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Author SHA1 Message Date
wmantly 69434d06ec Merge pull request #163 from theta42/release/v1.23.0-vault-proxy-fix
fix vault 403 for real (v1.23.0)
2026-08-04 00:19:16 -04:00
wmantly dd24257640 fix vault 403 for real (v1.23.0)
- /api/vault proxy now injects X-Vault-Token: the proxy declared its request
  hook with http-proxy-middleware v3 syntax (on: { proxyReq }), which the
  installed HPM v2 silently ignores — so every vault call reached OpenBao
  unauthenticated (the recurring 403). Rewritten as v2 onProxyReq.
- Header injection ordered before fixRequestBody (the body write flushes
  headers; setting X-Vault-Token after it failed on every POST/PUT).
- initORM add-only schema heal: sequelize.sync() never ALTERs, so newer columns
  (PluginInstance.lastLog) are now added via describeTable + addColumn.
- Long-lived external-app tokens via sso-app role (768h periodic); VaultAppToken
  stores each app token's accessor and renews it at boot + every 6h; re-minting
  revokes the previous token via its accessor.
- Wire-level tests for the vault proxy + app-token accessor lifecycle.
- package.json + lockfile bumped to 1.23.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 00:11:51 -04:00
wmantly b06aeca363 Merge pull request #162 from theta42/feat/agents-page-v1.22.0
feat: Agents page + secure /api/agent REST (v1.22.0)
2026-08-03 23:14:49 -04:00
wmantly ccf3122668 feat: Agents page + secure /api/agent REST (v1.22.0)
- New admin Agents page (nav + /agents route + views/agents.ejs): live list of
  connected theta-agent hosts with CPU/RAM/disk/ZFS/GPU telemetry and online
  status, updated live over socket.io ('agent.telemetry'/'agent.discovery').
- Auth + admin-gate the /api/agent REST router (it was mounted without
  middleware.auth — anyone could list nodes / send commands). The agent
  WebSocket (/api/agent/ws) is unaffected (handled by the raw wss upgrade with
  its own token auth).
- package.json + lockfile bumped to 1.22.0 to match the tag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 23:10:16 -04:00
13 changed files with 501 additions and 22 deletions
+12
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@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
# v1.23.0
- fix: /api/vault proxy never injected X-Vault-Token — the true root cause of the recurring vault 403 "permission denied". The proxy declared its hook with http-proxy-middleware v3 syntax (`on: { proxyReq }`), which the installed HPM v2 silently ignores, so every request reached OpenBao unauthenticated (and the client's sso auth headers were never stripped). Rewritten as v2 `onProxyReq`.
- fix: vault proxy header injection ordered before `fixRequestBody` — the body write flushes headers, so setting X-Vault-Token after it silently failed on every POST/PUT (writes would still 403 even with the hook fixed)
- fix: initORM add-only schema heal — `sequelize.sync()` never ALTERs existing tables, so columns added by newer releases (e.g. `PluginInstance.lastLog`, which crashed the scheduler on every boot of an upgraded deployment) are now detected via describeTable and added with addColumn (additive only, per-column fail-soft)
- feat: external-app vault tokens are long-lived and auto-renewed — minted via the new `sso-app` token role (periodic 768h, falls back to sso-broker's 24h role until theta-suite setup.sh is re-run); sso stores each token's accessor (new VaultAppToken model — an accessor can renew/revoke but not authenticate) and renews all of them at boot + every 6h via auth/token/renew-accessor, so a downstream app's credential stays valid as long as sso runs with zero renewal code in the app
- feat: re-minting an app token revokes the app's previous token via its stored accessor — exactly one live credential per app, no zombies
- test: wire-level tests for the vault proxy (real HTTP round-trip asserting token injection, auth-header stripping, path rewrite, and POST body integrity) + app-token accessor lifecycle tests
# v1.22.0
- feat: Agents page — live list of connected theta-agent hosts with telemetry (CPU/RAM/disk/ZFS/GPU) + online status, updating via socket.io
- security: auth + admin-gate the /api/agent REST routes (previously unauthenticated)
# v1.21.0
- fix: always reconcile OpenBao policy content before serving a (possibly cached) token, so stale stored policies can no longer cause a recurring vault 403 "permission denied"
- feat: shared secrets — users can publish secrets to secret/shared/<owner>/<slug> and grant read access to other users and downstream apps (OpenBao ACL policy edits, applied live)
+7
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ models.initORM().then(() => {
initScheduler(conf.discovery).catch(err => {
console.error('Failed to initialize scheduler:', err);
});
// Keep external-app vault tokens alive: renew every stored accessor now and
// on an interval (see vault_broker.startAppTokenRenewal). Only meaningful
// when OpenBao is configured; without VAULT_TOKEN the loop's calls fail soft.
if (process.env.VAULT_TOKEN) {
require('../utils/vault_broker').startAppTokenRenewal();
}
}).catch(err => {
console.error('Failed to initialize ORM:', err);
process.exit(1);
+34 -1
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ const { Webhook } = require('./webhook');
const { PluginInstance } = require('./plugin_instance');
const { SharedSecret } = require('./shared_secret');
const { SharedSecretGrant } = require('./shared_secret_grant');
const { VaultAppToken } = require('./vault_app_token');
async function initORM() {
const ormConf = conf.orm || {
dialect: 'sqlite',
@@ -33,16 +34,48 @@ async function initORM() {
conf: { orm: ormConf },
models: [
Resource, ResourceEdge, ResourceGroup, AccessRequest, Webhook, PluginInstance,
SharedSecret, SharedSecretGrant,
SharedSecret, SharedSecretGrant, VaultAppToken,
Token, AuthToken, InviteToken, ImpersonationToken, PasswordResetToken, OtpToken, ServiceToken
]
});
console.log('[initORM] ORM initialized successfully');
console.log('[initORM] Resource.orm =', !!Resource.orm, 'Token.orm =', !!Token.orm);
await healSchema();
} catch (err) {
console.error('[initORM] ORM initialization failed:', err.message);
throw err;
}
}
// Add-only schema heal. @simpleworkjs/orm runs sequelize.sync() WITHOUT alter,
// which creates missing tables but never touches existing ones — so a column
// added in a newer release (e.g. PluginInstance.lastLog) simply never appears
// in an upgraded deployment's database and every query on the model fails
// ("no such column"). This walks each Sequelize model and ADDs any attribute
// missing from its table. Strictly additive (never drops or retypes), works on
// any dialect via the query interface, and fail-soft per column so one bad
// attribute can't take the boot down.
async function healSchema() {
const adapter = Resource.orm && Resource.orm.adapters && Resource.orm.adapters.sequelize;
if (!adapter || !adapter.sequelize) return;
const sequelize = adapter.sequelize;
const qi = sequelize.getQueryInterface();
for (const SM of Object.values(sequelize.models)) {
const table = SM.getTableName();
let existing;
try { existing = await qi.describeTable(table); }
catch (e) { continue; } // no table yet — sync() handles creation
for (const [name, attr] of Object.entries(SM.getAttributes())) {
const col = attr.field || name;
if (existing[col]) continue;
try {
await qi.addColumn(table, col, attr);
console.log(`[initORM] schema heal: added missing column ${table}.${col}`);
} catch (e) {
console.error(`[initORM] schema heal: could not add ${table}.${col}:`, e.message);
}
}
}
}
module.exports.initORM = initORM;
+43
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
'use strict';
// VaultAppToken — the ACCESSOR of an OpenBao token minted for an external app
// from the vault UI (Apps tab), so sso can keep the token alive.
//
// The token itself is shown ONCE at mint and never stored (a stolen accessor
// cannot authenticate — it can only look up, renew, or revoke its token, and
// only the sso broker's policy grants those endpoints). App tokens are minted
// through the sso-app role as PERIODIC tokens: they live forever, but only if
// something renews them inside every period window. That something is sso's
// renewal loop (vault_broker.startAppTokenRenewal), which walks these rows and
// POSTs auth/token/renew-accessor on a timer — so a downstream app's credential
// stays valid as long as sso itself is running, with no renewal code needed in
// the downstream app.
//
// One row per app name: re-minting an app's token revokes the previous token
// via its accessor (no zombie credentials) and replaces the row.
const { Model } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
class VaultAppToken extends Model {
static fields = {
id: { type: 'uuid', primaryKey: true },
// The external app's name — also its policy (app-<name>) and KV namespace
// (secret/apps/<name>/). Unique: one live token per app.
name: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, unique: true, min: 1, max: 64 },
// The minted token's accessor (renew/revoke handle, cannot authenticate).
accessor: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, max: 128 },
// Renewal bookkeeping, updated by the renewal loop.
lastRenewedAt: { type: 'integer' },
lastError: { type: 'text' },
// Audit stamps (set by the route handler, not by an ORM hook).
created_by: { type: 'string' },
created_on: { type: 'integer' },
};
static async getByName(name) {
const rows = await this.list({ where: { name } });
return rows[0] || null;
}
}
module.exports = { VaultAppToken };
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "t42-sso-manager",
"version": "1.21.0",
"version": "1.23.0",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "t42-sso-manager",
"version": "1.21.0",
"version": "1.23.0",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@fortawesome/fontawesome-free": "^7.3.0",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "t42-sso-manager",
"version": "1.21.0",
"version": "1.23.0",
"description": "A very simple LDAP management and SSO system",
"author": [
{
+20 -1
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@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
'use strict';
const express = require('express');
const middleware = require('../middleware/auth');
const permission = require('../utils/permission');
const agentManager = require('../utils/agent_manager');
const ADMIN_GROUPS = ['app_sso_admin', 'app_super_admin', 'app_sso_directory_admin'];
module.exports = function initAgentWebSockets(app) {
if (!app.wss) {
console.warn("WebSocket server for agents is not initialized.");
@@ -71,8 +75,23 @@ module.exports = function initAgentWebSockets(app) {
} catch (e) {}
});
// REST API routes for Agent Management (mounted under /api/agent)
// REST API routes for Agent Management (mounted under /api/agent). The agent
// WebSocket (/api/agent/ws) is handled by the raw `wss` upgrade server in
// bin/www with its own ?token= auth — unaffected by the express middleware
// here. These REST routes are admin-facing, so they're auth + admin gated.
const router = express.Router();
router.use(middleware.auth);
router.use(async (req, res, next) => {
try {
await permission.byGroup(req.user, ADMIN_GROUPS);
next();
} catch (err) {
if (err && (err.status === 401 || err.name === 'Insufficient Permission')) {
return res.status(403).json({ status: 'error', message: 'admin only' });
}
next(err);
}
});
router.get('/nodes', (req, res) => {
res.json({
+6
View File
@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ router.get('/overview', function(req, res) {
res.render('overview', {...values});
});
// Connected theta-agent hosts + live telemetry (admin). Data from
// GET /api/agent/nodes; live updates via socket.io 'agent.*' events.
router.get('/agents', function(req, res) {
res.render('agents', {...values});
});
router.get('/admin', (req, res) => res.redirect(301, '/overview'));
router.get('/notifications', (req, res) => res.redirect(301, '/overview'));
router.get('/dashboard', (req, res) => res.redirect(301, '/overview'));
+153
View File
@@ -15,8 +15,36 @@ jest.mock('redis', () => ({
})
}));
// In-memory stand-ins for the ORM-backed models so mintAppToken/renewAppTokens
// can run without a database.
jest.mock('../models/shared_secret', () => ({
SharedSecret: { list: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]) },
}));
jest.mock('../models/shared_secret_grant', () => ({
SharedSecretGrant: { listForGrantee: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]) },
}));
jest.mock('../models/vault_app_token', () => {
const rows = [];
const VaultAppToken = {
_rows: rows,
list: jest.fn(async () => rows),
getByName: jest.fn(async (name) => rows.find(r => r.name === name) || null),
create: jest.fn(async (data) => {
const row = {
...data,
update: jest.fn(async function (patch) { Object.assign(this, patch); }),
delete: jest.fn(async function () { rows.splice(rows.indexOf(this), 1); }),
};
rows.push(row);
return row;
}),
};
return { VaultAppToken };
});
const baoConf = require('@simpleworkjs/bao-conf');
const vaultBroker = require('../utils/vault_broker');
const { VaultAppToken } = require('../models/vault_app_token');
describe('vault_broker admin policy', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
@@ -49,3 +77,128 @@ describe('vault_broker admin policy', () => {
}));
});
});
describe('app token lifecycle (accessor storage + renewal)', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
baoConf.request.mockReset();
VaultAppToken._rows.length = 0;
});
function mockBao({ mintAccessor = 'acc-1', renewOk = true } = {}) {
baoConf.request.mockImplementation(async (method, path, body) => {
if (path.startsWith('sys/policies/acl/')) {
if (method === 'GET') return { status: 404, text: async () => '' };
return { status: 204, ok: true };
}
if (path === 'auth/token/create/sso-app') {
return { ok: true, json: async () => ({ auth: { client_token: 'app-tok', accessor: mintAccessor, lease_duration: 2764800 } }) };
}
if (path === 'auth/token/renew-accessor') {
return renewOk ? { ok: true, json: async () => ({}) } : { ok: false, status: 400, text: async () => 'invalid accessor' };
}
if (path === 'auth/token/revoke-accessor') {
return { ok: true, status: 204, text: async () => '' };
}
return { status: 200, ok: true, json: async () => ({}) };
});
}
test('mintAppToken stores the accessor; re-mint revokes the old accessor and replaces the row', async () => {
mockBao({ mintAccessor: 'acc-old' });
await vaultBroker.mintAppToken('demo', 'adminuser');
expect(VaultAppToken._rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(VaultAppToken._rows[0]).toMatchObject({ name: 'demo', accessor: 'acc-old', created_by: 'adminuser' });
mockBao({ mintAccessor: 'acc-new' });
await vaultBroker.mintAppToken('demo', 'adminuser');
expect(baoConf.request).toHaveBeenCalledWith('POST', 'auth/token/revoke-accessor', { accessor: 'acc-old' });
expect(VaultAppToken._rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(VaultAppToken._rows[0].accessor).toBe('acc-new');
});
test('renewAppTokens renews each accessor and stamps lastRenewedAt', async () => {
mockBao();
await vaultBroker.mintAppToken('demo', 'adminuser');
VaultAppToken._rows[0].lastRenewedAt = 0;
await vaultBroker.renewAppTokens();
expect(baoConf.request).toHaveBeenCalledWith('POST', 'auth/token/renew-accessor', { accessor: 'acc-1' });
expect(VaultAppToken._rows[0].lastRenewedAt).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(VaultAppToken._rows[0].lastError).toBeNull();
});
test('renewAppTokens records the failure on the row without throwing', async () => {
mockBao({ renewOk: false });
await vaultBroker.mintAppToken('demo', 'adminuser');
await vaultBroker.renewAppTokens();
expect(VaultAppToken._rows[0].lastError).toMatch(/renew failed \(400\)/);
});
});
// Real HTTP round-trip through vaultProxy() against an in-process fake OpenBao.
// This exists because the proxy once shipped with a hook shape the installed
// http-proxy-middleware version ignored (v3 `on: { proxyReq }` vs v2
// `onProxyReq`), so NO X-Vault-Token was ever injected and every /api/vault
// request 403'd. A unit test on options can't catch that — only a wire test can.
describe('vaultProxy wire behavior', () => {
const http = require('http');
const express = require('express');
let target; // fake OpenBao
let seen; // last request the fake OpenBao received
let app; // sso app fragment: scopeGuard stub + vaultProxy
let server;
beforeAll((done) => {
target = http.createServer((req, res) => {
let body = '';
req.on('data', (c) => { body += c; });
req.on('end', () => {
seen = { method: req.method, url: req.url, headers: req.headers, body };
res.setHeader('content-type', 'application/json');
res.end('{"ok":true}');
});
});
target.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
process.env.VAULT_ADDR = `http://127.0.0.1:${target.address().port}`;
jest.resetModules();
const broker = require('../utils/vault_broker');
app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/vault', (req, res, next) => { req.vaultToken = 'scoped-token-123'; next(); }, broker.vaultProxy());
server = app.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', done);
});
});
afterAll((done) => {
server.close(() => target.close(done));
});
function call(path, opts = {}) {
const port = server.address().port;
return fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}${path}`, opts);
}
test('GET list rewrites /api/vault -> /v1, injects X-Vault-Token, strips sso auth headers', async () => {
const res = await call('/api/vault/secret/metadata/users/alice?list=true', {
headers: { 'auth-token': 'sso-session-token', authorization: 'Bearer sso_x_y', 'content-type': 'application/json' },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(seen.url).toBe('/v1/secret/metadata/users/alice?list=true');
expect(seen.headers['x-vault-token']).toBe('scoped-token-123');
expect(seen.headers['auth-token']).toBeUndefined();
expect(seen.headers['authorization']).toBeUndefined();
});
test('POST body survives the express.json + fixRequestBody round-trip', async () => {
const res = await call('/api/vault/secret/data/users/alice/foo', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', 'auth-token': 'sso-session-token' },
body: JSON.stringify({ data: { hello: 'world' } }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(seen.method).toBe('POST');
expect(seen.url).toBe('/v1/secret/data/users/alice/foo');
expect(seen.headers['x-vault-token']).toBe('scoped-token-123');
expect(JSON.parse(seen.body)).toEqual({ data: { hello: 'world' } });
});
});
+1
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@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ module.exports = {
{href: '/directory', icon: 'fa-solid fa-server', label: 'Directory', groups: ['app_sso_admin', 'app_sso_directory_admin', 'admin']},
// Vault requires login - per-user secrets at secret/users/<uid>/*.
{href: '/vault', icon: 'fa-solid fa-vault', label: 'Vault', groups: ['login']},
{href: '/agents', icon: 'fa-solid fa-microchip', label: 'Agents', groups: ['app_sso_admin', 'admin']},
{href: '/overview', icon: 'fa-solid fa-gauge-high', label: 'Overview', groups: ['app_sso_admin', 'admin']},
],
};
+109 -17
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
const permission = require('./permission');
const { SharedSecret } = require('../models/shared_secret');
const { SharedSecretGrant } = require('../models/shared_secret_grant');
const { VaultAppToken } = require('../models/vault_app_token');
const ROLE = 'sso-broker';
const DEFAULT_TTL = 24 * 60 * 60; // matches the role's token_period (24h)
@@ -83,15 +84,18 @@ async function ensurePolicy(name, hcl) {
await bao('PUT', `sys/policies/acl/${name}`, { policy: hcl });
}
// Mint a token through the sso-broker role with the given policies. Returns
// { token, ttl } (ttl = lease_duration seconds, falls back to DEFAULT_TTL).
async function mintToken(policies) {
const res = await bao('POST', 'auth/token/create/sso-broker', { policies });
// Mint a token through a token role with the given policies. Returns
// { token, accessor, ttl } (ttl = lease_duration seconds, falls back to
// DEFAULT_TTL). Roles: sso-broker (24h period — user/admin tokens, re-minted
// from cache) and sso-app (768h period — long-lived external-app credentials,
// kept alive via their stored accessor by the renewal loop below).
async function mintToken(policies, role = ROLE) {
const res = await bao('POST', `auth/token/create/${role}`, { policies });
const json = await res.json();
const token = json && json.auth && json.auth.client_token;
if (!token) throw new Error(`OpenBao token mint returned no client_token: ${JSON.stringify(json)}`);
const ttl = (json.auth && json.auth.lease_duration) || DEFAULT_TTL;
return { token, ttl };
return { token, accessor: json.auth.accessor, ttl };
}
// ── Shared-secret policy rules ───────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -185,15 +189,94 @@ ${granted}`.trim();
// a later compromise of an admin session cannot recover previously-minted app
// tokens. The caller must record it in the external app immediately. Later
// grants to the app edit app-<name> policy content (live-applied to this token).
async function mintAppToken(name) {
//
// What IS stored is the token's ACCESSOR (VaultAppToken row): an accessor
// cannot authenticate, but it lets the renewal loop below keep the (periodic)
// token alive and lets a re-mint revoke the app's previous token so exactly
// one credential per app is ever live.
async function mintAppToken(name, actorUid) {
if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$/.test(name)) {
throw new Error('invalid app name (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens; max 63 chars)');
}
await ensurePolicy(`app-${name}`, await appPolicyHcl(name));
const { token, ttl } = await mintToken([`app-${name}`]);
// App tokens are long-lived credentials: mint via the sso-app role (768h
// period) so a renewal inside every 32-day window keeps them alive forever.
// Fall back to the broker's own 24h role on deployments whose setup.sh
// predates the sso-app role (re-running setup.sh creates it).
let minted;
try {
minted = await mintToken([`app-${name}`], 'sso-app');
} catch (e) {
console.warn(`vault_broker: sso-app token role unavailable (${e.message}); falling back to sso-broker (24h period). Re-run theta-env setup.sh to create the sso-app role.`);
minted = await mintToken([`app-${name}`]);
}
const { token, accessor, ttl } = minted;
// Replace the app's accessor row; revoke the superseded token (best-effort —
// it may already be expired) so re-minting never leaves a zombie credential.
try {
const existing = await VaultAppToken.getByName(name);
if (existing) {
await baoConf.request('POST', 'auth/token/revoke-accessor', { accessor: existing.accessor });
await existing.delete();
}
if (accessor) {
await VaultAppToken.create({
name, accessor,
lastRenewedAt: Date.now(),
created_by: actorUid, created_on: Date.now(),
});
}
} catch (e) {
// Accessor bookkeeping must never block handing the token out; without a
// row the token simply isn't auto-renewed (it still lives one full period).
console.error(`vault_broker: could not store accessor for app-${name}:`, e.message);
}
return { token, ttl, policy: `app-${name}`, path: `secret/apps/${name}/` };
}
// ── App-token renewal loop ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Walks the stored accessors and renews each token (auth/token/renew-accessor),
// resetting its periodic clock. Runs at boot and then every RENEW_INTERVAL_MS —
// far inside both possible periods (24h fallback and 768h), so a downstream
// app's token stays valid for as long as sso is running. Failures are recorded
// on the row (visible to admins in the DB / future UI) and never throw.
const RENEW_INTERVAL_MS = 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 6h — several chances per 24h period
let renewTimer;
async function renewAppTokens() {
let rows;
try { rows = await VaultAppToken.list(); }
catch (e) { console.error('vault_broker: app-token renewal: could not list accessors:', e.message); return; }
for (const row of rows) {
try {
const res = await baoConf.request('POST', 'auth/token/renew-accessor', { accessor: row.accessor });
if (res.ok) {
await row.update({ lastRenewedAt: Date.now(), lastError: null });
} else {
const text = await res.text().catch(() => '');
// 400 "invalid accessor" = token expired or was revoked out-of-band;
// keep the row + error so the admin can see the app needs a re-mint.
await row.update({ lastError: `renew failed (${res.status}) ${text}` });
console.warn(`vault_broker: renew of app token '${row.name}' failed (${res.status}) — re-mint it from the vault UI if the app is still in use.`);
}
} catch (e) {
try { await row.update({ lastError: e.message }); } catch (e2) { /* best-effort */ }
console.error(`vault_broker: renew of app token '${row.name}' errored:`, e.message);
}
}
}
// Start the loop (idempotent). unref() so an open handle never blocks exit.
function startAppTokenRenewal() {
if (renewTimer) return renewTimer;
renewAppTokens().catch((e) => console.error('vault_broker: initial app-token renewal failed:', e.message));
renewTimer = setInterval(() => {
renewAppTokens().catch((e) => console.error('vault_broker: app-token renewal failed:', e.message));
}, RENEW_INTERVAL_MS);
if (renewTimer.unref) renewTimer.unref();
return renewTimer;
}
// ── Grant / revoke shared-secret access ─────────────────────────────────────
// Creating a grant writes the DB row and then edits the grantee's policy content
// to add read on the shared path; revoking removes both. Because OpenBao parses
@@ -292,15 +375,20 @@ function vaultProxy() {
target: VAULT_ADDR,
changeOrigin: true,
pathRewrite: { '^/api/vault': '/v1' },
on: {
proxyReq(proxyReq, req, res, options) {
fixRequestBody(proxyReq, req, res, options);
// Inject ONLY the server-minted scoped token; strip the client's
// sso session/api auth so it never reaches OpenBao.
proxyReq.setHeader('X-Vault-Token', req.vaultToken);
proxyReq.removeHeader('auth-token');
proxyReq.removeHeader('authorization');
},
// http-proxy-middleware v2 API: hooks are top-level onProxyReq/onError,
// NOT the v3 `on: { proxyReq }` shape. v2 silently ignores an `on` key,
// which shipped this proxy with NO token injection — every /api/vault
// call reached OpenBao unauthenticated and 403'd.
onProxyReq(proxyReq, req, res, options) {
// Header ops MUST precede fixRequestBody: it write()s the parsed body
// onto proxyReq, which flushes headers — setHeader after that throws
// (swallowed upstream), silently dropping the token on every write.
// Inject ONLY the server-minted scoped token; strip the client's
// sso session/api auth so it never reaches OpenBao.
proxyReq.setHeader('X-Vault-Token', req.vaultToken);
proxyReq.removeHeader('auth-token');
proxyReq.removeHeader('authorization');
fixRequestBody(proxyReq, req, res, options);
},
});
}
@@ -314,7 +402,7 @@ mintAppRouter.post('/', async (req, res, next) => {
await permission.byGroup(req.user, [ADMIN_GROUP]);
const name = (req.body && req.body.name || '').trim();
if (!name) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'name is required' });
const result = await mintAppToken(name);
const result = await mintAppToken(name, req.user && req.user.uid);
res.json(result);
} catch (e) {
if (e.status === 401) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'admin only' });
@@ -330,6 +418,10 @@ module.exports = {
scopeGuard,
vaultProxy,
mintAppRouter,
// app-token lifecycle
renewAppTokens,
startAppTokenRenewal,
VaultAppToken,
// sharing
SharedSecret,
SharedSecretGrant,
+112
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
<%- include('top') %>
<div class="container-fluid py-4">
<div class="d-flex justify-content-between align-items-center mb-3">
<h2><i class="fa-solid fa-microchip"></i> Theta Agents <small class="text-muted">(connected hosts)</small></h2>
<button class="btn btn-outline-primary" onclick="loadAgents()"><i class="fa-solid fa-rotate"></i> Refresh</button>
</div>
<div class="card shadow-sm">
<div class="card-header bg-light"><h5 class="card-title mb-0">Connected agents</h5></div>
<div class="table-responsive">
<table class="table table-hover align-middle mb-0">
<thead class="table-light">
<tr>
<th>Host</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th style="width:110px">CPU</th>
<th style="width:110px">RAM</th>
<th style="width:110px">Disk</th>
<th>ZFS</th>
<th>GPU</th>
<th>Last seen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody id="agents-tbody">
<tr><td colspan="9" class="text-center text-muted">Loading agents...</td></tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
</div>
<p class="text-muted small mt-3">
Live data from the theta-agent telemetry stream. An agent reports hostname/IP discovery and
CPU/RAM/disk/ZFS/GPU usage every ~60s over the WebSocket; "Online" means seen in the last 90s.
</p>
</div>
<script type="text/javascript">
app.auth.forceLogin(['app_sso_admin', 'admin']);
let agentsById = {}; // token -> agent record
function bar(val) {
val = Math.max(0, Math.min(100, val || 0));
return `<div class="progress" style="height:8px"><div class="progress-bar" role="progressbar" style="width:${val}%"></div></div>`;
}
function timeAgo(iso) {
if (!iso) return '';
const m = moment(iso);
return m.isValid() ? m.fromNow() : '';
}
function esc(s) {
if (s == null) return '';
return app.util.escapeHtml(String(s));
}
function renderRow(id, a) {
const d = a.discovery || {};
const t = a.telemetry || {};
const online = !!a.isOnline;
const badge = `<span class="badge ${online ? 'bg-success' : 'bg-secondary'}">${online ? 'Online' : 'Offline'}</span>`;
const cpu = t.cpu_usage_percent != null ? t.cpu_usage_percent : 0;
const ram = t.ram_usage_percent != null ? t.ram_usage_percent : 0;
const disk = t.disk_usage_percent != null ? t.disk_usage_percent : 0;
const gpu = (t.gpu_usage_percent != null && t.gpu_usage_percent >= 0) ? t.gpu_usage_percent + '%' : 'N/A';
return `<tr id="agent-${id}">
<td><strong>${esc(a.hostname || 'unknown')}</strong>${d.location ? `<div class="small text-muted">${esc(d.location)}</div>` : ''}</td>
<td>${esc(a.ipAddress || '')}</td>
<td>${badge}</td>
<td>${cpu}% ${bar(cpu)}</td>
<td>${ram}% ${bar(ram)}</td>
<td>${disk}% ${bar(disk)}</td>
<td>${esc(t.zfs_health || 'N/A')}</td>
<td>${gpu}</td>
<td class="small text-muted">${timeAgo(a.lastSeen)}</td>
</tr>`;
}
async function loadAgents() {
const tbody = document.getElementById('agents-tbody');
try {
const res = await app.api.get('agent/nodes');
const agents = (res && res.agents) || [];
agentsById = {};
agents.forEach(a => { agentsById[a.token] = a; });
tbody.innerHTML = agents.length
? agents.map(a => renderRow(a.token, a)).join('')
: '<tr><td colspan="9" class="text-center text-muted">No agents connected.</td></tr>';
} catch (err) {
tbody.innerHTML = `<tr><td colspan="9" class="text-center text-danger">Error loading agents: ${esc(err && err.message || err)}</td></tr>`;
}
}
// Live updates from the server's agent.* socket.io broadcasts. The app's
// default socket is scoped to P2PSub, so open a dedicated socket here.
const agentSocket = io({ auth: { token: app.auth.getToken() } });
agentSocket.on('agent.telemetry', (msg) => {
const a = agentsById[msg && msg.token];
if (a) { a.telemetry = msg.payload; a.isOnline = true; const row = document.getElementById('agent-' + msg.token); if (row) row.outerHTML = renderRow(msg.token, a); }
});
agentSocket.on('agent.discovery', (msg) => {
const a = agentsById[msg && msg.token];
if (a) { a.discovery = msg.payload; a.hostname = (msg.payload && msg.payload.hostname) || a.hostname; const row = document.getElementById('agent-' + msg.token); if (row) row.outerHTML = renderRow(msg.token, a); }
});
loadAgents();
// Re-fetch periodically to reflect connect/disconnect + isOnline (90s window).
setInterval(loadAgents, 30000);
</script>
<%- include('bottom') %>
+1
View File
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
<div class="card-header bg-light"><h5 class="card-title mb-0">Mint an app token</h5></div>
<div class="card-body">
<p class="text-muted small">Mints a scoped OpenBao token confined to <code>secret/apps/&lt;name&gt;/*</code> for an external app. The token is shown <strong>once</strong> — record it in the app immediately; it cannot be recovered later.</p>
<p class="text-muted small">The token is periodic: it stays valid as long as the app renews it within its period (<code>POST /v1/auth/token/renew-self</code>). If it lapses, mint a new one here — the app's policy and stored secrets are kept.</p>
<div class="mb-3">
<label class="form-label">App name (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)</label>
<input type="text" class="form-control" id="app-name-input" placeholder="e.g. my-service">