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Author SHA1 Message Date
wmantly 8a76f71edd Release 1.9.0: Quick Jump copy-to-clipboard section (#23) 2026-07-28 18:11:40 -04:00
wmantly e482f52f10 Add a Quick Jump copy-to-clipboard section to the dashboard (#22)
The uid_-_target grammar-mode SSH command was documented in the README but
nowhere in the UI itself -- users had to remember/reconstruct the format by
hand. Adds a "Quick Jump" card with a one-click-copy command for the
interactive-picker form, plus a copy button on every row of "Hosts you can
reach" that copies the exact grammar-mode command for that specific host
(using the logged-in user's own uid, so it's ready to paste and run as-is).

conf.ssh.listenPort is now passed to the dashboard view so the command can
include the right -p flag when the SSH front door isn't on the default port
22 (theta-env, for example, exposes it on 2222).

Verified live: logged in as the local admin user, confirmed the Quick Jump
command and a per-host command both populate correctly and copy to the
clipboard (toast confirmation), and that the per-host command matches the
exact uid_-_target grammar the SSH server's parseUsername expects.
2026-07-28 18:10:17 -04:00
wmantly a6af160627 Release 1.8.2: audit records carry the real upstream-connect error as failDetail (#21) 2026-07-28 17:57:28 -04:00
wmantly 8c9646b65c Thread real upstream-connect errors into audit records as failDetail (#19)
resolveAndConnect discarded the actual error from connectUpstream
(ECONNREFUSED, ETIMEDOUT, an ssh2 auth failure, ...) and replaced it with
the generic reason string 'upstream-unreachable', so the audit log gave no
way to tell a network-layer failure from an auth failure -- which is why
"Could not reach 192.168.1.206" for the emby host couldn't be root-caused
without live host-shell access. Now the real error message is captured and
surfaced as failDetail, shown as a tooltip on the audit table's fail badge.
2026-07-28 15:50:25 -04:00
wmantly 1d09f243dd Release 1.8.1: Redis persistence fix (#20) 2026-07-28 15:50:11 -04:00
wmantly ec4ca97af4 Fix: Redis had zero persistence — every rebuild wiped sessions, (#18)
in-flight OAuth logins, and any admin-created API token

redis-server ran with --save '' --appendonly no (deliberately ephemeral,
per the original "audit/metrics/session storage" framing). That stopped
being a safe assumption once API tokens (PATs) lived in this same Redis
-- a PAT is supposed to be a stable, long-lived credential, not
disposable session state, but every `docker rm -f jump-host` + rebuild
silently invalidated every one that existed.

Matches proxy's existing pattern exactly: AOF + periodic RDB persisted
to $REDIS_DATA_DIR (default /data), which the deployment mounts as a
volume (see the companion theta-env change).

Verified against a live container: minted a real PAT, force-recreated
the container (docker rm -f + rebuild), confirmed the same token still
authenticates afterward.

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 15:46:40 -04:00
wmantly 21ef8960c4 Merge pull request #17 from theta42/release/1.8.0
Release 1.8.0
2026-07-28 13:35:18 -04:00
wmantly a5bef2980b Release 1.8.0: fix TUI-mode SSH connection drops, HTML-escaped loading indicator
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 13:32:28 -04:00
wmantly ab2ee0fed3 Merge pull request #16 from theta42/fix/tui-session-listener-race
Fix: TUI-mode SSH connections could drop with PTY/shell request failed
2026-07-28 13:07:55 -04:00
wmantly ab9e04e007 Merge pull request #15 from theta42/fix/loading-message-html-escaped
Fix HTML-escaped loading indicator in formAJAX
2026-07-28 13:07:49 -04:00
wmantly a3a6787776 Fix: TUI-mode SSH connections could drop with "PTY allocation
request failed" / "shell request failed"

runTuiSession awaited audit.create() (a Redis round-trip) and then
accessibleHosts() (a directory API call) BEFORE calling runTui(), which
is where the pty/shell/exec/subsystem listeners actually get attached to
the session. The client sends its pty-req and shell requests immediately
after opening the session -- if either await took long enough for those
requests to arrive first, ssh2 auto-rejects any channel request with no
listener (CHANNEL_FAILURE), which is exactly what OpenSSH reports as
"PTY allocation request failed on channel 0" / "shell request failed on
channel 0". The connection then just sat there, since nothing was left
to drive it.

runGrammar already has this exact fix (see its own comment); runTuiSession
never got the equivalent treatment. Fixed the same way: register the
session listeners synchronously, before any await, by having runTui take
a Promise for the hosts list instead of the resolved list -- the shell
handler awaits it internally once the client actually sends a shell
request, which by construction happens only after the listener already
exists.

Verified: publickey auth against a real deployment succeeds (confirms
the earlier ldaps:// fix holds), and the failure reproduces with the
exact reported error strings for a bare `ssh user@host` (TUI/picker mode,
no target) connection. Full suite: 50/50 passing, no regressions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:58:49 -04:00
wmantly 0ead0199a3 Fix HTML-escaped loading indicator in formAJAX
Same fix as sso-manager-node/proxy: formAJAX's loading indicator passed a
raw <div class="spinner-border"> string to app.messages.action, which
HTML-escapes its message by design (@simpleworkjs/frontend). Replaced
with plain text ("Saving…").

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:53:08 -04:00
wmantly 0af2fc7e3d Merge pull request #14 from theta42/release/1.7.1
Release 1.7.1
2026-07-28 00:20:38 -04:00
wmantly bc2180116f Release 1.7.1: add no-native-dialogs regression test
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 00:19:25 -04:00
wmantly 1b70701795 Merge pull request #13 from theta42/test/no-native-dialogs
Add regression test: no native alert()/confirm()/prompt()
2026-07-27 23:58:56 -04:00
wmantly 98e1e0e279 Add regression test: no native alert()/confirm()/prompt()
Native confirm() blocks all further browser events on the page (found
live, mid browser-automation testing, on sso-manager-node's equivalent
secret-rotate flow -- it froze the tab). This app has no such call sites
(never did); this static check (scans views/ and public/js|lib/js for
bare alert(/confirm(/prompt() calls) keeps it that way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 23:57:41 -04:00
wmantly b03fcefaae Merge pull request #12 from theta42/release/1.7.0
Release 1.7.0
2026-07-27 20:26:56 -04:00
wmantly 3474482f6f Release 1.7.0: self-service API tokens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 20:25:40 -04:00
wmantly da361a8a86 Merge pull request #11 from theta42/feature/api-tokens
Add self-service API tokens (PATs)
2026-07-27 20:13:40 -04:00
wmantly 4326d5588e Add self-service API tokens (PATs) — the UI had no way to create one
jump-host had zero API-token support: no model, no route, no UI, and
Auth.checkApiToken was explicitly absent from the createOidcClient() call
(per the comment it left behind). proxy and sso-manager-node both have
this; jump-host didn't.

Ports proxy's models/api_token.js + routes/api_token.js pattern (jmp_
prefix instead of prx_), wires checkApiToken into createOidcClient(), adds
Bearer-token support to middleware/auth.js, and adds a token management
card to dashboard.ejs (create/list/rotate/revoke) using app.modal/
app.messages.

Scope note: a jump-host token carries no group claims (unlike proxy's,
which snapshots the creator's groups), so it authenticates as its creator
for non-admin routes (e.g. GET /api/user/hosts) but can never pass
requireAdmin — a deliberate, conservative default rather than recomputing
live admin status per-request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 19:44:04 -04:00
15 changed files with 565 additions and 35 deletions
+31
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@@ -4,6 +4,37 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented here. Format loosely
follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); versions
correspond to git tags (`vX.Y.Z`) and `nodejs/package.json`'s `version`.
## [1.9.0] - 2026-07-28
### Added
- **"Quick Jump" copy-to-clipboard section on the dashboard** — the `uid_-_target` grammar-mode SSH command was documented in the README but nowhere in the UI. A new card gives a one-click-copy command for interactive-picker mode, and every row in "Hosts you can reach" has its own copy button for the exact grammar-mode command to that host, ready to paste and run as-is (uses the logged-in user's own uid).
## [1.8.2] - 2026-07-28
### Fixed
- **Audit records for a failed upstream connection only ever said `upstream-unreachable`** — `resolveAndConnect` discarded the real error from `connectUpstream` (ECONNREFUSED, ETIMEDOUT, an ssh2 auth-failure message, etc.) and replaced it with that one generic string, so there was no way to tell a network-layer failure from an auth failure from the audit log alone. This is what blocked root-causing the "Could not reach 192.168.1.206" (emby host) report — the real error is now captured and surfaced as a new `failDetail` field on the audit record, shown as a tooltip on the fail badge in the admin audit table.
## [1.8.1] - 2026-07-28
### Fixed
- **Redis had zero persistence** (`--save '' --appendonly no`, no data-dir volume) — every container rebuild/recreation silently wiped all sessions, in-flight OAuth logins, and any admin-created API token. This is why re-running `setup.sh` appeared to "break OAuth with jump": the jump-host container gets recreated, and any token or in-flight login vanished with it. Now Redis persists (AOF + periodic RDB) to `/data`, mounted as a named volume (`jump-redis-data`) in theta-env's compose file. Verified live: minted a PAT, force-recreated the container, confirmed the same PAT still authenticated afterward.
## [1.8.0] - 2026-07-28
### Fixed
- **TUI-mode SSH connections (a bare `ssh user@host`, no target) could drop with "PTY allocation request failed" / "shell request failed"** — `runTuiSession` awaited two real round-trips (an audit-log write, then a directory API call) *before* attaching the session's pty/shell/exec listeners, so a client that sent those requests quickly enough got auto-rejected by ssh2 before anything was listening. `runGrammar` (the `uid_-_target` path) already had the equivalent fix; this ports it to the picker path.
- **`formAJAX`'s loading indicator showed literal HTML**, not a spinner — same fix as sso-manager-node/proxy's companion releases.
## [1.7.1] - 2026-07-28
### Added
- **Regression test**: a static check across all views/client-side scripts fails CI if any native `alert()`/`confirm()`/`prompt()` call appears — these block all further browser events on the page. This app has never had one; keeps it that way.
## [1.7.0] - 2026-07-27
### Added
- **Self-service API tokens (PATs)** — `models/api_token.js` + `routes/api_token.js` (mounted at `/api-token`), Bearer-token support in `middleware/auth.js`, and a create/list/rotate/revoke card on the dashboard. Ports proxy's `jmp_<id>_<secret>` pattern; unlike proxy's, a jump-host token carries no group claims, so it authenticates as its creator for non-admin routes only (never passes `requireAdmin`). jump-host previously had no PAT support at all.
## [1.6.0] - 2026-07-27
### Changed
+11 -3
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@@ -12,9 +12,17 @@ if [[ -f /config/jump-secrets.js ]]; then
info "Loaded config from /config/jump-secrets.js"
fi
# Redis for audit/metrics/session storage (app connects to 127.0.0.1:6379).
info "Starting redis..."
redis-server --daemonize yes --save '' --appendonly no
# Redis for audit/metrics/session AND api-token storage (app connects to
# 127.0.0.1:6379). Persisted (AOF + periodic RDB) to /data, which the
# deployment should mount as a volume -- without this, every container
# recreation silently wiped every session, in-flight OAuth login, and any
# admin-created API token, which is especially bad for the last one since a
# PAT is meant to be a stable, long-lived credential, not session state.
REDIS_DATA_DIR="${REDIS_DATA_DIR:-/data}"
mkdir -p "$REDIS_DATA_DIR"
info "Starting redis (AOF persisted to $REDIS_DATA_DIR)..."
redis-server --daemonize yes --dir "$REDIS_DATA_DIR" --appendonly yes \
--appendfilename appendonly.aof --save 900 1 --save 300 10 --save 60 10000
# Wait for redis to answer before starting the app.
for _ in $(seq 1 20); do
+18
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@@ -9,6 +9,24 @@ const { Auth } = require('../models');
async function auth(req, res, next){
try{
// API-only token: `Authorization: Bearer jmp_<id>_<secret>`. Carries no
// group claims (see models/api_token.js), so it authenticates as its
// creator but never passes requireAdmin below.
const authz = req.header('authorization') || '';
if(authz.slice(0, 7).toLowerCase() === 'bearer '){
const t = await Auth.checkApiToken(authz.slice(7));
req.token = {
user: {username: t.created_by},
created_by: t.created_by,
groupsArray: () => [],
check: () => true,
is_valid: true,
};
req.user = req.token.user;
req.groups = [];
return next();
}
req.token = await Auth.checkToken(req.header('auth-token'));
req.user = req.token.user;
req.groups = typeof req.token.groupsArray === 'function' ? req.token.groupsArray() : [];
+83
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@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
'use strict';
const Table = require('.');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const crypto = require('crypto');
// Self-service personal access token (PAT) for the jump host's own API.
// Format: jmp_<id>_<secret>
// id — 24-char hex, stored plaintext as the record key (O(1) lookup)
// secret — 48-char hex, stored only as a bcrypt hash (isPrivate); shown ONCE
//
// Authenticated via `Authorization: Bearer jmp_...`. Mirrors proxy's
// models/api_token.js — see that file for the fuller design notes. jump-host
// has no per-user group snapshot the way proxy/sso do (its authz is a single
// admin/non-admin bit off conf.auth.adminGroups/adminUsers), so a token
// authenticates as its creator only; the auth middleware re-derives
// admin-ness from that user's current groups, same as a live session.
//
// No `static _ttl`: records persist (lifetime is the optional expires_at field).
const PREFIX = 'jmp_';
const randomHex = (bytes) => crypto.randomBytes(bytes).toString('hex');
class ApiToken extends Table{
static _key = 'id';
static _keyMap = {
'id': {default: function(){ return randomHex(12) }, type: 'string'},
'secret_hash': {isRequired: true, type: 'string', isPrivate: true},
'name': {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 1, max: 255},
'description': {default: '', type: 'string'},
'created_by': {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 3, max: 500},
'created_on': {default: function(){return (new Date).getTime()}},
'updated_on': {default: function(){return (new Date).getTime()}, always: true},
'expires_at': {default: 0, type: 'number'}, // epoch ms; 0 = never
'last_used_on': {default: 0, type: 'number'},
'is_valid': {default: true, type: 'boolean'},
}
get isExpired() {
return this.expires_at > 0 && (new Date).getTime() > this.expires_at;
}
static async add(data){
const id = randomHex(12);
const secret = randomHex(24);
data.id = id;
data.secret_hash = await bcrypt.hash(secret, 10);
const token = await this.create(data);
token._raw_token = `${PREFIX}${id}_${secret}`;
return token;
}
async rotate(){
const secret = randomHex(24);
await this.update({ secret_hash: await bcrypt.hash(secret, 10) });
return `${PREFIX}${this.id}_${secret}`;
}
// Validate a raw `jmp_<id>_<secret>` string. Throws a generic Error on any
// failure so the caller (Auth.checkApiToken) can collapse every case into
// one 401 (no existence / wrong-secret / expired leak).
static async authenticate(raw){
const m = /^jmp_([0-9a-f]{24})_([0-9a-f]{48})$/i.exec(String(raw || ''));
if(!m) throw new Error('InvalidApiToken');
let token;
try{
token = await this.get(m[1]);
}catch(e){
throw new Error('InvalidApiToken');
}
if(!token) throw new Error('InvalidApiToken');
const ok = await bcrypt.compare(m[2], token.secret_hash);
if(!ok || !token.is_valid || token.isExpired) throw new Error('InvalidApiToken');
// Best-effort: stamp last use. Fire-and-forget so a Redis hiccup never
// fails an otherwise-valid request.
try{ await token.update({ last_used_on: (new Date).getTime() }); }catch(_){}
return token;
}
}
ApiToken.register();
module.exports = {ApiToken};
+7 -4
View File
@@ -32,14 +32,17 @@ async function getRedis() {
module.exports.getRedis = getRedis;
// Register models (order matters: User before AuthToken's relation resolves).
// Register models (order matters: User before AuthToken's relation resolves,
// and before ApiToken so `require('.')`'s Table is already exporting User).
require('./user_redis'); // User (redis-backed local + OIDC JIT)
const { ApiToken } = require('./api_token');
module.exports.ApiToken = ApiToken;
// Shared OIDC client (authorization-code + PKCE): session models (Token,
// AuthToken, OidcState), the Auth service, and the /login /logout /oidc/start
// /oidc/callback router — all created on this app's Table/redis. jump-host has
// no Bearer PATs, so checkApiToken is omitted (Auth.checkApiToken is absent).
const oidcClient = createOidcClient({ Table });
// /oidc/callback router — all created on this app's Table/redis. checkApiToken
// wraps ApiToken.authenticate, same wiring as proxy's models/index.js.
const oidcClient = createOidcClient({ Table, checkApiToken: (raw) => ApiToken.authenticate(raw) });
module.exports.Token = oidcClient.Token;
module.exports.AuthToken = oidcClient.AuthToken;
module.exports.OidcState = oidcClient.OidcState;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "t42-jump-host",
"version": "1.6.0",
"version": "1.9.0",
"description": "SSH jump host for the theta42 stack — LDAP-authenticated, directory-driven host bridging with audit and metrics",
"author": [
{
+12 -2
View File
@@ -15,8 +15,18 @@ app.jump = (function(app){
return {metrics: metrics, sessions: sessions, audit: audit, hosts: hosts};
})(app);
// Self-service API token (PAT) management.
app.apiToken = (function(app){
function list(cb){ app.api.get('api-token/', cb); }
function add(args, cb){ app.api.post('api-token/', args, cb); }
function remove(id, cb){ app.api.delete('api-token/' + id, cb); }
function rotate(id, cb){ app.api.post('api-token/' + id + '/rotate', {}, cb); }
return {list: list, add: add, remove: remove, rotate: rotate};
})(app);
// Shared render helpers.
app.jump.fmtTime = function(ts){ return ts ? moment(Number(ts)).format('YYYY-MM-DD HH:mm:ss') : '—'; };
app.jump.esc = function(s){ return $('<div>').text(s == null ? '' : String(s)).html(); };
app.jump.result = function(e){ return e.success ? '<span class="badge bg-success">ok</span>'
: '<span class="badge bg-danger">' + app.jump.esc(e.failReason || 'fail') + '</span>'; };
app.jump.result = function(e){ if (e.success) return '<span class="badge bg-success">ok</span>';
var title = e.failDetail ? ' title="' + app.jump.esc(e.failDetail) + '"' : '';
return '<span class="badge bg-danger"' + title + '>' + app.jump.esc(e.failReason || 'fail') + '</span>'; };
+4 -7
View File
@@ -679,13 +679,10 @@ function formAJAX(btn){
return false;
}
app.messages.action(
`<div class="spinner-border" role="status">
<span class="visually-hidden">Loading...</span>
</div>`,
$form,
'info'
);
// Plain text: app.messages.action HTML-escapes its message (by design,
// see @simpleworkjs/frontend), so raw markup like a spinner <div> would
// render literally instead of as an element.
app.messages.action('Saving…', $form, 'info');
app.api[method]($form.attr('action'), formData, function(error, data){
app.messages.action(data.message, $form, error ? 'danger' : 'success'); //re-populate table
+4
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ router.use('/auth', require('../models').authRouter);
// Who am I — needs a valid session but no admin gate (drives the login state).
router.use('/user', middleware.auth, require('./user'));
// Self-service API token (PAT) management — any authenticated user, no
// admin gate (see routes/api_token.js for why a token can't reach admin routes).
router.use('/api-token', middleware.auth, require('./api_token'));
// Jump-host data — admin only (audit log, active sessions, metrics).
router.use('/', middleware.auth, middleware.requireAdmin, require('./jump'));
+120
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@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
'use strict';
// Self-service API token (PAT) management. Every endpoint is owner-scoped: a
// user only sees / mutates tokens where created_by === req.user.username.
// Mirrors proxy's routes/api_token.js. Mounted under middleware.auth only
// (no requireAdmin) — any authenticated user may mint one, but the token
// itself carries no group claims (see models/api_token.js), so it can only
// reach non-admin routes (e.g. GET /api/user/hosts), never the admin-gated
// ones under routes/jump.js.
const router = require('express').Router();
const {ApiToken} = require('../models');
function forbidden(){
let error = new Error('Forbidden');
error.name = 'Forbidden';
error.message = 'You do not own this API token.';
error.status = 403;
return error;
}
// Resolve a token the caller owns. Missing or not-yours both raise 403 (no
// existence leak; ids are unguessable random hex anyway).
async function getOwned(req, id){
let token;
try{
token = await ApiToken.get(id);
}catch(e){
throw forbidden();
}
if(!token || token.created_by !== req.user.username) throw forbidden();
return token;
}
router.get('/', async function(req, res, next){
try{
return res.json({results: await ApiToken.listDetail({created_by: req.user.username})});
}catch(error){
next(error);
}
});
router.post('/', async function(req, res, next){
try{
const days = req.body.expires_in_days !== '' && req.body.expires_in_days !== undefined
? Number(req.body.expires_in_days) : 0;
const token = await ApiToken.add({
name: req.body.name,
description: req.body.description || '',
created_by: req.user.username,
expires_at: days > 0 ? (new Date).getTime() + days * 86400000 : 0,
});
return res.json({
results: token,
token: token._raw_token,
message: `API token '${token.name}' created. Save it now — it will not be shown again.`,
});
}catch(error){
next(error);
}
});
router.get('/:id', async function(req, res, next){
try{
return res.json({results: await getOwned(req, req.params.id)});
}catch(error){
next(error);
}
});
router.put('/:id', async function(req, res, next){
try{
const token = await getOwned(req, req.params.id);
const update = {};
for(const k of ['name', 'description']){
if(req.body[k] !== undefined) update[k] = req.body[k];
}
if(req.body.expires_in_days !== undefined && req.body.expires_in_days !== ''){
const days = Number(req.body.expires_in_days);
update.expires_at = days > 0 ? (new Date).getTime() + days * 86400000 : 0;
}else if(req.body.expires_at !== undefined){
update.expires_at = Number(req.body.expires_at) || 0;
}
return res.json({
results: await token.update(update),
message: `API token '${token.name}' updated.`,
});
}catch(error){
next(error);
}
});
router.delete('/:id', async function(req, res, next){
try{
const token = await getOwned(req, req.params.id);
await token.remove();
return res.json({id: req.params.id, message: `API token '${token.name}' revoked.`});
}catch(error){
next(error);
}
});
router.post('/:id/rotate', async function(req, res, next){
try{
const token = await getOwned(req, req.params.id);
const raw = await token.rotate();
return res.json({
token: raw,
message: `API token '${token.name}' rotated. Save it — it will not be shown again.`,
});
}catch(error){
next(error);
}
});
module.exports = router;
+4
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ const values = {
titleIcon: conf.environment !== 'production' ? '<i class="fa-brands fa-dev"></i>' : '',
name: conf.name,
logo: conf.logo,
// The SSH front door's port -- the dashboard's "quick jump" copy buttons
// need this to build a real, working `ssh ...` command (the web UI and
// SSH front door share a hostname but not a port).
sshPort: (conf.ssh && conf.ssh.listenPort) || 22,
...buildInfo,
};
+50 -16
View File
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ async function resolveAndConnect(state, record, { onHostKey } = {}) {
let justInjected = false;
try { justInjected = await ensureKeyInjected(state.user, JUMP_KEYS.publicLine); }
catch (_) { throw fail('key-inject-failed'); }
catch (err) { throw fail('key-inject-failed', err.message); }
let upstream;
try {
@@ -139,12 +139,16 @@ async function resolveAndConnect(state, record, { onHostKey } = {}) {
username: state.uid, privateKey: JUMP_KEYS.clientKey,
uid: state.uid, justInjected, onHostKey,
});
} catch (_) { throw fail('upstream-unreachable'); }
} catch (err) { throw fail('upstream-unreachable', err.message); }
return { upstream, host, endpoint };
}
function fail(reason) { const e = new Error(reason); e.reason = reason; return e; }
// detail carries the real underlying error message (e.g. ECONNREFUSED,
// ETIMEDOUT, an ssh2 auth-failure string) so audit records aren't reduced to
// just the generic reason code -- without it, a network-layer failure and an
// SSH auth failure both looked identical in the audit log.
function fail(reason, detail) { const e = new Error(reason); e.reason = reason; e.detail = detail; return e; }
async function runGrammar(session, client, state) {
// Register session listeners IMMEDIATELY — before any async work.
@@ -174,25 +178,47 @@ async function runGrammar(session, client, state) {
} catch (err) {
const reason = err.reason || 'error';
rejectUp(new Error(reasonMessage(reason)));
await record.finish({ success: false, failReason: reason });
await record.finish({ success: false, failReason: reason, failDetail: err.detail });
await metrics.bump({ uid: state.uid, success: false });
}
}
async function runTuiSession(session, client, state) {
// Register session listeners IMMEDIATELY, before any await — same fix,
// same reason, as runGrammar above. The client sends pty-req and shell
// requests right after opening the session; awaiting audit.create() and
// accessibleHosts() first (both real round-trips: Redis, then the
// directory API) left a window where those requests could arrive before
// runTui had attached any listener for them, and ssh2 auto-rejects an
// unlistened channel request with CHANNEL_FAILURE — surfacing to the
// client as "PTY allocation request failed" / "shell request failed",
// with the connection then just sitting there (nothing left to drive it).
let resolveHosts, rejectHosts;
const hostsPromise = new Promise((res, rej) => { resolveHosts = res; rejectHosts = rej; });
// A silent catch so a rejection isn't "unhandled" if the client never
// sends a shell request at all (exec-only) — runTui's own .catch() below
// still runs independently when it does.
hostsPromise.catch(() => {});
const tuiPromise = runTui(session, state.uid, hostsPromise);
const record = await audit.create({ uid: state.uid, authMethod: state.authMethod, clientIp: state.clientIp, mode: 'tui' });
const finishFail = async (reason) => {
await record.finish({ success: false, failReason: reason });
const finishFail = async (reason, detail) => {
await record.finish({ success: false, failReason: reason, failDetail: detail });
await metrics.bump({ uid: state.uid, success: false });
try { client.end(); } catch (_) {}
};
let hosts;
try { hosts = await accessibleHosts(state.user); }
catch (_) { return finishFail('directory-unreachable'); }
try {
hosts = await accessibleHosts(state.user);
resolveHosts(hosts);
} catch (_) {
rejectHosts(new Error('directory-unreachable'));
return finishFail('directory-unreachable');
}
const tui = await runTui(session, state.uid, hosts);
const tui = await tuiPromise;
if (!tui.host) return finishFail('cancelled');
state.target = tui.host.slug;
@@ -201,7 +227,7 @@ async function runTuiSession(session, client, state) {
let justInjected = false;
try { justInjected = await ensureKeyInjected(state.user, JUMP_KEYS.publicLine); }
catch (_) { return finishFail('key-inject-failed'); }
catch (err) { return finishFail('key-inject-failed', err.message); }
let upstream;
try {
@@ -210,9 +236,9 @@ async function runTuiSession(session, client, state) {
username: state.uid, privateKey: JUMP_KEYS.clientKey,
uid: state.uid, justInjected, onHostKey: (fp) => record.patch({ hostKeyFp: fp }),
});
} catch (_) {
} catch (err) {
try { tui.channel.write(`\r\n Could not reach ${endpoint.address}.\r\n`); tui.channel.close(); } catch (_) {}
return finishFail('upstream-unreachable');
return finishFail('upstream-unreachable', err.message);
}
registry.add(record.id, { uid: state.uid, target: endpoint.address, slug: tui.host.slug });
@@ -253,7 +279,10 @@ function reasonMessage(reason) {
// Run the TUI picker over a shell channel; returns { host, channel, ptyInfo }.
// host is null if the user quit. exec/subsystem in picker mode are rejected.
function runTui(session, uid, hosts) {
// Takes a Promise for the accessible-hosts list (not the resolved list)
// so the caller can register these listeners before that lookup completes
// — see the comment in runTuiSession for why that ordering matters.
function runTui(session, uid, hostsPromise) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
let ptyInfo = null;
let settled = false;
@@ -262,9 +291,14 @@ function runTui(session, uid, hosts) {
session.on('pty', (accept, _reject, info) => { ptyInfo = info; accept && accept(); });
session.on('shell', (accept) => {
const channel = accept();
pickHost(channel, uid, hosts).then((host) => {
if (!host) { try { channel.write('\r\n Bye.\r\n'); channel.close(); } catch (_) {} }
finish({ host, channel, ptyInfo });
hostsPromise.then((hosts) => {
pickHost(channel, uid, hosts).then((host) => {
if (!host) { try { channel.write('\r\n Bye.\r\n'); channel.close(); } catch (_) {} }
finish({ host, channel, ptyInfo });
});
}).catch(() => {
try { channel.write('\r\n Could not reach the directory.\r\n'); channel.close(); } catch (_) {}
finish({ host: null });
});
});
session.on('exec', (accept) => {
@@ -156,6 +156,29 @@ test('shell bridges and echoes', async () => {
assert.match(out, /echo:ping/);
});
test('connectUpstream rejects with a specific, non-generic error when the target refuses the connection', async () => {
// Regression coverage for ssh_server.js's resolveAndConnect: it used to
// discard this error entirely (catch (_) { throw fail('upstream-unreachable') }),
// so the audit log recorded the same generic reason for a refused port, a
// timeout, or a bad key alike. Now the real message is threaded through as
// failDetail, so this must stay meaningful.
// Bind a server just to reserve a free port, then close it immediately so
// nothing is listening there — guarantees ECONNREFUSED rather than relying
// on a hardcoded port number that might be in use.
const closedPort = await new Promise((resolve) => {
const probe = require('net').createServer();
probe.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => { const p = probe.address().port; probe.close(() => resolve(p)); });
});
await assert.rejects(
connectUpstream({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: closedPort, username: 'test', privateKey: jumpKey, uid: 'test', justInjected: false }),
(err) => {
assert.ok(err.message && err.message.length > 0);
assert.notStrictEqual(err.message, 'upstream-unreachable');
return true;
},
);
});
test('sftp subsystem bytes pass through', async () => {
const { conn, ready } = connectJump();
await ready;
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
'use strict';
// Regression guard: native alert()/confirm()/prompt() calls block all further
// browser events on the page (found live, mid browser-automation testing, on
// sso-manager-node's equivalent secret-rotate flow) and are visually
// inconsistent with the rest of the UI. This app has no such call sites;
// keep it that way.
const { test } = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const ROOTS = ['views', 'public/js', 'public/lib/js'].map((d) => path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', d));
const NATIVE_DIALOG_RE = /(^|[^.\w$])(alert|confirm|prompt)\s*\(/g;
function walk(dir) {
let files = [];
if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) return files;
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
const full = path.join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) files = files.concat(walk(full));
else if (/\.(ejs|js)$/.test(entry.name)) files.push(full);
}
return files;
}
test('no view or client-side script calls native alert()/confirm()/prompt()', () => {
const offenders = [];
for (const root of ROOTS) {
for (const file of walk(root)) {
const src = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
let m;
NATIVE_DIALOG_RE.lastIndex = 0;
while ((m = NATIVE_DIALOG_RE.exec(src))) {
const line = src.slice(0, m.index).split('\n').length;
offenders.push(`${path.relative(path.join(__dirname, '..', '..'), file)}:${line}${m[2]}(`);
}
}
}
assert.deepStrictEqual(offenders, []);
});
+154 -2
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,27 @@
</div>
</div>
<div class="row g-3 mb-4">
<div class="col-12">
<div class="card shadow-sm">
<div class="card-header"><i class="fa-solid fa-terminal me-1"></i> Quick Jump</div>
<div class="card-body">
<p class="text-muted small mb-2">
Skip the picker: <code>ssh &lt;your-username&gt;_-_&lt;host-slug&gt;@&lt;this-jump-host&gt;</code>
connects straight to a host. Or just <code>ssh &lt;your-username&gt;@&lt;this-jump-host&gt;</code>
for the interactive picker.
</p>
<div class="input-group">
<input type="text" class="form-control font-monospace" id="quick-jump-cmd" readonly>
<button class="btn btn-outline-secondary" onclick="copySshCommand('#quick-jump-cmd')" title="Copy">
<i class="fa-solid fa-copy"></i>
</button>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="row g-3 mb-4">
<div class="col-12">
<div class="card shadow-sm">
@@ -37,7 +58,7 @@
</div>
</div>
<div class="row g-3">
<div class="row g-3 mb-4">
<div class="col-md-6">
<div class="card shadow-sm"><div class="card-header"><i class="fa-solid fa-server me-1"></i> Top hosts</div>
<table class="table table-sm mb-0"><tbody id="top-hosts"></tbody></table>
@@ -50,6 +71,27 @@
</div>
</div>
<div class="row g-3">
<div class="col-12">
<div class="card shadow-sm">
<div class="card-header d-flex justify-content-between align-items-center">
<span><i class="fa-solid fa-key me-1"></i> API Tokens</span>
<button class="btn btn-sm btn-primary" onclick="createApiToken()"><i class="fa-solid fa-plus"></i> New token</button>
</div>
<div class="card-header actionMessage" style="display:none"></div>
<p class="text-muted small px-3 pt-3 mb-0">
Personal access tokens authenticate as you against this jump host's own API
(e.g. <code>GET /api/user/hosts</code>) — not for SSH login. A token carries
no group claims, so it can't reach admin-only endpoints.
</p>
<table class="table table-sm mb-0">
<thead><tr><th>Name</th><th>Created</th><th>Last used</th><th>Expires</th><th></th></tr></thead>
<tbody id="api-tokens"></tbody>
</table>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<script type="text/javascript">
function rows(sel, list){
var $b = $(sel).empty();
@@ -58,16 +100,124 @@
$b.append('<tr><td>' + app.jump.esc(x.name) + '</td><td class="text-end">' + x.count + '</td></tr>');
});
}
// The web UI and the SSH front door share a hostname, just not a port.
var SSH_PORT = <%- JSON.stringify(sshPort) %>;
function sshCommand(target){
var uid = app.auth.user && app.auth.user.username;
if(!uid) return '';
var portFlag = SSH_PORT === 22 ? '' : ' -p ' + SSH_PORT;
return 'ssh ' + uid + (target ? '_-_' + target : '') + '@' + location.hostname + portFlag;
}
function copySshCommand(sel){
var $el = $(sel);
var text = $el.val();
if(!text) return;
navigator.clipboard.writeText(text).then(function(){
app.messages.toast('Copied to clipboard', 'success');
}, function(){
app.messages.toast('Could not copy — select and copy manually', 'danger');
});
}
function hostRows(sel, hosts){
var $b = $(sel).empty();
if(!hosts || !hosts.length){ $b.append('<tr><td class="text-muted">No hosts reachable.</td></tr>'); return; }
hosts.forEach(function(h){
var addr = (h.metadata && (h.metadata.ip || h.metadata.address)) || '';
var rowId = 'host-cmd-' + h.slug.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, '');
$b.append('<tr><td>' + app.jump.esc(h.displayName || h.name || h.slug) + '</td>'
+ '<td class="text-muted small">' + app.jump.esc(h.slug) + '</td>'
+ '<td class="text-end text-muted small">' + app.jump.esc(addr) + '</td></tr>');
+ '<td class="text-end text-muted small">' + app.jump.esc(addr) + '</td>'
+ '<td class="text-end">'
+ '<input type="hidden" id="' + rowId + '" value="' + app.jump.esc(sshCommand(h.slug)) + '">'
+ '<button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-secondary" onclick="copySshCommand(\'#' + rowId + '\')" title="Copy quick-jump command"><i class="fa-solid fa-copy"></i></button>'
+ '</td></tr>');
});
}
function tokenRows(tokens){
var $b = $('#api-tokens').empty();
if(!tokens || !tokens.length){ $b.append('<tr><td colspan="5" class="text-muted">No API tokens.</td></tr>'); return; }
tokens.forEach(function(t){
var expires = t.expires_at ? app.jump.fmtTime(t.expires_at) : 'Never';
var lastUsed = t.last_used_on ? app.jump.fmtTime(t.last_used_on) : 'Never';
$b.append(
'<tr>'
+ '<td>' + app.jump.esc(t.name) + '</td>'
+ '<td class="text-muted small">' + app.jump.fmtTime(t.created_on) + '</td>'
+ '<td class="text-muted small">' + lastUsed + '</td>'
+ '<td class="text-muted small">' + expires + '</td>'
+ '<td class="text-end">'
+ '<button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-secondary" onclick="rotateApiToken(\'' + t.id + '\', this)" title="Rotate"><i class="fa-solid fa-rotate"></i></button> '
+ '<button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-danger" onclick="revokeApiToken(\'' + t.id + '\', this)" title="Revoke"><i class="fa-solid fa-trash"></i></button>'
+ '</td>'
+ '</tr>'
);
});
}
function loadApiTokens(){
app.apiToken.list(function(error, data){
if(error) return tokenRows([]);
tokenRows(data && data.results);
});
}
function showToken(title, token){
app.modal.open({title: title, bodyHtml:
'<p class="text-danger"><i class="fa-solid fa-triangle-exclamation"></i> Save this token now — it will <strong>not</strong> be shown again.</p>'
+ '<div class="input-group"><input type="text" class="form-control font-monospace" readonly value="' + app.jump.esc(token) + '"></div>'
+ '<p class="mt-3 mb-0 text-muted small">Use it as a bearer token:<br><code>Authorization: Bearer ' + app.jump.esc(token) + '</code></p>'
});
}
function createApiToken(){
var $body = app.modal.open({title: 'New API Token', bodyHtml:
'<div class="mb-3">'
+ '<label class="form-label">Name</label>'
+ '<input type="text" class="form-control" id="new-token-name" placeholder="e.g. laptop-cron">'
+ '</div>'
+ '<div class="mb-3">'
+ '<label class="form-label">Expires in (days, blank = never)</label>'
+ '<input type="number" class="form-control" id="new-token-days" min="1">'
+ '</div>'
+ '<button class="btn btn-primary" onclick="submitApiToken()"><i class="fa-solid fa-check"></i> Create</button>'
});
$body.find('#new-token-name').focus();
}
function submitApiToken(){
var name = $('#new-token-name').val().trim();
var $card = $('#api-tokens').closest('.card');
if(!name) return app.messages.action('Name is required', $card, 'danger');
app.apiToken.add({
name: name,
expires_in_days: $('#new-token-days').val(),
}, function(error, data){
if(error) return app.messages.action((data && data.message) || 'Failed to create token', $card, 'danger');
showToken('API Token Created', data.token);
loadApiTokens();
});
}
async function revokeApiToken(id, btn){
var $card = $(btn).closest('.card');
var ok = await app.messages.confirm('Revoke this API token? It stops working immediately.', $card, 'danger');
if(!ok) return;
app.apiToken.remove(id, function(error, data){
if(error) return app.messages.action((data && data.message) || 'Failed to revoke token', $card, 'danger');
loadApiTokens();
});
}
async function rotateApiToken(id, btn){
var $card = $(btn).closest('.card');
var ok = await app.messages.confirm('Rotate this API token? The old token stops working immediately.', $card, 'warning');
if(!ok) return;
app.apiToken.rotate(id, function(error, data){
if(error) return app.messages.action((data && data.message) || 'Failed to rotate token', $card, 'danger');
showToken('API Token Rotated', data.token);
loadApiTokens();
});
}
$(document).ready(async function(){
app.jump.metrics(function(error, data){
if(error || !data) return;
@@ -80,10 +230,12 @@
});
await app.auth.loadUser();
if(app.auth.isAdmin()) $('#my-hosts-title').text('All hosts');
$('#quick-jump-cmd').val(sshCommand());
app.jump.hosts(function(error, data){
if(error) return hostRows('#my-hosts', []);
hostRows('#my-hosts', data && data.results);
});
loadApiTokens();
});
</script>
<%- include('bottom') %>