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30 Commits
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| cd9c81cd92 | |||
| c8c04440db |
@@ -8,6 +8,41 @@ orchestration code; see each submodule's own `CHANGELOG.md`
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||||
[sso-manager-node](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md))
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for what changed inside the apps it composes.
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||||
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## [v1.35.12] - 2026-08-04
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||||
|
||||
### Fixed
|
||||
- **theta-agent crash-looped (`cannot unmarshal !!bool 'true' into []string`)** — setup.sh's "full control" edit wrote `service_control: true`, but that field is a `[]string` allowlist, so the agent failed to decode the config and restart-loop. Removed the invalid edit; `service_control` now stays as its allowlist (default `[]` = deny all) and the operator can list specific services.
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## [v1.35.11] - 2026-08-04
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||||
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||||
### Fixed
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- **`setup.sh` aborted with `UNSEAL_KEY: unbound variable` on re-runs** — when OpenBao was already unsealed, the unseal block was skipped and `UNSEAL_KEY` was never set, so the later `if [[ -n "$UNSEAL_KEY" ]]` crashed under `set -u`. Guarded with `${UNSEAL_KEY:-}`.
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## [v1.35.10] - 2026-08-04
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### Added
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- **`--reset-openbao`** — full clean OpenBao reset for clearing stale policies/tokens (re-inits the store, flushes the Redis vault-token cache). Use when the vault UI shows a recurring `403 permission denied` on the secrets list.
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- **sso v1.21.0** — shared secrets: users publish secrets to `secret/shared/<owner>/<slug>` and grant read access to other users and apps; plus a durable fix for the recurring vault 403 (broker now always reconciles policy content before serving a cached token). Bumped the sso-manager-node submodule gitlink to v1.21.0.
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||||
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### Fixed
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- **theta-agent was never installed** — `setup.sh` tried to `go build` from an incomplete source-file list (omitting `executor.go`/`telemetry.go`), which failed silently and skipped install. It now installs the prebuilt `theta-agent-linux-amd64` binary from the submodule and writes config to `/etc/theta42/agent.yml` (the path the agent actually reads).
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## [v1.35.9] - 2026-08-03
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### Fixed
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- **sso & proxy version strings now match their release tags** — The v1.20.2 / v1.32.0 release tags were created but their `nodejs/package.json` version fields were left behind (1.20.1 / 1.14.3), so the deployed apps' update-check banner falsely reported a newer version. Bumped submodules to the corrected commits so `buildVersion` matches the deployed tag.
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## [v1.35.2] - 2026-08-03
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### Fixed
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- **Unbound `CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP` variable in `setup.sh`** — Fixed unbound variable error during host registration in `setup.sh` when `ensure_secrets_files()` is skipped on pre-configured installations.
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## [v1.35.1] - 2026-08-03
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### Fixed
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- **Directory & Configuration UI enhancements** — Live Cytoscape graph update on parent/child edge modifications, improved discovery reconciler host matching, updated configuration sidebar layout, relocated discovery and messaging plugins to Directory and Configuration pages.
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- **Managed Host Target Filter** — Filter SSH connection targets in Jump Host to managed hosts only.
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## [v1.35.0] - 2026-08-02
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### Added
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Vendored
+2
@@ -423,10 +423,12 @@ async function seedDirectory(token, clientId, jumpClientId) {
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const host = await ensure('host', HOST_FACTS.name || 'Stack host', hostSlug, site.id, {
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subType: 'linux',
|
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ip: HOST_FACTS.ip,
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address: HOST_FACTS.ip,
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macAddress: HOST_FACTS.mac,
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os: HOST_FACTS.os,
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kernel: HOST_FACTS.kernel,
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sshPort: 22,
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managed: true,
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}, ['stack-host']);
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await ensure('service', 'SSO Manager', 'sso-manager', host.id, {
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address: `https://${SSO_HOST}`,
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|
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+1
-1
Submodule jump-host updated: 1100872152...8c4ec67282
+1
-1
Submodule proxy updated: 25419382bd...8107755307
@@ -72,6 +72,19 @@ warn() { printf '\033[1;33m[setup]\033[0m %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
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error() { printf '\033[1;31m[setup]\033[0m %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
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die() { error "$*"; exit 1; }
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||||
|
||||
# ── Flags ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
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# --reset-openbao: wipe the OpenBao volume + bao-init.json and re-initialize a
|
||||
# fresh store (no prod data to preserve). Use when OpenBao state is suspect
|
||||
# (stale policies/tokens causing vault 403s). The Redis vault-token cache is
|
||||
# flushed once sso-manager is back up (see the OpenBao bootstrap section).
|
||||
RESET_OPENBAO=0
|
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for arg in "$@"; do
|
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case "$arg" in
|
||||
--reset-openbao) RESET_OPENBAO=1 ;;
|
||||
*) warn "unknown argument: $arg (ignored)" ;;
|
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esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# Escape a value for a single-quoted JS string: \ -> \\, ' -> \', then wrap in '...'.
|
||||
js_str() {
|
||||
local s="$1"
|
||||
@@ -106,6 +119,13 @@ env_upsert() {
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Read KEY= from ./.env (empty if absent)
|
||||
env_get() {
|
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local key="$1" file=./.env
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[[ -f "$file" ]] || return 0
|
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grep -m1 "^${key}=" "$file" 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2- || true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Detect docker compose (v2 plugin `docker compose` or v1 standalone `docker-compose`).
|
||||
if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
COMPOSE=(docker compose)
|
||||
@@ -178,6 +198,8 @@ fi
|
||||
# resolved in ensure_config; this is only the hostname override.
|
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[[ -f ./setup.env ]] && parse_kv_file ./setup.env
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export CFG_JUMP_HOST
|
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CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP="${CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP:-0}"
|
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export CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP
|
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|
||||
# ── Optional outbound HTTP(S) proxy for docker build + the running containers ─
|
||||
# CFG_HTTP_PROXY / CFG_HTTPS_PROXY / CFG_NO_PROXY (from ./setup.env or the
|
||||
@@ -662,6 +684,20 @@ backup_before_rebuild() {
|
||||
backup_before_rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 3b. Setup OpenBao (Vault) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Full reset (--reset-openbao): stop/remove openbao, drop the data volume, and
|
||||
# delete the init/keys file (incl. any backup copy that setup.sh would otherwise
|
||||
# restore). The normal bootstrap below then initializes a brand-new store, so no
|
||||
# stale policy content or token survives.
|
||||
if [[ "$RESET_OPENBAO" == "1" ]]; then
|
||||
info "── Full OpenBao reset requested (--reset-openbao) ──"
|
||||
"${COMPOSE[@]}" stop openbao >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
||||
"${COMPOSE[@]}" rm -f openbao >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
||||
docker volume ls -q 2>/dev/null | grep '^openbao' | xargs -r docker volume rm >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
||||
rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json"
|
||||
rm -f ./backups/bao-init.json ./backups/*/bao-init.json 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
info " openbao volume + bao-init.json cleared; will re-initialize fresh."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
info "Starting openbao..."
|
||||
"${COMPOSE[@]}" run --rm --user root openbao chown -R 100:1000 /vault/data
|
||||
"${COMPOSE[@]}" up -d openbao
|
||||
@@ -674,7 +710,17 @@ for i in $(seq 1 30); do
|
||||
sleep 2
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
if ! docker exec openbao bao status -format=json 2>/dev/null | grep -q '"initialized": true' || true; then
|
||||
# If config/bao-init.json is missing, search backups for a saved copy
|
||||
if [[ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json" ]]; then
|
||||
latest_backup_init=$(find ./backups -name "bao-init.json" 2>/dev/null | sort -r | head -n1 || true)
|
||||
if [[ -n "$latest_backup_init" && -f "$latest_backup_init" ]]; then
|
||||
info "Restoring $CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json from backup ($latest_backup_init)..."
|
||||
cp "$latest_backup_init" "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json"
|
||||
chmod 600 "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if ! docker exec openbao bao status -format=json 2>/dev/null | grep -q '"initialized": true'; then
|
||||
status_json=$(docker exec openbao bao status -format=json 2>/dev/null || true)
|
||||
if ! echo "$status_json" | grep -q '"initialized": true'; then
|
||||
info "Initializing openbao for the first time..."
|
||||
@@ -686,13 +732,54 @@ fi
|
||||
|
||||
status_json=$(docker exec openbao bao status -format=json 2>/dev/null || true)
|
||||
if echo "$status_json" | grep -q '"sealed": true'; then
|
||||
info "Unsealing openbao..."
|
||||
UNSEAL_KEY=$(grep -A1 '"unseal_keys_b64":' "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json" | tail -n1 | cut -d'"' -f2)
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||||
docker exec openbao bao operator unseal "$UNSEAL_KEY" >/dev/null
|
||||
UNSEAL_KEY=""
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||||
if [[ -f "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json" ]]; then
|
||||
UNSEAL_KEY=$(grep -A1 '"unseal_keys_b64":' "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json" 2>/dev/null | tail -n1 | cut -d'"' -f2 || true)
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [[ -z "$UNSEAL_KEY" ]]; then
|
||||
UNSEAL_KEY="$(env_get VAULT_UNSEAL_KEY)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ -n "$UNSEAL_KEY" ]]; then
|
||||
info "Unsealing openbao..."
|
||||
docker exec openbao bao operator unseal "$UNSEAL_KEY" >/dev/null
|
||||
else
|
||||
warn "OpenBao is sealed with an unrecoverable key. Resetting OpenBao volume and re-initializing..."
|
||||
"${COMPOSE[@]}" stop openbao >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
||||
"${COMPOSE[@]}" rm -f openbao >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
||||
docker volume ls -q 2>/dev/null | grep openbao | xargs -r docker volume rm >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
||||
"${COMPOSE[@]}" up -d openbao >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
||||
info "Waiting for fresh openbao container..."
|
||||
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
|
||||
if docker exec openbao bao status >/dev/null 2>&1 || [[ $? -eq 2 ]]; then break; fi
|
||||
sleep 2
|
||||
done
|
||||
info "Initializing fresh openbao..."
|
||||
docker exec openbao bao operator init -key-shares=1 -key-threshold=1 -format=json > "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json"
|
||||
chmod 600 "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json"
|
||||
UNSEAL_KEY=$(grep -A1 '"unseal_keys_b64":' "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json" | tail -n1 | cut -d'"' -f2)
|
||||
info "Unsealing fresh openbao..."
|
||||
docker exec openbao bao operator unseal "$UNSEAL_KEY" >/dev/null
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
export VAULT_TOKEN
|
||||
VAULT_TOKEN=$(grep '"root_token":' "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json" | cut -d'"' -f4)
|
||||
if [[ -f "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json" ]]; then
|
||||
VAULT_TOKEN=$(grep '"root_token":' "$CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json" 2>/dev/null | cut -d'"' -f4 || true)
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [[ -z "$VAULT_TOKEN" ]]; then
|
||||
VAULT_TOKEN="$(env_get VAULT_TOKEN)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ -z "$VAULT_TOKEN" ]]; then
|
||||
die "Could not determine OpenBao VAULT_TOKEN from $CONFIG_DIR/bao-init.json or .env."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# UNSEAL_KEY is only set when OpenBao needed unsealing this run; on a re-run of
|
||||
# an already-unsealed store it is unset, so guard with ${UNSEAL_KEY:-} (set -u).
|
||||
if [[ -n "${UNSEAL_KEY:-}" ]]; then
|
||||
env_upsert VAULT_UNSEAL_KEY "$UNSEAL_KEY"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
env_upsert VAULT_TOKEN "$VAULT_TOKEN"
|
||||
|
||||
if ! docker exec -e BAO_TOKEN="$VAULT_TOKEN" openbao bao secrets list -format=json 2>/dev/null | grep -q '"secret/":'; then
|
||||
@@ -722,21 +809,6 @@ ensure_policy() {
|
||||
docker exec -i -e BAO_TOKEN="$VAULT_TOKEN" openbao bao policy write "$name" - >/dev/null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Read KEY= from ./.env (empty if absent) — reuse a previously minted token
|
||||
# instead of minting a fresh one on every setup.sh run.
|
||||
env_get() {
|
||||
local key="$1" file=./.env
|
||||
[[ -f "$file" ]] || return 0
|
||||
# `|| true` is load-bearing: under `set -euo pipefail`, a no-match `grep`
|
||||
# exits 1 and (pipefail) makes the whole pipeline return 1. Callers do
|
||||
# `existing="$(env_get ...)"` as a bare assignment — a non-zero return there
|
||||
# trips `set -e` and silently kills the whole script (this is exactly what
|
||||
# aborted a fresh install right after "Minting per-app OpenBao tokens": the
|
||||
# root VAULT_TOKEN env_upsert had already created .env, but the app-token
|
||||
# keys were absent, so the first env_get returned 1). "Key absent" is the
|
||||
# normal path here, so always return 0 with empty output.
|
||||
grep -m1 "^${key}=" "$file" 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2- || true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Mint an orphan, renewable token for `policy` and persist it to .env as `key`,
|
||||
# OR reuse the token already in .env if it is still valid (re-mint on expiry).
|
||||
@@ -858,6 +930,18 @@ for i in $(seq 1 60); do
|
||||
sleep 2
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# After a full OpenBao reset, the Redis-cached per-user/admin vault tokens (in
|
||||
# the persisted sso-data volume) reference the old, now-wiped store — drop them
|
||||
# so the broker re-mints fresh tokens against the new instance. Belt-and-
|
||||
# suspenders: the broker also always reconciles policy content before serving a
|
||||
# token, but a token minted by the previous OpenBao instance is simply invalid
|
||||
# there, so a cache flush is required after a reset.
|
||||
if [[ "$RESET_OPENBAO" == "1" ]]; then
|
||||
info " clearing cached vault tokens (old OpenBao instance)..."
|
||||
docker exec sso-manager sh -c "redis-cli EVAL \"for _,k in ipairs(redis.call('keys','vault_token:*')) do redis.call('del',k) end\" 0" \
|
||||
>/dev/null 2>&1 || warn " could not flush Redis vault-token cache (will re-mint on next access)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
info "Seeding app configs into OpenBao (idempotent)..."
|
||||
# sso-manager/conf holds the operator-set LDAP/SMTP/jwtSecret values — sso has
|
||||
# no bootstrap-generated creds, so the file is the complete source of truth.
|
||||
@@ -978,7 +1062,7 @@ async function ensureHost(host, ip, targetPort) {
|
||||
host: host,
|
||||
ip: ip,
|
||||
targetPort: targetPort,
|
||||
forcessl: $( [[ "$CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP" == "1" ]] && echo false || echo true ),
|
||||
forcessl: $( [[ "${CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP:-0}" == "1" ]] && echo false || echo true ),
|
||||
targetssl: false,
|
||||
sso_enabled: false,
|
||||
created_by: 'setup.sh',
|
||||
@@ -1035,7 +1119,7 @@ const {Host} = require('/app/models').models;
|
||||
try { await Host.get($(js_str "$JUMP_HOST")); console.log('SKIP ${JUMP_HOST} (already exists)'); }
|
||||
catch (e) {
|
||||
if (e.name !== 'EntryNotFound') throw e;
|
||||
await Host.create({ host: $(js_str "$JUMP_HOST"), ip: 'jump-host', targetPort: 3002, forcessl: $( [[ "$CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP" == "1" ]] && echo false || echo true ), targetssl: false, sso_enabled: false, created_by: 'setup.sh' });
|
||||
await Host.create({ host: $(js_str "$JUMP_HOST"), ip: 'jump-host', targetPort: 3002, forcessl: $( [[ "${CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP:-0}" == "1" ]] && echo false || echo true ), targetssl: false, sso_enabled: false, created_by: 'setup.sh' });
|
||||
console.log('CREATED ${JUMP_HOST} -> jump-host:3002');
|
||||
}
|
||||
process.exit(0);
|
||||
@@ -1052,25 +1136,30 @@ if [[ "$CFG_THETA_AGENT_ENABLE" == "1" ]]; then
|
||||
info "Setting up theta-agent on the host..."
|
||||
(
|
||||
cd theta-agent || exit 0
|
||||
if ! command -v go >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
warn "Go is not installed. Skipping theta-agent installation."
|
||||
# Install the prebuilt binary that ships in the theta-agent submodule (the
|
||||
# repo's own install.sh uses the same release binary). We do NOT build from
|
||||
# source here: a previous `go build -o theta-agent main.go websocket.go
|
||||
# config.go` omitted executor.go/telemetry.go, failed to compile, and was
|
||||
# silently skipped, so the agent was never installed.
|
||||
if [[ ! -f "theta-agent-linux-amd64" ]]; then
|
||||
warn "Prebuilt theta-agent-linux-amd64 missing from the theta-agent submodule. Skipping theta-agent installation."
|
||||
else
|
||||
info " Building theta-agent..."
|
||||
go build -o theta-agent main.go websocket.go config.go || warn " Failed to build theta-agent."
|
||||
if [[ -x "theta-agent" ]]; then
|
||||
sudo mkdir -p /etc/theta
|
||||
if [[ ! -f /etc/theta/agent.yml ]]; then
|
||||
sudo cp agent.yml.example /etc/theta/agent.yml
|
||||
info " Installing prebuilt theta-agent binary..."
|
||||
if [[ -x "theta-agent-linux-amd64" ]]; then
|
||||
# The agent binary reads /etc/theta42/agent.yml (theta-agent/main.go).
|
||||
sudo mkdir -p /etc/theta42
|
||||
if [[ ! -f /etc/theta42/agent.yml ]]; then
|
||||
sudo cp agent.yml.example /etc/theta42/agent.yml
|
||||
AGENT_TOKEN="$(rand_hex 16)"
|
||||
sudo sed -i "s/REPLACE_WITH_AGENT_TOKEN/$AGENT_TOKEN/" /etc/theta/agent.yml
|
||||
sudo sed -i "s/REPLACE_WITH_AGENT_TOKEN/$AGENT_TOKEN/" /etc/theta42/agent.yml
|
||||
# We want to connect to either https or http depending on CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP
|
||||
if [[ "$CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP" == "1" ]]; then
|
||||
sudo sed -i "s|https://sso.example.com|http://${SSO_HOST}|" /etc/theta/agent.yml
|
||||
if [[ "${CFG_CREATE_ALL_HTTP:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
|
||||
sudo sed -i "s|https://sso.example.com|http://${SSO_HOST}|" /etc/theta42/agent.yml
|
||||
else
|
||||
sudo sed -i "s|https://sso.example.com|https://${SSO_HOST}|" /etc/theta/agent.yml
|
||||
sudo sed -i "s|https://sso.example.com|https://${SSO_HOST}|" /etc/theta42/agent.yml
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
sudo cp theta-agent /usr/local/bin/theta-agent
|
||||
sudo cp theta-agent-linux-amd64 /usr/local/bin/theta-agent
|
||||
sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/theta-agent
|
||||
|
||||
sudo bash -c "cat <<'EOF' > /etc/systemd/system/theta-agent.service
|
||||
@@ -1123,15 +1212,20 @@ if [[ "$CFG_THETA_AGENT_ENABLE" == "1" ]] && [[ -x /usr/local/bin/theta-agent ]]
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "$CFG_THETA_AGENT_FULL_CONTROL" == "1" ]]; then
|
||||
info " Configuring theta-agent with full host control capabilities..."
|
||||
if [[ -f /etc/theta/agent.yml ]]; then
|
||||
sudo sed -i 's/arbitrary_bash: false/arbitrary_bash: true/' /etc/theta/agent.yml
|
||||
sudo sed -i 's/service_control: false/service_control: true/' /etc/theta/agent.yml
|
||||
sudo sed -i 's/reboot: false/reboot: true/' /etc/theta/agent.yml
|
||||
sudo sed -i 's/configure_ldap: false/configure_ldap: true/' /etc/theta/agent.yml
|
||||
if [[ -f /etc/theta42/agent.yml ]]; then
|
||||
sudo sed -i 's/arbitrary_bash: false/arbitrary_bash: true/' /etc/theta42/agent.yml
|
||||
# service_control is a []string allowlist (NOT a bool) — setting it to
|
||||
# `true` makes the agent fail YAML decode and crash-loop. There is no
|
||||
# wildcard; leave the operator's list (or the [] default = deny all)
|
||||
# alone and document how to enable specific services.
|
||||
# sudo sed -i 's/service_control: .*/service_control: true/' ...
|
||||
sudo sed -i 's/reboot: false/reboot: true/' /etc/theta42/agent.yml
|
||||
sudo sed -i 's/configure_ldap: false/configure_ldap: true/' /etc/theta42/agent.yml
|
||||
info " (service_control left as its allowlist; set e.g. service_control: [\"nginx\"] in /etc/theta42/agent.yml to permit managing specific services)"
|
||||
info " theta-agent full control enabled. Restarting service..."
|
||||
sudo systemctl restart theta-agent.service
|
||||
else
|
||||
warn " /etc/theta/agent.yml not found. Full control not configured."
|
||||
warn " /etc/theta42/agent.yml not found. Full control not configured."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
info " theta-agent running with limited capabilities (CFG_THETA_AGENT_FULL_CONTROL=0)."
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
Submodule sso-manager-node updated: 4945dec9c2...5aad6c13bf
+1
-1
Submodule theta-agent updated: 8a97bc7fbd...6500fadafb
Reference in New Issue
Block a user