feat(multi-site): wire no-inbound relay registration into the real bootstrap flow

sso-manager-node/jump-host already had the relay-automation mechanism
(noInbound/meshIp/publicHost -> theta-proxy route via proxy_client.js,
GET /api/mesh/self on jump-host) but nothing in the actual operator
bring-up flow could ever reach it -- setup.sh, bootstrap/site-join.js,
and setup.env.example had zero wiring for it.

Add bootstrap/site-relay-register.js: reads this spoke's own role from
/config/site.json, logs into the local jump-host as its bootstrap
admin to discover its mesh IP, and registers it with the master. Mesh
peering itself stays a manual step (mint/paste a join token, same
pattern as the site join key), so this runs on every setup.sh
invocation via CFG_SPOKE_NO_INBOUND/CFG_SPOKE_PUBLIC_HOST and is a
no-op ("not meshed yet") until an operator has actually meshed the two
jump-hosts.

Also updates MULTI_SITE_SPEC.md's status table/TODO and the published
mesh.md docs page, which still described this as "designed but not
automated" after the API-level work had already shipped.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-10 21:09:10 -04:00
parent d8d811b0ab
commit 744c85f4bf
5 changed files with 176 additions and 17 deletions
+124
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@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
/*
* theta-suite site-relay-register — runs inside the sso-manager container
* (same pattern as site-join.js) to finish no-inbound relay automation for a
* spoke with no public IP (MULTI_SITE_SPEC.md §5.2).
*
* site-join.js's initial join can't supply a mesh IP: this site's jump-host
* isn't meshed to the master's yet at that point (mesh peering is a manual,
* out-of-band action on both jump-hosts -- mint a join token on the master's
* jump-host, paste it into this site's jump-host "Join a mesh" UI action --
* the same reason the site join key itself is minted/pasted by hand rather
* than automated). This script is the follow-up: run it (setup.sh does, on
* every run, when CFG_SPOKE_NO_INBOUND is set) once meshing is done, and it
* discovers this jump-host's mesh IP and registers it with the master so
* theta-proxy there can auto-create the relay route (see sso-manager-node's
* utils/proxy_client.js). Safe to run before meshing completes -- reports
* "not meshed yet" and exits 0 so a re-run later just picks it up.
*
* docker compose exec sso-manager node /bootstrap/site-relay-register.js \
* https://sso.this-site.example.com sso-branch2.master-domain.example.com
*
* Self-contained (Node built-ins + global fetch), same rule as bootstrap.js
* and site-join.js -- it does NOT require the SSO's internal models. It
* reads this node's own spoke role from /config/site.json (written by
* site-join.js) and logs into the LOCAL jump-host as its bootstrap-minted
* local admin (/config/jump-secrets.js) to call jump-host's own
* GET /api/mesh/self.
*
* Output (stdout, KEY=VALUE for setup.sh): RELAY=<registered|not-meshed|not-a-spoke|skipped>.
* Progress logs go to stderr.
*/
'use strict';
const fs = require('fs');
const SITE_CONFIG = '/config/site.json';
const JUMP_SECRETS = '/config/jump-secrets.js';
const JUMP_INTERNAL = 'http://jump-host:3002';
const selfUrl = process.argv[2];
const publicHost = process.argv[3];
function log(msg) { console.error('[site-relay-register] ' + msg); }
async function main() {
if (!selfUrl || !publicHost) {
throw new Error('usage: node /bootstrap/site-relay-register.js <selfUrl> <publicHost>');
}
if (!fs.existsSync(SITE_CONFIG)) {
log('No /config/site.json yet — this node has not joined a master. Nothing to do.');
console.log('RELAY=not-a-spoke');
return;
}
const site = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(SITE_CONFIG, 'utf8'));
if (site.isMaster || !site.masterUrl || !site.masterJoinKey) {
log('Not a joined spoke (missing masterUrl/masterJoinKey, or this is a master). Nothing to do.');
console.log('RELAY=not-a-spoke');
return;
}
if (!fs.existsSync(JUMP_SECRETS)) {
log('No /config/jump-secrets.js — jump-host has not been provisioned yet. Skipping.');
console.log('RELAY=skipped');
return;
}
const jumpSecrets = require(JUMP_SECRETS);
const jumpAdminUser = (jumpSecrets.auth && jumpSecrets.auth.adminUsers && jumpSecrets.auth.adminUsers[0]) || 'jumpadmin';
const jumpAdminPass = (jumpSecrets.auth && jumpSecrets.auth.localAdminPass) || '';
if (!jumpAdminPass) {
log('jump-secrets.js has no local admin password. Skipping.');
console.log('RELAY=skipped');
return;
}
const loginRes = await fetch(`${JUMP_INTERNAL}/api/auth/login`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ uid: jumpAdminUser, password: jumpAdminPass }),
});
if (!loginRes.ok) {
throw new Error(`jump-host admin login failed (${loginRes.status}): ${await loginRes.text().catch(() => '')}`);
}
const { token: jumpToken } = await loginRes.json();
if (!jumpToken) throw new Error('jump-host login returned no token');
const selfRes = await fetch(`${JUMP_INTERNAL}/api/mesh/self`, { headers: { 'auth-token': jumpToken } });
if (!selfRes.ok) {
throw new Error(`jump-host mesh self-lookup failed (${selfRes.status}): ${await selfRes.text().catch(() => '')}`);
}
const selfData = await selfRes.json();
if (!selfData.meshIp) {
log('jump-host is not meshed yet (no mesh IP assigned). Mesh-join it first (jump-host UI), then re-run setup.sh.');
console.log('RELAY=not-meshed');
return;
}
log(`Discovered mesh IP ${selfData.meshIp}. Registering with ${site.masterUrl}...`);
const regRes = await fetch(`${site.masterUrl.replace(/\/+$/, '')}/api/site/spokes`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer ' + site.masterJoinKey, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
endpoint: selfUrl,
siteSlug: site.siteSlug || '',
noInbound: true,
meshIp: selfData.meshIp,
publicHost,
}),
});
const text = await regRes.text().catch(() => '');
let data = null;
try { data = JSON.parse(text); } catch (e) { /* not JSON */ }
if (!regRes.ok) {
throw new Error(`relay registration failed (${regRes.status}): ${(data && data.message) || text}`);
}
log(`Relay: ${(data.relay && data.relay.note) || 'registered'}`);
console.log('RELAY=registered');
}
main().catch((e) => {
console.error('[site-relay-register] FAILED: ' + e.message);
process.exit(1);
});
+7 -9
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
> ## Shipped today > ## Shipped today
> - **Join, live replication, promotion** (`sso-manager-node`): a spoke joins via a one-time export over a site join key (`POST /api/site/join-keys` / `/export` / `/join`), then registers its own endpoint so the master can push live resync pings on every catalog write — no longer a one-time snapshot. Promotion (`POST /api/directory-admin/site-promote`) coordinates a real handoff, demoting the old master as one action. Identical agent-signing keys ride the same export/resync path. Read [`sso-manager-node/docs/site-join.md`](https://github.com/theta42/theta-directory/blob/master/docs/site-join.md) and `directory_spec.md` §11 for the endpoint-level detail. > - **Join, live replication, promotion** (`sso-manager-node`): a spoke joins via a one-time export over a site join key (`POST /api/site/join-keys` / `/export` / `/join`), then registers its own endpoint so the master can push live resync pings on every catalog write — no longer a one-time snapshot. Promotion (`POST /api/directory-admin/site-promote`) coordinates a real handoff, demoting the old master as one action. Identical agent-signing keys ride the same export/resync path. Read [`sso-manager-node/docs/site-join.md`](https://github.com/theta42/theta-directory/blob/master/docs/site-join.md) and `directory_spec.md` §11 for the endpoint-level detail.
> - **Gateway-to-gateway WireGuard mesh** (`theta-gateway`): real site-to-site tunnels via `POST /api/mesh/register`/`/join`, kernel WireGuard with a userspace `wireguard-go` fallback. Verified with an actual two-container encrypted tunnel passing traffic, not a mock. > - **Gateway-to-gateway WireGuard mesh** (`theta-gateway`): real site-to-site tunnels via `POST /api/mesh/register`/`/join`, kernel WireGuard with a userspace `wireguard-go` fallback. Verified with an actual two-container encrypted tunnel passing traffic, not a mock.
> - **Not yet connected to each other**: the mesh is a transport layer that exists on its own; `sso-manager-node`'s HTTPS-based join/replicate calls don't route over it yet. That wiring, plus the no-inbound relay it would enable (mechanism verified, automation not built — see status table), is the next layer. > - **Cross-component routing + no-inbound relay automation**: `sso-manager-node`'s replication traffic now prefers a spoke's mesh IP over the open internet when one is on file (`utils/site_replicate.js`), and a no-inbound spoke's join (`POST /api/site/join` → `/api/site/spokes`) can carry `noInbound`/`meshIp`/`publicHost`, which drives `utils/proxy_client.js` to auto-create the relay route on the master's `theta-proxy` via its existing self-service API token system (reused, not a new credential type). The one piece that stays a manual, out-of-band step is the mesh peering itself (mint a join token on one jump-host, paste it into the other's "Join a mesh" UI) — `theta-suite`'s `bootstrap/site-relay-register.js` (`CFG_SPOKE_NO_INBOUND`/`CFG_SPOKE_PUBLIC_HOST`) picks up from there on the next `setup.sh` run.
> - **mDNS local-discovery (Linux + Windows)**: shipped and verified — `theta-gateway` announces (`services/mdns_announce.js`), `theta-agent` discovers and applies a hosts-file override, cleanly reverts when the announcement disappears. Linux was verified end-to-end over real multicast; Windows shipped in `theta-agent` v2.2.0 (CRLF-aware hosts override, `ipconfig /flushdns`, and a /32 host-route pin so the WireGuard tunnel can't swallow the direct LAN path). macOS still needs real testing — see the TODO note. > - **mDNS local-discovery (Linux + Windows)**: shipped and verified — `theta-gateway` announces (`services/mdns_announce.js`), `theta-agent` discovers and applies a hosts-file override, cleanly reverts when the announcement disappears. Linux was verified end-to-end over real multicast; Windows shipped in `theta-agent` v2.2.0 (CRLF-aware hosts override, `ipconfig /flushdns`, and a /32 host-route pin so the WireGuard tunnel can't swallow the direct LAN path). macOS still needs real testing — see the TODO note.
Design scale: a handful of sites (dozen max, 254 hard ceiling — see §4), a few hundred users/hosts total. This is a deliberate, small, trusted-operator deployment, not a hyperscale/adversarial-tenant one — several decisions below (fire-and-forget replication, identical directories) trade blast-radius for simplicity *because* the scale allows it. Don't generalize these choices past that scale without re-deriving them. Design scale: a handful of sites (dozen max, 254 hard ceiling — see §4), a few hundred users/hosts total. This is a deliberate, small, trusted-operator deployment, not a hyperscale/adversarial-tenant one — several decisions below (fire-and-forget replication, identical directories) trade blast-radius for simplicity *because* the scale allows it. Don't generalize these choices past that scale without re-deriving them.
@@ -260,19 +260,17 @@ See [`AGENT_LOCAL_DISCOVERY_SPEC.md`](./AGENT_LOCAL_DISCOVERY_SPEC.md) — split
| Continuous/live replication (vs. one-time export-on-join) | **Shipped** (`sso-manager-node`) — a spoke registers its own endpoint at join time (`POST /api/site/spokes`), and every successful master catalog write fires a fire-and-forget push (`utils/site_replicate.js`) at every registered spoke, which re-pulls a fresh export. Verified end-to-end in `docker-compose.multisite-e2e.yml`. | | Continuous/live replication (vs. one-time export-on-join) | **Shipped** (`sso-manager-node`) — a spoke registers its own endpoint at join time (`POST /api/site/spokes`), and every successful master catalog write fires a fire-and-forget push (`utils/site_replicate.js`) at every registered spoke, which re-pulls a fresh export. Verified end-to-end in `docker-compose.multisite-e2e.yml`. |
| Identical-directory signing key | **Shipped**`POST /api/site/export` includes the master's agent-signing key; a spoke adopts it via `agent_keys.adopt()` on join and every resync. OpenBao secret replication *beyond* this one key is still not built. | | Identical-directory signing key | **Shipped**`POST /api/site/export` includes the master's agent-signing key; a spoke adopts it via `agent_keys.adopt()` on join and every resync. OpenBao secret replication *beyond* this one key is still not built. |
| Coordinated master promotion (demote the old master as one action) | **Shipped**`POST /api/site/demote` + `site-promote`'s handoff logic. Fixed two real pre-existing bugs while wiring this in: `site-promote`'s god_admin check read a `req.user.groups` field nothing ever populated (permanently 403'd for everyone), and the read-only write-gate 403'd `site-promote` itself before the handler could run. | | Coordinated master promotion (demote the old master as one action) | **Shipped**`POST /api/site/demote` + `site-promote`'s handoff logic. Fixed two real pre-existing bugs while wiring this in: `site-promote`'s god_admin check read a `req.user.groups` field nothing ever populated (permanently 403'd for everyone), and the read-only write-gate 403'd `site-promote` itself before the handler could run. |
| WireGuard gateway-to-gateway mesh (`theta-gateway`) | **Shipped**`POST /api/mesh/register`/`/join` (join-token bootstrap), `utils/wg_iface.js` (kernel WireGuard, falls back to userspace `wireguard-go`). Verified with a real two-container test: actual encrypted tunnel, real ICMP traffic across it, 0% loss. This is the mesh transport layer only — nothing in `sso-manager-node`'s replication yet routes traffic *over* it; today's site-to-site HTTPS calls (join/export/resync) still go over whatever network path already reaches the target, same as before this layer existed. | | WireGuard gateway-to-gateway mesh (`theta-gateway`) | **Shipped**`POST /api/mesh/register`/`/join` (join-token bootstrap), `utils/wg_iface.js` (kernel WireGuard, falls back to userspace `wireguard-go`). Verified with a real two-container test: actual encrypted tunnel, real ICMP traffic across it, 0% loss. `wg_iface.removePeer()` also cleans up the kernel routes `setPeer()` added (verified live: routes present after `setPeer`, gone after `removePeer`, own local route untouched), and `DELETE /api/mesh/gateways/:id` exposes it from the mesh UI. |
| No-inbound-spoke relay (master proxies a spoke with no public IP) | **Mechanism verified, automation not built.** Confirmed with a standalone test (not `theta-proxy`'s actual Lua/Redis engine, which needs its own dedicated pass to wire safely): a spoke with zero published ports, reachable only via its WG mesh IP, served a request that an external client sent to the master's public port — the master terminated the connection and relayed over the tunnel. So the underlying idea works; what's missing is `theta-proxy` automatically creating that relay route when a no-inbound spoke registers (needs a real service-to-service credential between `sso-manager-node` and `theta-proxy`/`theta-gateway` that doesn't exist yet — a new integration, not a small wiring task), and today's HTTPS-based join/replicate still requires the spoke to reach the master's API directly (and vice versa for export), so a spoke with zero inbound *and* zero outbound path still can't join at all. | | Cross-component routing (replication over the mesh) | **Shipped**`utils/site_replicate.js` tries a registered spoke's `meshIp` first (falling back to its public `endpoint` on failure) when pushing resync pings; a spoke with no `meshIp` on file behaves exactly as before. |
| No-inbound-spoke relay (master proxies a spoke with no public IP) | **Shipped at the API/automation layer, wired into the real bootstrap flow.** `POST /api/site/join`/`/api/site/spokes` accept `noInbound`/`meshIp`/`publicHost` and call `utils/proxy_client.js`, which mints/reuses a `theta-proxy` self-service API token (`prx_...`, OpenBao `secret/integrations/theta-proxy`) and calls the proxy's real Host API to create or update the relay route — verified against a real running `theta-proxy` container (`GET /api/host/:item`'s actual `{item, results: {...}}` response shape, not the flat shape first assumed). `theta-suite`'s `bootstrap/site-relay-register.js` + `CFG_SPOKE_NO_INBOUND`/`CFG_SPOKE_PUBLIC_HOST` (`setup.env.example`) drive it from the operator-facing bring-up flow, re-run automatically on every `setup.sh` invocation until the jump-host mesh IP is discoverable. What's still a manual step, deliberately: the gateway-to-gateway mesh *peering* itself (mint a join token on one jump-host, paste it into the other's UI) — same pattern as minting/pasting a site join key, not something an unattended script should do blind. A spoke with zero inbound *and* zero outbound path still can't join at all (join/export still need the spoke to reach the master's API directly). |
| mDNS local-discovery (Linux) | **Shipped**`theta-gateway` announces (`services/mdns_announce.js`, opt-in via `THETA_LOCAL_DISCOVERY_HOSTS`), `theta-agent` discovers and applies a hosts-file override (`local_discovery.go`, opt-in via `prefer_local_directory`). Verified end-to-end with real containers over real multicast: announce → discover → apply → clean revert on disappearance, all confirmed. Caught two real bugs along the way (`mdns.Lookup()`'s IPv6 query aborting the whole lookup even after a valid IPv4 response arrived; `rename()` failing with EBUSY over a bind-mounted `/etc/hosts`, common in every container runtime) — see the commit messages in `theta-agent`. | | mDNS local-discovery (Linux) | **Shipped**`theta-gateway` announces (`services/mdns_announce.js`, opt-in via `THETA_LOCAL_DISCOVERY_HOSTS`), `theta-agent` discovers and applies a hosts-file override (`local_discovery.go`, opt-in via `prefer_local_directory`). Verified end-to-end with real containers over real multicast: announce → discover → apply → clean revert on disappearance, all confirmed. Caught two real bugs along the way (`mdns.Lookup()`'s IPv6 query aborting the whole lookup even after a valid IPv4 response arrived; `rename()` failing with EBUSY over a bind-mounted `/etc/hosts`, common in every container runtime) — see the commit messages in `theta-agent`. |
| mDNS local-discovery (Windows) | **Shipped**`theta-agent` v2.2.0: Windows hosts override (`%SystemRoot%\System32\drivers\etc\hosts`, CRLF-aware, `ipconfig /flushdns` after each change — reachable because the agent runs as a SYSTEM service, so the elevation question resolved in our favor), plus a /32 host-route pin via the owning local interface (`route.exe add ... metric 1`) so the WireGuard mesh tunnel can't swallow the direct LAN path, and a prompt WS reconnect on apply/revert. Tests run the real Windows write path on the Windows CI leg. | | mDNS local-discovery (Windows) | **Shipped**`theta-agent` v2.2.0: Windows hosts override (`%SystemRoot%\System32\drivers\etc\hosts`, CRLF-aware, `ipconfig /flushdns` after each change — reachable because the agent runs as a SYSTEM service, so the elevation question resolved in our favor), plus a /32 host-route pin via the owning local interface (`route.exe add ... metric 1`) so the WireGuard mesh tunnel can't swallow the direct LAN path, and a prompt WS reconnect on apply/revert. Tests run the real Windows write path on the Windows CI leg. |
| mDNS local-discovery (macOS) | Not built — the hosts override compiles on darwin via the shared unix path, but macOS still needs `dscacheutil -flushcache` and real hardware testing (mDNSResponder behavior, hosts-file vs. native Bonjour — see Appendix B §3). Being built on a real macOS VM. | | mDNS local-discovery (macOS) | Not built — the hosts override compiles on darwin via the shared unix path, but macOS still needs `dscacheutil -flushcache` and real hardware testing (mDNSResponder behavior, hosts-file vs. native Bonjour — see Appendix B §3). Being built on a real macOS VM. |
### TODO — what's actually left, in dependency order ### TODO — what's actually left
1. **Service-to-service auth model for internal components** (`sso-manager-node``theta-proxy`/`theta-gateway`). No unified credential exists today — the site join key (spoke↔master) and the mesh join token (gateway↔gateway) are two separately-invented patterns for the same underlying problem. Items 2 and 3 below both need this; design it once here rather than letting a third integration invent a third pattern. 1. **Full secret replication** — only the agent-signing key is replicated today. LDAP admin credentials, JWT secrets, and other per-deployment secrets still differ per site, which complicates full disaster recovery. **Paused pending a real-deployment question independent of the code**: this repo's own `conf/secrets.js` was found to contain committed real credentials during this work (LDAP bind, SMTP, VoIP.ms) — see the git-remediation note elsewhere in this repo's history. Building a feature that copies live secrets to additional sites shouldn't proceed until provider-side rotation of those specific credentials is confirmed done; the mechanism itself (generic secret sync, never touching those particular values) can still be designed without that answer.
2. **Cross-component routing** — route `sso-manager-node`'s HTTPS replication traffic (join/export/resync) over the WireGuard mesh instead of the open internet, now that the mesh exists as its own transport layer. Blocked on #1. 2. Service-to-service auth, cross-component routing, no-inbound relay automation, and mesh peer cleanup (the four items formerly listed here) are **done** — see the status table above. What remains genuinely open in that area is documented there inline (mesh peering stays a manual step by design; zero-inbound-and-zero-outbound spokes still can't join).
3. **No-inbound relay automation** — the relay mechanism itself is verified (master terminates + relays to a spoke with zero inbound path — see status table), but nothing in `theta-proxy` creates that route automatically when a no-inbound spoke registers. Blocked on #1.
4. **Full secret replication** — only the agent-signing key is replicated today. LDAP admin credentials, JWT secrets, and other per-deployment secrets still differ per site, which complicates full disaster recovery.
5. **Mesh peer cleanup**`wg_iface.removePeer()` doesn't remove the kernel routes `setPeer()` adds (flagged in code; not yet exercised because nothing removes a mesh peer today).
**mDNS local-discovery, macOS** is deliberately not listed above: the Linux and Windows sides are shipped and verified (`theta-agent` v2.2.0), and macOS is being built on a real macOS VM where the darwin-specific behavior (mDNSResponder/DNS-cache) can actually be tested. Check `theta-agent`'s recent history before assuming it's still open. **mDNS local-discovery, macOS** is deliberately not listed above: the Linux and Windows sides are shipped and verified (`theta-agent` v2.2.0), and macOS is being built on a real macOS VM where the darwin-specific behavior (mDNSResponder/DNS-cache) can actually be tested. Check `theta-agent`'s recent history before assuming it's still open.
+12 -8
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@@ -48,13 +48,17 @@ the hard ceiling this addressing scheme supports.
- `NET_ADMIN` capability (or equivalent) on the container/host running the - `NET_ADMIN` capability (or equivalent) on the container/host running the
gateway, to create the WireGuard interface. gateway, to create the WireGuard interface.
## Not yet connected to directory sync ## Connected to directory sync
This mesh is a networking layer on its own. [Theta Directory's multi-site [Theta Directory's multi-site join](../sso/multi-site.html) (catalog + LDAP
join](../sso/multi-site.html) (catalog + LDAP replication between a master replication between a master and its spokes) prefers this mesh once it's up:
and its spokes) does not currently route its traffic over this mesh — the a spoke that's registered a mesh IP gets its live resync pushes routed over
two features work independently today. Routing directory sync over the mesh, the tunnel instead of the open internet, falling back to its public endpoint
and using the mesh to reach a spoke site with no inbound access of its own, if the mesh path fails. A spoke with no public IP at all can also register as
are both designed but not yet automated — see the [architecture no-inbound (`CFG_SPOKE_NO_INBOUND` in `theta-suite`'s `setup.env`) so the
master auto-creates a relay route through its own `theta-proxy` — the master
terminates TLS for that spoke's hostname and relays over this mesh. The mesh
peering itself (this page) stays a manual step on both sides; directory join
and relay registration pick up from there. See the [architecture
spec](https://github.com/theta42/theta-suite/blob/master/docs/MULTI_SITE_SPEC.md) spec](https://github.com/theta42/theta-suite/blob/master/docs/MULTI_SITE_SPEC.md)
for current status. for the full detail.
+14
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@@ -64,6 +64,20 @@ CFG_DOMAIN=example.com
#CFG_MASTER_DIRECTORY_URL=https://sso.master.example.com #CFG_MASTER_DIRECTORY_URL=https://sso.master.example.com
#CFG_MASTER_DIRECTORY_JOIN_KEY=stj_9f2e... #CFG_MASTER_DIRECTORY_JOIN_KEY=stj_9f2e...
# No public IP at all (CGNAT, etc.)? The master can still reach this spoke by
# relaying over the gateway-to-gateway WireGuard mesh instead of the open
# internet (MULTI_SITE_SPEC.md §5.2) -- but the mesh peering itself is a
# manual, out-of-band step on BOTH jump-hosts (mint a mesh join token on the
# master's jump-host, paste it into this site's jump-host "Join a mesh" UI
# action) that can't run unattended inside this script. Once that's done, set
# these two and re-run setup.sh: it discovers this jump-host's assigned mesh
# IP (GET /api/mesh/self) and registers it with the master, which then
# auto-creates the relay route on its own theta-proxy. Safe to leave set
# before meshing -- setup.sh just reports "not meshed yet" and skips until a
# later re-run finds the mesh IP.
#CFG_SPOKE_NO_INBOUND=true
#CFG_SPOKE_PUBLIC_HOST=sso-branch2.master-domain.example.com
# ── Optional outbound HTTP(S) proxy ────────────────────────────────────────── # ── Optional outbound HTTP(S) proxy ──────────────────────────────────────────
# For an isolated/offline/corporate-network test host that only reaches the # For an isolated/offline/corporate-network test host that only reaches the
# internet through an upstream HTTP proxy — NOT the theta42 "proxy" app. # internet through an upstream HTTP proxy — NOT the theta42 "proxy" app.
+19
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@@ -1279,6 +1279,25 @@ NODEEOF
) )
echo "$JUMP_HOSTS_OUT" | sed 's/^/[setup] /' echo "$JUMP_HOSTS_OUT" | sed 's/^/[setup] /'
# ── 7b2. No-inbound relay registration (first-run *and* every re-run) ─────────
# CFG_SPOKE_NO_INBOUND: this site has no public IP, so the master relays to it
# over the gateway-to-gateway WireGuard mesh (MULTI_SITE_SPEC.md §5.2). The
# mesh peering itself is a manual, out-of-band step on both jump-hosts (mint a
# join token on the master's jump-host, paste it into this site's jump-host
# "Join a mesh" UI action) -- it can't run unattended here, and it commonly
# happens AFTER this first setup.sh run finishes. So this step runs on every
# invocation, not just first-run: it discovers this jump-host's mesh IP and
# (re-)registers it with the master, and is a no-op until meshing is done.
if [[ "${CFG_SPOKE_NO_INBOUND:-false}" == "true" ]]; then
if [[ -z "${CFG_SPOKE_PUBLIC_HOST:-}" ]]; then
warn "CFG_SPOKE_NO_INBOUND=true but CFG_SPOKE_PUBLIC_HOST is unset — skipping relay registration."
else
info "Checking no-inbound relay registration (CFG_SPOKE_PUBLIC_HOST=${CFG_SPOKE_PUBLIC_HOST})..."
"${COMPOSE[@]}" exec -T sso-manager node /bootstrap/site-relay-register.js \
"https://$CFG_SSO_HOST" "$CFG_SPOKE_PUBLIC_HOST" || warn "relay registration did not complete — check: ${COMPOSE[*]} exec sso-manager node /bootstrap/site-relay-register.js https://$CFG_SSO_HOST $CFG_SPOKE_PUBLIC_HOST"
fi
fi
# ── 7c. Install theta-agent on the host ────────────────────────────────────── # ── 7c. Install theta-agent on the host ──────────────────────────────────────
# Controlled by CFG_THETA_AGENT_ENABLE (default: 1 = enabled) # Controlled by CFG_THETA_AGENT_ENABLE (default: 1 = enabled)
CFG_THETA_AGENT_ENABLE="${CFG_THETA_AGENT_ENABLE:-1}" CFG_THETA_AGENT_ENABLE="${CFG_THETA_AGENT_ENABLE:-1}"