New optional service (jump-host compose profile) built from the new
theta42/ldap-client submodule: a genuinely SSSD + AuthorizedKeysCommand
LDAP-joined host, not a container with a manually-dropped public key in
authorized_keys. Lets jump-host's actual key-injection -> upstream-connect
flow be exercised end-to-end against the local dev stack's own LDAP.
Verified: real SSH login through jump-host's uid_-_target grammar, live key
injection into LDAP, and ldap-test-host serving that key via
AuthorizedKeysCommand -- both via the SSH CLI and WinSCP.
config.example/ldap-test-host.vars.example documents the one field an
operator fills in (the ldapclient service account's bind password, already
generated by bootstrap.js as serviceAccountPass) -- the rest points at this
stack's own local LDAP by default.
sso-manager's Directory data had no persistent volume at all: @simpleworkjs/orm
falls back to './config/inventory.sqlite' (relative to /app) when conf.orm isn't
set, which lives in the container's ephemeral layer -- every container recreate
silently wiped every site/host/service/oauth-client resource and their
relationships. setup.sh's generated sso-secrets.js now sets
orm.storage=/data/inventory.sqlite, co-located with the already-persisted
sso-data volume (same one Redis uses). Verified live: migrated the running
stack's existing Directory data to /data, force-recreated the container, and
confirmed all 8 resources survived.
Also bumps sso-manager-node to v1.8.0 (resource modal standardization: tabs,
footer with created/updated-by metadata, linkable /directory/:slug URLs, a new
Children tab, and site-slug-prefixed auto-created LDAP groups).
Companion to theta42/jump-host#18: that PR turns on Redis persistence
(AOF + RDB) at /data, but without a volume mount, persistence-within-the-
container is pointless -- docker rm -f (which every real rebuild uses,
per this repo's own documented docker-compose-v1 recreate quirk) throws
the container's whole filesystem away regardless. Adds jump-redis-data:/data,
matching proxy-data's existing role for the same package (lua-resty-auto-ssl
also relies on Redis persistence, via its own volume).
Verified: minted a jump-host API token, force-recreated the container,
confirmed the token still worked afterward.
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
seedDirectory() only ever linked ONE OAuth client -- whatever id was
passed in, which was always the proxy's (resolvedClientId). jump-host's
own OAuth client (minted by provisionJumpHost) was never passed through,
so it was created but never got a ResourceEdge to the "SSH Jump Host"
service resource -- it just showed up in the Directory with no parent.
provisionJumpHost now returns the jump client's id (looking it up even
on the "already configured" early-return path, so existing deployments
self-heal on the next setup.sh run instead of needing this fixed only for
fresh installs), and seedDirectory takes it as a third argument, linking
it under the jump-host service the same way the proxy's client is linked
under the proxy service.
Also fixed live on the affected deployment via the directory-admin API
(created the missing edge directly) rather than waiting for a rebuild.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Regression guard for bootstrap.js's jump-secrets.js template: its ldap
block must use ldaps:// (implicit TLS, :636), not ldap:// (:389), as long
as tlsOptions is set alongside it. ldapts treats a non-empty tlsOptions as
"use implicit TLS" regardless of URL scheme, and jump-host's LDAP client
always sets tlsOptions -- so this exact combination broke every SSH login
to jump-host (any account, any password) before being root-caused
against a real deployment.
Static (parses bootstrap.js as text), not a require()+exec of it --
bootstrap.js is a self-running provisioning script with real side effects
(LDAP writes, live API calls), not a library, so there's nothing safe to
import and call in CI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
jump-secrets.js's ldap.url was 'ldap://sso-manager:389' with tlsOptions
set. ldapts treats a non-empty tlsOptions as "use implicit TLS" regardless
of URL scheme, so every LDAP connection from jump-host opened a raw TLS
handshake against sso-manager's plaintext-LDAP port — slapd dropped the
connection before any LDAP message parsed (visible in slapd.log as
"connection lost" right after ACCEPT, no BIND ever logged). Every SSH
login failed with a generic "Permission denied" for any account, any
password — indistinguishable from a wrong credential.
Root-caused by building a local theta-env stack, restarting jump-host
with edited config, and calling userLdap.getUser/checkPassword directly
inside the container: got "Client network socket disconnected before
secure TLS connection was established" instead of a vague auth failure.
Switching to ldaps://sso-manager:636 (already exposed by the same
container, already what tlsOptions was meant for) fixes it — verified
getUser/checkPassword succeed and a real SSH login authenticates.
Companion defensive fix: simpleworkjs/ldap#1 (rejects this exact
ldap://+tlsOptions combination going forward, for proxy/sso too).
Existing deployments must edit their own ./config/jump-secrets.js (this
template only affects fresh bootstraps) — see the PR description.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CFG_HTTP_PROXY / CFG_HTTPS_PROXY / CFG_NO_PROXY in setup.env (all
optional, unset by default) get wired into every service's docker build
(npm/apt) and running container (SMTP, ACME/Let's Encrypt, DNS provider
calls, the jump-host directory API client) as HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY/
NO_PROXY. Useful for isolated/offline/corporate-network test hosts that
only reach the internet through an upstream proxy — distinct from the
theta42 "proxy" app itself. CFG_NO_PROXY defaults to the stack's own
internal service names so container-to-container traffic never routes
through the proxy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes the sshPublicKey ObjectClassViolationError (both in sso-manager-node's
API and jump-host's key-injection path) and the blank OAuth parent
dropdown; adds a host list to jump-host's dashboard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
sso-dashboard.png and proxy-hosts.png still showed the pre-unification
nav; refresh with the current shared shell and add a jump-host dashboard
screenshot alongside them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
sso-manager-node v1.5.0, proxy v1.4.0, jump-host v1.3.0 — the three apps
now share one byte-identical front-end shell (top.ejs, bottom.ejs,
app-base.js) with per-app values in each repo's utils/ui.js, one nav-gating
model driven by /api/user/me, and jQuery 4 / EJS 3 across the board.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
sso-manager-node -> v1.4.0, proxy -> v1.3.0, jump-host -> v1.2.0. The three
apps now share @simpleworkjs/{oidc-client,directory-schema,ldap,app-stack}
(1.0.0, published under the simpleworkjs org) instead of byte-identical forks,
and the SSO directory discovery API no longer leaks client_secret_hash and
returns the {results} envelope (fixing jump-host bridging). No setup.sh change:
the new deps resolve from npm in each app's image build (npm ci stays clean).
CHANGELOG embeds the full per-app release notes. UI chrome unification is
deferred to a browser-verified session (see UI_UNIFICATION_HANDOFF.md).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The jump host's web UI now authenticates via OIDC + a local admin
(jump-host v1.1.0). Wire that in the bundle:
- bootstrap mints a dedicated 'theta-jump' OAuth client (redirect
https://<JUMP_HOST>/api/auth/oidc/callback) and writes a full oidc
block + generated local admin password into config/jump-secrets.js,
mirroring the proxy's OIDC provisioning
- an existing pre-OIDC jump-secrets.js (API token but no OIDC client) is
regenerated so upgraders get SSO login
- bump jump-host submodule v1.0.x -> v1.1.0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes the OAuth-client-API client_id serialization bug that broke this
stack's bootstrap (rotate -> 500 -> 'bootstrap failed'). See CHANGELOG.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds jump-host as a third, opt-in submodule, wired behind
CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED (default off — existing installs unaffected):
- .gitmodules + jump-host submodule pinned to v1.0.0
- setup.sh: resolves the enable flag early, adds jump-host to the
submodule tag-update loop and activates the `jump-host` compose
profile when enabled; builds/starts the service after the proxy,
waits for its /health, and registers its web UI as a proxy Host;
passes CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED/CFG_JUMP_HOST to the bootstrap
- docker-compose.yml: jump-host service with profiles:["jump-host"],
depends_on sso-manager healthy, ports 2222 (SSH) + 3002 (web),
./config:ro + jump-data volume
- bootstrap.js: when enabled, mints a directory API token and writes
./config/jump-secrets.js (binds as cn=admin so it can write the
sshPublicKey attribute for key injection), and seeds a directory
service entry for the jump host. Warn-only, idempotent.
- setup.env.example: CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED / CFG_JUMP_HOST / JUMP_SSH_PORT
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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