---
layout: default
title: Architecture
---
# Architecture
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theta-env is a **composition** repo: it builds the two existing projects from
their git submodules and adds the glue that wires them together. It does not
fork or patch them — both projects work unchanged on their own.
---
## The three repos
| Repo | Role |
|------|------|
| [`theta42/sso-manager-node`](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node) | OIDC provider + OpenLDAP directory + web UI. All-in-one image (`Dockerfile.openldap`). |
| [`theta42/proxy`](https://github.com/theta42/proxy) | OIDC-protected reverse proxy (OpenResty + Node mgmt app + Redis). All-in-one image (`Dockerfile`). |
| `theta42/theta-env` (this repo) | Composes the two on one Docker network + automates first-run wiring. |
The two projects are pinned as **git submodules**. `git clone --recursive`
fetches all three in one step; `git submodule update --remote` bumps them.
---
## The two containers
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ your browser / apps / legacy LDAP clients │
└───────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
│ https (:443) ldaps (:636)
┌─────────▼─────────┐
│ proxy container │ OpenResty :80/:443/:4443
│ (OIDC + LDAP) │ Node mgmt app :3000 (localhost only)
│ │ bundled Redis (127.0.0.1:6379)
└─────────┬─────────┘
┌─────────────┼────────────────────────────┐
│ ldaps:636 │ http:3001 (internal) │ OIDC token + userinfo
│ (docker net)│ (docker net, not published)│ (server-to-server)
▼ ▼ │
┌──────────────────────────────┐ │
│ sso-manager container │◄──────────────────┘
│ OIDC provider (Express) │ bundled Redis (127.0.0.1:6379)
│ OpenLDAP (slapd) │ web UI :3001 (localhost only)
│ ldaps :636 (published) │
└───────────────────────────────┘
▲
│ ldaps :636 (published to host) — legacy apps bind directly
│
┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ legacy apps (Gitea, Emby, …)│
└──────────────────────────────┘
```
Both containers bundle their **own Redis** (the proxy hardcodes `127.0.0.1:6379`
in three places that ignore config; the SSO's models default to the same). Two
redis instances is the no-source-patch path and is fine at this scale.
### What's exposed, what's not
| Port | On host? | Purpose |
|------|----------|---------|
| `443` (proxy) | **yes** | the public entry point — OIDC login + proxied apps + the SSO/proxy UIs |
| `80` (proxy) | **yes** | HTTP-01 for Let's Encrypt (and redirect to 443) |
| `4443` (proxy) | yes (optional) | alt HTTPS listener |
| `3000` (proxy) | localhost only | proxy mgmt UI/API (first-run convenience; fronted by 443 normally) |
| `636` (sso) | yes | LDAPS for legacy direct-LDAP clients |
| `3001` (sso) | localhost only | SSO web UI (first-run convenience; fronted by the proxy normally) |
| `389` (sso) | **no** | plain LDAP — internal only (app↔slapd over localhost) |
---
## The first-run bootstrap
`./setup.sh` orchestrates first-run wiring; `bootstrap/bootstrap.js` does the
actual work, running **inside the sso-manager container** (bind-mounted
read-only from this repo). It's deliberately self-contained — only Node
built-ins (`child_process`, `crypto`, `fs`) + global `fetch`, and it reads its
inputs from the bind-mounted `./config/sso-secrets.js` + `./config/proxy-secrets.js`
(not from env):
1. **Build + start sso-manager**, wait for `/health`.
2. **LDAP service account** — `ldapadd` `cn=ldapclient,ou=people,` (an
`organizationalRole` with a `{SSHA512}` password). The proxy binds as this
DN — not the admin DN.
3. **First admin user** — `ldapadd` `cn=,ou=people,` (inetOrgPerson +
posixAccount, `{SSHA512}` password) and add them as `member` of
`app_sso_admin` + `app_sso_oauth_admin` (the SSO's permission check reads the
group's `member` list).
4. **Log in** as that admin via `POST /api/auth/login {uid,password}` — this
also validates the password end-to-end.
5. **Register the proxy as an OIDC client** via `POST /api/oauth/client` (gated
by `app_sso_oauth_admin`, satisfied by step 3). The SSO **generates** the
`client_id`/`client_secret` (UUIDs) — supplied creds are ignored — so the
bootstrap writes the generated creds **back into `./config/proxy-secrets.js`**
(the sso-manager mounts `./config` read-write for this; the proxy mounts it
read-only). If `proxy-secrets.js` already holds a `clientId`+`clientSecret`
matching an existing client, they are kept; if the client exists but the file
has no usable secret, the secret is rotated and written back.
6. **Build + start the proxy**, wait for `/health`. The proxy entrypoint symlinks
`./config/proxy-secrets.js` to `/app/conf/secrets.js`, so `@simpleworkjs/conf`
(≥1.1.0) reads the OAuth creds + LDAP bind creds from the file.
`setup.sh` then prints the first-admin login + the public URLs.
### How config reaches the apps (no `.env`)
All config and secrets live in `./config/` (gitignored, bind-mounted). Each
entrypoint symlinks its file to `/app/conf/secrets.js` early, before the app
starts:
```
./config/sso-secrets.js -> sso-manager:/app/conf/secrets.js (./config RW)
./config/proxy-secrets.js -> proxy:/app/conf/secrets.js (./config RO)
```
`@simpleworkjs/conf` loads `conf/base.js → .js → conf/secrets.js → app_*
env`, where **env beats `secrets.js`**. So compose passes **no `app_*` env vars**
(only `NODE_ENV`, `NODE_PORT`) — that makes `secrets.js` authoritative. The SSO
entrypoint reads the few values it needs at startup (LDAP base DN, admin
password, JWT secret, cert CN) from `secrets.js` via an in-container `node` call.
### Why not `require` the SSO's internal models?
A `docker compose exec` process reads `conf/base.js` defaults (the docker-exec
env doesn't carry the entrypoint's exported vars), so the SSO's models would
bind the wrong LDAP DN. Using the `openldap-clients` binaries with explicit
admin creds from `./config/sso-secrets.js` sidesteps that entirely, and going
through the HTTP API for the OAuth client validates the whole admin login path
end-to-end.
---
## Idempotency
Re-running `./setup.sh` converges to `./config/`:
- The LDAP service account + admin passwords are **reset to `./config/`**.
- Group membership is ensured (add is a no-op if already a member).
- The OAuth client is kept if `proxy-secrets.js` already holds its creds;
created or rotated otherwise, and the new creds written back.
So `setup.sh` is safe to re-run after editing `./config/`, after a `docker
compose down`, or after restoring from backup.
---
## Backups and restore
`./setup.sh` auto-snapshots `./config/` + LDAP + both Redis to
`./backups//` before each rebuild (keeps the last `BACKUP_KEEP`,
default 5). State lives on named volumes (`ldap-data`, `sso-data`, `proxy-data`)
and survives recreation; `down -v` wipes them. Redis is persisted with AOF +
RDB on those volumes. For the full manual-backup + restore runbook (full /
Redis-only / LDAP-only, with the AOF-vs-RDB note), see the *Backups and
restore* section of the [README](https://github.com/theta42/theta-env#backups-and-restore).
Quick LDAP backup:
```bash
docker compose exec sso-manager slapcat -f /etc/openldap/slapd.conf -b "" > backup.ldif
```
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