Merge pull request #111 from theta42/release/1.18.0

Release 1.18.0: bump submodules for API-token UI unification

.github/workflows/lint.yml

@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ name: Lint
 
 # theta-env has no app code of its own to unit-test (it orchestrates the
 # proxy/sso-manager-node submodules) -- this checks the one thing that can
-# actually break silently: setup.sh and bootstrap.js.
+# actually break silently: setup.sh and bootstrap.js, plus a static
+# consistency check on the config bootstrap.js generates for jump-host
+# (test/check_jump_ldap_tls.js).
 on:
   pull_request:
     branches:
@@ -39,3 +41,6 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Syntax check
         run: node --check bootstrap/bootstrap.js
+
+      - name: Jump-host LDAP config consistency
+        run: node test/check_jump_ldap_tls.js

.gitmodules

@@ -4,3 +4,7 @@
 [submodule "proxy"]
 	path = proxy
 	url = https://github.com/theta42/proxy.git
+[submodule "jump-host"]
+	path = jump-host
+	url = https://github.com/theta42/jump-host.git
+	branch = master

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -10,6 +10,424 @@ for what changed inside the apps it composes.
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [1.18.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Changed
+Cross-app API-token self-service UI unification: all 3 apps now share the
+same card-grid list, "+ New Token" modal-based create flow, `app.modal`-based
+secret reveal, and Edit modal (with real created-by/on audit metadata).
+
+#### sso-manager-node — [v1.8.2](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.8.2), [v1.8.3](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.8.3)
+
+**v1.8.2**
+
+##### Fixed
+- **Creating a new OAuth integration didn't reliably show the "save this client secret now" reveal modal** — `saveResource()` called `app.modal.close()` immediately before conditionally showing the secret via `app.modal.open()`. `app.modal` is a singleton, and `close()` immediately followed by `open()` collides with Bootstrap's hide-transition guard. An intervening `await loadResources()` made this race unlikely to lose in practice, but not guaranteed to — found while fixing the same, guaranteed-to-lose bug in jump-host and proxy's API-token create flows.
+
+**v1.8.3**
+
+##### Changed
+- **`profile.ejs`'s self-service API-token UI unified onto `app.modal`**, matching the pattern already shipped this round in `directory.ejs`, proxy, and jump-host: the static `#secretModal`/`#editModal` elements are retired in favor of the shared `app.modal` singleton, the always-visible inline create-form card becomes a "+ New Token" button + modal, and badge classes switch from `bg-*` to `text-bg-*`.
+- Checkmark-flash copy feedback (silently broken by FontAwesome's `<i>`→`<svg>` replacement) replaced with toast-based `copyFieldValue`, matching proxy and jump-host.
+
+#### proxy — [v1.7.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.7.0)
+
+##### Added
+- **API tokens: "+ New Token" modal button (replacing the always-visible inline create-form card) and a new Edit modal** — continues the cross-app API-token UI unification started in jump-host. The Edit modal's footer shows real created-by/on data; the `PUT /api-token/:id` route already fully supported editing, so no backend change was needed.
+
+##### Fixed
+- **Creating an API token didn't show the "save this secret now" reveal modal** — the create flow called `app.modal.close()` immediately before `app.modal.open()` (to show the secret) in the same tick; since `app.modal` is a singleton, that collided with Bootstrap's hide-transition guard and the reveal modal silently never appeared.
+
+#### jump-host — [v1.10.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.10.0), [v1.10.1](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.10.1)
+
+**v1.10.0**
+
+##### Added
+- **API-token UI unified with sso-manager-node/proxy**: card grid replacing the bare table, a new Edit modal (footer shows real created-by/on data), and a Description field on both the create and edit flows — the model and API already fully supported all of this, it just wasn't exposed anywhere in the dashboard.
+
+##### Changed
+- `@simpleworkjs/frontend` bumped to `^0.2.6` (this app was still on `^0.2.5`).
+
+**v1.10.1**
+
+##### Fixed
+- **The API-token reveal modal silently didn't show after creating a token** — `submitApiToken()` called `app.modal.close()` immediately before `showToken()`'s `app.modal.open()` in the same tick, colliding with Bootstrap's hide-transition guard on the singleton modal. Same root cause as the OAuth-secret-reveal race fixed in sso-manager-node (v1.8.2) and the create-token race fixed in proxy (v1.7.0).
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.8.3](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.8.3)
+- proxy -> [v1.7.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.7.0)
+- jump-host -> [v1.10.1](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.10.1)
+
+## [1.17.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Added
+- **proxy's host modal now has a footer (created/updated-by/on metadata) and a linkable `/hosts/{host}` URL**, migrated onto the same shared `app.modal` component as sso-manager-node's resource modal — continuing the entity-modal standardization across the stack.
+
+### Fixed
+- **proxy: the Let's-Encrypt challenge-type/wildcard-matching visibility logic could stop reacting to the hostname field after the first Add/Edit host**, and **the SSO allow-list autocomplete could go empty starting on the second Add/Edit** — both were DOM-rebuild timing bugs in the same class as the resource-modal fixes already shipped.
+- **sso-manager-node: the resource modal's "Associated LDAP Groups" autocomplete went empty after the first Add/Edit** — same DOM-rebuild timing bug, now fixed.
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.8.1](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.8.1)
+- proxy -> [v1.6.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.6.0)
+
+## [1.16.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Added
+- **"Quick Jump" copy-to-clipboard section on the jump-host dashboard** — one-click-copy SSH commands (interactive-picker mode, plus a per-host `uid_-_target` grammar-mode command) instead of having to remember/reconstruct the format by hand.
+
+### Fixed
+- **jump-host audit records for a failed downstream connection only ever said `upstream-unreachable`**, with no way to tell a network-layer failure from an auth failure — the real error (ECONNREFUSED, ETIMEDOUT, an ssh2 auth-failure message, etc.) is now captured and shown as a tooltip on the audit table's fail badge.
+
+### Bumped
+- jump-host -> [v1.9.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.9.0)
+
+## [1.15.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Fixed
+- **sso-manager's Directory data (every site/host/service/oauth-client resource and their relationships/LDAP-group associations) had no persistent volume** — `@simpleworkjs/orm` fell back to `./config/inventory.sqlite` (relative to the app's `/app` cwd) whenever `conf.orm` wasn't set, which sits in the container's ephemeral writable layer, not any mounted volume. Every container recreate (`docker compose up --build`, `down`/`up`, an image rebuild) silently wiped the entire Directory Management page. `setup.sh`'s generated `sso-secrets.js` (and the example template) now set `orm: { dialect: 'sqlite', storage: '/data/inventory.sqlite' }`, co-locating it with the already-persisted `sso-data` volume (where Redis lives). **Existing deployments**: this repo doesn't rewrite an operator's existing `config/sso-secrets.js` (re-running `setup.sh` leaves it untouched by design) — add the `orm` block above manually, and copy the container's current `/app/config/inventory.sqlite` to `/data/inventory.sqlite` *before* recreating the container, or the existing Directory data will be lost on the next recreate instead of migrated.
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.8.0](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.8.0)
+
+## [1.14.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Fixed
+- **jump-host's Redis had zero persistence** (`--save '' --appendonly no`, no data-dir volume) — every container rebuild/recreation (including a `setup.sh` re-run) silently wiped all sessions, in-flight OAuth logins, and any admin-created API token. This is the root cause of the reported "re-running setup.sh breaks OAuth with jump" — the jump-host container gets recreated, and any token or in-flight login vanished with it, while proxy was unaffected because its Redis was already persisted. Now jump-host's Redis persists (AOF + periodic RDB) to `/data`, mounted as a new named volume, `jump-redis-data`. Verified live: minted a PAT, force-recreated the container, confirmed the same PAT still authenticated afterward.
+
+### Changed
+- `docker-compose.yml`: added the `jump-redis-data` volume, mounted at `/data` on the `jump-host` service.
+
+### Bumped
+- jump-host -> [v1.8.1](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.8.1)
+
+## [1.13.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Fixed
+Found via feedback on a fresh install:
+- **jump-host's OAuth client had no parent in the Directory.** `seedDirectory()` only ever linked the proxy's OAuth client; jump-host's own (minted by `provisionJumpHost`) was created but never passed through, so it never got a `ResourceEdge`. Existing deployments self-heal on the next `setup.sh` run.
+- **TUI-mode SSH connections (bare `ssh user@host`) could drop** with "PTY allocation request failed" / "shell request failed" — a session-listener race in jump-host, same class of bug `runGrammar` already had a fix for.
+- **Every form submit briefly showed literal HTML** instead of a loading spinner, across all three apps.
+- **`POST /api/user/` and `PUT /api/user/password` had no success message** — a green notification with nothing in it right after adding a user.
+- **The login page gave no explanation for why the user landed there** when redirected mid-OAuth-flow.
+
+### Changed
+- **Directory: tree view is now the only view; clicking a resource's name opens its detail modal.**
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.7.0](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.7.0)
+- proxy -> [v1.5.3](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.5.3)
+- jump-host -> [v1.8.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.8.0)
+
+No `setup.sh` or compose change. Also confirmed (no fix needed): the Let's Encrypt ACME account key persists correctly across container rebuilds — `lua-resty-auto-ssl`'s Redis storage adapter writes through the bundled Redis, which is started with `--appendonly yes` into `/data`, mapped to the persisted `proxy-data` volume. Only an explicit `docker-compose down -v` / volume removal would lose it (which is also what's required, and expected, on a domain change).
+
+## [1.12.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.6.3](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.6.3) — fixes the root cause of a real "lost user" report: `routes/group.js` never invalidated the User cache on membership changes, so an account added to the `app_sso_service_account` marker group (which hides accounts from the Users page's People tab) could look like it had vanished for up to 5 minutes — and, separately, could be added to that group with no warning at all. Both fixed; see the linked release for detail.
+
+No `setup.sh` or compose change.
+
+## [1.11.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Added
+- **`test/check_jump_ldap_tls.js`**, wired into the `Lint` workflow: a static consistency check on the jump-secrets.js template `bootstrap.js` generates, so the `ldap://` + `tlsOptions` mistake that broke every SSH login in 1.10.0 fails CI before it ever reaches a real deployment again.
+- **A static "no native `alert()`/`confirm()`/`prompt()`" check** is now part of all three apps' own test suites (they block all further browser events on the page — see 1.9.0/1.10.0's release notes).
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.6.2](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.6.2) — fixes `DELETE /api/oauth/client/:id` (`client.remove is not a function`, a genuine 500 masked by tests that never checked the response status), plus the regression test above.
+- proxy -> [v1.5.2](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.5.2) — the regression test above.
+- jump-host -> [v1.7.1](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.7.1) — the regression test above.
+
+No `setup.sh` or compose change.
+
+## [1.10.0] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Fixed
+- **`bootstrap/bootstrap.js`'s jump-secrets.js template now points jump-host at `ldaps://sso-manager:636`**, not `ldap://sso-manager:389`. The plain-port URL combined with jump-host's `tlsOptions` made `ldapts` attempt implicit TLS against a port serving plaintext LDAP — slapd dropped every connection before any LDAP message parsed, so SSH password login failed for every account, with any password, indistinguishable from a wrong credential. Root-caused by standing up a local jump-host, editing its config, and calling `getUser`/`checkPassword` directly inside the container. **Existing deployments must edit `./config/jump-secrets.js` themselves** (this template only affects fresh bootstraps) — see theta42/theta-env#99. Companion defensive fix: [simpleworkjs/ldap v1.0.2](https://github.com/simpleworkjs/ldap/releases/tag/v1.0.2) now rejects this `ldap://` + `tlsOptions` combination outright.
+
+### Bumped
+- jump-host -> [v1.7.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.7.0) — adds self-service API tokens (create/list/rotate/revoke from its dashboard); jump-host previously had none.
+
+No `setup.sh` or compose change.
+
+## [1.9.0] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.6.1](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.6.1)
+- proxy -> [v1.5.1](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.5.1)
+
+Both apps had every native `alert()`/`confirm()` call removed, replaced by
+`@simpleworkjs/frontend`'s `app.messages.action`/`confirm`/`toast` (the
+same modules adopted in [1.8.0](#180---2026-07-27)). This was found live,
+mid browser-verification of that release: clicking sso-manager-node
+directory.ejs's "Rotate Client Secret" triggered a native `confirm()`,
+which blocks all further browser events on the page — a real hazard for
+anyone driving the app with browser automation, not just a cosmetic
+inconsistency. sso-manager-node also dropped `app.user.remove`/
+`app.oauthClient.remove` from `public/js/app.js` (dead code with a native
+`confirm()` guard and zero callers).
+
+No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change.
+
+## [1.8.0] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.6.0](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.6.0)
+- proxy -> [v1.5.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.5.0)
+- jump-host -> [v1.6.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.6.0)
+
+All three apps adopt the newly published `@simpleworkjs/frontend` package's
+`app.messages`, `app.modal`, and `app.validate` modules, replacing the
+vendored `app.util.actionMessage`/`actionConfirm`/`alert` in
+`public/lib/js/app-base.js` (byte-identical across all three apps) and the
+vendored `public/lib/js/val.js` (byte-identical in sso-manager-node and
+jump-host, and the same engine plus proxy-only DNS/hostname rules in proxy).
+Message content is now HTML-escaped — the ad hoc `app.util.alert()` this
+replaces had none — and `app.messages.action` falls back to a page-wide
+toast when there's no inline `.actionMessage` target on the page. proxy's
+`host`/`target`/`hostname` wildcard-DNS validation rules (mirroring
+`utils/hostname_validate.js`) move to its own `public/js/app.js`, registered
+via `$.validateSettings`, since they're proxy-specific and don't belong in
+the shared package's generic rule set (`eq`/`user`/`password`/`ip`).
+jump-host doesn't currently use any `[validate]` attributes, so its `val.js`
+swap is dedup/future-proofing rather than a behavior change.
+
+`app.api`/`app.auth`/`app.pubsub`/`app.socket` in each app's `app-base.js`
+are untouched: they're app-specific (a dual-mode callback/promise API with
+`auth-token` header injection) and not something the frontend package's
+generic `app.js` provides, so it isn't loaded.
+
+No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change.
+
+## [1.7.0] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.5.1](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.5.1)
+- jump-host -> [v1.5.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.5.0)
+
+Two production bugs fixed: `PUT /api/user/:uid` 500'd with an LDAP
+`ObjectClassViolationError` when setting `sshPublicKey` on any account
+predating the `ldapPublicKey` objectClass (notably the bootstrap admin) —
+and the exact same bug, in the shared `@simpleworkjs/ldap` package's
+`addSshKey`, was silently aborting SSH connections at jump-host's
+key-injection step for the same class of accounts. Both are fixed by
+ensuring the objectClass is present before writing the attribute. Also
+fixed: the Directory's "add resource" modal left the parent-Service
+dropdown blank when adding an OAuth Integration.
+
+Jump-host's web dashboard also gained a "Hosts you can reach" list
+(admins see "All hosts") — previously it only showed usage metrics with
+no way to see your actual access from the browser.
+
+No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change.
+
+## [1.6.0] - 2026-07-26
+
+### Bumped
+- jump-host -> [v1.4.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.4.0)
+
+Jump-host gains **standalone mode**: it can now run with no LDAP directory and
+no SSO Manager at all, storing users and hosts itself via
+`@simpleworkjs/orm` (Sequelize; SQLite by default, any Sequelize-supported
+dialect). This is an app-internal capability, opt-in via
+`standalone.enabled` in jump-host's own config — the bundled theta-env stack
+is unaffected and continues to wire jump-host to the shared LDAP directory
+and SSO Manager as before. Two bugs were also fixed in jump-host's SSH
+server: an ephemeral listen port (`0`) was silently overridden back to the
+default, and session listeners could miss a client's immediate `exec`/`shell`
+request.
+
+No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change on the theta-env side.
+
+## [1.5.0] - 2026-07-26
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.5.0](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.5.0)
+- proxy -> [v1.4.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.4.0)
+- jump-host -> [v1.3.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.3.0)
+
+This release finishes the UI half of the unification that 1.4.0 deferred: the
+three apps now share one front-end shell. `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs`
+and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are byte-identical across sso-manager-node,
+proxy and jump-host, and everything per-app moved into each repo's new
+`nodejs/utils/ui.js` (nav items and the groups that may see them, footer links,
+favicon, profile/logout targets, update-banner on/off). Nav gating is one model
+everywhere — the shell reveals `.group-required-<cn>` from `GET /api/user/me`,
+normalising sso's LDAP DNs and the OIDC clients' group CNs to the same shape,
+with the clients' `isAdmin` flag exposed as a synthetic `admin` group. jQuery is
+4.0.0 and EJS 3.1.10 in all three.
+
+Five client-side bugs were fixed along the way, including two that broke real
+flows: `app.api.delete` ignored the callback that `formAJAX` passes (so
+DELETE-method forms — the proxy's host and DNS delete buttons — never refreshed),
+and the login page threw on every logged-out visit while revealing its card.
+
+No `setup.sh`, compose or config change: this is app-internal UI work. Verified
+by driving a full stack of all three apps in a browser — every page renders
+console-clean, nav gating is correct per role, and the OIDC login round trip
+completes on both OIDC clients.
+
+sso-manager-node 1.5.0:
+
+### Changed
+- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
+- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
+- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
+- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
+- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
+- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
+
+### Fixed
+- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
+- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
+- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
+- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
+
+### Fixed (sso-manager-node)
+- `public/lib/js/val.js` shadowed `message` with `let` inside `validateField`, so a custom rule's return value never reached `validateMessage` and the caller always saw the generic length message. Resolved by adopting the shared validator, which also brings the `target`/`hostname` rules and the real password policy (>= 8 chars, and either 12+ or 3 of 4 character classes) to this app.
+- `public/js/app.js` used `$.isFunction`, removed in jQuery 4.
+
+### Added (sso-manager-node)
+- `GET /api/user/me` now also reports `isAdmin` (membership in `app_sso_admin`), the single effective-rights flag the shared UI shell gates the update banner on. Group-level gating still reads `memberOf`.
+
+### Verified
+- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
+
+proxy 1.4.0:
+
+### Changed
+- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
+- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
+- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
+- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
+- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
+- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
+
+### Fixed
+- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
+- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
+- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
+- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
+
+### Added
+- `.group-required { display: none }` in `public/css/styles.css`, the base rule the shared gating model reveals against.
+- Admin-only nav items lost their inline `display: none` in favour of that class, and the brand link points at `/` instead of `#`.
+
+### Verified
+- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
+
+jump-host 1.3.0:
+
+### Changed
+- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
+- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
+- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
+- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
+- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
+- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
+
+### Fixed
+- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
+- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
+- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
+- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
+
+### Added
+- `.group-required { display: none }` in `public/css/styles.css`, the base rule the shared gating model reveals against.
+- `#spa-shell` dropped its inline `margin-top`; `styles.css` already sets it and the shared shell adjusts it when a banner is shown.
+
+### Verified
+- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
+
+## [1.4.0] - 2026-07-25
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.4.0](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.4.0)
+- proxy -> [v1.3.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.3.0)
+- jump-host -> [v1.2.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.2.0)
+
+This release unifies the three theta42 apps onto shared `@simpleworkjs/*` packages
+(`oidc-client`, `directory-schema`, `ldap`, `app-stack` — published under the
+simpleworkjs org at 1.0.0), replacing each app's byte-identical forks of the same
+code so they share one codebase and API schema. It also fixes a security
+regression in the SSO directory discovery API (OAuth `client_secret_hash` leaked
+to every authenticated caller) and the envelope drift that broke jump-host
+bridging. The shared UI chrome (`top.ejs`/`bottom.ejs`, `app-base.js`, `val.js`)
+is intentionally **not** unified in this release — that work is deferred to a
+browser-verified session; see `UI_UNIFICATION_HANDOFF.md`. No `setup.sh` change:
+the new `@simpleworkjs/*` deps resolve from npm inside each app's image build
+(`npm ci` stays clean; no `file:`/`link:`).
+
+sso-manager-node 1.4.0:
+
+### Security
+- **The directory discovery API leaked OAuth `client_secret_hash` (and any secret-ish metadata key) to every authenticated caller.** `Resource` doesn't override `toJSON`, so the ORM serialized `metadata` wholesale — including the `client_secret_hash` stored on `kind:'oauth'` resources — across `GET /api/discovery/resources`, `/graph`, `/me`, `/resources/:slug`, and the directory-admin `GET /api/directory-admin/resources`. Every discovery read endpoint and the admin list now route through `projectResource`/`projectResources` from `@simpleworkjs/directory-schema`, which unconditionally strips secret keys (anything matching `/secret|password|privatekey/i`, including `client_secret_hash`) and, for non-directory-admins, reduces metadata to a public allowlist. Admins never receive `client_secret_hash` either.
+
+### Fixed
+- **Directory discovery envelope drift.** `routes/discovery.js` (the `autoRouter(Resource)` mounted live at `app.js:87`) returned **bare arrays**, not the `{ results: [...] }` envelope the directory contract specifies — so jump-host's `data.results || []` collapsed every per-group query to `[]` and no user could bridge. Discovery is now served by explicit `/resources`, `/resources/:slug`, `/graph`, `/me` handlers that all return the `{ results }` envelope. The dead `routes/api_discovery.js` (mounted at `app.js:112`, *after* the 404 catcher) and its mount were removed.
+- `GET /api/discovery/resources?group=<cn>` now returns 200 with `{ results: [...] }` instead of 404.
+
+### Added
+- `@simpleworkjs/directory-schema` — the directory contract: the `kind` enum, `Resource`/`ResourceEdge`/`ResourceGroup` field defs, the `{ results }` envelope, the security projection (`projectResource`/`projectResources`/`isDirectoryAdmin`), and the discovery client. `models/resource.js` imports the field defs; the discovery + directory-admin routes use the projection.
+- `@simpleworkjs/ldap` — `models/user_ldap.js` and `models/group_ldap.js` now take `escapeFilter`/`escapeDN` and `makeClient`/`withClient` from the shared package (via local wrappers that pass `conf`); sso keeps its rich `User.get`/`Group.get`/`User.login`/`User.addSSHkey` (posix/write-side stays app-local). sso's `makeClient` passes no `tlsOptions`, so cert validation is unchanged.
+- `@simpleworkjs/app-stack` — unified `build_info` (`{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}`) and the `static-modules` mounting helper. `utils/build_info.js` and the static-modules loop in `routes/index.js` use the shared helpers.
+- New `tests/discovery.test.js` (jest + supertest, runs under the docker harness): locks in the `{ results }` envelope on `/resources`, `/graph`, `/me`, `/resources/:slug`, the `?group=` 200-regression, and the no-`client_secret_hash`/no-secret-key guarantee for every caller.
+
+### Changed
+- Dependency alignment: `ldapts` `^8.1.2` → `^8.1.8`. The new `@simpleworkjs/*` deps resolve from the npm registry (`^1.0.0`); no `file:`/`link:` entries in the lockfile, so `npm ci` is clean in docker builds.
+- `build_info` export shape changed from `{commit, version}` to `{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}` (the shared shape used by all three apps).
+
+proxy 1.3.0:
+
+### Added
+- `@simpleworkjs/oidc-client` — the OIDC client (session models, auth router, OIDC utils, safe-redirect, local-admin bootstrap). Deleted the local `utils/oidc.js`, `utils/safe_redirect.js`, `models/oidc_state.js`, `models/token.js`, `models/auth.js`, `routes/auth.js`; `models/index.js` wires the factory. The per-host SSO in `routes/host_auth.js` is unchanged but consumes the shared OIDC utils.
+- `@simpleworkjs/ldap` — the ldapts client + RFC 4515/4514 escaping.
+- `@simpleworkjs/app-stack` — unified `build_info` (`{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}`) and the `static-modules` mounting helper. `utils/build_info.js` and the static-modules loop in `routes/render.js` now use the shared helpers.
+
+### Security
+- **LDAP filter injection in `User.get`.** The user lookup built its search filter by interpolating `data.username` raw into `(&(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)(uid=<username>))`. A username containing `*`, `(`, `)`, `\`, or NUL could widen or alter the filter (e.g. `*` → match-all). The filter value is now passed through `escapeFilter` from `@simpleworkjs/ldap` (RFC 4515 escaping).
+
+### Changed
+- Dependency alignment: `model-redis` `^1.5` → `^1.6.0`, `ldapts` `^8.1.2` → `^8.1.8`. The four new `@simpleworkjs/*` deps resolve from the npm registry (`^1.0.0`); no `file:`/`link:` entries in the lockfile, so `npm ci` is clean in docker builds.
+- `build_info` export shape changed from `{commit, version}` to `{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}` (the shared shape used by all three apps). The `/health` endpoint and footer now report `buildVersion`/`buildHash`.
+
+jump-host 1.2.0:
+
+### Added
+- `@simpleworkjs/oidc-client` — the OIDC client (session models, auth router, OIDC utils, safe-redirect, local-admin bootstrap). Deleted the local `utils/oidc.js`, `utils/safe_redirect.js`, `models/oidc_state.js`, `models/token.js`, `models/auth.js`, `routes/auth.js`; `models/index.js` wires the factory and the local-admin bootstrap.
+- `@simpleworkjs/directory-schema` — the sso↔jump-host directory contract. `utils/access.js` now fetches reachable hosts through the shared `createDirectoryClient` (`getResourcesByGroup`).
+- `@simpleworkjs/ldap` — `models/user_ldap.js` is now a thin wrapper over `createLdapClient`, preserving this app's loose TLS default (`rejectUnauthorized: false`) and the exact export shape.
+- `@simpleworkjs/app-stack` — unified `build_info` (`{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}`) and the `static-modules` mounting helper. `build_info` moved from `models/` to `utils/`; `routes/render.js` uses `mountStaticModules`.
+
+### Fixed
+- **Directory envelope drift was silently treated as "no reachable hosts".** `utils/access.js` previously read `data.results || []`, so if the SSO directory ever returned a bare array (envelope drift) every per-group query collapsed to `[]` and no user could bridge. The shared client now validates the `{ results }` envelope on every call and treats an envelope violation as a failed group fetch rather than silently returning `[]`.
+
+### Changed
+- Dependency alignment: `ldapts` `^8.1.2` → `^8.1.8`, `redis` `^4.7` → `^6.1.0` (the direct `redis` dep is unused — only `model-redis` is used, which already brings `redis` ^6.1.0). The new `@simpleworkjs/*` deps resolve from the npm registry (`^1.0.0`); no `file:`/`link:` entries in the lockfile, so `npm ci` is clean in docker builds.
+- `build_info` export shape changed from `{commit, version}` to `{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}` (the shared shape used by all three apps). The `/health` endpoint and footer now report `buildVersion`/`buildHash`.
+- `app-base.js` `forceLogin`/`logInRedirect` switched to the `?redirect=` query-param convention (matching the server-side `/login?redirect=` route).
+
+## [1.3.7] - 2026-07-23
+
+### Added
+- The bootstrap now provisions the jump host's **web-UI SSO login** when the jump host is enabled: it mints a dedicated `theta-jump` OAuth client and writes a full `oidc` block (endpoints, client id/secret, callback) plus a generated local anti-lockout admin password into `./config/jump-secrets.js`. Matches how the proxy's OIDC client is provisioned. An existing pre-OIDC `jump-secrets.js` (API token but no OIDC client) is regenerated so upgraders get SSO login. Requires jump-host ≥ v1.1.0.
+
+## [1.3.6] - 2026-07-23
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.3.2](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.3.2)
+
+sso-manager-node 1.3.2:
+
+### Fixed
+- **OAuth client management API returned `client_id: undefined` on every GET**, which broke this stack's bootstrap: it lists the OAuth clients and rotates by the returned `client_id`, so it called `/api/oauth/client/undefined/rotate` and got a 500 — aborting `setup.sh` with `bootstrap failed` whenever `proxy-secrets.js` had no usable secret (e.g. a fresh/rotated deployment). The ORM's `toJSON()` was stripping the mapped `client_id`/`scopes`/… fields; `OAuthClient.get()` now emits them explicitly (and omits `client_secret_hash`). Unknown client ids now 404 instead of 500.
+
+## [1.3.5] - 2026-07-23
+
+### Added
+- **Optional SSH jump host** (theta42/jump-host) as a third, opt-in submodule. Enable with `CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED=true` in `setup.env`: setup.sh clones/tag-tracks the submodule and builds it behind the `jump-host` compose profile, the bootstrap mints a directory API token and writes `./config/jump-secrets.js` (LDAP admin bind so it can inject users' `sshPublicKey`), the jump host is registered as a proxy Host (its web UI) and seeded as a directory service. Users then `ssh uid_-_host@jump.<domain>` (WinSCP-friendly) or `ssh uid@jump.<domain>` for a TUI host picker; the web UI on :3002 shows audit + metrics. Off by default — existing installs are unaffected.
+
 ## [1.3.4] - 2026-07-23
 
 ### Bumped
@@ -384,7 +802,8 @@ First tagged release. Establishes the `vX.Y.Z` tag convention going forward.
 - proxy -> [v1.1.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.1.0)
 - sso-manager-node -> [v1.1.0](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.1.0)
 
-[Unreleased]: https://github.com/theta42/theta-env/compare/v1.1.20...HEAD
+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/theta42/theta-env/compare/v1.4.0...HEAD
+[1.4.0]: https://github.com/theta42/theta-env/compare/v1.3.7...v1.4.0
 [1.1.17]: https://github.com/theta42/theta-env/compare/v1.1.16...v1.1.17
 [1.1.16]: https://github.com/theta42/theta-env/compare/v1.1.15...v1.1.16
 [1.1.15]: https://github.com/theta42/theta-env/compare/v1.1.14...v1.1.15

bootstrap/bootstrap.js

@@ -229,14 +229,15 @@ async function listClients(token) {
 	return (data && data.results) || [];
 }
 
-async function createClient(token) {
+async function createClient(token, opts) {
+	const o = opts || { name: CLIENT_NAME, description: 'theta-env proxy (auto-registered)', redirect_uris: [REDIRECT_URI] };
 	const res = await fetch(`${SSO_INTERNAL}/api/oauth/client`, {
 		method: 'POST',
 		headers: { 'auth-token': token, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
 		body: JSON.stringify({
-			name: CLIENT_NAME,
-			description: 'theta-env proxy (auto-registered)',
-			redirect_uris: [REDIRECT_URI],
+			name: o.name,
+			description: o.description,
+			redirect_uris: o.redirect_uris,
 			scopes: ['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'groups'],
 			allowed_groups: [],
 		}),
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ async function createClient(token) {
 	const id = (data.results && data.results.client_id) || data.client_id;
 	const secret = data.client_secret;
 	if (!id || !secret) throw new Error(`create OAuth client returned no id/secret: ${JSON.stringify(data)}`);
-	log(`Created OAuth client ${CLIENT_NAME} (${id})`);
+	log(`Created OAuth client ${o.name} (${id})`);
 	return { id, secret };
 }
 
@@ -333,7 +334,7 @@ const HOST_FACTS = {
 	kernel: process.env.STACK_HOST_KERNEL || '',
 };
 
-async function seedDirectory(token, clientId) {
+async function seedDirectory(token, clientId, jumpClientId) {
 	let resources = ((await dirGet(token, 'resources')).results) || [];
 
 	// Create a resource unless its slug (or a legacy alternate from an earlier
@@ -418,19 +419,33 @@ async function seedDirectory(token, clientId) {
 		subType: 'openresty',
 	});
 
-	// Link the proxy's OAuth client (Resource-backed since sso-manager 1.3.0)
-	// under its service, if it appears in the directory and isn't linked yet.
-	if (clientId) {
-		const oauthRes = resources.find((r) => r.id === clientId);
-		if (oauthRes) {
-			const edges = ((await dirGet(token, 'edges')).results) || [];
-			const linked = edges.some((e) => e.childId === clientId);
-			if (!linked) {
-				await dirPost(token, 'edges', { parentId: psvc.id, childId: clientId, relation: 'oauth' });
-				log(`  directory: linked OAuth client under 'proxy'`);
-			}
+	// Optional SSH jump host service.
+	let jumpSvc = null;
+	if (/^(1|true|yes)$/i.test(process.env.CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED || '')) {
+		const jumpHost = process.env.CFG_JUMP_HOST || (DOMAIN ? `jump.${DOMAIN}` : '');
+		jumpSvc = await ensure('service', 'SSH Jump Host', 'jump-host', host.id, {
+			address: jumpHost ? `https://${jumpHost}` : '',
+			port: 3002,
+			gitRepo: 'https://github.com/theta42/jump-host',
+			subType: 'ssh',
+		});
+	}
+
+	// Link an OAuth client (Resource-backed since sso-manager 1.3.0) under its
+	// owning service, if it appears in the directory and isn't linked yet.
+	async function linkOauthClient(id, parent, label) {
+		if (!id || !parent) return;
+		const oauthRes = resources.find((r) => r.id === id);
+		if (!oauthRes) return;
+		const edges = ((await dirGet(token, 'edges')).results) || [];
+		const linked = edges.some((e) => e.childId === id);
+		if (!linked) {
+			await dirPost(token, 'edges', { parentId: parent.id, childId: id, relation: 'oauth' });
+			log(`  directory: linked OAuth client under '${label}'`);
 		}
 	}
+	await linkOauthClient(clientId, psvc, 'proxy');
+	await linkOauthClient(jumpClientId, jumpSvc, 'jump-host');
 }
 
 // Write the OAuth client creds back into /config/proxy-secrets.js so the proxy
@@ -463,6 +478,148 @@ function writeProxyCreds(id, secret) {
 	}
 }
 
+// ── 6. Optional: provision the SSH jump host ────────────────────────────────
+// When CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED=true, the jump host needs: a directory API token
+// (to resolve which hosts a user may reach), an LDAP bind account that can
+// WRITE the sshPublicKey attribute (it injects its own key on first use), and
+// a config file it reads. We write /config/jump-secrets.js deriving LDAP/site
+// from sso-secrets.js + a freshly minted API token. The bundled jump host
+// binds as cn=admin (already able to write sshPublicKey) — hardened bare-metal
+// deployments should use a scoped account + attribute ACL instead (see the
+// jump-host README). Idempotent: skips if the file already has a real token.
+const JUMP_ENABLED = /^(1|true|yes)$/i.test(process.env.CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED || '');
+const JUMP_HOST = process.env.CFG_JUMP_HOST || (DOMAIN ? `jump.${DOMAIN}` : '');
+const JUMP_SECRETS = '/config/jump-secrets.js';
+const JUMP_TOKEN_NAME = 'theta-jump-host';
+const JUMP_CLIENT_NAME = 'theta-jump';
+const JUMP_REDIRECT_URI = `https://${JUMP_HOST}/api/auth/oidc/callback`;
+
+async function mintApiToken(token, name) {
+	const res = await fetch(`${SSO_INTERNAL}/api/api-token`, {
+		method: 'POST',
+		headers: { 'auth-token': token, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+		body: JSON.stringify({ name, description: 'theta-env jump host (auto-registered)' }),
+	});
+	if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`mint API token failed (${res.status}): ${await res.text().catch(() => '')}`);
+	const data = await res.json();
+	const raw = data.token || (data.results && data.results.token) || data.raw_token;
+	if (!raw) throw new Error(`API token response had no token: ${JSON.stringify(data)}`);
+	return raw;
+}
+
+// The generated file is "complete" only if it has BOTH a real directory API
+// token AND an OIDC client id — an existing file from the pre-OIDC layout (a
+// token but no oidc block) is regenerated so the web UI's SSO login works.
+function jumpFileComplete() {
+	try {
+		const src = fs.readFileSync(JUMP_SECRETS, 'utf8');
+		const hasToken = /apiToken:\s*['"]sso_[0-9a-f]{24}_[0-9a-f]{48}['"]/.test(src);
+		const hasOidc = /clientId:\s*['"][0-9a-f-]{8,}['"]/.test(src);
+		return hasToken && hasOidc;
+	} catch (_) { return false; }
+}
+
+function writeJumpSecrets(apiToken, oidc, localAdminPass) {
+	const siteName = (sso.stack && sso.stack.siteName) || 'local';
+	const ldapsHost = (sso.ldap && sso.ldap.ldapsHost) || SSO_HOST;
+	const body = `'use strict';
+// Generated by theta-env bootstrap. The jump host reads this via
+// @simpleworkjs/conf (CONF_SECRETS). Binds as cn=admin so it can write the
+// sshPublicKey attribute (key injection); for a hardened deployment use a
+// scoped account with an sshPublicKey write-ACL instead (see jump-host README).
+module.exports = {
+\tname: ${JSON.stringify(sso.name || 'SSO Manager')},
+\tldap: {
+\t\t// ldaps:// (636), not ldap:// (389): @simpleworkjs/ldap's client always
+\t\t// sets tlsOptions (see jump-host's models/user_ldap.js), and ldapts
+\t\t// treats a non-empty tlsOptions as "use implicit TLS" regardless of the
+\t\t// URL scheme -- pointed at the plain port, that means it opens a raw TLS
+\t\t// handshake against a server expecting plaintext LDAP, which slapd just
+\t\t// drops (logged as "connection lost", no BIND ever attempted). This bit
+\t\t// jump-host silently: every SSH login failed with the generic
+\t\t// "Permission denied" for any password, because getUser()/checkPassword()
+\t\t// never even reached slapd.
+\t\turl: 'ldaps://sso-manager:636',
+\t\tbindDN: ${JSON.stringify(BIND_DN)},
+\t\tbindPassword: ${JSON.stringify(ADMIN_PASS)},
+\t\tuserBase: ${JSON.stringify(`ou=people,${BASE_DN}`)},
+\t\tgroupBase: ${JSON.stringify(`ou=groups,${BASE_DN}`)},
+\t\ttlsOptions: { rejectUnauthorized: false },
+\t},
+\tsso: {
+\t\turl: 'http://sso-manager:3001',
+\t\tapiToken: ${JSON.stringify(apiToken)},
+\t},
+\tssh: {
+\t\tlistenPort: 2222,
+\t\thostKeyPath: '/var/lib/jump-host/keys',
+\t\tpasswordAuth: 'off',
+\t\tkeyComment: ${JSON.stringify(`jump-host@${siteName}`)},
+\t},
+\tweb: { port: 3002 },
+\t// Web UI SSO login — the jump host's own OAuth client. tokenEndpoint /
+\t// userinfoEndpoint use the internal docker-net address (server-to-server);
+\t// authorizationEndpoint is the public SSO host (browser-facing).
+\toidc: {
+\t\tenabled: true,
+\t\tissuer: ${JSON.stringify(`https://${SSO_HOST}`)},
+\t\tauthorizationEndpoint: ${JSON.stringify(`https://${SSO_HOST}/oauth/authorize`)},
+\t\ttokenEndpoint: 'http://sso-manager:3001/oauth/token',
+\t\tuserinfoEndpoint: 'http://sso-manager:3001/oauth/userinfo',
+\t\tclientId: ${JSON.stringify(oidc.id)},
+\t\tclientSecret: ${JSON.stringify(oidc.secret)},
+\t\tredirectUri: ${JSON.stringify(JUMP_REDIRECT_URI)},
+\t\tscopes: ['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'groups'],
+\t\tgroupsClaim: 'groups',
+\t\tusernameClaim: 'preferred_username',
+\t},
+\tauth: {
+\t\tadminGroups: ['app_sso_admin'],
+\t\tadminUsers: ['jumpadmin'],
+\t\tlocalAdminPass: ${JSON.stringify(localAdminPass)},
+\t},
+\tredis: { prefix: 'jump_host_', redisConf: { url: 'redis://127.0.0.1:6379' } },
+\tstack: { ssoHost: ${JSON.stringify(SSO_HOST)}, jumpHost: ${JSON.stringify(JUMP_HOST)}, ldapsHost: ${JSON.stringify(ldapsHost)} },
+};
+`;
+	fs.writeFileSync(JUMP_SECRETS, body, { mode: 0o600 });
+}
+
+// Returns the jump host's OAuth client id (so seedDirectory can link it under
+// the SSH Jump Host service), whether or not this run actually wrote a fresh
+// jump-secrets.js -- otherwise re-runs on an already-configured deployment
+// never get a chance to self-heal a missing directory link (see the "no
+// parent" bug this was written for).
+async function provisionJumpHost(token) {
+	if (jumpFileComplete()) {
+		log('Jump host: /config/jump-secrets.js already has API token + OIDC client — keeping.');
+		const clients = await listClients(token);
+		const existing = clients.find((c) => c.name === JUMP_CLIENT_NAME);
+		return existing ? existing.client_id : null;
+	}
+	const apiToken = await mintApiToken(token, JUMP_TOKEN_NAME);
+
+	// Mint (or reuse) the jump host's own OAuth client for web-UI SSO login.
+	const clients = await listClients(token);
+	let oidc = clients.find((c) => c.name === JUMP_CLIENT_NAME);
+	if (oidc && oidc.client_id) {
+		oidc = await rotateClient(token, oidc.client_id);
+		oidc = { id: oidc.id, secret: oidc.secret };
+	} else {
+		oidc = await createClient(token, {
+			name: JUMP_CLIENT_NAME,
+			description: 'theta-env jump host web UI (auto-registered)',
+			redirect_uris: [JUMP_REDIRECT_URI],
+		});
+	}
+
+	const localAdminPass = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
+	writeJumpSecrets(apiToken, oidc, localAdminPass);
+	log(`Jump host: wrote /config/jump-secrets.js (API token + OAuth client ${oidc.id}).`);
+	log(`Jump host: local admin 'jumpadmin' password: ${localAdminPass}`);
+	return oidc.id;
+}
+
 (async function main() {
 	try {
 		log(`Base DN: ${BASE_DN}`);
@@ -506,11 +663,23 @@ function writeProxyCreds(id, secret) {
 			resolvedClientId = id;
 		}
 
+		// Provision the jump host (mint token + write config) when enabled.
+		// Warn-only — never fail the whole bring-up over the optional service.
+		let jumpClientId = null;
+		if (JUMP_ENABLED) {
+			try {
+				jumpClientId = await provisionJumpHost(token);
+				out('JUMP_HOST_CONFIGURED', '1');
+			} catch (e) {
+				log(`WARNING: jump host provisioning failed (${e.message || e}) — continuing`);
+			}
+		}
+
 		// Seed the directory (site/host/services + OAuth client link). Never
 		// fails the bootstrap — warn and continue.
 		try {
 			log('Seeding directory resources...');
-			await seedDirectory(token, resolvedClientId);
+			await seedDirectory(token, resolvedClientId, jumpClientId);
 		} catch (e) {
 			log(`WARNING: directory seed failed (${e.message || e}) — continuing`);
 		}

config.example/sso-secrets.js.example

@@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ module.exports = {
 		jwtSecret: 'CHANGE-ME',                 // signs all tokens — keep secret
 		token_lifetime: { access_token: 3600, refresh_token: 2592000 },
 	},
+	// Without this, @simpleworkjs/orm falls back to './config/inventory.sqlite'
+	// (relative to the app's /app cwd) -- inside the container's ephemeral
+	// layer, not any mounted volume, so every Resource/site/host/service/oauth
+	// row (the whole Directory Management page) would be silently wiped on
+	// every container recreate. /data is already a persisted volume (Redis
+	// lives there too), so this just co-locates the sqlite file with it.
+	orm: {
+		dialect: 'sqlite',
+		storage: '/data/inventory.sqlite',
+	},
 
 	// ── Orchestrator-only (ignored by the app; read by setup.sh + bootstrap) ──
 	stack: {

docker-compose.yml

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ services:
         # setup.sh sets this from the host, where the submodule resolves
         # correctly (git -C sso-manager-node rev-parse --short HEAD).
         GIT_COMMIT: ${SSO_GIT_COMMIT:-}
+        # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for npm/apt during the build (NOT
+        # the theta42 "proxy" app). Set CFG_HTTP_PROXY in setup.env; empty by
+        # default, so this is a no-op unless configured.
+        HTTP_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+        HTTPS_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+        NO_PROXY: ${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
     container_name: sso-manager
     restart: unless-stopped
     networks: [theta-net]
@@ -58,6 +64,11 @@ services:
       - NODE_PORT=3001
       - LDAP_SERVER_ID=${LDAP_SERVER_ID:-}
       - LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS=${LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS:-}
+      # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for outbound calls (SMTP, etc.) at
+      # runtime. See the build args above for the same setting during build.
+      - HTTP_PROXY=${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+      - HTTPS_PROXY=${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+      - NO_PROXY=${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
     volumes:
       # Operator-edited SSO secrets (sso-secrets.js). Read-WRITE so the bootstrap
       # can write the generated OAuth client creds into proxy-secrets.js. The
@@ -91,6 +102,11 @@ services:
         # setup.sh sets this from the host, where the submodule resolves
         # correctly (git -C proxy rev-parse --short HEAD).
         GIT_COMMIT: ${PROXY_GIT_COMMIT:-}
+        # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for npm/apt during the build. See
+        # the sso-manager service above for details.
+        HTTP_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+        HTTPS_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+        NO_PROXY: ${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
     container_name: proxy
     restart: unless-stopped
     networks: [theta-net]
@@ -110,6 +126,11 @@ services:
       # not from env. NODE_ENV/NODE_PORT are process env the app reads directly.
       - NODE_ENV=production
       - NODE_PORT=3000
+      # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for outbound calls (ACME/Let's
+      # Encrypt, DNS providers) at runtime.
+      - HTTP_PROXY=${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+      - HTTPS_PROXY=${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+      - NO_PROXY=${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
     volumes:
       # Operator-edited proxy secrets (proxy-secrets.js). READ-ONLY — the proxy
       # only reads it; the sso-manager bootstrap writes the OAuth creds. The
@@ -131,6 +152,43 @@ services:
       retries: 3
       start_period: 30s
 
+  # Optional SSH jump host. Only started when the `jump-host` compose profile
+  # is active — setup.sh exports COMPOSE_PROFILES=jump-host when
+  # CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED=true. Authenticates users against the SSO's OpenLDAP,
+  # resolves reachable hosts from the directory API, and bridges SSH through.
+  jump-host:
+    profiles: ["jump-host"]
+    build:
+      context: ./jump-host
+      dockerfile: Dockerfile
+      args:
+        GIT_COMMIT: ${JUMP_GIT_COMMIT:-}
+        # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for npm/apt during the build. See
+        # the sso-manager service above for details.
+        HTTP_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+        HTTPS_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+        NO_PROXY: ${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
+    container_name: jump-host
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    networks: [theta-net]
+    depends_on:
+      sso-manager:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    ports:
+      - "${JUMP_SSH_PORT:-2222}:2222"   # SSH front door
+      - "${JUMP_WEB_BIND:-0.0.0.0}:${JUMP_WEB_PORT:-3002}:3002"  # web UI/API
+    environment:
+      - NODE_ENV=production
+      # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for outbound calls (the directory API
+      # client) at runtime.
+      - HTTP_PROXY=${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+      - HTTPS_PROXY=${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+      - NO_PROXY=${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
+    volumes:
+      - ./config:/config:ro         # jump-secrets.js (written by ensure_config/bootstrap)
+      - jump-data:/var/lib/jump-host  # generated host keys persist here
+      - jump-redis-data:/data         # Redis (sessions, OAuth state, API tokens) persists here
+
 networks:
   theta-net:
     driver: bridge
@@ -141,4 +199,6 @@ volumes:
   sso-data:
   proxy-data:
   proxy-cache:
-  proxy-logs:
+  proxy-logs:
+  jump-data:
+  jump-redis-data:

docs/architecture.md

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ fetches all three in one step; `git submodule update --remote` bumps them.
 
 ```
             ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
-            │  your browser / apps / legacy LDAP clients     │
+            │  your browser / apps / direct LDAP clients     │
             └───────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
                             │ https (:443)        ldaps (:636)
                   ┌─────────▼─────────┐

docs/index.md

@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ LDAP directory) and [Proxy](https://theta42.github.io/proxy/) (an
 OIDC-protected reverse proxy that can also look users up directly in LDAP) —
 and automates the fiddly part: registering the proxy as an OIDC client of the
 SSO and pointing it at the right LDAP directory, with hostnames and secrets
-generated from one `setup.env`.
+generated from one `setup.env`. An optional third component, the
+[Jump Host](https://theta42.github.io/jump-host/), adds directory-driven SSH
+access to your machines through one public entry point.
 
 ## Screenshots
 
@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@ The SSO Manager and the proxy it fronts, both stood up by one `./setup.sh` run:
 
 <a href="images/sso-dashboard.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/sso-dashboard.png" alt="SSO Manager dashboard" width="49%"></a>
 <a href="images/proxy-hosts.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/proxy-hosts.png" alt="Proxy host list" width="49%"></a>
+<a href="images/jump-dashboard.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/jump-dashboard.png" alt="Jump Host dashboard" width="49%"></a>
 
 *(click either screenshot to view full size)*
 
@@ -41,7 +44,11 @@ snapshots state before every rebuild.
 - **SSO Manager**, fronted by the proxy under TLS — manage users, groups,
   and OAuth clients.
 - **Proxy** — add the hosts you want to protect with OIDC login.
-- **LDAPS** for legacy apps that bind directly.
+- **LDAPS** for direct binds — Linux hosts (PAM/SSSD, sudo, SSH keys) and
+  LDAP-native apps authenticate against the same directory.
+- **SSH Jump Host** *(optional)* — `ssh uid_-_host@jump.<domain>` (WinSCP-friendly)
+  or an interactive picker; access is driven by directory group membership, with
+  a web UI for audit + metrics. Enable with `CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED=true`.
 - **Self-service API tokens** in both apps' UIs, for scripting/CI without a
   browser session.
 - **Multi-Site Support (Geo-Location Scaling)** — built-in support for N-Way Multi-Master LDAP replication across physical locations.
@@ -67,3 +74,5 @@ architecture, and running each project standalone, see the
   provider + LDAP directory this stack runs.
 - **[Proxy](https://theta42.github.io/proxy/)** — the reverse proxy this
   stack runs in front of it.
+- **[Jump Host](https://theta42.github.io/jump-host/)** — the optional SSH jump
+  host this stack can bring up (`CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED=true`).

docs/quickstart.md

@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ setups `CFG_DOMAIN` is the only value you set:
 | `CFG_ADMIN_UID` | `admin` | optional, defaults to `admin` |
 | `CFG_ADMIN_EMAIL` | `admin@<proxyHost>` | optional |
 | `CFG_BASE_DN` | `dc=lab,dc=local` | advanced: override the derived LDAP base DN |
+| `CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED` | `true` | optional: bring up the [SSH jump host](https://theta42.github.io/jump-host/) (default off) |
+| `CFG_JUMP_HOST` | `jump.lab.local` | optional, defaults to `jump.<domain>` |
+| `JUMP_SSH_PORT` | `2222` | optional: host port for the jump host's SSH (never 22 by default) |
 
 `setup.env` is used **only on the first run** to generate `./config/`; after
 that `./config/*.js` are operator-owned and `setup.env` is ignored. Secrets

setup.env.example

@@ -33,10 +33,35 @@ CFG_DOMAIN=example.com
 #CFG_SSO_HOST=sso.example.com
 #CFG_PROXY_HOST=proxy.example.com
 
+# ── Optional SSH jump host ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Enable the theta42/jump-host component: a public SSH jump host that
+# authenticates users against the directory and bridges them to downstream
+# hosts (ssh uid_-_target@jump, or an interactive picker). Off by default.
+# When true, setup.sh clones/builds the jump-host submodule, the bootstrap
+# mints its directory API token + writes ./config/jump-secrets.js, and it's
+# registered in the proxy + directory. See jump-host's README for the LDAP
+# write-ACL note (the bundled deployment binds as cn=admin).
+#CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED=false
+#CFG_JUMP_HOST=jump.example.com   # defaults to jump.<domain>
+#JUMP_SSH_PORT=2222               # host port mapped to the jump host's SSH (never 22 by default)
+
 # Advanced: override the derived LDAP base DN directly (e.g. to namespace
 # under an OU-style prefix). Leave unset to use the DN built from CFG_DOMAIN:
 #CFG_BASE_DN=dc=example,dc=com
 
+# ── Optional outbound HTTP(S) proxy ──────────────────────────────────────────
+# For an isolated/offline/corporate-network test host that only reaches the
+# internet through an upstream HTTP proxy — NOT the theta42 "proxy" app.
+# Wired into every service's docker build (npm/apt) AND its running container
+# (SMTP, ACME/Let's Encrypt, DNS provider calls, the jump-host directory API
+# client). Leave unset to disable (the default); CFG_HTTPS_PROXY falls back to
+# CFG_HTTP_PROXY if unset, and CFG_NO_PROXY defaults to covering the stack's
+# own internal service names so container-to-container traffic never goes
+# through the proxy.
+#CFG_HTTP_PROXY=http://proxy.example.com:3128
+#CFG_HTTPS_PROXY=http://proxy.example.com:3128
+#CFG_NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,sso-manager,proxy,jump-host
+
 # Optional — sensible defaults if left blank:
 #CFG_ORG=SSO Manager            # app display name + outbound email org
 #CFG_ADMIN_UID=admin            # initial SSO admin username

setup.sh

@@ -152,6 +152,35 @@ then
 	fi
 fi
 
+# ── Optional jump host: resolve the enable flag early ─────────────────────────
+# CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED gates the optional SSH jump host (a third submodule).
+# Read it from the environment or ./setup.env now (before the submodule loop
+# and the compose steps) so every run knows whether to build/start it. The
+# authoritative CFG_* for secrets are still resolved in ensure_config; this is
+# only the on/off switch + its hostname.
+[[ -f ./setup.env ]] && parse_kv_file ./setup.env
+JUMP_ENABLED=0
+case "${CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED:-}" in 1|true|TRUE|yes|YES) JUMP_ENABLED=1 ;; esac
+export CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED CFG_JUMP_HOST
+# When enabled, activate the compose profile so `up`/`ps` include the service.
+if [[ "$JUMP_ENABLED" == "1" ]]; then export COMPOSE_PROFILES="jump-host"; fi
+
+# ── Optional outbound HTTP(S) proxy for docker build + the running containers ─
+# CFG_HTTP_PROXY / CFG_HTTPS_PROXY / CFG_NO_PROXY (from ./setup.env or the
+# environment) — NOT the theta42 "proxy" app; this is an upstream HTTP proxy
+# for reaching the internet (npm/apt during image builds, and SMTP/ACME/DNS
+# provider calls at runtime), useful on isolated/offline/corporate-network
+# test hosts. Off by default. docker-compose.yml passes these through as both
+# build args (Docker also recognizes them as predefined build ARGs) and
+# container environment on every service, so one setup.env entry covers the
+# whole stack.
+export CFG_HTTP_PROXY="${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}"
+export CFG_HTTPS_PROXY="${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}}"
+export CFG_NO_PROXY="${CFG_NO_PROXY:-localhost,127.0.0.1,sso-manager,proxy,jump-host}"
+if [[ -n "$CFG_HTTP_PROXY" ]]; then
+	info "Using HTTP proxy for docker build + containers: $CFG_HTTP_PROXY"
+fi
+
 # ── 1. Update submodules to their latest release tag, verify build contexts ───
 # Submodules track release tags (vX.Y.Z), not the tip of master -- so
 # "update" means "move to the newest tag", not "move to the newest commit".
@@ -167,8 +196,11 @@ if [[ "${SKIP_SUBMODULE_UPDATE:-0}" != "1" ]]; then
 		die "git submodule update --init failed. Run manually: git submodule update --init --recursive"
 	fi
 
-	info "Updating submodules to their latest release tag (sso-manager-node, proxy)..."
-	for sm in sso-manager-node proxy; do
+	# jump-host is optional: only track/build it when enabled.
+	SUBMODULES=(sso-manager-node proxy)
+	[[ "$JUMP_ENABLED" == "1" ]] && SUBMODULES+=(jump-host)
+	info "Updating submodules to their latest release tag (${SUBMODULES[*]})..."
+	for sm in "${SUBMODULES[@]}"; do
 		[[ -d "$sm" ]] || continue
 		before_rev="$(git -C "$sm" rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || true)"
 		# Prefer the exact tag the submodule is currently pinned to; fall back
@@ -260,6 +292,16 @@ module.exports = {
 		jwtSecret: $(js_str "$CFG_JWT_SECRET"),
 		token_lifetime: { access_token: 3600, refresh_token: 2592000 },
 	},
+	// Without this, @simpleworkjs/orm falls back to './config/inventory.sqlite'
+	// relative to the app's /app cwd -- inside the container's ephemeral layer,
+	// not any mounted volume -- so every Resource/site/host/service/oauth row
+	// (the whole Directory Management page) would be silently wiped on every
+	// container recreate. /data is already a persisted volume (Redis lives
+	// there too), so this just co-locates the sqlite file with it.
+	orm: {
+		dialect: 'sqlite',
+		storage: '/data/inventory.sqlite',
+	},
 
 	// ── Orchestrator-only (ignored by the app) ───────────────────────────────
 	stack: {
@@ -660,6 +702,8 @@ BOOTSTRAP_OUT=$("${COMPOSE[@]}" exec -T \
 	-e STACK_HOST_MAC="$STACK_HOST_MAC" \
 	-e STACK_HOST_OS="$STACK_HOST_OS" \
 	-e STACK_HOST_KERNEL="$STACK_HOST_KERNEL" \
+	-e CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED="${CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED:-}" \
+	-e CFG_JUMP_HOST="${CFG_JUMP_HOST:-}" \
 	sso-manager node /bootstrap/bootstrap.js) \
 	|| die "bootstrap failed:\n${BOOTSTRAP_OUT}"
 
@@ -735,6 +779,46 @@ NODEEOF
 ) || die "Registering hosts with the proxy failed:\n${HOSTS_OUT}"
 echo "$HOSTS_OUT" | sed 's/^/[setup] /'
 
+# ── 7b. Optional: build + start the SSH jump host ─────────────────────────────
+# Enabled by CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED. The bootstrap (step 5) already wrote
+# ./config/jump-secrets.js (minted API token + LDAP admin bind). Build/start the
+# service (compose profile 'jump-host' is active), wait for its web /health, and
+# register its web UI hostname as a proxy Host so https://<JUMP_HOST> routes.
+if [[ "$JUMP_ENABLED" == "1" ]]; then
+	JUMP_HOST="${CFG_JUMP_HOST:-jump.${SSO_HOST#sso.}}"
+	JUMP_GIT_COMMIT="$(git -C jump-host rev-parse --short HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)"
+	export JUMP_GIT_COMMIT
+	info "Building + starting jump-host (optional; enabled via CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED)..."
+	"${COMPOSE[@]}" up -d --build jump-host
+
+	info "Waiting for jump-host to be healthy..."
+	for i in $(seq 1 60); do
+		if docker exec jump-host node -e "require('http').get('http://localhost:3002/health',r=>process.exit(r.statusCode===200?0:1)).on('error',()=>process.exit(1))" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			info "jump-host is healthy."; break
+		fi
+		if (( i == 60 )); then warn "jump-host did not become healthy in 120s. Check: ${COMPOSE[*]} logs jump-host"; break; fi
+		sleep 2
+	done
+
+	info "Registering ${JUMP_HOST} (jump-host web UI) with the proxy..."
+	JUMP_HOSTS_OUT=$("${COMPOSE[@]}" exec -T proxy node <<NODEEOF || true
+const {Host} = require('/app/models').models;
+(async () => {
+	try {
+		try { await Host.get($(js_str "$JUMP_HOST")); console.log('SKIP ${JUMP_HOST} (already exists)'); }
+		catch (e) {
+			if (e.name !== 'EntryNotFound') throw e;
+			await Host.create({ host: $(js_str "$JUMP_HOST"), ip: 'jump-host', targetPort: 3002, forcessl: true, targetssl: false, sso_enabled: false, created_by: 'setup.sh' });
+			console.log('CREATED ${JUMP_HOST} -> jump-host:3002');
+		}
+		process.exit(0);
+	} catch (error) { console.error('ERROR', error.message); process.exit(1); }
+})();
+NODEEOF
+)
+	echo "$JUMP_HOSTS_OUT" | sed 's/^/[setup] /'
+fi
+
 # ── 8. Summary ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 echo
 info "\033[1;32mDone. Your SSO + proxy stack is up.\033[0m"
@@ -743,6 +827,11 @@ echo "  SSO Manager UI:    https://${SSO_HOST}   (fronted by the proxy under TLS
 echo "                      first-run fallback: http://127.0.0.1:${SSO_PORT:-3001}"
 echo "  Proxy mgmt UI:      https://${PROXY_HOST}"
 echo "                      first-run fallback: http://127.0.0.1:${MGMT_PORT:-3000}"
+if [[ "$JUMP_ENABLED" == "1" ]]; then
+echo "  Jump host (SSH):    ssh -p ${JUMP_SSH_PORT:-2222} <uid>@${JUMP_HOST:-jump.${SSO_HOST#sso.}}   (TUI picker)"
+echo "                      ssh -p ${JUMP_SSH_PORT:-2222} <uid>_-_<host>@${JUMP_HOST:-jump.${SSO_HOST#sso.}}"
+echo "  Jump host (web):    https://${JUMP_HOST:-jump.${SSO_HOST#sso.}}   (audit + metrics)"
+fi
 echo
 echo "  First admin login credentials are in ./config/sso-secrets.js:"
 echo "    user: ${ADMIN_UID}"

test/check_jump_ldap_tls.js

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+'use strict';
+
+// Regression guard for bootstrap.js's generated jump-secrets.js template:
+// its ldap block must use ldaps:// (implicit TLS, :636), never ldap:// (:389),
+// as long as tlsOptions is set alongside it.
+//
+// ldapts treats a non-empty tlsOptions as "use implicit TLS" regardless of URL
+// scheme, and jump-host's LDAP client always sets tlsOptions -- so ldap://
+// + tlsOptions opens a raw TLS handshake against a port serving plaintext
+// LDAP. The server silently drops the connection before any LDAP message
+// parses, and every operation (getUser, checkPassword, ...) then fails
+// identically -- indistinguishable from a wrong password. This shipped once
+// (every SSH login to jump-host failed, for any account, any password) before
+// being root-caused against a real deployment. Static, not a require()+exec
+// of bootstrap.js, because bootstrap.js is a self-running provisioning script
+// with real side effects (LDAP writes, API calls), not a library.
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const BOOTSTRAP_PATH = path.join(__dirname, '..', 'bootstrap', 'bootstrap.js');
+const src = fs.readFileSync(BOOTSTRAP_PATH, 'utf8');
+
+// Isolate the generated jump-secrets.js template (the backtick string
+// assigned to `body` inside writeJumpSecrets) rather than scanning the whole
+// file, so this only ever looks at what's actually written to the deployed
+// config -- not, say, a comment or an unrelated ldap:// URL elsewhere.
+// bootstrap.js's own source has literal backslash-t escape sequences inside
+// the backtick string (they only become real tabs when the template
+// literal is actually evaluated) -- so these patterns match `\t` as two
+// literal characters, not a real tab byte.
+const bodyMatch = /const body = `([\s\S]*?)`;\n\tfs\.writeFileSync\(JUMP_SECRETS/.exec(src);
+if (!bodyMatch) {
+	console.error('check_jump_ldap_tls: could not locate the jump-secrets.js template in bootstrap.js — did writeJumpSecrets change shape?');
+	process.exit(1);
+}
+const template = bodyMatch[1];
+
+// Bounded by the next top-level key (sso:) rather than the ldap block's own
+// closing brace, which is more robust to exactly how it's indented/escaped.
+const ldapBlockMatch = /ldap:\s*\{([\s\S]*?)\\tsso:\s*\{/.exec(template);
+if (!ldapBlockMatch) {
+	console.error('check_jump_ldap_tls: could not find the ldap: {...} block in the jump-secrets.js template.');
+	process.exit(1);
+}
+const ldapBlock = ldapBlockMatch[1];
+
+const hasTlsOptions = /tlsOptions\s*:/.test(ldapBlock);
+const urlMatch = /url:\s*'([^']+)'/.exec(ldapBlock);
+const url = urlMatch ? urlMatch[1] : null;
+
+if (!url) {
+	console.error('check_jump_ldap_tls: no url found in the ldap block.');
+	process.exit(1);
+}
+
+if (hasTlsOptions && !url.startsWith('ldaps://')) {
+	console.error(
+		`check_jump_ldap_tls: jump-secrets.js template sets tlsOptions but url is "${url}" (not ldaps://). ` +
+		'This is the exact bug that broke every SSH login to jump-host -- see the comment above this check.'
+	);
+	process.exit(1);
+}
+
+console.log(`check_jump_ldap_tls: OK (url=${url}, tlsOptions=${hasTlsOptions})`);