wmantly
db3333e26d
bao-conf 1.0.0's init() threw when VAULT_TOKEN was unset, crashing boot (.catch -> process.exit(1)) in any deployment without an OpenBao sidecar (standalone Docker, bare metal). 1.0.1 makes init() fail-soft on a missing token (warn + continue from CONF_SECRETS). The theta-env stack is unaffected (it always sets a scoped VAULT_TOKEN). Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
195 lines
19 KiB
Markdown
195 lines
19 KiB
Markdown
# Changelog
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All notable changes to this project are documented here. Format loosely
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follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); versions
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correspond to git tags (`vX.Y.Z`) and `nodejs/package.json`'s `version`.
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## [1.14.1] - 2026-08-01
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### Fixed
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- **Bumped `@simpleworkjs/bao-conf` to 1.0.1** so standalone/no-OpenBao boots
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don't crash. bao-conf 1.0.0's `init()` threw when `VAULT_TOKEN` was unset,
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which — combined with `bin/www`'s `.catch(() => process.exit(1))` — made the
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jump host exit at boot in any deployment without an OpenBao sidecar
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(standalone Docker, bare metal). 1.0.1 makes `init()` fail-soft on a missing
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token (warn + continue from `CONF_SECRETS`), matching the documented
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contract. The theta-env stack is unaffected (it always sets a scoped
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`VAULT_TOKEN`).
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## [1.14.0] - 2026-08-01
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### Changed
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- **Secrets now load from OpenBao at boot** via
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[@simpleworkjs/bao-conf](https://simpleworkjs.github.io/bao-conf/), which
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deep-merges `secret/jump-host/conf` over the file-loaded config. The jump
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host authenticates to OpenBao with a scoped `VAULT_TOKEN` (policy
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`jump-host` — read-only on its own path), never the root token. Because the
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OIDC `clientSecret` is captured at require time inside `createOidcClient`
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(during `require('../models')`), `bin/www` now runs `bao-conf.init()`
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**before** `require('../models')`. Fail-soft: if OpenBao is unreachable,
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boot continues from `CONF_SECRETS`. The `config/jump-secrets.js` file is now
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an operator-edit seed artifact (gitignored); OpenBao is authoritative. See
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theta-env's [Secrets docs](https://theta42.github.io/theta-env/secrets/).
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- Bumped package version to track the release tag.
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## [1.11.0] - 2026-07-30
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### Added
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- **`app_super_admin` (cross-app) and `app_jump_admin` groups**: super admins are full admins here same as `app_sso_admin`; jump admins get audit page/data access without other admin rights. The Audit page/API is now actually admin-gated server-side (previously the page shell rendered for any logged-in user, only its data was gated).
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- **Host list adds Last connection/Last failed connection columns** and highlights rows green (a session is live right now) or yellow (the most recent attempt failed), backed by new per-host last-success/last-fail timestamps in `models/metrics.js`. `services/ssh_server.js` now attributes grammar/TUI connect failures to the resolved host when one was found, not just aggregate counters.
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### Changed
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- **Dashboard's stat boxes and Top hosts/Top users cards moved to the Audit page** (audit is now the admin-facing metrics home; dashboard stays focused on "hosts I can reach"). "All hosts" renamed to "My hosts".
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## [1.10.2] - 2026-07-30
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### Changed
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- **Dashboard, Sessions, and Audit pages now match sso-manager-node/proxy's page width**, wrapping content in a standard container instead of rendering full-bleed inside the fluid shell.
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- **Audit's nav entry is now admin-gated** (`groups: ['admin']` in `utils/ui.js`), reusing the existing synthetic-admin-group nav-gating convention — the API route was already server-side admin-gated; this hides the nav link for non-admins too.
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## [1.10.1] - 2026-07-28
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### Fixed
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- **The API-token reveal modal silently didn't show after creating a token** — `submitApiToken()` called `app.modal.close()` immediately before `showToken()`'s `app.modal.open()` in the same tick, colliding with Bootstrap's hide-transition guard on the singleton modal. Same root cause as the OAuth-secret-reveal race fixed in sso-manager-node (v1.8.2) and the create-token race fixed in proxy (v1.7.0).
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## [1.10.0] - 2026-07-28
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### Added
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- **API-token UI unified with sso-manager-node/proxy**: card grid replacing the bare table, a new Edit modal (footer shows real created-by/on data), and a Description field on both the create and edit flows — the model and API already fully supported all of this, it just wasn't exposed anywhere in the dashboard.
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### Changed
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- `@simpleworkjs/frontend` bumped to `^0.2.6` (this app was still on `^0.2.5`).
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## [1.9.0] - 2026-07-28
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### Added
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- **"Quick Jump" copy-to-clipboard section on the dashboard** — the `uid_-_target` grammar-mode SSH command was documented in the README but nowhere in the UI. A new card gives a one-click-copy command for interactive-picker mode, and every row in "Hosts you can reach" has its own copy button for the exact grammar-mode command to that host, ready to paste and run as-is (uses the logged-in user's own uid).
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## [1.8.2] - 2026-07-28
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### Fixed
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- **Audit records for a failed upstream connection only ever said `upstream-unreachable`** — `resolveAndConnect` discarded the real error from `connectUpstream` (ECONNREFUSED, ETIMEDOUT, an ssh2 auth-failure message, etc.) and replaced it with that one generic string, so there was no way to tell a network-layer failure from an auth failure from the audit log alone. This is what blocked root-causing the "Could not reach 192.168.1.206" (emby host) report — the real error is now captured and surfaced as a new `failDetail` field on the audit record, shown as a tooltip on the fail badge in the admin audit table.
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## [1.8.1] - 2026-07-28
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### Fixed
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- **Redis had zero persistence** (`--save '' --appendonly no`, no data-dir volume) — every container rebuild/recreation silently wiped all sessions, in-flight OAuth logins, and any admin-created API token. This is why re-running `setup.sh` appeared to "break OAuth with jump": the jump-host container gets recreated, and any token or in-flight login vanished with it. Now Redis persists (AOF + periodic RDB) to `/data`, mounted as a named volume (`jump-redis-data`) in theta-env's compose file. Verified live: minted a PAT, force-recreated the container, confirmed the same PAT still authenticated afterward.
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## [1.8.0] - 2026-07-28
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### Fixed
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- **TUI-mode SSH connections (a bare `ssh user@host`, no target) could drop with "PTY allocation request failed" / "shell request failed"** — `runTuiSession` awaited two real round-trips (an audit-log write, then a directory API call) *before* attaching the session's pty/shell/exec listeners, so a client that sent those requests quickly enough got auto-rejected by ssh2 before anything was listening. `runGrammar` (the `uid_-_target` path) already had the equivalent fix; this ports it to the picker path.
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- **`formAJAX`'s loading indicator showed literal HTML**, not a spinner — same fix as sso-manager-node/proxy's companion releases.
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## [1.7.1] - 2026-07-28
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### Added
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- **Regression test**: a static check across all views/client-side scripts fails CI if any native `alert()`/`confirm()`/`prompt()` call appears — these block all further browser events on the page. This app has never had one; keeps it that way.
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## [1.7.0] - 2026-07-27
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### Added
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- **Self-service API tokens (PATs)** — `models/api_token.js` + `routes/api_token.js` (mounted at `/api-token`), Bearer-token support in `middleware/auth.js`, and a create/list/rotate/revoke card on the dashboard. Ports proxy's `jmp_<id>_<secret>` pattern; unlike proxy's, a jump-host token carries no group claims, so it authenticates as its creator for non-admin routes only (never passes `requireAdmin`). jump-host previously had no PAT support at all.
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## [1.6.0] - 2026-07-27
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### Changed
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- **Adopted `@simpleworkjs/frontend`'s `app.messages`, `app.modal`, and `app.validate` modules**, replacing the vendored `app.util.actionMessage`/`actionConfirm` in `public/lib/js/app-base.js` and the vendored `public/lib/js/val.js` (unused by any current view here, so this is dedup/future-proofing rather than a behavior change). `app.api`/`app.auth`/`app.pubsub`/`app.socket` are untouched.
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## [1.5.0] - 2026-07-27
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### Added
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- **Web UI dashboard now lists the hosts you can reach** ("Hosts you can reach", or "All hosts" for admins) — previously the dashboard only showed usage metrics, with no way to see your actual access from the browser. Backed by a new `GET /api/user/hosts` endpoint (auth-only, not admin-gated): admins get the full inventory via `utils/access.js`'s new `allHosts()`, everyone else gets the same group-based resolution the SSH front door uses.
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- `utils/access.js`'s `accessibleHosts()` now accepts a pre-resolved `groups` array on the user object, skipping the LDAP `getGroups(dn)` round-trip — the web UI's OIDC session already has its groups claim and has no LDAP `dn` to query with.
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### Fixed
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- **Bumped `@simpleworkjs/ldap` to 1.0.1**, which fixes `addSshKey` throwing `ObjectClassViolationError` (LDAP `0x41`) on accounts predating the `ldapPublicKey` auxiliary objectClass. This is the code path this jump host's key-injection (`utils/key_inject.js`) uses on every first connection for a user — on affected accounts it aborted the SSH connection entirely (`key-inject-failed`).
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## [1.4.0] - 2026-07-26
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### Added
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- **Standalone mode** — run the jump host with no LDAP directory and no SSO Manager at all. Set `standalone.enabled: true` and user authentication and host discovery switch to `@simpleworkjs/orm`-backed stores (Sequelize; SQLite by default, any Sequelize-supported dialect via `conf.orm`) instead of the directory services. `models/user_ldap.js` and `utils/access.js` become conditional facades that pick their backend at require time — `ssh_server.js`, `bridge.js`, `key_inject.js`, `tui_picker.js`, and the web UI are unchanged either way.
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- New ORM models: `StandaloneUser` (`uid`, `passwordHash`, `sshPublicKeys`, `groups`) and `StandaloneHost` (`slug`, `displayName`, `kind`, `metadata`), plus `models/user_file.js` and `utils/hosts_file.js`, which implement the same interfaces as the LDAP client and `accessibleHosts()` respectively. There's no admin UI for standalone users/hosts yet — see the README's "Standalone mode" section for the ORM-model seeding snippet. In standalone mode every stored host is reachable by every stored user; there's no group-based authorization yet.
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- 47 tests pass (24 existing + 15 new unit + 3 existing integration + 5 new standalone integration).
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### Fixed
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- **`services/ssh_server.js` used `|| 2222` for the listen port**, so an explicit `listenPort: 0` (ephemeral port, used by the test suite) was silently overridden back to 2222. Changed to `?? 2222`.
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- **`services/ssh_server.js` awaited `audit.create()` before registering session listeners.** A client that sends `exec`/`shell` immediately after connecting could have its request dropped because nothing was listening yet. Listener registration now happens first.
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## [1.3.0] - 2026-07-26
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### Changed
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- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
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- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
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- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
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- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
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- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
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- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
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### Fixed
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- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
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- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
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- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
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- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
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### Added
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- `.group-required { display: none }` in `public/css/styles.css`, the base rule the shared gating model reveals against.
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- `#spa-shell` dropped its inline `margin-top`; `styles.css` already sets it and the shared shell adjusts it when a banner is shown.
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### Verified
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- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
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## [1.2.0] - 2026-07-25
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### Added
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- Adopted the shared `@simpleworkjs/*` packages published under the simpleworkjs org, replacing this app's byte-identical forks of the same code so the theta42 apps share one codebase and API schema:
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- `@simpleworkjs/oidc-client` — the OIDC client (session models, auth router, OIDC utils, safe-redirect, local-admin bootstrap). Deleted the local `utils/oidc.js`, `utils/safe_redirect.js`, `models/oidc_state.js`, `models/token.js`, `models/auth.js`, `routes/auth.js`; `models/index.js` wires the factory and the local-admin bootstrap.
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- `@simpleworkjs/directory-schema` — the sso↔jump-host directory contract. `utils/access.js` now fetches reachable hosts through the shared `createDirectoryClient` (`getResourcesByGroup`).
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- `@simpleworkjs/ldap` — `models/user_ldap.js` is now a thin wrapper over `createLdapClient`, preserving this app's loose TLS default (`rejectUnauthorized: false`) and the exact export shape.
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- `@simpleworkjs/app-stack` — unified `build_info` (`{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}`) and the `static-modules` mounting helper. `build_info` moved from `models/` to `utils/`; `routes/render.js` uses `mountStaticModules`.
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### Fixed
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- **Directory envelope drift was silently treated as "no reachable hosts".** `utils/access.js` previously read `data.results || []`, so if the SSO directory ever returned a bare array (envelope drift) every per-group query collapsed to `[]` and no user could bridge. The shared client now validates the `{ results }` envelope on every call and treats an envelope violation as a failed group fetch rather than silently returning `[]`.
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### Changed
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- Dependency alignment: `ldapts` `^8.1.2` → `^8.1.8`, `redis` `^4.7` → `^6.1.0` (the direct `redis` dep is unused — only `model-redis` is used, which already brings `redis` ^6.1.0). The new `@simpleworkjs/*` deps resolve from the npm registry (`^1.0.0`); no `file:`/`link:` entries in the lockfile, so `npm ci` is clean in docker builds.
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- `build_info` export shape changed from `{commit, version}` to `{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}` (the shared shape used by all three apps). The `/health` endpoint and footer now report `buildVersion`/`buildHash`.
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## [1.1.0] - 2026-07-23
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### Changed
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- **Rebuilt the web UI on the shared theta42 app stack** so it looks and behaves like the SSO Manager and Proxy: Express + EJS with the same `top.ejs`/`bottom.ejs` shell, Bootstrap 5, jQuery, jq-repeat, FontAwesome, the shared `app-base.js` client framework, and Socket.IO — replacing the bespoke minimal theme. Dashboard, Sessions, and Audit pages now render in the common look/feel.
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- **Web-UI auth is now OIDC + a local anti-lockout admin** (the proxy's model), replacing the direct LDAP-bind login. Normal users log in through the SSO ("Log in with SSO"); a local `auth.adminUsers` account (bootstrapped on first boot, password from `auth.localAdminPass`) still works if the SSO is unreachable. Admin access is gated by `auth.adminGroups` or the local admin account. New config: `oidc` block + `auth.adminUsers`/`localAdminPass`. **Note:** the SSH bridge and its own LDAP auth are unchanged — this only affects the web management UI.
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## [1.0.1] - 2026-07-23
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### Fixed
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- Test scripts use shell-expanded globs and CI provides a redis service, so `npm test` runs green on the Node 20/22 CI runners (the `node --test` `**` glob and the redis-backed models only worked locally before). No runtime change.
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## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-23
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### Added
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- Initial release. An SSH jump host for the theta42 stack:
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- **Username-grammar routing**: `ssh {uid}_-_{target}@jumphost` bridges
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straight to the downstream host (`target` = a directory host slug, bare
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hostname, or IP). Shell, exec, and the **SFTP subsystem** all pass through,
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so WinSCP/`sftp` work.
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- **Interactive TUI picker**: plain `ssh {uid}@jumphost` lists the hosts the
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user can reach (from the SSO directory) and bridges to the chosen one.
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- **LDAP auth** of the inbound user (publickey against the user's
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`sshPublicKey`, or password via LDAP bind — password policy is
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off/local/all).
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- **Directory-driven access**: reachable hosts are the union of the user's
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LDAP groups × the SSO directory (`/api/discovery/resources?group=`).
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- **Per-user key injection**: the jump host appends its own public key to the
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user's `sshPublicKey` on first use, then connects downstream as that user
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(downstream hosts already serve LDAP keys via ldap-client's
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AuthorizedKeysCommand).
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- **Web UI + HTTP API** (`:3002`) for auditing and metrics: active sessions,
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paged audit log, per-user/per-host counters. Admin login gated by LDAP
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group membership.
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- **Audit logging** of every connection attempt/session (user, target,
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method, result, bytes, duration, downstream host-key fingerprint).
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- Packaged like theta42/proxy: idempotent `ops/install.sh` + systemd unit,
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all-in-one Docker image, standalone `docker-compose.yml`.
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