_discovery.go,
hosts_override.go -- see prior commit for the two real bugs found via
live testing), bumps AgentVersion, and documents prefer_local_directory
in agent.yml.example.
Also backfills CHANGELOG entries for v2.1.0/v2.1.1 (Windows agent,
WireGuard client, installer, CI), which were tagged and released but
never documented here.
See CHANGELOG.md for the full breakdown. Summary:
- ldap_tunnel.go: serves a local unix socket for SSSD/PAM and relays raw
bytes to the SSO over the existing WSS channel (ldap_tunnel messages);
the agent never parses LDAP (DESIGN.md §4). Adds safeWriter to
serialize WebSocket writes now that telemetry, heartbeat, the LDAP
tunnel, and command responses all share one connection.
- secrets.go: renders local templates ({{ bao "path#key" }} placeholders)
by fetching node-scoped values from the SSO and writing the target
atomically at 0600, on a signed render_secrets command (DESIGN.md §5).
demo/ has minimal bash + Node consumers of the rendered file.
- iam.go: applies signed node IAM pushes -- sudoers.d rules (visudo -c
validated), SSH AuthorizedKeysCommand keys, /etc/security/access.conf,
and revocation via sss_cache -E + pkill -u (DESIGN.md §6).
- Capability reporting: the agent's enabled capabilities ride along in
its discovery frame so the SSO can show them in the Directory.
- DESIGN.md: the v2 protocol design this implements.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
theta-suite's setup.sh installs the committed theta-agent-linux-amd64
rather than building from source, so a stale binary means the fix in this
repo never reaches the host.
The v1.5.0 binary predated join-key support: setup.sh would write a
join_key into agent.yml that the running agent did not understand, and it
would have looped on "close 4001: Unauthorized" -- the same trap the
v1.3.0 heartbeat fix hit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Installing the agent with one key is now all it takes to add a host.
New `join_key` config field, presented while auth_token is empty. The SSO
exchanges it for this agent's own token and the public key it must pin,
both delivered in the config frame; the agent persists them and blanks
the join key. Nothing has to be copied between two machines by hand.
PersistEnrollment rewrites only the credential lines -- line-based rather
than a YAML round-trip -- so operator comments, the capability matrix and
formatting survive. It re-reads afterwards so the credential is live
without a restart, and keeps the file 0600.
The connect URL carries ?hostname= so a self-enrolling host is named
after itself, and the agent refuses to connect at all (with a long
back-off) when it has no credential rather than presenting an empty one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements protocol v1.2.0.
verifySignature() returned true when no public_key was configured,
logging "skipping signature verification". The SSO installer never wrote
a public_key, so a default install executed reboot, service_restart,
configure_ldap, arbitrary_bash and update_binary UNVERIFIED from anything
that could reach its socket. An agent that cannot verify now refuses.
Canonicalization also disagreed with the server. Go's encoding/json
escapes <, > and & by default; JSON.stringify does not. Any payload
containing them hashed differently on each side and failed verification
-- for arbitrary_bash that is most real scripts (`>` redirection, `&&`).
Now uses json.Encoder with SetEscapeHTML(false), trailing newline
trimmed.
The SSO now rejects tokens it did not issue. Handles its close codes
(4001/4002/4003/4004) and backs off 5 minutes on an enrollment failure
instead of retrying every 5s forever. The connect log no longer prints
the URL, which carried ?token=.
install.sh gains --public-key and warns when none is configured.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
wmantly