Merge pull request #6 from theta42/fix/rebuild-agent-binary

fix: rebuild the prebuilt linux/amd64 binary for join keys (v1.5.1)
2026-08-06 10:44:41 -04:00 · 2026-08-06 10:43:51 -04:00 · 2026-08-06 10:40:05 -04:00 · 2026-08-06 10:34:06 -04:00 · 2026-08-05 18:55:12 -04:00 · 2026-08-05 18:43:26 -04:00
20 changed files with 2152 additions and 66 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+# Changelog
+
+All notable changes to the `theta-agent` daemon will be documented in this file.
+
+The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
+and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
+
+## [v1.5.1] - 2026-08-06
+
+### Fixed
+- **Rebuilt the prebuilt `theta-agent-linux-amd64`.** theta-suite's `setup.sh` installs that committed binary rather than building from source, so a stale one means the fix in this repo never reaches the host. The v1.5.0 binary predated join-key support: an install would have written a `join_key` into `agent.yml` that the running agent did not understand, and it would have looped on `close 4001: Unauthorized`. (Same trap as the v1.3.0 heartbeat fix.)
+
+## [v1.5.0] - 2026-08-06
+
+Join-key enrollment (protocol v1.2.0 §1.1). Installing the agent with one key is now all it takes to add a host.
+
+### Added
+- **`join_key` config field.** Presented while `auth_token` is empty. The SSO exchanges it for this agent's own token and the public key it must pin, both delivered in the `config` frame; the agent writes them into `agent.yml` and blanks the join key. No value has to be copied between two machines by hand any more.
+- `ConfigManager.PersistEnrollment` rewrites only the credential lines, line-based rather than a YAML round-trip, so operator comments, the capability matrix and formatting survive. Re-reads the file afterwards, so the new credential is live without a restart, and keeps the file at `0600`.
+- `Config.Credential()` — the agent's own token when it has one, otherwise the join key.
+- The connect URL carries `?hostname=`, so a self-enrolling host is named after itself instead of a generated placeholder.
+- `install.sh --join-key`.
+
+### Fixed
+- The agent now refuses to connect (with a clear message and a long back-off) when it has neither an `auth_token` nor a `join_key`, rather than repeatedly presenting an empty credential.
+
+## [v1.4.0] - 2026-08-05
+
+Implements **Protocol v1.2.0**. See `PROTOCOL.md` §1.1, §5.1–5.3.
+
+### Security
+- **Fail-closed signature verification.** `verifySignature` returned `true` when no `public_key` was configured, logging "skipping signature verification". Combined with an installer that never wrote a `public_key`, that meant a default install would execute `reboot`, `service_restart`, `configure_ldap`, `arbitrary_bash` and `update_binary` **unverified** from anything that could reach its socket. An agent that cannot verify a high-risk command now refuses it.
+- **The token must be issued by the server.** The SSO now rejects tokens it did not mint (close code `4001`). Agents carrying a token generated by the old browser-side installer will not connect until re-enrolled.
+
+### Fixed
+- **Canonicalization mismatch broke signatures for most real scripts.** Go's `encoding/json` escapes `<`, `>` and `&` by default; the server's `JSON.stringify` does not. Any payload containing them — an `arbitrary_bash` script using `>` redirection or `&&`, which is most of them — hashed differently on each side and failed verification. `canonicalize()` now uses `json.Encoder` with `SetEscapeHTML(false)` and trims the encoder's trailing newline.
+- **Auth failures no longer hot-loop.** A rejected credential was retried every 5 seconds forever, flooding the SSO and its audit log. Close codes `4001`/`4003`/`4004` now back off for 5 minutes and log what to do about it.
+- **The auth token no longer appears in logs.** The connect line logged the full URL, including `?token=...`. It now logs only host + path, and the token is URL-escaped.
+
+### Added
+- Close-code handling for the SSO's enrollment signals: `4001` unauthorized, `4002` superseded, `4003` revoked, `4004` token rotated.
+- `install.sh --public-key <base64>`, written into the generated `agent.yml`. The installer warns loudly when no public key is configured, since such an agent can report telemetry but will refuse every high-risk command.
+- Tests: fail-closed with no key, wrong key, payload tampered after signing, shell metacharacters (`>`, `&&`, `<`) round-tripping, and canonical-form equality with the server. `interop_check_test.go` verifies a signature produced by the live SSO against the agent's own verifier (skipped unless `INTEROP_FIXTURE` is set).
+
+### Changed
+- Existing tests no longer rely on verification being skipped; high-risk cases now sign with a real test key.
+- `agent.yml.example`, `README.md`, `INSTALL.md`: enrollment is a prerequisite, and `public_key` is the base64 of the **raw 32-byte** Ed25519 key — not a PEM body. The previous documented example (`MCowBQYDK2VwAyEA...`) decodes to 44 bytes and would have been rejected.
+
+## [v1.3.0] - 2026-08-04
+
+### Fixed
+- **Silently ignore `heartbeat_ack`** — the server replies to the agent's own periodic heartbeat with `heartbeat_ack`. The agent had no case for it, so it fell through to the unknown-command handler, logged `Unknown command type: heartbeat_ack` every minute, and answered with a spurious error response. Heartbeat acks are fire-and-forget; the agent now ignores them silently.
+
+## [v1.2.0] - 2026-08-03
+
+### Added
+- **Protocol v1.1.0 Compliance**: Full alignment with `PROTOCOL.md` (v1.1.0) specification.
+- **Ed25519 Cryptographic Verification**: Verification of Ed25519 Base64 signatures for high-risk C2 commands (`reboot`, `service_restart`, `configure_ldap`, `arbitrary_bash`, `update_binary`).
+- **Enhanced Journal Log Fetcher (`fetch_logs`)**: Support for querying service-specific systemd logs (`service` parameter) with configurable line count (`lines` parameter).
+- **Pure Go Self-Update Engine (`update_binary`)**: Replaced shell script execution with pure Go HTTP client fetching, SHA256 verification, atomic file replacement, and clean daemon restart.
+
+### Fixed
+- **Goroutine Leak Prevention**: Added `stopCh` lifecycle management to terminate background telemetry and heartbeat tickers upon WebSocket disconnection.
+- **Dynamic Config Rerenders**: Resolved data races when toggling capabilities or reloading `agent.yml` via `reload_config`.
+- **Config Path Uniformity**: Standardized canonical configuration file path across codebase, installer, and documentation to `/etc/theta42/agent.yml`.
+
+## [v0.1.0] - 2026-08-01
+
+### Added
+- Initial release of `theta-agent` Go daemon replacing legacy bash metric scripts.
+- Persistent outbound WebSocket telemetry and local capability matrix enforcement.
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# Multi-stage build for minimal runtime image
+FROM golang:1.23-alpine AS builder
+
+# Install build dependencies
+RUN apk add --no-cache git
+
+WORKDIR /app
+COPY go.mod go.sum ./
+RUN go mod download
+
+COPY . .
+RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build -v -o theta-agent .
+
+# Final runtime image
+FROM alpine:latest
+RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates
+
+WORKDIR /
+
+# Create config directory
+RUN mkdir -p /etc/theta42
+
+COPY --from=builder /app/theta-agent /usr/local/bin/theta-agent
+
+# Run as root for system management
+USER root
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/theta-agent"]
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# Installation Guide: Theta Agent
+
+Theta Agent is designed for rapid deployment across the fleet. The recommended method is via the "One-Liner" install, which marries the agent to a specific SSO Manager instance.
+
+## Prerequisite: enroll the host
+
+The agent's token is issued by the SSO, not chosen by you. In the SSO open
+**Directory → Install Agent**, name the host, bind it to a host resource, and
+press **Enroll & issue token**. You get:
+
+- the **agent token** — shown once; only its hash is stored
+- the **SSO public key** — pinned by the agent to verify high-risk commands
+
+The modal builds the install command below with both already filled in. A token
+the SSO did not issue is rejected at connect time with close code `4001`.
+
+## Quick Start (The One-Liner)
+
+The SSO Manager provides a pre-generated installation command. Copy and paste it into your terminal as root:
+
+### Option A: Full Configuration (Recommended)
+Use this for precise control over capabilities:
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://sso.example.com/resources/theta-agent/install.sh | sh -s -- "BASE64_ENCODED_CONFIG"
+```
+
+### Option B: Minimal Setup
+Use this for rapid deployment with basic telemetry:
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://sso.example.com/resources/theta-agent/install.sh | sh -s -- \
+  --url "https://sso.example.com" --token "<ISSUED_TOKEN>" --public-key "<BASE64_PUBLIC_KEY>"
+```
+
+### What this does:
+1. Downloads the latest `theta-agent` binary.
+2. Decodes the base64 configuration string into `/etc/theta42/agent.yml`.
+3. Installs a systemd service unit.
+4. Starts the agent automatically.
+
+---
+
+## Manual Installation
+
+If you are in an air-gapped environment or prefer manual control:
+
+### 1. Deploy Binary
+Place the `theta-agent` binary in `/usr/local/bin/` and ensure it is executable:
+```bash
+chmod +x /usr/local/bin/theta-agent
+```
+
+### 2. Configure
+Create the configuration directory and the `agent.yml` file:
+```bash
+mkdir -p /etc/theta42
+nano /etc/theta42/agent.yml
+```
+Ensure the file has restricted permissions:
+```bash
+chmod 600 /etc/theta42/agent.yml
+```
+
+### 3. Setup systemd
+Create the file `/etc/systemd/system/theta-agent.service`:
+```ini
+[Unit]
+Description=Theta Agent Unified Endpoint Management
+After=network.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/theta-agent
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+StandardOutput=syslog
+StandardError=syslog
+SyslogIdentifier=theta-agent
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+```
+
+Enable and start the service:
+```bash
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl enable theta-agent
+systemctl start theta-agent
+```
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+### Verifying Connection
+Check the logs to ensure the agent has successfully connected to the SSO Manager:
+```bash
+journalctl -u theta-agent -f
+```
+You should see: `Successfully connected to SSO Manager.`
+
+### Configuration Errors
+If the agent fails to start, verify the config file exists and is valid YAML:
+```bash
+ls -l /etc/theta42/agent.yml
+```
+
+### Root Privileges
+The agent must run as root to execute system commands like `reboot` and `systemctl restart`. If you manually run the binary, ensure you use `sudo`.
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+# Theta Agent Protocol Specification (v1.2.0)
+
+This document defines the communication protocol between the `theta-agent` (Client) and the `sso-manager` (Server).
+
+## 1. Connection Establishment
+
+The agent establishes a persistent outbound WebSocket connection.
+
+- **Endpoint**: `wss://<manager-url>/api/agent/ws`
+- **Authentication**: The agent must provide its enrollment token as a query parameter:
+  - `wss://<manager-url>/api/agent/ws?token=<AGENT_TOKEN>`
+
+### 1.1 Enrollment (changed in v1.2.0)
+
+Two credentials can appear in `agent.yml`. The agent presents `auth_token` when
+it has one, otherwise `join_key`:
+
+| Field | Meaning |
+| :--- | :--- |
+| `auth_token` | This agent's own token, issued by the server. Long-term identity. |
+| `join_key` | Bootstrap credential (`tjk_…`), exchanged for an `auth_token` on first connect. |
+
+**Join-key flow.** The agent connects presenting a join key and
+`?hostname=<its hostname>`. The server enrolls the host and answers with a
+`config` frame carrying `enrolled: true`, `auth_token` and `public_key`. The
+agent writes both into `agent.yml`, blanks `join_key`, and uses its own token
+from then on. This is what makes "install the agent with a key" sufficient to
+add a host — no value has to be copied between two machines by hand.
+
+The public key is accepted on first connect (trust on first use) over the same
+channel that issued the token. Pre-register the host instead if you need the
+trust anchor pinned out of band.
+
+
+
+The token **must be issued by the server**. An administrator enrolls the agent in
+the SSO (Directory → Agents, or `POST /api/agent/enroll`), which mints the token,
+stores only its SHA-256, and displays the raw value once. That value goes into
+`auth_token` in `agent.yml`.
+
+Up to v1.1.0 the token was generated in the browser and never recorded
+server-side, so the server accepted *any* string: anyone who could reach
+`/api/agent/ws` could register as a node, publish discovery/telemetry, and
+receive commands addressed to a token they guessed. Tokens the server did not
+issue are now rejected.
+
+The server accepts the WebSocket upgrade before authenticating, so an
+authentication failure arrives as a **close frame**, not an HTTP status:
+
+| Code | Meaning | Agent behaviour |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| `4001` | Credential unknown — neither an issued token nor a valid join key | Back off (5 min); the credential will not fix itself |
+| `4002` | Superseded — another connection authenticated as this agent | Normal reconnect |
+| `4003` | Enrollment revoked or deleted by an administrator | Back off (5 min) |
+| `4004` | Token rotated — `agent.yml` holds the superseded value | Back off (5 min); re-copy the token |
+
+Revocation and rotation both drop any live socket immediately, so they take
+effect without waiting for the agent to reconnect.
+
+## 2. Message Format
+
+All messages are exchanged as JSON objects following the `WSMessage` structure.
+
+```json
+{
+  "type": "string",
+  "payload": {
+    "key": "value"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## 3. Client $\rightarrow$ Server Messages
+
+### 3.1 Discovery (One-time & On-Change)
+Sent immediately upon connection and whenever the agent detects a change in its own network IP addresses.
+
+- **Type**: `discovery`
+- **Payload**:
+  - `hostname`: (string) System hostname.
+  - `ip_addresses`: (array of strings) List of all non-loopback IPv4 addresses.
+  - `os`: (string) OS and Platform.
+  - `kernel`: (string) Kernel version.
+  - `cpu`: (string) CPU model.
+  - `ram_total_gb`: (float) Total system RAM in GB.
+  - `disk_total_gb`: (float) Total root disk capacity in GB.
+  - `location`: (string) Physical location from config.
+
+### 3.2 Telemetry (Periodic)
+Sent every 30 seconds.
+
+- **Type**: `telemetry`
+- **Payload**:
+  - `cpu_usage_percent`: (float) Current CPU load.
+  - `ram_usage_percent`: (float) Current RAM utilization.
+  - `disk_usage_percent`: (float) Current root disk utilization.
+  - `zfs_health`: (string) Primary ZFS pool status (e.g., "ONLINE").
+  - `gpu_usage_percent`: (float) Average NVIDIA GPU utilization (-1.0 if unavailable).
+  - `timestamp`: (string) RFC3339 timestamp.
+
+### 3.3 Heartbeat (Periodic)
+Sent every 60 seconds to maintain the connection and signal health.
+
+- **Type**: `heartbeat`
+- **Payload**:
+  - `timestamp`: (string) RFC3339 timestamp.
+
+### 3.4 Command Response
+Sent in response to any command received from the server.
+
+- **Type**: `response` (Implicitly handled as the answer to a command)
+- **Payload**:
+  - `status`: (string) Either `"ok"` or `"error"`.
+  - `message`: (string) Human-readable result or error description.
+  - `output`: (string, optional) Stdout/stderr for execution commands.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Server $\rightarrow$ Client Messages
+
+### 4.0 `config`
+
+Sent immediately on a successful connection.
+
+- **Type**: `config`
+- **Payload**:
+  - `message`: (string) human-readable greeting.
+  - `protocol_version`: (string) the server's protocol version.
+  - `agent_id`: (string) this agent's id in the SSO.
+  - `enrolled`: (bool, optional) present and `true` only when this connection
+    just enrolled via a join key.
+  - `auth_token`: (string, optional) the issued per-agent token — **persist it**.
+  - `public_key`: (string, optional) the key to pin — **persist it**.
+
+### 4.1 Standard Commands
+These commands are executed if the corresponding capability is enabled in `agent.yml`.
+
+| Command | Payload | Effect |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| `reload_config` | `{}` | Agent re-reads `/etc/theta42/agent.yml` from disk. |
+| `fetch_logs` | `{}` | Agent returns the last 100 lines of `journalctl -u theta-agent`. |
+
+### 4.2 High-Risk Commands (Signed)
+These commands **require** an Ed25519 signature in the payload. The agent verifies the signature against the `public_key` in its config.
+
+**Signature Format**:
+- The `signature` field contains the base64-encoded Ed25519 signature of the payload (with the `signature` key removed).
+
+| Command | Payload | Effect |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| `reboot` | `{ "signature": "..." }` | Triggers system reboot. |
+| `service_restart` | `{ "service": "...", "signature": "..." }` | Restarts specific systemd service. |
+| `configure_ldap` | `{ "config": "...", "signature": "..." }` | Writes `/etc/sssd/sssd.conf` and restarts `sssd`. |
+| `arbitrary_bash` | `{ "script": "...", "signature": "..." }` | Executes raw bash script. |
+| `update_binary` | `{ "url": "...", "sha256": "...", "signature": "..." }` | Downloads, verifies, and replaces the agent binary. |
+
+## 5. Cryptographic Verification Process
+
+To send a high-risk command:
+1. Create the payload (e.g., `{"script": "uptime"}`).
+2. Canonicalize the JSON (see 5.1).
+3. Sign the canonical bytes using the private Ed25519 key.
+4. Add the base64 signature to the payload: `{"script": "uptime", "signature": "..."}`.
+5. Send as a `WSMessage`.
+
+The agent performs the reverse process to verify authenticity before execution.
+
+### 5.1 Canonical form
+
+Both sides must produce **byte-identical** input to sign/verify:
+
+- keys sorted alphabetically
+- no insignificant whitespace
+- the `signature` key omitted
+- **no HTML escaping** — `<`, `>` and `&` are emitted literally
+- no trailing newline
+
+The escaping rule is load-bearing. Go's `encoding/json` escapes those three
+characters by default while JavaScript's `JSON.stringify` does not, so a payload
+containing any of them hashed differently on each side and verification failed.
+For `arbitrary_bash` that is most real scripts (`>` redirection, `&&`). The Go
+client uses `json.Encoder` with `SetEscapeHTML(false)`.
+
+Example — payload `{"script": "echo a > b && c", "comment": "x&y"}` canonicalizes to:
+
+```
+{"comment":"x&y","script":"echo a > b && c"}
+```
+
+### 5.2 The server signing key (changed in v1.2.0)
+
+The server's Ed25519 key pair is **persistent**, stored in OpenBao at
+`secret/agent/signing-key`. `public_key` in `agent.yml` is the base64-encoded raw
+32-byte public key, available from the enrollment response or
+`GET /api/agent/nodes`.
+
+Previously the pair was generated in memory at process start, so it changed on
+every restart and no agent could meaningfully pin it. If the server cannot load
+or persist a key it now **refuses to send high-risk commands** rather than
+signing with a key no agent has seen.
+
+### 5.3 Agent-side verification is fail-closed (changed in v1.2.0)
+
+An agent with no `public_key` configured **rejects** every high-risk command.
+Until v1.1.0 it logged "skipping signature verification" and executed them,
+which meant an agent installed without a key would run `reboot`,
+`configure_ldap` and `arbitrary_bash` from anything that reached its socket.
@@ -1,44 +1,110 @@
 # Theta Agent

-Theta Agent is a unified endpoint management daemon for the theta42 stack. It replaces legacy bash installation scripts (like `ldap-client`) and one-way metric scripts (`telemetry-agent`) with a powerful, 2-way Command & Control (C2) Go daemon.
+Theta Agent is a unified endpoint management daemon for the theta42 stack. It replaces legacy bash installation scripts and one-way metric scripts with a powerful, 2-way Command & Control (C2) Go daemon.

-The agent dials out to the central SSO Manager via a persistent WebSocket connection, enabling:
- **Continuous Telemetry:** Streams CPU/RAM/ZFS/GPU health to the central inventory.
- **Dynamic Discovery:** Automatically updates host IP and metadata on changes.
- **Remote Operations:** Allows SSO Manager administrators to remotely configure LDAP, restart systemd services, or execute maintenance scripts.
+The agent dials out to the central SSO Manager via a persistent WebSocket connection, enabling real-time telemetry, dynamic discovery, and secure remote operations.
+
+## Core Functionality
+
+### 1. Telemetry & Observability
+- **Host Discovery**: Pushes a comprehensive profile (IPs, OS, Kernel, CPU, RAM/Disk) upon connection and automatically updates when network interface IPs change.
+- **Continuous Monitoring**: Streams metrics every 30 seconds:
+  - CPU, RAM, and Root Disk usage.
+  - **ZFS Health**: Monitors pool status via `zpool list`.
+  - **GPU Utilization**: Tracks NVIDIA GPU usage via `nvidia-smi`.
+- **Health Checks**: Sends a periodic heartbeat to the SSO Manager to signal agent viability.
+
+### 2. Remote Operations (C2)
+The agent provides a powerful set of administrative tools, categorized by risk:
+
+#### Standard Operations
+- **Config Reload**: Triggers a reload of `/etc/theta42/agent.yml` from disk without restarting the process.
+- **Log Streaming**: Fetch the last 100 lines of the agent's system logs via the C2 channel.
+
+#### High-Risk Operations (Require Cryptographic Signatures)
+To prevent unauthorized execution, these commands must be signed with a private key corresponding to the `public_key` in `agent.yml`:
+- **Service Control**: Restart approved systemd services.
+- **System Control**: Trigger a full system reboot.
+- **Config Management**: Update `/etc/sssd/sssd.conf` and restart `sssd`.
+- **Remote Execution**: Execute raw bash scripts.
+- **Self-Update**: Securely download, verify (SHA256), and apply a new binary version.

 ## The Security Model (Blast Radius & Zero-Trust)

-Because Theta Agent runs as `root` (required to configure `/etc/sssd/sssd.conf`, restart services, and read hardware sensors), it represents a high-value target. If the central SSO Manager were compromised, a naive agent would allow an attacker to gain root shell execution on every server in the fleet.
+Because Theta Agent runs as `root`, it is a high-value target. To prevent lateral movement and contain the blast radius, it operates on a **strict, local-first capability matrix**.

-To prevent lateral movement and contain the blast radius, **Theta Agent operates on a strict, local-first capability matrix.**
+### Local Configuration Wins
+The agent will **only** execute commands that are explicitly enabled in its local configuration file (`/etc/theta42/agent.yml`). The central SSO Manager cannot override these settings.

-### 1. Local Configuration Wins
-The agent will **only** execute commands that are explicitly enabled in its local configuration file (`/etc/theta/agent.yml`). 
- By default, the agent is locked down to read-only telemetry and basic LDAP configuration.
- The central SSO Manager cannot override these settings. An administrator must physically (or via local config management) edit the local `agent.yml` file to grant the agent more permissions.
+### Cryptographic Hardening
+All high-risk commands require an Ed25519 signature. The agent verifies the signature against the `public_key` provided in the local config. If the signature is missing or invalid, the command is rejected regardless of the capability matrix.

-### 2. The Capability Matrix
-Capabilities are segmented into modules. You only enable what a specific server needs:
+Verification is **fail-closed**: an agent with no `public_key` configured rejects
+every high-risk command. (Before protocol v1.2.0 it logged "skipping signature
+verification" and executed them, so an agent installed without a key would run
+`reboot`, `configure_ldap` and `arbitrary_bash` unverified.)

-| Capability | Risk Level | Description |
-|------------|------------|-------------|
-| `telemetry` | Safe | Read-only. Pushes system metrics back to the SSO Manager. |
-| `configure_ldap` | Moderate | Allows the SSO manager to push down an updated SSSD configuration file. |
-| `reboot` | High | Allows the SSO Manager to trigger a system reboot. |
-| `service_control` | High | Allows starting/stopping/restarting systemd services. **Must be scoped** to specific services (e.g., `['gitea', 'nginx']`). |
-| `arbitrary_bash` | CRITICAL | Allows the execution of raw bash scripts sent from the SSO Manager. Useful for GitOps deployments on worker nodes, but highly dangerous. |
+### Enrollment
+The agent's token must be **issued by the SSO**. The server stores only its
+SHA-256 and rejects anything else at the WebSocket handshake, so a token cannot
+be minted client-side, and an enrollment can be revoked or rotated centrally —
+either drops the agent's live connection immediately. See `PROTOCOL.md` §1.1.

-### 3. Outbound-Only Communication
-The agent does not open any listening ports on the host firewall. It uses a long-lived outbound WebSocket connection to the SSO Manager. 
+### Capability Matrix

-### 4. Cryptographic Authentication
-Every agent is issued a unique, long-lived host token during installation. The SSO Manager verifies this token to ensure commands are only routed to the intended host, and telemetry is properly attributed.
+| Capability | Risk Level | Description | Impact |
+|------------|------------|-------------|---------|
+| `telemetry` | Safe | Read-only metrics. | Pushes system health to SSO Manager. |
+| `configure_ldap` | Moderate | Configures SSSD. | Updates `/etc/sssd/sssd.conf` and restarts `sssd`. |
+| `reboot` | High | System reboot. | Triggers an immediate host reboot. |
+| `service_control` | High | Service management. | Restarts services listed in the allowed list. |
+| `arbitrary_bash` | CRITICAL | Raw bash execution. | Executes any script sent by the manager as root. |

-## Example Configuration
+## Configuration

-See `agent.yml.example` for a secure baseline configuration.
+Configuration is stored in YAML format at `/etc/theta42/agent.yml`.
+
+### Example `agent.yml`
+```yaml
+server_url: "wss://sso.theta42.local"
+auth_token: "issued-by-the-sso-at-enrollment"
+public_key: "base64-encoded-ed25519-public-key"
+location: "dc-01-rack-12"
+capabilities:
+  telemetry: true
+  configure_ldap: true
+  reboot: true
+  service_control: ["nginx", "gitea", "sssd"]
+  arbitrary_bash: false
+```

 ## Installation

-*(Coming soon: Build instructions and `theta-agent install` guide)*
+1. **Build**: Compile for your target architecture (see CI/CD artifacts).
+2. **Deploy**: Place the binary in `/usr/local/bin/theta-agent`.
+3. **Enroll**: In the SSO, open **Directory → Install Agent**, name the host, bind
+   it to a host resource, and press **Enroll & issue token**. The SSO mints the
+   token (shown once) and gives you its public key. Tokens the server did not
+   issue are rejected.
+4. **Configure**: Create `/etc/theta42/agent.yml` with the issued `auth_token`,
+   the SSO's `public_key`, and your capabilities.
+4. **Service**: Set up as a systemd unit (example: `/etc/systemd/system/theta-agent.service`).
+
+For the fastest deployment, use the installation script:
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://sso.example.com/resources/theta-agent/install.sh | sh -s -- "BASE64_ENCODED_CONFIG"
+```
+
+The **Install Agent** modal generates that command for you after enrollment,
+with the token and public key already embedded. The equivalent flag form is:
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://sso.example.com/resources/theta-agent/install.sh | sh -s -- \
+  --url "https://sso.example.com" --token "<ISSUED_TOKEN>" --public-key "<BASE64_PUBLIC_KEY>"
+```
+
+## Development & Testing
+
+The agent uses a decoupled execution engine for safety and testability.
+- Run unit tests: `go test -v ./...`
+- The test suite uses a `MockExecutor` to verify that system commands are only triggered when the corresponding capability is enabled in the configuration.
@@ -1,8 +1,29 @@
 # theta-agent configuration file
-# Default location: /etc/theta/agent.yml
+# Default location: /etc/theta42/agent.yml

 server_url: "https://sso.example.com"
-auth_token: "REPLACE_WITH_AGENT_TOKEN"
+
+# This agent's own token. Leave EMPTY when installing with a join key -- the
+# agent fills it in itself once the SSO enrolls it. The server records only a
+# hash and rejects any token it did not issue, so a locally invented value will
+# never connect.
+auth_token: ""
+
+# The one credential you need to add a host. Used only while auth_token is
+# empty: the SSO exchanges it for this agent's own token + public key on first
+# connect, and the agent then blanks this line. Get one from the SSO
+# (Directory -> Install Agent, or POST /api/agent/join-keys).
+join_key: ""
+
+# Base64 of the SSO's RAW 32-byte Ed25519 public key (NOT a PEM body). Filled in
+# automatically when enrolling with a join key; set it by hand only if you
+# pre-registered this host.
+#
+# Required for any high-risk command. Without it the agent still reports
+# telemetry, but REFUSES reboot / service_restart / configure_ldap /
+# arbitrary_bash / update_binary, because it has no way to verify them.
+public_key: ""
+
 location: "default" # Location identifier (e.g., site, datacenter) for naming

 capabilities:
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ package main
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"

 	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
 )
@@ -16,12 +19,120 @@ type Capabilities struct {
 }

 type Config struct {
-	ServerURL    string       `yaml:"server_url"`
-	AuthToken    string       `yaml:"auth_token"`
+	ServerURL string `yaml:"server_url"`
+	AuthToken string `yaml:"auth_token"`
+	// A join key is the one credential an operator hands out. On first connect
+	// the server exchanges it for a per-agent AuthToken (written back to this
+	// file), so it is a bootstrap value, not a long-term credential. Used only
+	// when AuthToken is empty.
+	JoinKey      string       `yaml:"join_key"`
 	Location     string       `yaml:"location"`
+	PublicKey    string       `yaml:"public_key"` // Ed25519 public key for signed commands
 	Capabilities Capabilities `yaml:"capabilities"`
 }

+// Credential returns the value to present when connecting: our own token once
+// enrolled, otherwise the join key.
+func (c *Config) Credential() string {
+	if c.AuthToken != "" {
+		return c.AuthToken
+	}
+	return c.JoinKey
+}
+
+// ConfigManager handles thread-safe access and reloading of the agent configuration.
+type ConfigManager struct {
+	mu         sync.RWMutex
+	current    *Config
+	configPath string
+}
+
+func NewConfigManager(path string) (*ConfigManager, error) {
+	cfg, err := LoadConfig(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &ConfigManager{
+		current:    cfg,
+		configPath: path,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// Get returns a copy of the current configuration.
+func (cm *ConfigManager) Get() *Config {
+	cm.mu.RLock()
+	defer cm.mu.RUnlock()
+	return cm.current
+}
+
+// Reload re-reads the configuration from disk and updates the active config.
+func (cm *ConfigManager) Reload() error {
+	cfg, err := LoadConfig(cm.configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("reload failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	cm.mu.Lock()
+	cm.current = cfg
+	cm.mu.Unlock()
+	return nil
+}
+
+// PersistEnrollment writes the credentials the server issued during join-key
+// enrollment back into agent.yml, then reloads. Only the auth_token and
+// public_key lines are rewritten (added if absent); every other line, including
+// operator comments and the capability matrix, is preserved -- this file is
+// hand-edited, so a naive marshal-and-write would destroy it.
+//
+// The join key is blanked once we hold our own token: leaving a fleet-wide
+// credential on every host after it has stopped being needed is exactly the
+// blast radius the per-agent token exists to avoid.
+func (cm *ConfigManager) PersistEnrollment(token, publicKey string) error {
+	if token == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("server reported enrollment but sent no token")
+	}
+
+	cm.mu.Lock()
+	defer cm.mu.Unlock()
+
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(cm.configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", cm.configPath, err)
+	}
+
+	out := setYamlScalar(string(raw), "auth_token", token)
+	if publicKey != "" {
+		out = setYamlScalar(out, "public_key", publicKey)
+	}
+	out = setYamlScalar(out, "join_key", "")
+
+	// Same permissions the installer sets: this file now holds a credential.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(cm.configPath, []byte(out), 0600); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", cm.configPath, err)
+	}
+
+	cfg, err := LoadConfig(cm.configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("reload after enrollment: %w", err)
+	}
+	cm.current = cfg
+	return nil
+}
+
+// setYamlScalar replaces the value of a top-level `key: "..."` line, or appends
+// the key when it is absent. Deliberately line-based rather than a YAML
+// round-trip so comments and formatting survive.
+func setYamlScalar(doc, key, value string) string {
+	re := regexp.MustCompile(`(?m)^[ \t]*` + regexp.QuoteMeta(key) + `[ \t]*:.*$`)
+	line := fmt.Sprintf("%s: %q", key, value)
+	if re.MatchString(doc) {
+		return re.ReplaceAllString(doc, line)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasSuffix(doc, "\n") {
+		doc += "\n"
+	}
+	return doc + line + "\n"
+}
+
 func LoadConfig(path string) (*Config, error) {
 	file, err := os.Open(path)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestLoadConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	// Create a temporary directory for config files
+	tmpDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "agent-config-test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create temp dir: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		yamlContent string
+		filename    string
+		expectErr   bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "valid config",
+			yamlContent: `
+server_url: "http://sso.local"
+auth_token: "secret-token"
+location: "datacenter-1"
+capabilities:
+  telemetry: true
+  configure_ldap: true
+  reboot: false
+  service_control: ["nginx", "gitea"]
+  arbitrary_bash: false
+`,
+			filename:  "valid.yml",
+			expectErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "invalid yaml",
+			yamlContent: "invalid: [yaml: content",
+			filename:    "invalid.yml",
+			expectErr:   true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "missing file",
+			yamlContent: "",
+			filename:    "nonexistent.yml",
+			expectErr:   true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			path := filepath.Join(tmpDir, tc.filename)
+			if tc.yamlContent != "" {
+				err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tc.yamlContent), 0644)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("failed to write temp file: %v", err)
+				}
+			}
+
+			cfg, err := LoadConfig(path)
+			if (err != nil) != tc.expectErr {
+				t.Errorf("LoadConfig() error = %v, expectErr %v", err, tc.expectErr)
+				return
+			}
+
+			if !tc.expectErr && cfg == nil {
+				t.Error("LoadConfig() returned nil config without error")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCanManageService(t *testing.T) {
+	caps := Capabilities{
+		ServiceControl: []string{"nginx", "gitea"},
+	}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		service  string
+		expected bool
+	}{
+		{"nginx", true},
+		{"gitea", true},
+		{"ssh", false},
+		{"", false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.service, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if got := caps.CanManageService(tc.service); got != tc.expected {
+				t.Errorf("CanManageService(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.service, got, tc.expected)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// PersistEnrollment rewrites a hand-edited file, so it must replace exactly the
+// credential lines and leave everything else -- comments, capabilities,
+// formatting -- untouched.
+func TestPersistEnrollmentPreservesFile(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := dir + "/agent.yml"
+	original := `# theta-agent configuration file
+server_url: "https://sso.example.com"
+
+# Bootstrap credential, exchanged on first connect.
+join_key: "tjk_abc123"
+public_key: ""
+location: "rack-4"
+
+capabilities:
+  telemetry: true
+  # keep this comment
+  reboot: false
+  service_control: ["nginx"]
+`
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(original), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cm, err := NewConfigManager(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if err := cm.PersistEnrollment("issued-token-xyz", "PUBKEYBASE64"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("PersistEnrollment: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	out, _ := os.ReadFile(path)
+	got := string(out)
+
+	for _, want := range []string{
+		`auth_token: "issued-token-xyz"`,
+		`public_key: "PUBKEYBASE64"`,
+		`join_key: ""`, // blanked: a fleet-wide key must not linger once unneeded
+		"# theta-agent configuration file",
+		"# keep this comment",
+		`location: "rack-4"`,
+		`service_control: ["nginx"]`,
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
+			t.Errorf("expected %q in rewritten config, got:\n%s", want, got)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// and the in-memory config is live without a restart
+	if cm.Get().AuthToken != "issued-token-xyz" {
+		t.Errorf("config not reloaded: AuthToken = %q", cm.Get().AuthToken)
+	}
+	if cm.Get().Credential() != "issued-token-xyz" {
+		t.Errorf("Credential() should prefer the issued token, got %q", cm.Get().Credential())
+	}
+
+	// file must stay 0600 -- it now holds a credential
+	fi, _ := os.Stat(path)
+	if fi.Mode().Perm() != 0600 {
+		t.Errorf("expected mode 0600, got %o", fi.Mode().Perm())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPersistEnrollmentAddsMissingKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := dir + "/agent.yml"
+	// No auth_token or public_key lines at all.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("server_url: \"https://sso.example.com\"\njoin_key: \"tjk_x\"\n"), 0600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cm, err := NewConfigManager(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := cm.PersistEnrollment("tok", "pk"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("PersistEnrollment: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cm.Get().AuthToken != "tok" || cm.Get().PublicKey != "pk" {
+		out, _ := os.ReadFile(path)
+		t.Errorf("keys not appended; file:\n%s", out)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCredentialPrefersAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
+	c := &Config{JoinKey: "tjk_x"}
+	if c.Credential() != "tjk_x" {
+		t.Errorf("unenrolled agent should present the join key, got %q", c.Credential())
+	}
+	c.AuthToken = "own-token"
+	if c.Credential() != "own-token" {
+		t.Errorf("enrolled agent must present its own token, not the join key, got %q", c.Credential())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPersistEnrollmentRejectsEmptyToken(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := dir + "/agent.yml"
+	os.WriteFile(path, []byte("server_url: \"x\"\n"), 0600)
+	cm, _ := NewConfigManager(path)
+	if err := cm.PersistEnrollment("", "pk"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected an error when the server sends no token")
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+version: '3.8'
+services:
+  theta-agent:
+    build:
+      context: .
+    container_name: theta-agent-test
+    volumes:
+      - ./agent.yml.example:/etc/theta42/agent.yml:ro
+    privileged: true # Required for systemctl and root operations
+    network_mode: "host"
+    restart: always
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+)
+
+// Executor abstracts system operations to allow for easy mocking in tests.
+type Executor interface {
+	// Execute runs a system command and returns combined stdout/stderr.
+	Execute(command string, args ...string) ([]byte, error)
+
+	// WriteFile writes data to a file with specified permissions.
+	WriteFile(path string, data []byte, perm os.FileMode) error
+
+	// ReadFile reads the content of a file.
+	ReadFile(path string) ([]byte, error)
+}
+
+// SystemExecutor is the production implementation that performs real system calls.
+type SystemExecutor struct{}
+
+// Execute runs a real system command.
+func (s *SystemExecutor) Execute(command string, args ...string) ([]byte, error) {
+	cmd := exec.Command(command, args...)
+	return cmd.CombinedOutput()
+}
+
+// WriteFile performs a real file write.
+func (s *SystemExecutor) WriteFile(path string, data []byte, perm os.FileMode) error {
+	return os.WriteFile(path, data, perm)
+}
+
+// ReadFile performs a real file read.
+func (s *SystemExecutor) ReadFile(path string) ([]byte, error) {
+	return os.ReadFile(path)
+}
@@ -3,6 +3,15 @@ module github.com/theta42/theta-agent
 go 1.22.2

 require (
+	github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.2.6 // indirect
 	github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.3 // indirect
+	github.com/lufia/plan9stats v0.0.0-20211012122336-39d0f177ccd0 // indirect
+	github.com/power-devops/perfstat v0.0.0-20210106213030-5aafc221ea8c // indirect
+	github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3 v3.24.5 // indirect
+	github.com/shoenig/go-m1cpu v0.1.6 // indirect
+	github.com/tklauser/go-sysconf v0.3.12 // indirect
+	github.com/tklauser/numcpus v0.6.1 // indirect
+	github.com/yusufpapurcu/wmi v1.2.4 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.20.0 // indirect
 	gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
 )
@@ -1,5 +1,29 @@
+github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.2.6 h1:/Fpf6oFPoeFik9ty7siob0G6Ke8QvQEuVcuChpwXzpY=
+github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.2.6/go.mod h1:pprOEPIfldk/42T2oK7lQ4v4JSDwmV0As9GaiUsvbm0=
+github.com/google/go-cmp v0.5.6/go.mod h1:v8dTdLbMG2kIc/vJvl+f65V22dbkXbowE6jgT/gNBxE=
 github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.3 h1:saDtZ6Pbx/0u+bgYQ3q96pZgCzfhKXGPqt7kZ72aNNg=
 github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.3/go.mod h1:YR8l580nyteQvAITg2hZ9XVh4b55+EU/adAjf1fMHhE=
+github.com/lufia/plan9stats v0.0.0-20211012122336-39d0f177ccd0 h1:6E+4a0GO5zZEnZ81pIr0yLvtUWk2if982qA3F3QD6H4=
+github.com/lufia/plan9stats v0.0.0-20211012122336-39d0f177ccd0/go.mod h1:zJYVVT2jmtg6P3p1VtQj7WsuWi/y4VnjVBn7F8KPB3I=
+github.com/power-devops/perfstat v0.0.0-20210106213030-5aafc221ea8c h1:ncq/mPwQF4JjgDlrVEn3C11VoGHZN7m8qihwgMEtzYw=
+github.com/power-devops/perfstat v0.0.0-20210106213030-5aafc221ea8c/go.mod h1:OmDBASR4679mdNQnz2pUhc2G8CO2JrUAVFDRBDP/hJE=
+github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3 v3.24.5 h1:i0t8kL+kQTvpAYToeuiVk3TgDeKOFioZO3Ztz/iZ9pI=
+github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3 v3.24.5/go.mod h1:bsoOS1aStSs9ErQ1WWfxllSeS1K5D+U30r2NfcubMVk=
+github.com/shoenig/go-m1cpu v0.1.6 h1:nxdKQNcEB6vzgA2E2bvzKIYRuNj7XNJ4S/aRSwKzFtM=
+github.com/shoenig/go-m1cpu v0.1.6/go.mod h1:1JJMcUBvfNwpq05QDQVAnx3gUHr9IYF7GNg9SUEw2VQ=
+github.com/tklauser/go-sysconf v0.3.12 h1:0QaGUFOdQaIVdPgfITYzaTegZvdCjmYO52cSFAEVmqU=
+github.com/tklauser/go-sysconf v0.3.12/go.mod h1:Ho14jnntGE1fpdOqQEEaiKRpvIavV0hSfmBq8nJbHYI=
+github.com/tklauser/numcpus v0.6.1 h1:ng9scYS7az0Bk4OZLvrNXNSAO2Pxr1XXRAPyjhIx+Fk=
+github.com/tklauser/numcpus v0.6.1/go.mod h1:1XfjsgE2zo8GVw7POkMbHENHzVg3GzmoZ9fESEdAacY=
+github.com/yusufpapurcu/wmi v1.2.4 h1:zFUKzehAFReQwLys1b/iSMl+JQGSCSjtVqQn9bBrPo0=
+github.com/yusufpapurcu/wmi v1.2.4/go.mod h1:SBZ9tNy3G9/m5Oi98Zks0QjeHVDvuK0qfxQmPyzfmi0=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190916202348-b4ddaad3f8a3/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201204225414-ed752295db88/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.8.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.11.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.20.0 h1:Od9JTbYCk261bKm4M/mw7AklTlFYIa0bIp9BgSm1S8Y=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.20.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
+golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191204190536-9bdfabe68543/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
 gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+set -e
+
+# --- Configuration ---
+# In a real environment, these would be derived from the script's download URL
+# or passed as additional arguments. For now, we use the most recent release.
+BINARY_URL="https://github.com/theta42/theta-agent/releases/latest/download/theta-agent-linux-amd64"
+CONFIG_DIR="/etc/theta42"
+CONFIG_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/agent.yml"
+BIN_PATH="/usr/local/bin/theta-agent"
+SERVICE_FILE="/etc/systemd/system/theta-agent.service"
+
+# Colors for output
+RED='\033[0;31m'
+GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+NC='\033[0m' # No Color
+
+log() { echo -e "${GREEN}[+]${NC} $1"; }
+error() { echo -e "${RED}[!]${NC} $1"; exit 1; }
+
+# 1. Root check
+if [ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]; then
+  error "This script must be run as root."
+fi
+
+# Install SSSD and PAM integration packages if missing
+install_sssd_deps() {
+  if ! command -v sssd >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    log "Installing SSSD and PAM integration dependencies..."
+    if command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update -qq || true
+      DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -qq sssd sssd-ldap libnss-sss libpam-sss libsss-sudo pam-auth-update || true
+      if command -v pam-auth-update >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        pam-auth-update --enable mkhomedir || true
+      fi
+    elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      dnf install -y sssd sssd-ldap sssd-tools || true
+    elif command -v yum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      yum install -y sssd sssd-ldap sssd-tools || true
+    elif command -v pacman >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      pacman -S --noconfirm sssd || true
+    elif command -v zypper >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      zypper in -y sssd || true
+    fi
+  else
+    log "SSSD is already installed."
+  fi
+}
+
+# 2. Argument Parsing
+URL=""
+TOKEN=""
+JOIN_KEY=""
+PUBLIC_KEY=""
+B64_CONFIG=""
+INSTALL_SSSD=0
+
+while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
+  case $1 in
+    --url)
+      URL="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --token)
+      TOKEN="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    # Base64 of the SSO's raw Ed25519 public key. The agent verifies high-risk
+    # commands (reboot, configure_ldap, arbitrary_bash, update_binary) against
+    # it and REFUSES them when it is absent, so an install without this key can
+    # stream telemetry but cannot be acted on.
+    --public-key)
+      PUBLIC_KEY="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    # The one credential an operator hands out. The server exchanges it for a
+    # per-agent token on first connect, which the agent writes back into
+    # agent.yml -- so this is all you need to add a host.
+    --join-key)
+      JOIN_KEY="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --install-sssd|--ldap)
+      INSTALL_SSSD=1
+      shift
+      ;;
+    *)
+      B64_CONFIG="$1"
+      shift
+      ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+# Validation
+if [ -z "$B64_CONFIG" ] && { [ -z "$URL" ] || { [ -z "$TOKEN" ] && [ -z "$JOIN_KEY" ]; }; }; then
+  error "Missing required configuration. Provide a base64 encoded config, or --url with either --join-key or --token."
+  echo "Usage examples:"
+  echo "  sh install.sh \"BASE64_CONFIG\""
+  echo "  sh install.sh --url \"https://sso.local\" --join-key \"tjk_...\" --install-sssd"
+  echo "  sh install.sh --url \"https://sso.local\" --token \"ISSUED_TOKEN\" --public-key \"BASE64_KEY\""
+  echo ""
+  echo "--join-key is the normal path: the host enrolls itself on first connect"
+  echo "and the SSO issues it its own token + public key, which the agent writes"
+  echo "back into agent.yml. Get a key from Directory -> Install Agent."
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+log "Starting Theta Agent installation..."
+
+# 3. Install binary
+log "Downloading binary from $BINARY_URL..."
+curl -fsSL "$BINARY_URL" -o "$BIN_PATH" || error "Failed to download binary."
+chmod +x "$BIN_PATH"
+
+# 4. Setup configuration
+log "Preparing configuration directory $CONFIG_DIR..."
+mkdir -p "$CONFIG_DIR"
+chmod 755 "$CONFIG_DIR"
+
+if [ -n "$B64_CONFIG" ]; then
+  log "Decoding and writing configuration from base64..."
+  echo "$B64_CONFIG" | base64 -d > "$CONFIG_FILE" || error "Failed to decode base64 configuration."
+else
+  log "Generating minimal configuration from arguments..."
+  # Create a minimal yaml with the provided URL and Token
+  cat <<EOF > "$CONFIG_FILE"
+server_url: "$URL"
+auth_token: "$TOKEN"
+join_key: "$JOIN_KEY"
+public_key: "$PUBLIC_KEY"
+location: "unknown"
+capabilities:
+  telemetry: true
+  configure_ldap: false
+  reboot: false
+  service_control: []
+  arbitrary_bash: false
+EOF
+fi
+chmod 600 "$CONFIG_FILE"
+
+# An agent with no public_key cannot verify signed commands and will refuse
+# every one of them. That is the safe default, but it is silent at run time, so
+# say it plainly here where the operator is watching.
+if ! grep -qE '^public_key:[[:space:]]*"[^"]+"' "$CONFIG_FILE" 2>/dev/null; then
+  log "WARNING: no public_key configured — this agent will report telemetry but"
+  log "         REFUSE reboot / configure_ldap / arbitrary_bash / update_binary."
+  log "         Re-run with --public-key \"<base64 key>\" (shown at enrollment)."
+fi
+
+# 4b. Ensure SSSD dependencies are installed if configure_ldap is enabled
+if [ "$INSTALL_SSSD" -eq 1 ] || grep -q -i "configure_ldap:\s*true" "$CONFIG_FILE" 2>/dev/null; then
+  install_sssd_deps
+fi
+
+# 5. Setup systemd service
+log "Creating systemd service unit..."
+cat <<EOF > "$SERVICE_FILE"
+[Unit]
+Description=Theta Agent Unified Endpoint Management
+After=network.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+ExecStart=$BIN_PATH
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+StandardOutput=syslog
+StandardError=syslog
+SyslogIdentifier=theta-agent
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+EOF
+
+# 6. Start the agent
+log "Enabling and starting Theta Agent..."
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl enable theta-agent
+systemctl start theta-agent
+
+log "Theta Agent installation complete!"
+log "Verify status with: systemctl status theta-agent"
+log "Check logs with: journalctl -u theta-agent -f"
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Cross-implementation check: a payload signed by the Node server (utils/
+// agent_manager.js) must verify with the agent's own verifySignature. Skips
+// unless the fixture is present, so it never breaks a normal `go test`.
+func TestInteropWithServerSignature(t *testing.T) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(os.Getenv("INTEROP_FIXTURE"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Skip("no INTEROP_FIXTURE provided")
+	}
+	var fx struct {
+		Pub     string                 `json:"pub"`
+		Payload map[string]interface{} `json:"payload"`
+		Sig     string                 `json:"sig"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &fx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("bad fixture: %v", err)
+	}
+	payload := map[string]interface{}{}
+	for k, v := range fx.Payload {
+		payload[k] = v
+	}
+	payload["signature"] = fx.Sig
+
+	cfg := &Config{PublicKey: fx.Pub}
+	if !verifySignature(cfg, WSMessage{Type: "arbitrary_bash", Payload: payload}) {
+		t.Fatal("agent REJECTED a signature produced by the SSO server")
+	}
+	t.Log("agent accepted the server-produced signature")
+}
@@ -12,26 +12,30 @@ func main() {
 	log.Println("Starting Theta Agent...")

 	// Attempt to load configuration
-	configPath := "/etc/theta/agent.yml"
+	configPath := "/etc/theta42/agent.yml"
 	if len(os.Args) > 1 {
 		configPath = os.Args[1]
 	}

-	cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
+	cm, err := NewConfigManager(configPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Fatalf("Error loading configuration from %s: %v", configPath, err)
 	}
+	cfg := cm.Get()

 	log.Printf("Connecting to SSO Manager at %s", cfg.ServerURL)
-	log.Printf("Loaded capabilities: Telemetry=%v, LDAP=%v, Reboot=%v, Bash=%v", 
-		cfg.Capabilities.Telemetry, 
-		cfg.Capabilities.ConfigureLDAP, 
-		cfg.Capabilities.Reboot, 
+	log.Printf("Loaded capabilities: Telemetry=%v, LDAP=%v, Reboot=%v, Bash=%v",
+		cfg.Capabilities.Telemetry,
+		cfg.Capabilities.ConfigureLDAP,
+		cfg.Capabilities.Reboot,
 		cfg.Capabilities.ArbitraryBash,
 	)

+	// Initialize system executor
+	exec := &SystemExecutor{}
+
 	// WebSocket connection to SSO Manager
-	go connectWebSocket(cfg)
+	go connectWebSocket(cm, exec)

 	// Block until signal is received
 	sigs := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"log"
+	"net"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
+	"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3/cpu"
+	"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3/disk"
+	"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3/host"
+	"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3/mem"
+)
+
+type DiscoveryData struct {
+	Hostname    string   `json:"hostname"`
+	IPs        []string `json:"ip_addresses"`
+	OS          string   `json:"os"`
+	Kernel      string   `json:"kernel"`
+	CPUModel    string   `json:"cpu"`
+	RAMTotalGB  float64  `json:"ram_total_gb"`
+	DiskTotalGB float64  `json:"disk_total_gb"`
+	Location    string   `json:"location"`
+}
+
+type TelemetryData struct {
+	CPUUsagePercent float64 `json:"cpu_usage_percent"`
+	RAMUsagePercent float64 `json:"ram_usage_percent"`
+	DiskUsagePercent float64 `json:"disk_usage_percent"`
+	ZFSHealth       string  `json:"zfs_health,omitempty"`
+	GPUUsage        float64  `json:"gpu_usage_percent,omitempty"`
+	Timestamp       string  `json:"timestamp"`
+}
+
+// CollectDiscoveryData gathers static host information.
+func CollectDiscoveryData(cfg *Config) DiscoveryData {
+	h, _ := host.Info()
+
+	var ips []string
+	addrs, _ := net.InterfaceAddrs()
+	for _, addr := range addrs {
+		if ipnet, ok := addr.(*net.IPNet); ok && !ipnet.IP.IsLoopback() {
+			if ipnet.IP.To4() != nil {
+				ips = append(ips, ipnet.IP.String())
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	vm, _ := mem.VirtualMemory()
+	d, _ := disk.Usage("/")
+
+	cpuInfo, _ := cpu.Info()
+	cpuModel := "Unknown"
+	if len(cpuInfo) > 0 {
+		cpuModel = cpuInfo[0].Model
+	}
+
+	return DiscoveryData{
+		Hostname:    h.Hostname,
+		IPs:         ips,
+		OS:          fmt.Sprintf("%s %s", h.OS, h.Platform),
+		Kernel:      h.KernelVersion,
+		CPUModel:    cpuModel,
+		RAMTotalGB:  float64(vm.Total) / (1024 * 1024 * 1024),
+		DiskTotalGB: float64(d.Total) / (1024 * 1024 * 1024),
+		Location:    cfg.Location,
+	}
+}
+
+// CollectTelemetryData gathers real-time performance metrics including ZFS and GPU.
+func CollectTelemetryData(exec Executor) TelemetryData {
+	cpuPerc, _ := cpu.Percent(time.Second, false)
+	vm, _ := mem.VirtualMemory()
+	d, _ := disk.Usage("/")
+
+	cpuVal := 0.0
+	if len(cpuPerc) > 0 {
+		cpuVal = cpuPerc[0]
+	}
+
+	return TelemetryData{
+		CPUUsagePercent:  cpuVal,
+		RAMUsagePercent:  vm.UsedPercent,
+		DiskUsagePercent: d.UsedPercent,
+		ZFSHealth:       collectZFSHealth(exec),
+		GPUUsage:        collectGPUUsage(exec),
+		Timestamp:       time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
+	}
+}
+
+func collectZFSHealth(exec Executor) string {
+	out, err := exec.Execute("zpool", "list", "-H", "-o", "health")
+	if err != nil {
+		return "unknown"
+	}
+	lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), "\n")
+	if len(lines) > 0 {
+		return lines[0]
+	}
+	return "unknown"
+}
+
+func collectGPUUsage(exec Executor) float64 {
+	out, err := exec.Execute("nvidia-smi", "--query-gpu=utilization.gpu", "--format=csv,noheader,nounits")
+	if err != nil {
+		return -1.0
+	}
+	var usage float64
+	fmt.Sscanf(strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), "%f", &usage)
+	return usage
+}
+
+// StartTelemetryLoop manages the initial discovery push and the periodic telemetry stream.
+func StartTelemetryLoop(c MessageWriter, cm *ConfigManager, exec Executor, stopCh <-chan struct{}) {
+	cfg := cm.Get()
+
+	// 1. Immediate Discovery Push
+	pushDiscovery(c, cfg)
+
+	// If telemetry capability is disabled in agent.yml, return early after discovery
+	if !cfg.Capabilities.Telemetry {
+		log.Println("Telemetry capability is disabled in agent.yml; skipping telemetry stream.")
+		return
+	}
+
+	// 2. Periodic Telemetry Stream
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(30 * time.Second)
+	go func() {
+		defer ticker.Stop()
+		var lastIPs []string
+		for {
+			select {
+			case <-stopCh:
+				return
+			case <-ticker.C:
+				currentCFG := cm.Get()
+				if !currentCFG.Capabilities.Telemetry {
+					continue
+				}
+
+				// Network Change Detection
+				currentIPs := collectIPs()
+				if !equalSlices(lastIPs, currentIPs) {
+					log.Println("Network change detected. Pushing discovery update...")
+					pushDiscovery(c, currentCFG)
+					lastIPs = currentIPs
+				}
+
+				telemetry := CollectTelemetryData(exec)
+				payload, _ := json.Marshal(WSMessage{
+					Type: "telemetry",
+					Payload: map[string]interface{}{
+						"cpu_usage_percent":  telemetry.CPUUsagePercent,
+						"ram_usage_percent":  telemetry.RAMUsagePercent,
+						"disk_usage_percent": telemetry.DiskUsagePercent,
+						"zfs_health":         telemetry.ZFSHealth,
+						"gpu_usage_percent":   telemetry.GPUUsage,
+						"timestamp":          telemetry.Timestamp,
+					},
+				})
+				if err := c.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, payload); err != nil {
+					log.Printf("Failed to stream telemetry: %v", err)
+					return
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+}
+
+func collectIPs() []string {
+	var ips []string
+	addrs, _ := net.InterfaceAddrs()
+	for _, addr := range addrs {
+		if ipnet, ok := addr.(*net.IPNet); ok && !ipnet.IP.IsLoopback() {
+			if ipnet.IP.To4() != nil {
+				ips = append(ips, ipnet.IP.String())
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return ips
+}
+
+func equalSlices(a, b []string) bool {
+	if len(a) != len(b) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for i := range a {
+		if a[i] != b[i] {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func pushDiscovery(c MessageWriter, cfg *Config) {
+	discovery := CollectDiscoveryData(cfg)
+	discoveryPayload, _ := json.Marshal(discovery)
+
+	var discoveryMap map[string]interface{}
+	json.Unmarshal(discoveryPayload, &discoveryMap)
+
+	msg := WSMessage{
+		Type:    "discovery",
+		Payload: discoveryMap,
+	}
+
+	payload, _ := json.Marshal(msg)
+	if err := c.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, payload); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Failed to send discovery data: %v", err)
+	} else {
+		log.Println("Discovery data pushed to SSO Manager.")
+	}
+}
@@ -1,9 +1,18 @@
 package main

 import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
 	"log"
+	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"time"

@@ -15,8 +24,94 @@ type WSMessage struct {
 	Payload map[string]interface{} `json:"payload"`
 }

-func connectWebSocket(cfg *Config) {
+// Application close codes the SSO uses to say "your enrollment is the problem"
+// (PROTOCOL.md §1.1). All three mean retrying quickly is pointless.
+const (
+	closeUnauthorized = 4001 // token was never issued, or is unknown
+	closeSuperseded   = 4002 // another connection took over this enrollment
+	closeRevoked      = 4003 // enrollment revoked or deleted by an admin
+	closeTokenRotated = 4004 // token rotated; agent.yml holds the old one
+)
+
+// How long to wait before retrying after the server rejects our credential.
+// Short enough that a re-enrollment is picked up without a restart, long enough
+// that a decommissioned agent is not a permanent load on the SSO.
+const authRetryInterval = 5 * time.Minute
+
+type MessageWriter interface {
+	WriteMessage(messageType int, data []byte) error
+}
+
+// canonicalize produces the exact bytes the server signed (PROTOCOL.md §5):
+// keys sorted alphabetically, no whitespace, `signature` omitted.
+//
+// encoding/json sorts map keys for us, but by default it also escapes <, > and
+// & as <, > and & -- which Node's JSON.stringify on the server
+// does not. Any payload containing those characters therefore hashed
+// differently on each side and the signature failed. For arbitrary_bash that is
+// most real scripts: `>` redirection and `&&` are everywhere. SetEscapeHTML
+// (false) is what makes the two encoders agree.
+//
+// Encoder.Encode also appends a trailing newline, which must be trimmed or it
+// is signed-over data the server never produced.
+func canonicalize(payload map[string]interface{}) ([]byte, error) {
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	enc := json.NewEncoder(&buf)
+	enc.SetEscapeHTML(false)
+	if err := enc.Encode(payload); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return bytes.TrimRight(buf.Bytes(), "\n"), nil
+}
+
+func verifySignature(cfg *Config, msg WSMessage) bool {
+	// Fail CLOSED. This used to return true when no public key was configured,
+	// which meant an agent installed without a `public_key` would execute
+	// reboot / configure_ldap / arbitrary_bash from anything that could reach
+	// its socket, with no verification at all -- the exact commands the
+	// signature exists to protect. An agent that cannot verify must not act.
+	if cfg.PublicKey == "" {
+		log.Println("Refusing high-risk command: no public_key configured in agent.yml")
+		return false
+	}
+
+	sigB64, ok := msg.Payload["signature"].(string)
+	if !ok {
+		log.Println("High-risk command missing signature")
+		return false
+	}
+
+	sig, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sigB64)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Invalid base64 signature: %v", err)
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Create canonical payload for verification (remove signature key)
+	payloadCopy := make(map[string]interface{})
+	for k, v := range msg.Payload {
+		if k != "signature" {
+			payloadCopy[k] = v
+		}
+	}
+	canonicalPayload, err := canonicalize(payloadCopy)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Could not canonicalize payload for verification: %v", err)
+		return false
+	}
+
+	pubKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(cfg.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil || len(pubKeyBytes) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		log.Printf("Invalid public key in config: %v", err)
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return ed25519.Verify(pubKeyBytes, canonicalPayload, sig)
+}
+
+func connectWebSocket(cm *ConfigManager, exec Executor) {
 	for {
+		cfg := cm.Get()
 		// Ensure protocol is ws/wss
 		serverURL := strings.Replace(cfg.ServerURL, "http://", "ws://", 1)
 		serverURL = strings.Replace(serverURL, "https://", "wss://", 1)
@@ -26,12 +121,36 @@ func connectWebSocket(cfg *Config) {
 			log.Fatalf("Invalid ServerURL: %v", err)
 		}
 		u.Path = "/api/agent/ws"
-		u.RawQuery = "token=" + cfg.AuthToken
+		// Our own token once enrolled, else the join key. The hostname lets the
+		// server name a self-enrolling host something meaningful instead of a
+		// generated placeholder.
+		q := url.Values{}
+		q.Set("token", cfg.Credential())
+		if hn, err := os.Hostname(); err == nil && hn != "" {
+			q.Set("hostname", hn)
+		}
+		u.RawQuery = q.Encode()

-		log.Printf("Connecting to %s", u.String())
+		if cfg.Credential() == "" {
+			log.Printf("No auth_token or join_key in %s -- nothing to authenticate with. Retrying in %s.", cm.configPath, authRetryInterval)
+			time.Sleep(authRetryInterval)
+			continue
+		}

-		c, _, err := websocket.DefaultDialer.Dial(u.String(), nil)
+		// Never log u.String(): RawQuery carries the auth token, and agent logs
+		// are routinely shipped around and pasted into issues.
+		log.Printf("Connecting to %s%s", u.Host, u.Path)
+
+		c, resp, err := websocket.DefaultDialer.Dial(u.String(), nil)
 		if err != nil {
+			// The server now rejects tokens it did not issue. Retrying a bad
+			// credential every 5s just floods the SSO and its audit log
+			// forever, so back off hard and say plainly what is wrong.
+			if resp != nil && (resp.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden) {
+				log.Printf("Server rejected our token (HTTP %d). Enroll this agent in the SSO Directory and put the issued token in agent.yml. Retrying in %s.", resp.StatusCode, authRetryInterval)
+				time.Sleep(authRetryInterval)
+				continue
+			}
 			log.Printf("Dial error: %v. Retrying in 5 seconds...", err)
 			time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
 			continue
@@ -39,18 +158,47 @@ func connectWebSocket(cfg *Config) {

 		log.Println("Successfully connected to SSO Manager.")

-		// Start telemetry if enabled
-		var telemetryTicker *time.Ticker
-		var telemetryDone chan bool
-		if cfg.Capabilities.Telemetry {
-			telemetryTicker, telemetryDone = startTelemetry(c, cfg)
-		}
+		stopCh := make(chan struct{})
+
+		// Start telemetry and discovery with stopCh lifecycle control
+		StartTelemetryLoop(c, cm, exec, stopCh)
+
+		// Heartbeat loop
+		go func() {
+			ticker := time.NewTicker(60 * time.Second)
+			defer ticker.Stop()
+			for {
+				select {
+				case <-stopCh:
+					return
+				case <-ticker.C:
+					hb := WSMessage{Type: "heartbeat", Payload: map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339)}}
+					payload, _ := json.Marshal(hb)
+					if err := c.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, payload); err != nil {
+						return
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}()
+
+		// Set when the server closes us for an enrollment problem rather than a
+		// transient fault, so the reconnect below can back off instead of
+		// spinning on a credential that will not start working by itself.
+		authRejected := false

 		// Read loop
 		for {
 			_, message, err := c.ReadMessage()
 			if err != nil {
-				log.Println("WebSocket read error:", err)
+				// The SSO accepts the upgrade and only then closes with an
+				// application code, so an auth failure surfaces here rather
+				// than at Dial.
+				if websocket.IsCloseError(err, closeUnauthorized, closeRevoked, closeTokenRotated) {
+					authRejected = true
+					log.Printf("Server closed the connection: %v. This agent's token is not valid for that SSO — re-enroll it and update agent.yml.", err)
+				} else {
+					log.Println("WebSocket read error:", err)
+				}
 				break // break read loop, reconnect
 			}

@@ -60,14 +208,17 @@ func connectWebSocket(cfg *Config) {
 				continue
 			}

-			handleCommand(cfg, msg, c)
+			handleCommand(cm, msg, c, exec)
 		}

 		// Cleanup on disconnect
+		close(stopCh)
 		c.Close()
-		if telemetryTicker != nil {
-			telemetryTicker.Stop()
-			telemetryDone <- true
+
+		if authRejected {
+			log.Printf("Reconnecting in %s.", authRetryInterval)
+			time.Sleep(authRetryInterval)
+			continue
 		}

 		log.Println("WebSocket disconnected. Reconnecting in 5 seconds...")
@@ -75,33 +226,264 @@ func connectWebSocket(cfg *Config) {
 	}
 }

-func handleCommand(cfg *Config, msg WSMessage, c *websocket.Conn) {
-	log.Printf("Received command: %s", msg.Type)
+func handleCommand(cm *ConfigManager, msg WSMessage, c MessageWriter, exec Executor) {
+	cfg := cm.Get()
+	// Don't log the server's fire-and-forget heartbeat ack — it arrives every
+	// 60s and is not a command to act on; logging it is pure per-minute noise.
+	if msg.Type != "heartbeat_ack" {
+		log.Printf("Received command: %s", msg.Type)
+	}
+
+	sendResponse := func(status string, message string) {
+		resp, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"status": status, "message": message})
+		c.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, resp)
+	}

 	switch msg.Type {
-	case "config":
-		log.Printf("Received config payload: %v", msg.Payload)
-	case "reboot":
-		if !cfg.Capabilities.Reboot {
-			log.Println("Reboot rejected: capability disabled in agent.yml")
+	case "reload_config":
+		if err := cm.Reload(); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("Reload failed: %v", err)
+			sendResponse("error", "failed to reload config")
+		} else {
+			log.Println("Configuration reloaded successfully.")
+			sendResponse("ok", "configuration reloaded")
+		}
+	case "fetch_logs":
+		serviceName, _ := msg.Payload["service"].(string)
+		if serviceName == "" {
+			serviceName = "theta-agent"
+		}
+
+		if serviceName != "theta-agent" && !cfg.Capabilities.CanManageService(serviceName) {
+			log.Printf("Fetch logs rejected for '%s': not in allowed service list", serviceName)
+			sendResponse("error", "service log fetch rejected")
 			return
 		}
-		log.Println("Reboot capability enabled. (Simulation: rebooting system...)")
+
+		linesCount := 100
+		if l, ok := msg.Payload["lines"].(float64); ok && l > 0 {
+			linesCount = int(l)
+		}
+
+		log.Printf("Fetching logs for service %s (%d lines)...", serviceName, linesCount)
+		out, err := exec.Execute("journalctl", "-u", serviceName, "-n", fmt.Sprintf("%d", linesCount), "--no-pager")
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Printf("Log fetch failed: %v", err)
+			sendResponse("error", "failed to fetch logs")
+			return
+		}
+		resp := map[string]interface{}{
+			"status":  "ok",
+			"service": serviceName,
+			"logs":    string(out),
+		}
+		respPayload, _ := json.Marshal(resp)
+		c.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, respPayload)
+		return
+	case "update_binary":
+		if !verifySignature(cfg, msg) {
+			sendResponse("error", "signature verification failed")
+			return
+		}
+		if !cfg.Capabilities.ArbitraryBash {
+			sendResponse("error", "update capability disabled")
+			return
+		}
+
+		urlStr, _ := msg.Payload["url"].(string)
+		checksum, _ := msg.Payload["sha256"].(string)
+		if urlStr == "" || checksum == "" {
+			sendResponse("error", "missing url or sha256 checksum")
+			return
+		}
+
+		log.Printf("Updating binary from %s...", urlStr)
+		if err := downloadAndUpdateBinary(urlStr, checksum); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("Update failed: %v", err)
+			sendResponse("error", fmt.Sprintf("update failed: %v", err))
+			return
+		}
+		sendResponse("ok", "update applied successfully; restarting agent...")
+		os.Exit(0)
+	case "config":
+		// A config frame carrying credentials means the server accepted our
+		// join key and enrolled this host. Persist what it issued -- our own
+		// per-agent token and the public key to pin -- so the next connection
+		// authenticates as this agent rather than re-enrolling, and so signed
+		// commands can be verified. This is what lets an install ship with only
+		// a join key and still end up fully configured.
+		if enrolled, _ := msg.Payload["enrolled"].(bool); enrolled {
+			token, _ := msg.Payload["auth_token"].(string)
+			pubKey, _ := msg.Payload["public_key"].(string)
+			if err := cm.PersistEnrollment(token, pubKey); err != nil {
+				log.Printf("Enrolled, but could not persist credentials: %v", err)
+				log.Printf("This agent will re-enroll on every reconnect until %s is writable.", cm.configPath)
+			} else {
+				log.Printf("Enrolled with the SSO. Credentials written to %s; the join key is no longer needed.", cm.configPath)
+			}
+			sendResponse("ok", "enrollment stored")
+			return
+		}
+		log.Printf("Received config payload: %v", msg.Payload)
+		sendResponse("ok", "Configuration received")
+	case "reboot":
+		if !verifySignature(cfg, msg) {
+			sendResponse("error", "signature verification failed")
+			return
+		}
+		if !cfg.Capabilities.Reboot {
+			log.Println("Reboot rejected: capability disabled in agent.yml")
+			sendResponse("error", "reboot capability disabled")
+			return
+		}
+		log.Printf("Executing reboot...")
+		if _, err := exec.Execute("reboot"); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("Reboot failed: %v", err)
+			sendResponse("error", "reboot failed")
+			return
+		}
+		sendResponse("ok", "system rebooting")
 	case "service_restart":
 		serviceName, ok := msg.Payload["service"].(string)
 		if !ok || !cfg.Capabilities.CanManageService(serviceName) {
 			log.Printf("Service restart rejected for '%s': not in allowed service list", serviceName)
+			sendResponse("error", "service restart rejected")
 			return
 		}
 		log.Printf("Restarting service %s...", serviceName)
+		if _, err := exec.Execute("systemctl", "restart", serviceName); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("Service restart failed: %v", err)
+			sendResponse("error", "restart failed")
+			return
+		}
+		sendResponse("ok", "service restarted")
+	case "configure_ldap":
+		if !verifySignature(cfg, msg) {
+			sendResponse("error", "signature verification failed")
+			return
+		}
+		if !cfg.Capabilities.ConfigureLDAP {
+			log.Println("LDAP config rejected: capability disabled in agent.yml")
+			sendResponse("error", "LDAP config disabled")
+			return
+		}
+
+		configData, ok := msg.Payload["config"].(string)
+		if !ok {
+			log.Println("LDAP config payload missing or not a string")
+			sendResponse("error", "invalid config payload")
+			return
+		}
+
+		log.Println("Pushing updated SSSD configuration...")
+		if err := exec.WriteFile("/etc/sssd/sssd.conf", []byte(configData), 0600); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("Failed to write SSSD config: %v", err)
+			sendResponse("error", "failed to write config")
+			return
+		}
+
+		log.Println("Restarting SSSD service...")
+		if _, err := exec.Execute("systemctl", "restart", "sssd"); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("SSSD restart failed: %v", err)
+			sendResponse("error", "failed to restart sssd")
+			return
+		}
+		sendResponse("ok", "LDAP configuration updated")
+	case "arbitrary_bash":
+		if !verifySignature(cfg, msg) {
+			sendResponse("error", "signature verification failed")
+			return
+		}
+		if !cfg.Capabilities.ArbitraryBash {
+			log.Println("Bash execution rejected: capability disabled in agent.yml")
+			sendResponse("error", "bash execution disabled")
+			return
+		}
+
+		script, ok := msg.Payload["script"].(string)
+		if !ok {
+			log.Println("Bash payload missing or not a string")
+			sendResponse("error", "invalid script payload")
+			return
+		}
+
+		log.Printf("Executing remote script: %s", script)
+		out, err := exec.Execute("bash", "-c", script)
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Printf("Script execution failed: %v", err)
+			sendResponse("error", fmt.Sprintf("execution failed: %v", err))
+			return
+		}
+
+		resp := map[string]string{
+			"status": "ok",
+			"output": string(out),
+		}
+		respPayload, _ := json.Marshal(resp)
+		c.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, respPayload)
+		return
+	// heartbeat_ack is the server's acknowledgement of the agent's own periodic
+	// heartbeat (the agent sends `heartbeat`, the server answers `heartbeat_ack`).
+	// There is nothing to do with it -- it is not a command to run, and answering
+	// an ack with an error response would inject spurious errors into the
+	// command-response channel every minute. Silently ignore.
+	case "heartbeat_ack":
+		return
 	default:
 		log.Printf("Unknown command type: %s", msg.Type)
+		sendResponse("error", "unknown command type")
 	}
 }

-func startTelemetry(c *websocket.Conn, cfg *Config) (*time.Ticker, chan bool) {
-	ticker := time.Ticker{C: nil} // placeholder logic
-	done := make(chan bool)
-	log.Println("Telemetry loop started (placeholder).")
-	return &ticker, done
+func downloadAndUpdateBinary(downloadURL string, expectedSHA256 string) error {
+	resp, err := http.Get(downloadURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("http fetch failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		return fmt.Errorf("unexpected http status: %s", resp.Status)
+	}
+
+	tmpFile, err := os.CreateTemp("", "theta-agent-update-*")
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp file: %w", err)
+	}
+	tmpPath := tmpFile.Name()
+	defer os.Remove(tmpPath)
+
+	hasher := sha256.New()
+	writer := io.MultiWriter(tmpFile, hasher)
+
+	if _, err := io.Copy(writer, resp.Body); err != nil {
+		tmpFile.Close()
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save binary: %w", err)
+	}
+	tmpFile.Close()
+
+	actualSHA256 := fmt.Sprintf("%x", hasher.Sum(nil))
+	if !strings.EqualFold(actualSHA256, strings.TrimSpace(expectedSHA256)) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("sha256 mismatch: expected %s, got %s", expectedSHA256, actualSHA256)
+	}
+
+	if err := os.Chmod(tmpPath, 0755); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to set executable permissions: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	selfPath, err := os.Executable()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve current binary path: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(selfPath)
+	if err == nil {
+		selfPath = resolvedPath
+	}
+
+	if err := os.Rename(tmpPath, selfPath); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to replace binary: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// A fixed key pair for the tests, standing in for the SSO's persisted signing
+// key. High-risk commands must now be genuinely signed: the agent fails closed
+// when no public_key is configured, so these tests sign the way the server
+// does instead of relying on verification being skipped.
+var testPubKey, testPrivKey, _ = ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
+
+func testPubKeyB64() string {
+	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(testPubKey)
+}
+
+// sign mirrors the server's canonicalization (sorted keys, no whitespace, no
+// HTML escaping, `signature` omitted) and adds the signature to the payload.
+func sign(t *testing.T, payload map[string]interface{}) map[string]interface{} {
+	t.Helper()
+	if payload == nil {
+		payload = map[string]interface{}{}
+	}
+	canonical, err := canonicalize(payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("canonicalize: %v", err)
+	}
+	signed := make(map[string]interface{}, len(payload)+1)
+	for k, v := range payload {
+		signed[k] = v
+	}
+	signed["signature"] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ed25519.Sign(testPrivKey, canonical))
+	return signed
+}
+
+type MockConn struct {
+	Messages [][]byte
+}
+
+func (m *MockConn) WriteMessage(messageType int, data []byte) error {
+	m.Messages = append(m.Messages, data)
+	return nil
+}
+
+type MockExecutor struct {
+	ExecutedCommands [][]string
+	WrittenFiles     map[string][]byte
+}
+
+func (m *MockExecutor) Execute(command string, args ...string) ([]byte, error) {
+	m.ExecutedCommands = append(m.ExecutedCommands, append([]string{command}, args...))
+	return []byte("mock output"), nil
+}
+
+func (m *MockExecutor) WriteFile(path string, data []byte, perm os.FileMode) error {
+	if m.WrittenFiles == nil {
+		m.WrittenFiles = make(map[string][]byte)
+	}
+	m.WrittenFiles[path] = data
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (m *MockExecutor) ReadFile(path string) ([]byte, error) {
+	if m.WrittenFiles != nil {
+		if data, ok := m.WrittenFiles[path]; ok {
+			return data, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return []byte("mock file content"), nil
+}
+
+func TestHandleCommand(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name             string
+		cfg              *Config
+		msg              WSMessage
+		expectedStatus   string
+		expectedCmd      []string
+		expectedFile     string
+		expectedFileCont string
+		// sign the payload with the test key before dispatch, the way the SSO
+		// signs high-risk commands
+		signed bool
+		// heartbeat_ack (and any fire-and-forget ack) must be silently ignored —
+		// no response message, no command, no log noise.
+		expectedNoResponse bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "config command success",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type:    "config",
+				Payload: map[string]interface{}{"key": "value"},
+			},
+			expectedStatus: "ok",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "reboot command allowed",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				PublicKey:    testPubKeyB64(),
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{Reboot: true},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type: "reboot",
+			},
+			signed:         true,
+			expectedStatus: "ok",
+			expectedCmd:    []string{"reboot"},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "reboot command denied",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{Reboot: false},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type: "reboot",
+			},
+			expectedStatus: "error",
+			expectedCmd:    nil,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "service_restart allowed",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{
+					ServiceControl: []string{"nginx"},
+				},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type: "service_restart",
+				Payload: map[string]interface{}{
+					"service": "nginx",
+				},
+			},
+			expectedStatus: "ok",
+			expectedCmd:    []string{"systemctl", "restart", "nginx"},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "service_restart denied",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{
+					ServiceControl: []string{"nginx"},
+				},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type: "service_restart",
+				Payload: map[string]interface{}{
+					"service": "ssh",
+				},
+			},
+			expectedStatus: "error",
+			expectedCmd:    nil,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "configure_ldap allowed",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				PublicKey:    testPubKeyB64(),
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{ConfigureLDAP: true},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type: "configure_ldap",
+				Payload: map[string]interface{}{
+					"config": "domain = theta42.local\nserver = sso.local",
+				},
+			},
+			signed:           true,
+			expectedStatus:   "ok",
+			expectedFile:     "/etc/sssd/sssd.conf",
+			expectedFileCont: "domain = theta42.local\nserver = sso.local",
+			expectedCmd:      []string{"systemctl", "restart", "sssd"},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "configure_ldap denied",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{ConfigureLDAP: false},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type: "configure_ldap",
+				Payload: map[string]interface{}{
+					"config": "domain = theta42.local",
+				},
+			},
+			expectedStatus: "error",
+			expectedCmd:    nil,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "arbitrary_bash allowed",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				PublicKey:    testPubKeyB64(),
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{ArbitraryBash: true},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type: "arbitrary_bash",
+				Payload: map[string]interface{}{
+					"script": "uptime",
+				},
+			},
+			signed:         true,
+			expectedStatus: "ok",
+			expectedCmd:    []string{"bash", "-c", "uptime"},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "arbitrary_bash denied",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{ArbitraryBash: false},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type: "arbitrary_bash",
+				Payload: map[string]interface{}{
+					"script": "rm -rf /",
+				},
+			},
+			expectedStatus: "error",
+			expectedCmd:    nil,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "heartbeat_ack is silently ignored",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type: "heartbeat_ack",
+			},
+			expectedNoResponse: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "unknown command",
+			cfg: &Config{
+				Capabilities: Capabilities{},
+			},
+			msg: WSMessage{
+				Type: "mystery_command",
+			},
+			expectedStatus: "error",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			mockConn := &MockConn{}
+			mockExec := &MockExecutor{}
+			cm := &ConfigManager{current: tc.cfg}
+			msg := tc.msg
+			if tc.signed {
+				msg.Payload = sign(t, msg.Payload)
+			}
+			handleCommand(cm, msg, mockConn, mockExec)
+
+			if tc.expectedNoResponse {
+				if len(mockConn.Messages) != 0 {
+					t.Fatalf("expected no response message, got %d: %v", len(mockConn.Messages), mockConn.Messages)
+				}
+				if len(mockExec.ExecutedCommands) > 0 {
+					t.Errorf("expected no commands to be executed, but got %v", mockExec.ExecutedCommands)
+				}
+				return
+			}
+
+			if len(mockConn.Messages) != 1 {
+				t.Fatalf("expected 1 response message, got %d", len(mockConn.Messages))
+			}
+
+			var resp map[string]string
+			if err := json.Unmarshal(mockConn.Messages[0], &resp); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal response: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			if resp["status"] != tc.expectedStatus {
+				t.Errorf("expected status %q, got %q", tc.expectedStatus, resp["status"])
+			}
+
+			if tc.expectedCmd != nil {
+				if len(mockExec.ExecutedCommands) == 0 {
+					t.Errorf("expected command to be executed, but none were")
+				} else {
+					cmd := mockExec.ExecutedCommands[0]
+					if len(cmd) != len(tc.expectedCmd) {
+						t.Errorf("expected command length %d, got %d", len(tc.expectedCmd), len(cmd))
+					}
+					for i := range cmd {
+						if cmd[i] != tc.expectedCmd[i] {
+							t.Errorf("expected arg %d = %q, got %q", i, tc.expectedCmd[i], cmd[i])
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			} else if len(mockExec.ExecutedCommands) > 0 {
+				t.Errorf("expected no commands to be executed, but got %v", mockExec.ExecutedCommands)
+			}
+
+			if tc.expectedFile != "" {
+				content, ok := mockExec.WrittenFiles[tc.expectedFile]
+				if !ok {
+					t.Errorf("expected file %q to be written, but it wasn't", tc.expectedFile)
+				} else if string(content) != tc.expectedFileCont {
+					t.Errorf("expected file content %q, got %q", tc.expectedFileCont, string(content))
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// The agent must not execute a high-risk command it cannot verify. This used to
+// return true when no public_key was configured, so an agent installed without
+// one executed reboot / configure_ldap / arbitrary_bash unverified.
+func TestVerifySignatureFailsClosedWithoutPublicKey(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{} // no PublicKey
+	msg := WSMessage{Type: "arbitrary_bash", Payload: sign(t, map[string]interface{}{"script": "uptime"})}
+	if verifySignature(cfg, msg) {
+		t.Fatal("verifySignature accepted a command with no public_key configured")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifySignatureRejectsWrongKey(t *testing.T) {
+	otherPub, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
+	cfg := &Config{PublicKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(otherPub)}
+	msg := WSMessage{Type: "arbitrary_bash", Payload: sign(t, map[string]interface{}{"script": "uptime"})}
+	if verifySignature(cfg, msg) {
+		t.Fatal("verifySignature accepted a signature from a different key")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifySignatureRejectsTamperedPayload(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{PublicKey: testPubKeyB64()}
+	payload := sign(t, map[string]interface{}{"script": "uptime"})
+	payload["script"] = "rm -rf /" // swap the script, keep the signature
+	if verifySignature(cfg, WSMessage{Type: "arbitrary_bash", Payload: payload}) {
+		t.Fatal("verifySignature accepted a payload modified after signing")
+	}
+}
+
+// Regression: encoding/json escapes <, > and & by default, but the server's
+// JSON.stringify does not. Any script using redirection or && therefore
+// canonicalized differently on each side and failed verification -- which is
+// most real scripts.
+func TestVerifySignatureAcceptsShellMetacharacters(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &Config{PublicKey: testPubKeyB64()}
+	for _, script := range []string{
+		"echo hi > /tmp//out.log",
+		"systemctl is-active nginx && systemctl reload nginx",
+		"grep -c . < /etc/passwd",
+		"a=1 && b=2 && echo \"$a<$b\" > /dev/null",
+	} {
+		msg := WSMessage{Type: "arbitrary_bash", Payload: sign(t, map[string]interface{}{"script": script})}
+		if !verifySignature(cfg, msg) {
+			t.Errorf("verifySignature rejected a correctly signed script: %q", script)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The canonical form must be byte-identical to the server's: sorted keys, no
+// whitespace, no HTML escaping, no trailing newline, signature omitted.
+func TestCanonicalizeMatchesServerForm(t *testing.T) {
+	got, err := canonicalize(map[string]interface{}{
+		"script":  "echo a > b && c",
+		"comment": "x&y",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("canonicalize: %v", err)
+	}
+	want := `{"comment":"x&y","script":"echo a > b && c"}`
+	if string(got) != want {
+		t.Errorf("canonical form mismatch:\n got: %s\nwant: %s", got, want)
+	}
+}
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
wmantly	d128807431	Merge pull request #6 from theta42/fix/rebuild-agent-binary fix: rebuild the prebuilt linux/amd64 binary for join keys (v1.5.1)	2026-08-06 10:44:41 -04:00
wmantly	7d36318885	fix: rebuild the prebuilt linux/amd64 binary for join keys (v1.5.1) theta-suite's setup.sh installs the committed theta-agent-linux-amd64 rather than building from source, so a stale binary means the fix in this repo never reaches the host. The v1.5.0 binary predated join-key support: setup.sh would write a join_key into agent.yml that the running agent did not understand, and it would have looped on "close 4001: Unauthorized" -- the same trap the v1.3.0 heartbeat fix hit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-06 10:43:51 -04:00
wmantly	877e6caffa	Merge pull request #5 from theta42/feat/join-key-enrollment feat: join-key enrollment (v1.5.0, protocol v1.2.0 §1.1)	2026-08-06 10:40:05 -04:00
wmantly	0a5011cd42	feat: join-key enrollment (v1.5.0, protocol v1.2.0 1.1) Installing the agent with one key is now all it takes to add a host. New `join_key` config field, presented while auth_token is empty. The SSO exchanges it for this agent's own token and the public key it must pin, both delivered in the config frame; the agent persists them and blanks the join key. Nothing has to be copied between two machines by hand. PersistEnrollment rewrites only the credential lines -- line-based rather than a YAML round-trip -- so operator comments, the capability matrix and formatting survive. It re-reads afterwards so the credential is live without a restart, and keeps the file 0600. The connect URL carries ?hostname= so a self-enrolling host is named after itself, and the agent refuses to connect at all (with a long back-off) when it has no credential rather than presenting an empty one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-06 10:34:06 -04:00
wmantly	dc14274edc	Merge pull request #4 from theta42/fix/agent-enrollment-auth sec: fail-closed verification + server-issued enrollment (v1.4.0)	2026-08-05 18:55:12 -04:00
wmantly	d47d08ecab	sec: fail-closed verification + server-issued enrollment (v1.4.0) Implements protocol v1.2.0. verifySignature() returned true when no public_key was configured, logging "skipping signature verification". The SSO installer never wrote a public_key, so a default install executed reboot, service_restart, configure_ldap, arbitrary_bash and update_binary UNVERIFIED from anything that could reach its socket. An agent that cannot verify now refuses. Canonicalization also disagreed with the server. Go's encoding/json escapes <, > and & by default; JSON.stringify does not. Any payload containing them hashed differently on each side and failed verification -- for arbitrary_bash that is most real scripts (`>` redirection, `&&`). Now uses json.Encoder with SetEscapeHTML(false), trailing newline trimmed. The SSO now rejects tokens it did not issue. Handles its close codes (4001/4002/4003/4004) and backs off 5 minutes on an enrollment failure instead of retrying every 5s forever. The connect log no longer prints the URL, which carried ?token=. install.sh gains --public-key and warns when none is configured. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-05 18:43:26 -04:00
wmantly	51750d01ec	fix: ship the rebuilt binary with heartbeat_ack fix + test (v1.3.1) (#3 ) The prebuilt theta-agent-linux-amd64 was built before the v1.3.0 heartbeat_ack fix, so the installed agent still logged 'Unknown command type: heartbeat_ack'. Rebuild it with the fix; add a test asserting heartbeat_ack is silently ignored (no response, no command, no log).	2026-08-05 02:28:58 -04:00
wmantly	52379c2434	docs: changelog v1.3.0	2026-08-04 18:54:43 -04:00
wmantly	48d17e0e9f	fix: silently ignore heartbeat_ack instead of logging 'Unknown command type' (v1.3.0) (#2 ) The server replies to the agent's own heartbeat with heartbeat_ack; the agent had no case for it, so it fell through to the unknown-command handler, logged 'Unknown command type: heartbeat_ack' every minute, and answered with a spurious error response. heartbeats are fire-and-forget acks — nothing to run, nothing to reply.	2026-08-04 18:54:00 -04:00
wmantly	6500fadafb	Merge pull request #1 from theta42/fix/install-sssd-auto-v1.2.1 feat(install): add automatic SSSD and PAM package installation v1.2.1	2026-08-03 15:02:08 -04:00
wmantly	6348c4c060	feat(install): add automatic SSSD and PAM package installation v1.2.1	2026-08-03 15:01:57 -04:00
wmantly	821ce5f991	release: v1.2.0 - Pure Go update engine, enhanced journal log fetcher, and protocol concurrency fixes	2026-08-03 02:13:11 -04:00
wmantly	e2ec7e7234	Add build binary	2026-08-03 02:01:14 -04:00
wmantly	0493076575	Enterprise release: add self-updates, command signing, and telemetry enhancements	2026-08-03 01:59:27 -04:00