Release 1.3.0: adopt shared @simpleworkjs/* packages; fix LDAP filter injection

Rewire onto the shared @simpleworkjs/oidc-client, /ldap, and /app-stack
packages (deleting the byte-identical local forks of the same code), close the
LDAP filter-injection in User.get by routing the username through escapeFilter
(RFC 4515), align model-redis ^1.6.0 and ldapts ^8.1.8, and unify build_info to
{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}. package-lock regenerated from the npm
registry (no file:/link:), so npm ci is clean in docker builds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,6 +6,45 @@ correspond to git tags (`vX.Y.Z`) and `nodejs/package.json`'s `version`.
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [1.3.0] - 2026-07-25
+
+### Added
+- Adopted the shared `@simpleworkjs/*` packages published under the simpleworkjs org, replacing this app's byte-identical forks of the same code so the theta42 apps share one codebase and API schema:
+  - `@simpleworkjs/oidc-client` — the OIDC client (session models, auth router, OIDC utils, safe-redirect, local-admin bootstrap). Deleted the local `utils/oidc.js`, `utils/safe_redirect.js`, `models/oidc_state.js`, `models/token.js`, `models/auth.js`, and `routes/auth.js`; `models/index.js` now wires the factory. The per-host SSO in `routes/host_auth.js` is unchanged but consumes the shared OIDC utils.
+  - `@simpleworkjs/ldap` — the ldapts client + RFC 4515/4514 escaping.
+  - `@simpleworkjs/app-stack` — unified `build_info` (`{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}`) and the `static-modules` mounting helper. `utils/build_info.js` and the static-modules loop in `routes/render.js` now use the shared helpers.
+
+### Security
+- **LDAP filter injection in `User.get`.** The user lookup built its search filter by interpolating `data.username` raw into `(&(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)(uid=<username>))`. A username containing `*`, `(`, `)`, `\`, or NUL could widen or alter the filter (e.g. `*` → match-all). The filter value is now passed through `escapeFilter` from `@simpleworkjs/ldap` (RFC 4515 escaping).
+
+### Changed
+- Dependency alignment: `model-redis` `^1.5` → `^1.6.0`, `ldapts` `^8.1.2` → `^8.1.8`. The four new `@simpleworkjs/*` deps resolve from the npm registry (`^1.0.0`); no `file:`/`link:` entries in the lockfile, so `npm ci` is clean in docker builds.
+- `build_info` export shape changed from `{commit, version}` to `{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}` (the shared shape used by all three apps). The `/health` endpoint and footer now report `buildVersion`/`buildHash`.
+
+## [1.2.2] - 2026-07-21
+
+### Fixed
+- Multi-target load balancing (added in 1.2.0) crashed every request to a load-balanced host: `ops/nginx_conf/targetinfo.lua` required a nonexistent `resty.balancer.round_robin` module. The `lua-resty-balancer` rock installed by the Dockerfile/`install.sh` doesn't provide that path — it provides `resty.roundrobin` (constructed as `roundrobin:new(nodes)`, not `:new()` + `:reinit(nodes)`). Fixed `targetinfo.lua` to use the real module and API; verified end-to-end that requests now round-robin across targets with no Lua errors.
+
+## [1.2.1] - 2026-07-21
+
+### Fixed
+- The bootstrap anti-lockout admin account was always created as `proxyadmin2` regardless of `conf.auth.adminUsers`, while `migrations/permission_bootstrap.js` grants the global-admin permission to `conf.auth.adminUsers[0]`. If an operator customized `adminUsers` away from the default, the bootstrapped account and the permissioned account were two different (non-matching) usernames, so the anti-lockout account ended up with no admin access. `models/user_redis.js` now derives the bootstrap username from `conf.auth.adminUsers[0]` (falling back to `proxyadmin2`), matching `permission_bootstrap.js`.
+- Corrected a `secrets.js.example` comment that claimed the bootstrap admin's password "defaults to the username itself" — it actually generates a random password printed to the container log on first boot.
+
+### Changed
+- Refreshed all README screenshots (hosts, per-host SSO auth, per-host basic auth) against the current UI, and added a new load-balancing screenshot for the multi-target feature.
+
+## [1.2.0] - 2026-07-21
+
+### Added
+- Multi-target load balancing: hosts can now specify additional backend targets (`IP:port`, one per line) alongside the primary target; the proxy distributes requests across all of them round-robin via `lua-resty-balancer`. Fixes #47.
+
+## [1.1.17] - 2026-07-20
+
+### Fixed
+- An existing single-label subdomain host (e.g. `sso.nl.wgnode.com`) could not be attached to a wildcard cert added later (e.g. `*.nl.wgnode.com`): `Host.lookUpWildcardParent()` only checked the wildcard-as-child position (the wildcard's own base domain) and missed the far more common wildcard-as-sibling case, so the edit form's "Parent Wildcard" option stayed permanently greyed out. It now checks both positions, and a regression test covers the sibling case.
+
 ## [1.1.16] - 2026-07-18
 
 ### Changed
@@ -13,6 +52,10 @@ correspond to git tags (`vX.Y.Z`) and `nodejs/package.json`'s `version`.
 - Genericized committed defaults in `conf/base.js` and `conf/development.js`: LDAP now defaults to `ldap://localhost` with `dc=example,dc=com`, and OIDC endpoints default to `https://sso.example.com` instead of internal theta42 infrastructure.
 - The bootstrap `proxyadmin2` account now gets a random, one-time password when `auth.localAdminPass` is unset, instead of the well-known default `proxyadmin2`. The password is printed to the log on first creation and can be made deterministic by setting `auth.localAdminPass` in the secrets file.
 
+### Security
+- Sanitized rendered docs HTML via `xss` in `routes/docs.js` so malicious markdown cannot inject scripts or other dangerous markup into the in-app docs viewer.
+- The Unix socket JSON-RPC socket is now created with mode `660` instead of world-writable `777`.
+
 ### Fixed
 - The global error handler no longer leaks `err.keys`, stack traces, or other internal details in JSON responses; only `name` and `message` are returned to clients.
 - `DEPLOYMENT.md` and `docs/docker.md` now correctly describe the `CONF_SECRETS` env-var mechanism instead of the old symlink behavior.
@@ -123,7 +166,9 @@ First tagged release. Establishes the `vX.Y.Z` tag convention that the in-app up
 - Standalone backup script (`ops/backup.sh`) for deployments not using theta-env's orchestrator — snapshots Redis and `./config`, with retention.
 - Admin-only in-app banner that checks GitHub releases every 24h and surfaces available updates.
 
-[Unreleased]: https://github.com/theta42/proxy/compare/v1.1.15...HEAD
+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/theta42/proxy/compare/v1.1.17...HEAD
+[1.1.17]: https://github.com/theta42/proxy/compare/v1.1.16...v1.1.17
+[1.1.16]: https://github.com/theta42/proxy/compare/v1.1.15...v1.1.16
 [1.1.15]: https://github.com/theta42/proxy/compare/v1.1.14...v1.1.15
 [1.1.14]: https://github.com/theta42/proxy/compare/v1.1.13...v1.1.14
 [1.1.13]: https://github.com/theta42/proxy/compare/v1.1.12...v1.1.13

Dockerfile

@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ RUN apt-get update \
 # resty.limit.req is bundled with OpenResty, so no rock is needed for it.
 RUN luarocks install lua-resty-auto-ssl \
     && luarocks install luasocket \
+    && luarocks install lua-resty-balancer \
     && luarocks install lua-resty-ipmatcher
 
 # ── Node app ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

README.md

@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ management once basic auth is enabled:
 
 [![Per-host basic auth](docs/images/host-auth-basic.png)](docs/images/host-auth-basic.png)
 
+Multiple backend targets per host, load balanced round-robin:
+
+[![Load balancing](docs/images/load-balancing.png)](docs/images/load-balancing.png)
+
 ## Why this over the alternatives
 
 Nginx Proxy Manager, Traefik, and Caddy are all good reverse proxies with
@@ -51,6 +55,7 @@ provider + LDAP directory you already run.
 - Multiple DNS provider integrations (Cloudflare, DigitalOcean, PorkBun, DuckDNS — DuckDNS is free)
 - Wildcard SSL certificate support with automatic renewal
 - Dynamic host routing with wildcard domain matching (*, **)
+- **Multi-target load balancing** — configure multiple backend targets per host with built-in round-robin load balancing
 - Web-based management interface
 - RESTful API for automation
 - **OIDC login** — the proxy is an OpenID Connect client of an external SSO

docs/concepts-hosts.md

@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@ host form whenever the name you're entering already has a matching
 wildcard available to reuse — including the wildcard's own bare base
 domain (e.g. `example.com` itself, not just `something.example.com`).
 
+## Load Balancing
+
+If you have multiple servers running the same application, you can load balance traffic across them. When editing a host, you can specify **Additional Targets** (one `IP:port` per line). The proxy will automatically distribute incoming requests across your primary target and all additional targets using a round-robin strategy, providing simple high availability and load distribution without extra configuration.
+
 ## Want more detail?
 
 This page skips the system-internals (Redis, OpenResty, the lookup service)

docs/index.md

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ LDAP directory you already run.
 - Automated HTTPS via Let's Encrypt — HTTP-01 and DNS-01 (wildcard) challenges
 - Multiple DNS providers (Cloudflare, DigitalOcean, PorkBun, DuckDNS — free)
 - Dynamic host routing with wildcard domain matching (`*`, `**`)
+- **Multi-target load balancing** — configure multiple backend targets per host with built-in round-robin load balancing
 - **OIDC login** and **direct LDAP lookups**, independently of each other
 - Per-host **basic auth** as an alternative to SSO (mutually exclusive, so
   it's never ambiguous which one gated a request)

nodejs/middleware/auth.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 'use strict';
 
-const {Auth} = require('../models/auth');
+const {Auth} = require('../models');
 
 async function auth(req, res, next){
 	try{

nodejs/models/auth.js

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
-'use strict';
-
-const Table = require('../models');
-const {User, AuthToken} = Table.models;
-const {ApiToken} = require('./api_token');
-
-/**
- * Auth Model
- *
- * Handles authentication operations for the application.
- * Manages user login, token validation, and logout processes.
- *
- * Dependencies:
- * - User model: Validates user credentials
- * - AuthToken model: Creates and manages authentication tokens
- *
- * All methods throw standardized login errors on failure to avoid
- * leaking information about whether usernames exist or tokens are valid.
- */
-class Auth{
-	/**
-	 * Standardized error responses for authentication failures.
-	 * Returns generic "Invalid Credentials" message for security.
-	 */
-	static errors = {
-		login: function(){
-			let error = new Error('LoginFailed');
-			error.name = 'LoginFailed';
-			error.message = `Invalid Credentials, login failed.`;
-			error.status = 401;
-
-			return error;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/**
-	 * Authenticate user and create session token.
-	 *
-	 * @param {Object} data - Login credentials {username, password}
-	 * @returns {Object} {user, token} - User object and auth token
-	 * @throws {Error} Generic login error on any failure
-	 *
-	 * Flow:
-	 * 1. Validate credentials via User.login()
-	 * 2. Create new AuthToken for the user
-	 * 3. Return both user data and token
-	 */
-	static async login(data){
-		try{
-			let user = await User.login(data);
-			// Backends may attach group membership to the user (LDAP); default
-			// to none for local/redis users.
-			let groups = Array.isArray(user.groups) ? user.groups : [];
-			let token = await AuthToken.create({username: user.username, groups});
-
-			return {user, token}
-		}catch(error){
-			console.log('login error', error);
-			throw this.errors.login();
-		}
-	}
-
-	/**
-	 * Establish a session for an OIDC-authenticated identity: JIT-provision the
-	 * local user (redis-backed) and mint an AuthToken carrying the SSO groups.
-	 *
-	 * @param {Object} identity - {username, groups} from utils/oidc claims
-	 * @returns {Object} {user, token}
-	 */
-	static async oidcSession(identity){
-		let user = typeof User.upsertOidc === 'function'
-			? await User.upsertOidc(identity)
-			: await User.get(identity.username);
-		let token = await AuthToken.create({
-			username: user.username,
-			groups: identity.groups || [],
-		});
-
-		return {user, token};
-	}
-
-	/**
-	 * Validate an authentication token.
-	 *
-	 * @param {string} token - Token string to validate
-	 * @returns {Object} Token object if valid
-	 * @throws {Error} Generic login error if token invalid or expired
-	 *
-	 * Checks:
-	 * 1. Token exists in database
-	 * 2. Token has not expired (via token.check())
-	 */
-	static async checkToken(token){
-		try{
-			token = await AuthToken.get(token);
-			if(token && token.check()) return token;
-
-			throw this.errors.login();
-		}catch(error){
-			console.log('check error', error);
-			throw this.errors.login();
-		}
-	}
-
-	/**
-	 * Validate an `Authorization: Bearer prx_<id>_<secret>` API token.
-	 *
-	 * Returns the authenticated ApiToken record (with created_by + the
-	 * mint-time groups snapshot); middleware/auth.js wraps it into the
-	 * req.token shape the authz layer expects. Every failure collapses to the
-	 * same generic login 401 — no leak of existence / wrong secret / expired.
-	 */
-	static async checkApiToken(raw){
-		try{
-			return await ApiToken.authenticate(raw);
-		}catch(error){
-			console.log('api-token check error', error);
-			throw this.errors.login();
-		}
-	}
-
-	/**
-	 * Destroy an authentication token (logout).
-	 *
-	 * @param {string} data - Token string to destroy
-	 * @returns {void}
-	 *
-	 * Removes token from database, invalidating the session.
-	 */
-	static async logout(data){
-		let token = await AuthToken.get(data);
-		await token.destroy();
-	}
-}
-
-module.exports = {Auth};

nodejs/models/host.js

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ class Host extends Table{
 		'host': {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 1, max: 500},
 		'ip': {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 3, max: 500},
 		'targetPort': {isRequired: true, type: 'number', min:0, max:65535},
+		'targets': {default: function(){return []}, isRequired: false, type: 'object'},
 		'forcessl': {isRequired: false, default: true, type: 'boolean'},
 		'targetssl': {isRequired: false, default: false, type: 'boolean'},
 
@@ -518,24 +519,38 @@ class Host extends Table{
 		if(parent && parent['*'] && parent['*']['#record']) return parent['*']['#record'];
 	}
 
-	// Find the wildcard covering @host as its own base domain (e.g.
-	// "*.cool.mysite.com" for host="cool.mysite.com"), regardless of whether
-	// @host is already registered as its own host. Unlike lookUp(), which
-	// walks to and returns @host's own exact-match leaf when one exists, this
-	// walks to that exact position and looks one level deeper at its "*"
-	// child -- the sibling wildcard slot -- so it still finds the parent
-	// wildcard even when @host already has its own (non-wildcard) record.
-	// Used when attaching an already-created host to a wildcard after the
-	// fact (see update() below); Host.create()'s own wildcardChild handling
-	// can keep using plain lookUp() since a host being newly created hasn't
-	// claimed its own leaf yet.
+	// Find the wildcard that could cover @host, regardless of whether @host is
+	// already registered as its own host. Unlike lookUp(), which walks to and
+	// returns @host's own exact-match leaf when one exists, this keeps looking
+	// for a sibling/child "*" slot, so it still finds the parent wildcard even
+	// when @host already has its own (non-wildcard) record. Used when attaching
+	// an already-created host to a wildcard after the fact (see update() below);
+	// Host.create()'s own wildcardChild handling can keep using plain lookUp()
+	// since a host being newly created hasn't claimed its own leaf yet.
+	//
+	// Two tree positions qualify, and we must check BOTH:
+	//   1. Child "*" of @host's own node -- @host is the wildcard's base domain
+	//      (e.g. "*.cool.mysite.com" covers host="cool.mysite.com").
+	//   2. Sibling "*" one level up -- @host is a single-label subdomain of the
+	//      wildcard (e.g. "*.nl.wgnode.com" covers host="sso.nl.wgnode.com").
+	// Case 2 is the common one and was previously missed: the walk consumed the
+	// leftmost label ("sso") and only inspected that leaf's "*" child, so an
+	// already-existing sibling subdomain could never be attached to its wildcard.
 	static lookUpWildcardParent(host){
 		let place = this.lookUpObj;
+		let parent = undefined;
 		for(let fragment of host.split('.').reverse()){
-			if(!place[fragment]) return undefined;
+			// @host may have no leaf of its own (brand-new subdomain); that case
+			// is already handled by plain lookUp()'s wildcard fallback in the
+			// caller, so just stop -- we've still tracked `parent` for case 2.
+			if(!place[fragment]){ place = undefined; break; }
+			parent = place;
 			place = place[fragment];
 		}
-		if(place['*'] && place['*']['#record']) return place['*']['#record'];
+		// Case 1: wildcard is a child of @host's own node.
+		if(place && place['*'] && place['*']['#record']) return place['*']['#record'];
+		// Case 2: wildcard is a sibling of @host's leftmost label.
+		if(parent && parent['*'] && parent['*']['#record']) return parent['*']['#record'];
 	}
 
 	static async lookUpReady(){

nodejs/models/index.js

@@ -1,18 +1,37 @@
 'use strict';
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
 const {setUpTable} = require('model-redis');
+const {createOidcClient, bootstrapLocalAdmin} = require('@simpleworkjs/oidc-client');
 
 const Table = setUpTable(conf.redis);
 
 module.exports = Table;
 
+// App-local models. User + ApiToken register before the OIDC client factory
+// below: Auth binds User, and checkApiToken wraps ApiToken.authenticate.
+require('./user');                      // User (redis-backed local + OIDC JIT)
+const {ApiToken} = require('./api_token'); // ApiToken (Bearer PATs)
 require('./dns_provider');
 require('./dynamic_record');
 require('./host');
-require('./token');
-require('./user');
 require('./local_group');
 require('./permission');
-require('./oidc_state');
 require('./sso_session');
-require('./api_token');
+
+// Shared OIDC client (authorization-code + PKCE): session models (Token,
+// AuthToken, OidcState), the Auth service, and the /login /logout /oidc/start
+// /oidc/callback router — all created on this app's Table/redis. PAT validation
+// is wired in (proxy accepts Bearer prx_<id>_<secret>); the package collapses
+// every checkApiToken failure to a generic 401.
+const oidcClient = createOidcClient({
+	Table,
+	checkApiToken: (raw) => ApiToken.authenticate(raw),
+});
+module.exports.Token = oidcClient.Token;
+module.exports.AuthToken = oidcClient.AuthToken;
+module.exports.OidcState = oidcClient.OidcState;
+module.exports.Auth = oidcClient.Auth;
+module.exports.authRouter = oidcClient.router;
+
+// Idempotent anti-lockout local admin (was the IIFE in user_redis.js).
+bootstrapLocalAdmin(Table.models.User, {defaultName: 'proxyadmin2'});

nodejs/models/oidc_state.js

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-'use strict';
-
-const Table = require('.');
-
-/**
- * OidcState
- *
- * Short-lived store for an in-flight OpenID Connect authorization request.
- * Keyed by the random `state` value; holds the PKCE `code_verifier` and the
- * post-login redirect target until the SSO calls us back.
- *
- * The record auto-expires via model-redis per-key TTL (static _ttl), so an
- * abandoned login attempt leaves nothing behind and there is no cleanup job.
- */
-class OidcState extends Table{
-	static _key = 'state';
-
-	// Auth round-trips are quick; 5 minutes is plenty and bounds replay.
-	static _ttl = 300;
-
-	static _keyMap = {
-		'created_on': {default: function(){return (new Date).getTime()}},
-		'state': {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 8, max: 500},
-		'codeVerifier': {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 8, max: 500},
-		'redirect': {default: '/', isRequired: false, type: 'string'},
-	}
-}
-
-OidcState.register();
-
-module.exports = {OidcState};

nodejs/models/token.js

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-'use strict';
-
-const Table = require('.');
-const UUID = function b(a){return a?(a^Math.random()*16>>a/4).toString(16):([1e7]+-1e3+-4e3+-8e3+-1e11).replace(/[018]/g,b)};
-
-
-class Token extends Table{
-	static _key = 'token';
-	static _keyMap = {
-		'created_by': {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 3, max: 500},
-		'created_on': {default: function(){return (new Date).getTime()}},
-		'updated_on': {default: function(){return (new Date).getTime()}, always: true},
-		'token': {default: UUID, type: 'string', min: 36, max: 36, isPrivate: true},
-		'is_valid': {default: true, type: 'boolean'},	
-	}
-
-	constructor(...args){
-		super(...args);
-	}
-
-	async check(){
-		try{
-			return this.is_valid;
-		}catch(error){
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-Token.register();
-
-class AuthToken extends Token{
-	static _keyMap = {
-		...super._keyMap,
-		user: {model: 'User', rel: 'one', localKey: 'created_by'},
-		// Group memberships captured at login (OIDC `groups` claim or LDAP
-		// group membership), stored as a JSON string. Drives authorization for
-		// the life of the session without re-querying the IdP on every request.
-		groups: {default: '[]', isRequired: false, type: 'string'},
-	}
-
-	static async create(data){
-		data.created_by = data.username;
-		if(Array.isArray(data.groups)){
-			data.groups = JSON.stringify(data.groups);
-		}
-		return super.create(data)
-
-	}
-
-	// Parse the stored groups JSON back into an array, tolerating bad/missing
-	// data so authorization never crashes on a malformed token.
-	groupsArray(){
-		try{
-			let parsed = JSON.parse(this.groups);
-			return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [];
-		}catch(error){
-			return [];
-		}
-	}
-}
-AuthToken.register();
-
-module.exports = {Token, AuthToken};

nodejs/models/user_ldap.js

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 'use strict';
 
 const { Client, Attribute, Change } = require('ldapts');
-const {Token} = require('./token');
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf').ldap;
+const { escapeFilter } = require('@simpleworkjs/ldap');
 
 // tlsOptions is optional and forwarded to ldapts so the proxy can bind to
 // ldaps:// with a self-signed or internal-CA cert. Set via conf/secrets.js or
@@ -107,7 +107,9 @@ User.get = async function(data){
 		
 		await client.bind(conf.bindDN, conf.bindPassword);
 
-		let filter = `(&${conf.userFilter}(${conf.userNameAttribute}=${data.username}))`;
+		// Escape the interpolated username (RFC 4515) — previously raw, which
+		// let `*`/`(`/`)`/`\`/NUL in a username break or broaden the filter.
+		let filter = `(&${conf.userFilter}(${conf.userNameAttribute}=${escapeFilter(data.username)}))`;
 
 		const res = await client.search(conf.searchBase, {
 			scope: 'sub',

nodejs/models/user_pam.js

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 const linuxUser = require('linux-sys-user').promise();
 const objValidate = require('../utils/object_validate');
-const {Token} = require('./token');
 const {promisify} = require('util');
 const pam = require('authenticate-pam');
 const authenticate = promisify(pam.authenticate);

nodejs/models/user_redis.js

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 const Table = require('.');
 const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
 const crypto = require('crypto');
-const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
 const saltRounds = 10;
 
 class User extends Table{
@@ -86,35 +85,6 @@ class User extends Table{
 
 User.register();
 
-(async function(){
-	var defaultUser = 'proxyadmin2'
-	// Optional: an orchestrator (e.g. theta-env's setup.sh) can set
-	// auth.localAdminPass in proxy-secrets.js to a generated password so this
-	// bootstrap account isn't left at a well-known default. Only used on first
-	// creation -- once the account exists this is never read again, so it's
-	// safe to leave set. If unset, a random password is generated and printed
-	// once; save it from the log or set auth.localAdminPass explicitly.
-	var defaultPass = (conf.auth && conf.auth.localAdminPass);
-	if (!defaultPass) {
-		defaultPass = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
-		console.warn(`====================================================================`);
-		console.warn(`Bootstrap admin "${defaultUser}" created with random password:`);
-		console.warn(`${defaultPass}`);
-		console.warn(`Set auth.localAdminPass in your secrets file to make this deterministic.`);
-		console.warn(`====================================================================`);
-	}
-	try{
-		let user = await User.get(defaultUser);
-	}catch(error){
-		try{
-			let user = await User.create({
-				username:defaultUser,
-				password: defaultPass,
-				created_by: defaultUser
-			});
-			console.log(defaultUser, 'created');
-		}catch(error){
-			console.error(error)
-		}
-	}
-})();
+// Anti-lockout local-admin bootstrap moved to @simpleworkjs/oidc-client
+// (bootstrapLocalAdmin); invoked once from models/index.js after User is
+// registered. See the package lib/bootstrap.js for the original logic.

nodejs/package-lock.json

@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
 {
   "name": "proxy-api",
-  "version": "1.1.16",
+  "version": "1.2.2",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "proxy-api",
-      "version": "1.1.16",
+      "version": "1.2.2",
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "@fortawesome/fontawesome-free": "^7.3.0",
         "@popperjs/core": "^2.11.8",
+        "@simpleworkjs/app-stack": "^1.0.0",
         "@simpleworkjs/conf": "^1.2.0",
+        "@simpleworkjs/ldap": "^1.0.0",
+        "@simpleworkjs/oidc-client": "^1.0.0",
         "acme-client": "^5.4.0",
         "axios": "^1.13.5",
         "bcrypt": "^6.0.0",
@@ -26,7 +29,7 @@
         "ldapts": "^8.1.8",
         "linux-sys-user": "^1.2.0",
         "marked": "^9.1.6",
-        "model-redis": "^1.5.0",
+        "model-redis": "^1.6.0",
         "moment": "^2.30.1",
         "mustache": "^4.2.0",
         "p2psub": "^0.2.0",
@@ -281,6 +284,18 @@
         "@redis/client": "^6.1.0"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/@simpleworkjs/app-stack": {
+      "version": "1.0.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@simpleworkjs/app-stack/-/app-stack-1.0.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-Hg/mouA87WruKeZqhqtJgAaLabjHY8Z9POO6U+DB7sGGDhy1jgZXT31hyxLUDV+InByOPhz48NIkGiWNwoesXQ==",
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "express": "^5.2.1"
+      },
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=18.0.0"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/@simpleworkjs/conf": {
       "version": "1.2.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@simpleworkjs/conf/-/conf-1.2.0.tgz",
@@ -293,6 +308,32 @@
         "node": ">=16.0.0"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/@simpleworkjs/ldap": {
+      "version": "1.0.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@simpleworkjs/ldap/-/ldap-1.0.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-saDmwk+KJ6kIWj9/MF37d+BM9KQisy6DsI9umyt1FWNyx6+wnEEat/1RUTwXKBd4IKJK+zPT5lC/B6gfa2CuAA==",
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "ldapts": "^8.1.8"
+      },
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=18.0.0"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/@simpleworkjs/oidc-client": {
+      "version": "1.0.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@simpleworkjs/oidc-client/-/oidc-client-1.0.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-AzxIaE32p4yKDlp0mWvZp1wmXi8tMFckcPwMiQyZrDgEC0IybGhbjppPa+vNGx1AoVLp64vRL/zR3yXb/19NPg==",
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "@simpleworkjs/conf": "^1.2.0",
+        "express": "^5.2.1",
+        "express-rate-limit": "^8.5.2"
+      },
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=18.0.0"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/@socket.io/component-emitter": {
       "version": "3.1.2",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@socket.io/component-emitter/-/component-emitter-3.1.2.tgz",
@@ -1508,9 +1549,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/model-redis": {
-      "version": "1.5.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/model-redis/-/model-redis-1.5.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-eVXQQN+k3cR5aJBvPQurgr8WXYpAvVoLu6ydMWenSOJZBDVcHqeNqUCp8n5lYrxv6iZ8PlF0WQzZFmbJ1zP6/A==",
+      "version": "1.6.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/model-redis/-/model-redis-1.6.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-QinykZ0H9vhyj0qY9NnNd1m1YcBXBXuc0viENJuEyTwplhOWT0cpjpGxObqoD1ysb8AJkrBkJB9tAf4EZbISWA==",
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "redis": "^6.1.0"

nodejs/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "proxy-api",
-  "version": "1.1.16",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
   "author": [
     {
       "name": "William Mantly",
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
     "@fortawesome/fontawesome-free": "^7.3.0",
     "@popperjs/core": "^2.11.8",
     "@simpleworkjs/conf": "^1.2.0",
+    "@simpleworkjs/app-stack": "^1.0.0",
+    "@simpleworkjs/ldap": "^1.0.0",
+    "@simpleworkjs/oidc-client": "^1.0.0",
     "acme-client": "^5.4.0",
     "axios": "^1.13.5",
     "bcrypt": "^6.0.0",
@@ -36,7 +39,7 @@
     "ldapts": "^8.1.8",
     "linux-sys-user": "^1.2.0",
     "marked": "^9.1.6",
-    "model-redis": "^1.5.0",
+    "model-redis": "^1.6.0",
     "moment": "^2.30.1",
     "mustache": "^4.2.0",
     "p2psub": "^0.2.0",

nodejs/routes/api.js

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ const middleware = require('../middleware/auth');
 const authz = require('../middleware/authz');
 
 // API routes for authentication.
-router.use('/auth',  require('./auth'));
+router.use('/auth',  require('../models').authRouter);
 
 // API routes for working with users. All endpoints need to be have valid user.
 // User management is admin-only; the router allows self-service exceptions

nodejs/routes/auth.js

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-'use strict';
-
-const router = require('express').Router();
-const { rateLimit } = require('express-rate-limit');
-const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
-const { Auth } = require('../models/auth');
-const { OidcState } = require('../models/oidc_state');
-const oidc = require('../utils/oidc');
-const { safeInternalPath } = require('../utils/safe_redirect');
-
-// Throttle unauthenticated auth endpoints (credential login + the OIDC
-// handshake) to blunt brute-force / callback abuse. Keyed per IP.
-const authLimiter = rateLimit({
-	windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,   // 15 minutes
-	max: 60,                    // 60 attempts per IP per window
-	standardHeaders: true,
-	legacyHeaders: false,
-	message: {name: 'TooManyRequests', message: 'Too many attempts, please try again later.'},
-});
-
-
-router.post('/login', authLimiter, async function(req, res, next){
-	try{
-		let auth = await Auth.login(req.body);
-		return res.json({
-			login: true,
-			token: auth.token.token,
-			message:`${req.body.username} logged in!`,
-		});
-	}catch(error){
-		next(error);
-	}
-});
-
-router.all('/logout', async function(req, res, next){
-	try{
-		if(req.user){
-			await req.user.logout();
-		}
-
-		res.json({message: 'Bye'})
-	}catch(error){
-		next(error);
-	}
-});
-
-/**
- * OIDC login start: create a PKCE + state challenge, persist it (auto-expiring
- * via OidcState TTL), and redirect the browser to the SSO authorize endpoint.
- */
-router.get('/oidc/start', authLimiter, async function(req, res, next){
-	try{
-		if(!conf.oidc || !conf.oidc.enabled){
-			let error = new Error('OidcDisabled');
-			error.status = 404;
-			error.message = 'OIDC login is not enabled.';
-			throw error;
-		}
-
-		let {state, codeVerifier, codeChallenge} = oidc.createAuthRequest();
-		await OidcState.create({
-			state,
-			codeVerifier,
-			// Sanitize now so a hostile ?redirect= can't be stored and later
-			// reflected into the login page's navigation.
-			redirect: safeInternalPath(req.query.redirect || '/'),
-		});
-
-		return res.redirect(oidc.buildAuthUrl(state, codeChallenge));
-	}catch(error){
-		next(error);
-	}
-});
-
-/**
- * OIDC callback: validate state (consuming the one-time record), exchange the
- * code for tokens, read identity from userinfo, establish a session, and hand
- * the app token back to the browser via a URL fragment for the login page to
- * store in localStorage.
- */
-router.get('/oidc/callback', authLimiter, async function(req, res, next){
-	try{
-		let {code, state} = req.query;
-		if(!code || !state){
-			let error = new Error('OidcCallbackInvalid');
-			error.status = 400;
-			error.message = 'Missing code or state.';
-			throw error;
-		}
-
-		// get() throws if the state is unknown or has expired — this both binds
-		// the callback to our request and bounds replay.
-		let saved = await OidcState.get(state);
-		await saved.remove();
-
-		let tokens = await oidc.exchangeCode(code, saved.codeVerifier);
-		let claims = await oidc.fetchUserInfo(tokens.access_token);
-		let identity = oidc.claimsToIdentity(claims);
-
-		let {token} = await Auth.oidcSession(identity);
-
-		let redirect = safeInternalPath(saved.redirect || '/');
-		return res.redirect(
-			`/login#token=${encodeURIComponent(token.token)}&redirect=${encodeURIComponent(redirect)}`
-		);
-	}catch(error){
-		next(error);
-	}
-});
-
-module.exports = router;

nodejs/routes/host_auth.js

@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
 /**
  * Per-host SSO endpoints (#57), served under /__proxy_auth on EVERY proxied host
  * (nginx routes that path here; see ops/nginx_conf/proxy.conf). These run the
- * OIDC authorization-code flow (reusing utils/oidc.js and conf.oidc) and, on a
+ * OIDC authorization-code flow (reusing @simpleworkjs/oidc-client's pure oidc
+ * utils and conf.oidc) and, on a
  * successful + authorized login, mint a Redis-backed SsoSession and set the
  * `__proxy_sso` cookie for the host. OpenResty then gates the host on that
  * session (ops/nginx_conf/hostfeatures.lua).
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@
 
 const router = require('express').Router();
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
-const oidc = require('../utils/oidc');
+const {oidc} = require('@simpleworkjs/oidc-client');
 const {Host} = require('../models').models;
 const {HostSsoState, SsoSession} = require('../models/sso_session');
 const {identityAllowed} = require('../utils/host_sso');

nodejs/routes/render.js

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ const express = require('express');
 const router = require('express').Router();
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
 const buildInfo = require('../utils/build_info');
+const { mountStaticModules } = require('@simpleworkjs/app-stack');
 
 const values ={
   title: conf.environment !== 'production' ? `dev` : '',
@@ -15,24 +16,16 @@ const values ={
 }
 
 // List of front end node modules to be served
-const frontEndModules = ['bootstrap', 'mustache', 'jquery', '@fortawesome',
-  'moment', '@popper', 'jq-repeat',
-];
-
-// Server front end modules
-// https://stackoverflow.com/a/55700773/3140931
 // Vendor libraries only change when package versions are bumped (a rebuild),
 // so they're safe to cache aggressively; ETag/Last-Modified (on by default)
-// still cover that rare case with a cheap 304 instead of a stale asset.
-frontEndModules.forEach(dep => {
-  router.use(`/static-modules/${dep}`, express.static(path.join(__dirname, `../node_modules/${dep}`), {maxAge: '7d'}))
+// still cover that rare case with a cheap 304 instead of a stale asset. The
+// app's own JS/CSS/img from public/ gets a shorter maxAge since it changes on
+// every deploy and isn't cache-busted/fingerprinted.
+mountStaticModules(router, {
+  root: path.join(__dirname, '..'),
+  deps: ['bootstrap', 'mustache', 'jquery', '@fortawesome', 'moment', '@popper', 'jq-repeat'],
 });
 
-// Have express server static content( images, CSS, browser JS) from the public
-// local folder. Shorter maxAge than /static-modules since this is the app's
-// own JS/CSS, which changes on every deploy and isn't cache-busted/fingerprinted.
-router.use('/static', express.static(path.join(__dirname, '../public'), {maxAge: '1h'}))
-
 router.get('/', (req, res) => {
   res.redirect(301, '/hosts');
 });

nodejs/test/unit/host_lookup.test.js

@@ -185,6 +185,35 @@ describe('Host wildcard base-domain lookup', () => {
 		await populateTree(Host, ['*.cool.mysite.com']);
 		assert.strictEqual(Host.lookUpWildcardParent('other.example.com'), undefined);
 	});
+
+	// Regression: the common case -- an already-existing single-label subdomain
+	// (its own auto-SSL/HTTP-01 host) sitting beside a wildcard, e.g.
+	// sso.nl.wgnode.com under *.nl.wgnode.com. The wildcard is a SIBLING of the
+	// subdomain's leftmost label, not a child of its node, so the old walk (which
+	// consumed "sso" and only checked that leaf's "*" child) never found it and
+	// the edit form's "Parent Wildcard" option stayed permanently greyed out.
+	test('lookUpWildcardParent finds a sibling wildcard for an existing single-label subdomain', async () => {
+		await populateTree(Host, ['sso.nl.wgnode.com', '*.nl.wgnode.com']);
+		const result = Host.lookUpWildcardParent('sso.nl.wgnode.com');
+		assert.ok(result, 'Should find the sibling wildcard');
+		assert.strictEqual(result.host, '*.nl.wgnode.com');
+	});
+
+	// A subdomain with no leaf of its own (never created) is deliberately NOT
+	// this method's job -- the walk stops before reaching the sibling "*" slot.
+	// The route resolves that case via plain lookUp()'s wildcard fallback first
+	// (covered in the route-fallback describe block below).
+	test('lookUpWildcardParent returns undefined for a subdomain with no leaf of its own', async () => {
+		await populateTree(Host, ['*.nl.wgnode.com']);
+		assert.strictEqual(Host.lookUpWildcardParent('api.nl.wgnode.com'), undefined);
+	});
+
+	test('lookUpWildcardParent does not treat a deeper wildcard as covering a shallower host', async () => {
+		// *.deep.nl.wgnode.com must NOT be offered as a parent for sso.nl.wgnode.com
+		// (a single-level wildcard covers only its own direct children).
+		await populateTree(Host, ['sso.nl.wgnode.com', '*.deep.nl.wgnode.com']);
+		assert.strictEqual(Host.lookUpWildcardParent('sso.nl.wgnode.com'), undefined);
+	});
 });
 
 /**
@@ -231,6 +260,24 @@ describe('Host wildcard-parent route fallback (lookUp then lookUpWildcardParent)
 		await populateTree(Host, ['cool.mysite.com']);
 		assert.strictEqual(findWildcardParent('cool.mysite.com'), null);
 	});
+
+	// The user's scenario: sso.nl.wgnode.com already exists as its own host, and
+	// a *.nl.wgnode.com wildcard is added afterward. lookUp() resolves to sso's
+	// own (non-wildcard) leaf, so the fallback to lookUpWildcardParent() is what
+	// surfaces the sibling wildcard and lets the edit form offer conversion.
+	test('finds the sibling wildcard for an already-existing single-label subdomain', async () => {
+		await populateTree(Host, ['sso.nl.wgnode.com', '*.nl.wgnode.com']);
+		const result = findWildcardParent('sso.nl.wgnode.com');
+		assert.ok(result);
+		assert.strictEqual(result.host, '*.nl.wgnode.com');
+	});
+
+	test('finds the sibling wildcard for a never-created single-label subdomain', async () => {
+		await populateTree(Host, ['*.nl.wgnode.com']);
+		const result = findWildcardParent('api.nl.wgnode.com');
+		assert.ok(result);
+		assert.strictEqual(result.host, '*.nl.wgnode.com');
+	});
 });
 
 /**
@@ -265,11 +312,17 @@ function createMockHostClassWithWildcardParentFix() {
 
 		static lookUpWildcardParent(host) {
 			let place = this.lookUpObj;
+			let parent = undefined;
 			for(let fragment of host.split('.').reverse()){
-				if(!place[fragment]) return undefined;
+				if(!place[fragment]){ place = undefined; break; }
+				parent = place;
 				place = place[fragment];
 			}
-			if(place['*'] && place['*']['#record']) return place['*']['#record'];
+			// Case 1: wildcard is a child of host's own node (base domain).
+			if(place && place['*'] && place['*']['#record']) return place['*']['#record'];
+			// Case 2: wildcard is a sibling of host's leftmost label
+			// (single-label subdomain, e.g. sso.nl.wgnode.com -> *.nl.wgnode.com).
+			if(parent && parent['*'] && parent['*']['#record']) return parent['*']['#record'];
 		}
 	};
 }

nodejs/test/unit/oidc.test.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ const {describe, test} = require('node:test');
 const assert = require('node:assert');
 const crypto = require('crypto');
 
-const oidc = require('../../utils/oidc');
+const oidc = require('@simpleworkjs/oidc-client').oidc;
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
 
 /**

nodejs/test/unit/safe_redirect.test.js

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 const {describe, test} = require('node:test');
 const assert = require('node:assert');
 
-const {safeInternalPath} = require('../../utils/safe_redirect');
+const {safeInternalPath} = require('@simpleworkjs/oidc-client');
 
 /**
  * safeInternalPath guards the OIDC post-login redirect against open-redirect

nodejs/utils/build_info.js

@@ -1,29 +1,16 @@
 'use strict';
 
-const fs = require('fs');
+// Unified build-info shape ({ buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear }) via the
+// shared @simpleworkjs/app-stack. The baked commit file lives at nodejs/.build_commit
+// (../ from here in utils/), matching the Dockerfile gitinfo stage; cwd is
+// utils/ for the bare-metal git fallback.
+
 const path = require('path');
-const { execSync } = require('child_process');
-const { version: buildVersion } = require('../package.json');
+const { createBuildInfo } = require('@simpleworkjs/app-stack');
+const { version } = require('../package.json');
 
-// Docker builds bake the commit hash into ../.build_commit (see the gitinfo
-// stage in Dockerfile) -- the final image has no git binary and no .git
-// directory, so `git rev-parse` below always fails there. Bare-metal/dev
-// runs have no baked file, so they fall back to asking git directly.
-function readBuildHash() {
-	try {
-		const baked = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../.build_commit'), 'utf8').trim();
-		if (baked) return baked;
-	} catch (_) {}
-
-	try {
-		return execSync('git rev-parse --short HEAD', { cwd: __dirname }).toString().trim();
-	} catch (_) {
-		return 'unknown';
-	}
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-	buildVersion,
-	buildHash: readBuildHash(),
-	buildYear: new Date().getFullYear(),
-};
+module.exports = createBuildInfo({
+	version,
+	buildCommitPath: path.join(__dirname, '../.build_commit'),
+	cwd: __dirname,
+});

nodejs/utils/host_features.js

@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ function normalizeHostFeatures(body){
 	if('sso_enabled' in body) body.sso_enabled = toBool(body.sso_enabled);
 	if('sso_allow_users' in body)  body.sso_allow_users  = parseAllowList(body.sso_allow_users);
 	if('sso_allow_groups' in body) body.sso_allow_groups = parseAllowList(body.sso_allow_groups);
+	if('targets' in body) body.targets = parseAllowList(body.targets);
 
 	if('ratelimit_rate' in body)  body.ratelimit_rate  = clampNumber(body.ratelimit_rate, 1, 1000000, 10);
 	if('ratelimit_burst' in body) body.ratelimit_burst = clampNumber(body.ratelimit_burst, 0, 1000000, 20);

nodejs/utils/oidc.js

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-'use strict';
-
-const crypto = require('crypto');
-const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
-
-/**
- * Minimal OpenID Connect authorization-code + PKCE client.
- *
- * The SSO publishes no jwks_uri, so we do not verify ID-token signatures;
- * instead we treat the flow as opaque and read identity from the userinfo
- * endpoint (the access token is exchanged server-side over TLS). Uses Node's
- * global fetch (Node 18+) and crypto — no external dependency.
- *
- * All endpoints and client config come from conf.oidc (+ clientSecret from
- * secrets.js, deep-merged by @simpleworkjs/conf).
- */
-
-const base64url = buf => buf.toString('base64')
-	.replace(/\+/g, '-').replace(/\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '');
-
-// A high-entropy random string for `state` / PKCE verifier.
-function randomToken(bytes = 32){
-	return base64url(crypto.randomBytes(bytes));
-}
-
-// PKCE S256 challenge derived from the verifier.
-function codeChallengeS256(verifier){
-	return base64url(crypto.createHash('sha256').update(verifier).digest());
-}
-
-// Generate the {state, codeVerifier, codeChallenge} triple for a new login.
-function createAuthRequest(){
-	let state = randomToken(32);
-	let codeVerifier = randomToken(32);
-	let codeChallenge = codeChallengeS256(codeVerifier);
-	return {state, codeVerifier, codeChallenge};
-}
-
-// Build the SSO authorize URL the browser is redirected to. `redirectUri`
-// overrides conf.oidc.redirectUri (per-host SSO uses a per-host callback).
-function buildAuthUrl(state, codeChallenge, redirectUri){
-	let o = conf.oidc;
-	let params = new URLSearchParams({
-		response_type: 'code',
-		client_id: o.clientId,
-		redirect_uri: redirectUri || o.redirectUri,
-		scope: (o.scopes || ['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'groups']).join(' '),
-		state,
-		code_challenge: codeChallenge,
-		code_challenge_method: 'S256',
-	});
-	return `${o.authorizationEndpoint}?${params.toString()}`;
-}
-
-// Exchange an authorization code for tokens at the token endpoint. `redirectUri`
-// must match the one used in buildAuthUrl (per-host for per-host SSO).
-async function exchangeCode(code, codeVerifier, redirectUri){
-	let o = conf.oidc;
-	let body = new URLSearchParams({
-		grant_type: 'authorization_code',
-		code,
-		redirect_uri: redirectUri || o.redirectUri,
-		client_id: o.clientId,
-		client_secret: o.clientSecret,
-		code_verifier: codeVerifier,
-	});
-
-	let res = await fetch(o.tokenEndpoint, {
-		method: 'POST',
-		headers: {
-			'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
-			'Accept': 'application/json',
-		},
-		body: body.toString(),
-	});
-
-	if(!res.ok){
-		let text = await res.text().catch(() => '');
-		let error = new Error('OidcTokenExchangeFailed');
-		error.name = 'OidcTokenExchangeFailed';
-		error.message = `Token exchange failed (${res.status}): ${text}`;
-		error.status = 502;
-		throw error;
-	}
-
-	return res.json();
-}
-
-// Fetch the userinfo claims for an access token.
-async function fetchUserInfo(accessToken){
-	let o = conf.oidc;
-	let res = await fetch(o.userinfoEndpoint, {
-		headers: {
-			'Authorization': `Bearer ${accessToken}`,
-			'Accept': 'application/json',
-		},
-	});
-
-	if(!res.ok){
-		let error = new Error('OidcUserInfoFailed');
-		error.name = 'OidcUserInfoFailed';
-		error.message = `Userinfo request failed (${res.status})`;
-		error.status = 502;
-		throw error;
-	}
-
-	return res.json();
-}
-
-// Pull the app username and group list out of userinfo claims per conf.
-function claimsToIdentity(claims){
-	let o = conf.oidc;
-	let username = claims[o.usernameClaim || 'preferred_username'] || claims.sub;
-	let groups = claims[o.groupsClaim || 'groups'] || [];
-	if(!Array.isArray(groups)) groups = [groups].filter(Boolean);
-	return {username, groups, claims};
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-	randomToken,
-	codeChallengeS256,
-	createAuthRequest,
-	buildAuthUrl,
-	exchangeCode,
-	fetchUserInfo,
-	claimsToIdentity,
-};

nodejs/utils/safe_redirect.js

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-'use strict';
-
-/**
- * Constrain a post-login redirect target to a same-origin path.
- *
- * Rejects anything that could leave the site or execute script:
- *   - absolute URLs        ("https://evil.com")            -> not a "/" path
- *   - protocol-relative    ("//evil.com", "/\\evil.com")   -> host takeover
- *   - scheme targets       ("javascript:...", "data:...")  -> XSS
- * Anything not a plain "/path" falls back to "/".
- *
- * The browser has its own copy of this in public/lib/js/app-base.js; keep the
- * two in sync.
- */
-function safeInternalPath(path){
-	if(typeof path !== 'string' || path.charAt(0) !== '/'
-			|| path.charAt(1) === '/' || path.charAt(1) === '\\'){
-		return '/';
-	}
-	return path;
-}
-
-module.exports = {safeInternalPath};

nodejs/views/hosts.ejs

@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@
 		});
 
 		$f.find("textarea[name='req_headers']").val(hostFeatureHeadersToText(h.req_headers));
+		$f.find("textarea[name='targets']").val(hostFeatureListToText(h.targets));
 		$f.find("textarea[name='resp_headers']").val(hostFeatureHeadersToText(h.resp_headers));
 		$f.find("textarea[name='ip_allow']").val(hostFeatureListToText(h.ip_allow));
 		$f.find("textarea[name='ip_deny']").val(hostFeatureListToText(h.ip_deny));
@@ -632,6 +633,14 @@
 									<small class="field-help text-muted d-block">Whether the proxy talks to the target over HTTP or HTTPS. Independent of Incoming SSL above — clients can use HTTPS to reach the proxy while it still talks plain HTTP to the target, or vice versa.</small>
 								</div>
 							</div>
+
+							<hr>
+
+							<div class="form-group">
+								<label for="targets" class="form-label">Additional Targets (Load Balancing)</label>
+								<textarea name="targets" class="form-control" rows="2" placeholder="10.0.0.2:8080&#10;10.0.0.3:8080"></textarea>
+								<small class="field-help text-muted d-block">Add additional targets here (IP:port, one per line) to load balance across them using round-robin. The primary target above is always included.</small>
+							</div>
 						</div>
 
 						<!-- TLS & Wildcard -->

ops/install.sh

@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ apt-get install -y nodejs openresty
 echo "==> Lua modules"
 luarocks install lua-resty-auto-ssl
 luarocks install luasocket
+luarocks install lua-resty-balancer
 # CIDR matcher for the per-host IP allow/deny lists (hostfeatures.lua).
 # resty.limit.req is bundled with OpenResty, so no rock is needed for it.
 luarocks install lua-resty-ipmatcher

ops/nginx_conf/targetinfo.lua

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ function M.get(ngx, domain, targetInfo)
 
     local json = require "cjson"
     local redis = require "resty.redis"
+    local roundrobin = require "resty.roundrobin"
 
     if not domain then
         return nil, 499
@@ -95,6 +96,44 @@ function M.get(ngx, domain, targetInfo)
         return nil, 406
     end
 
+    -- Load balancing
+    local target_list = {}
+    table.insert(target_list, res["ip"] .. ":" .. tostring(res["targetPort"]))
+    
+    if res["targets"] and res["targets"] ~= "" and res["targets"] ~= "[]" then
+        local decodeOk, decodedTargets = pcall(json.decode, res["targets"])
+        if decodeOk and type(decodedTargets) == "table" then
+            for _, t in ipairs(decodedTargets) do
+                table.insert(target_list, t)
+            end
+        end
+    end
+
+    if #target_list > 1 then
+        if not M.host_balancers then M.host_balancers = {} end
+        local cache_key = domain .. "_" .. (res["updated_on"] or "0")
+        
+        if not M.host_balancers[domain] or M.host_balancers[domain].key ~= cache_key then
+            local nodes = {}
+            for _, t in ipairs(target_list) do
+                nodes[t] = 1
+            end
+            local b = roundrobin:new(nodes)
+            M.host_balancers[domain] = { b = b, key = cache_key }
+        end
+        
+        local peer = M.host_balancers[domain].b:find()
+        if peer then
+            local colon = peer:find(":")
+            if colon then
+                res["ip"] = peer:sub(1, colon - 1)
+                res["targetPort"] = peer:sub(colon + 1)
+            else
+                res["ip"] = peer
+            end
+        end
+    end
+
     ngx.ctx.targetInfo = res
     -- Remember which host this target was resolved for, so the reuse guard at
     -- the top can tell a genuine cache hit from a coalesced request for a

secrets.js.example

@@ -67,12 +67,14 @@ module.exports = {
         adminUsers: ['proxyadmin'],
         groupRoleMap: {},
         // Optional: the local anti-lockout admin's initial password, used
-        // ONLY the first time that account is created. Leave unset and it
-        // defaults to the username itself ("proxyadmin2") — fine for a quick
-        // local test, but change it (or set this) before exposing the proxy
-        // publicly. Once the account exists, this key is never read again;
-        // change the password via the app itself (or delete the Redis user
-        // to force it to be re-bootstrapped with a new value here).
+        // ONLY the first time that account is created. Leave unset and a
+        // random password is generated and printed to the container log on
+        // first boot — fine for a quick local test if you copy it from the
+        // log right away, but set this (or change the password afterward)
+        // before exposing the proxy publicly. Once the account exists, this
+        // key is never read again; change the password via the app itself
+        // (or delete the Redis user to force it to be re-bootstrapped with a
+        // new value here).
         // localAdminPass: 'change-me',
     },