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+189
@@ -10,6 +10,195 @@ for what changed inside the apps it composes.
|
||||
|
||||
## [Unreleased]
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.9.0] - 2026-07-27
|
||||
|
||||
### Bumped
|
||||
- sso-manager-node -> [v1.6.1](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.6.1)
|
||||
- proxy -> [v1.5.1](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.5.1)
|
||||
|
||||
Both apps had every native `alert()`/`confirm()` call removed, replaced by
|
||||
`@simpleworkjs/frontend`'s `app.messages.action`/`confirm`/`toast` (the
|
||||
same modules adopted in [1.8.0](#180---2026-07-27)). This was found live,
|
||||
mid browser-verification of that release: clicking sso-manager-node
|
||||
directory.ejs's "Rotate Client Secret" triggered a native `confirm()`,
|
||||
which blocks all further browser events on the page — a real hazard for
|
||||
anyone driving the app with browser automation, not just a cosmetic
|
||||
inconsistency. sso-manager-node also dropped `app.user.remove`/
|
||||
`app.oauthClient.remove` from `public/js/app.js` (dead code with a native
|
||||
`confirm()` guard and zero callers).
|
||||
|
||||
No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change.
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.8.0] - 2026-07-27
|
||||
|
||||
### Bumped
|
||||
- sso-manager-node -> [v1.6.0](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.6.0)
|
||||
- proxy -> [v1.5.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.5.0)
|
||||
- jump-host -> [v1.6.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.6.0)
|
||||
|
||||
All three apps adopt the newly published `@simpleworkjs/frontend` package's
|
||||
`app.messages`, `app.modal`, and `app.validate` modules, replacing the
|
||||
vendored `app.util.actionMessage`/`actionConfirm`/`alert` in
|
||||
`public/lib/js/app-base.js` (byte-identical across all three apps) and the
|
||||
vendored `public/lib/js/val.js` (byte-identical in sso-manager-node and
|
||||
jump-host, and the same engine plus proxy-only DNS/hostname rules in proxy).
|
||||
Message content is now HTML-escaped — the ad hoc `app.util.alert()` this
|
||||
replaces had none — and `app.messages.action` falls back to a page-wide
|
||||
toast when there's no inline `.actionMessage` target on the page. proxy's
|
||||
`host`/`target`/`hostname` wildcard-DNS validation rules (mirroring
|
||||
`utils/hostname_validate.js`) move to its own `public/js/app.js`, registered
|
||||
via `$.validateSettings`, since they're proxy-specific and don't belong in
|
||||
the shared package's generic rule set (`eq`/`user`/`password`/`ip`).
|
||||
jump-host doesn't currently use any `[validate]` attributes, so its `val.js`
|
||||
swap is dedup/future-proofing rather than a behavior change.
|
||||
|
||||
`app.api`/`app.auth`/`app.pubsub`/`app.socket` in each app's `app-base.js`
|
||||
are untouched: they're app-specific (a dual-mode callback/promise API with
|
||||
`auth-token` header injection) and not something the frontend package's
|
||||
generic `app.js` provides, so it isn't loaded.
|
||||
|
||||
No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change.
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.7.0] - 2026-07-27
|
||||
|
||||
### Bumped
|
||||
- sso-manager-node -> [v1.5.1](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.5.1)
|
||||
- jump-host -> [v1.5.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.5.0)
|
||||
|
||||
Two production bugs fixed: `PUT /api/user/:uid` 500'd with an LDAP
|
||||
`ObjectClassViolationError` when setting `sshPublicKey` on any account
|
||||
predating the `ldapPublicKey` objectClass (notably the bootstrap admin) —
|
||||
and the exact same bug, in the shared `@simpleworkjs/ldap` package's
|
||||
`addSshKey`, was silently aborting SSH connections at jump-host's
|
||||
key-injection step for the same class of accounts. Both are fixed by
|
||||
ensuring the objectClass is present before writing the attribute. Also
|
||||
fixed: the Directory's "add resource" modal left the parent-Service
|
||||
dropdown blank when adding an OAuth Integration.
|
||||
|
||||
Jump-host's web dashboard also gained a "Hosts you can reach" list
|
||||
(admins see "All hosts") — previously it only showed usage metrics with
|
||||
no way to see your actual access from the browser.
|
||||
|
||||
No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change.
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.6.0] - 2026-07-26
|
||||
|
||||
### Bumped
|
||||
- jump-host -> [v1.4.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.4.0)
|
||||
|
||||
Jump-host gains **standalone mode**: it can now run with no LDAP directory and
|
||||
no SSO Manager at all, storing users and hosts itself via
|
||||
`@simpleworkjs/orm` (Sequelize; SQLite by default, any Sequelize-supported
|
||||
dialect). This is an app-internal capability, opt-in via
|
||||
`standalone.enabled` in jump-host's own config — the bundled theta-env stack
|
||||
is unaffected and continues to wire jump-host to the shared LDAP directory
|
||||
and SSO Manager as before. Two bugs were also fixed in jump-host's SSH
|
||||
server: an ephemeral listen port (`0`) was silently overridden back to the
|
||||
default, and session listeners could miss a client's immediate `exec`/`shell`
|
||||
request.
|
||||
|
||||
No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change on the theta-env side.
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.5.0] - 2026-07-26
|
||||
|
||||
### Bumped
|
||||
- sso-manager-node -> [v1.5.0](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.5.0)
|
||||
- proxy -> [v1.4.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.4.0)
|
||||
- jump-host -> [v1.3.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.3.0)
|
||||
|
||||
This release finishes the UI half of the unification that 1.4.0 deferred: the
|
||||
three apps now share one front-end shell. `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs`
|
||||
and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are byte-identical across sso-manager-node,
|
||||
proxy and jump-host, and everything per-app moved into each repo's new
|
||||
`nodejs/utils/ui.js` (nav items and the groups that may see them, footer links,
|
||||
favicon, profile/logout targets, update-banner on/off). Nav gating is one model
|
||||
everywhere — the shell reveals `.group-required-<cn>` from `GET /api/user/me`,
|
||||
normalising sso's LDAP DNs and the OIDC clients' group CNs to the same shape,
|
||||
with the clients' `isAdmin` flag exposed as a synthetic `admin` group. jQuery is
|
||||
4.0.0 and EJS 3.1.10 in all three.
|
||||
|
||||
Five client-side bugs were fixed along the way, including two that broke real
|
||||
flows: `app.api.delete` ignored the callback that `formAJAX` passes (so
|
||||
DELETE-method forms — the proxy's host and DNS delete buttons — never refreshed),
|
||||
and the login page threw on every logged-out visit while revealing its card.
|
||||
|
||||
No `setup.sh`, compose or config change: this is app-internal UI work. Verified
|
||||
by driving a full stack of all three apps in a browser — every page renders
|
||||
console-clean, nav gating is correct per role, and the OIDC login round trip
|
||||
completes on both OIDC clients.
|
||||
|
||||
sso-manager-node 1.5.0:
|
||||
|
||||
### Changed
|
||||
- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
|
||||
- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
|
||||
- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
|
||||
- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
|
||||
- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
|
||||
- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Fixed
|
||||
- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
|
||||
- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
|
||||
- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
|
||||
- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
|
||||
|
||||
### Fixed (sso-manager-node)
|
||||
- `public/lib/js/val.js` shadowed `message` with `let` inside `validateField`, so a custom rule's return value never reached `validateMessage` and the caller always saw the generic length message. Resolved by adopting the shared validator, which also brings the `target`/`hostname` rules and the real password policy (>= 8 chars, and either 12+ or 3 of 4 character classes) to this app.
|
||||
- `public/js/app.js` used `$.isFunction`, removed in jQuery 4.
|
||||
|
||||
### Added (sso-manager-node)
|
||||
- `GET /api/user/me` now also reports `isAdmin` (membership in `app_sso_admin`), the single effective-rights flag the shared UI shell gates the update banner on. Group-level gating still reads `memberOf`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Verified
|
||||
- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
|
||||
|
||||
proxy 1.4.0:
|
||||
|
||||
### Changed
|
||||
- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
|
||||
- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
|
||||
- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
|
||||
- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
|
||||
- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
|
||||
- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Fixed
|
||||
- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
|
||||
- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
|
||||
- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
|
||||
- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
|
||||
|
||||
### Added
|
||||
- `.group-required { display: none }` in `public/css/styles.css`, the base rule the shared gating model reveals against.
|
||||
- Admin-only nav items lost their inline `display: none` in favour of that class, and the brand link points at `/` instead of `#`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Verified
|
||||
- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
|
||||
|
||||
jump-host 1.3.0:
|
||||
|
||||
### Changed
|
||||
- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
|
||||
- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
|
||||
- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
|
||||
- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
|
||||
- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
|
||||
- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Fixed
|
||||
- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
|
||||
- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
|
||||
- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
|
||||
- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
|
||||
|
||||
### Added
|
||||
- `.group-required { display: none }` in `public/css/styles.css`, the base rule the shared gating model reveals against.
|
||||
- `#spa-shell` dropped its inline `margin-top`; `styles.css` already sets it and the shared shell adjusts it when a banner is shown.
|
||||
|
||||
### Verified
|
||||
- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.4.0] - 2026-07-25
|
||||
|
||||
### Bumped
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ services:
|
||||
# setup.sh sets this from the host, where the submodule resolves
|
||||
# correctly (git -C sso-manager-node rev-parse --short HEAD).
|
||||
GIT_COMMIT: ${SSO_GIT_COMMIT:-}
|
||||
# Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for npm/apt during the build (NOT
|
||||
# the theta42 "proxy" app). Set CFG_HTTP_PROXY in setup.env; empty by
|
||||
# default, so this is a no-op unless configured.
|
||||
HTTP_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
|
||||
HTTPS_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
|
||||
NO_PROXY: ${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
|
||||
container_name: sso-manager
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
networks: [theta-net]
|
||||
@@ -58,6 +64,11 @@ services:
|
||||
- NODE_PORT=3001
|
||||
- LDAP_SERVER_ID=${LDAP_SERVER_ID:-}
|
||||
- LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS=${LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS:-}
|
||||
# Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for outbound calls (SMTP, etc.) at
|
||||
# runtime. See the build args above for the same setting during build.
|
||||
- HTTP_PROXY=${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
|
||||
- HTTPS_PROXY=${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
|
||||
- NO_PROXY=${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
# Operator-edited SSO secrets (sso-secrets.js). Read-WRITE so the bootstrap
|
||||
# can write the generated OAuth client creds into proxy-secrets.js. The
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +102,11 @@ services:
|
||||
# setup.sh sets this from the host, where the submodule resolves
|
||||
# correctly (git -C proxy rev-parse --short HEAD).
|
||||
GIT_COMMIT: ${PROXY_GIT_COMMIT:-}
|
||||
# Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for npm/apt during the build. See
|
||||
# the sso-manager service above for details.
|
||||
HTTP_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
|
||||
HTTPS_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
|
||||
NO_PROXY: ${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
|
||||
container_name: proxy
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
networks: [theta-net]
|
||||
@@ -110,6 +126,11 @@ services:
|
||||
# not from env. NODE_ENV/NODE_PORT are process env the app reads directly.
|
||||
- NODE_ENV=production
|
||||
- NODE_PORT=3000
|
||||
# Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for outbound calls (ACME/Let's
|
||||
# Encrypt, DNS providers) at runtime.
|
||||
- HTTP_PROXY=${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
|
||||
- HTTPS_PROXY=${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
|
||||
- NO_PROXY=${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
# Operator-edited proxy secrets (proxy-secrets.js). READ-ONLY — the proxy
|
||||
# only reads it; the sso-manager bootstrap writes the OAuth creds. The
|
||||
@@ -142,6 +163,11 @@ services:
|
||||
dockerfile: Dockerfile
|
||||
args:
|
||||
GIT_COMMIT: ${JUMP_GIT_COMMIT:-}
|
||||
# Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for npm/apt during the build. See
|
||||
# the sso-manager service above for details.
|
||||
HTTP_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
|
||||
HTTPS_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
|
||||
NO_PROXY: ${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
|
||||
container_name: jump-host
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
networks: [theta-net]
|
||||
@@ -153,6 +179,11 @@ services:
|
||||
- "${JUMP_WEB_BIND:-0.0.0.0}:${JUMP_WEB_PORT:-3002}:3002" # web UI/API
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
- NODE_ENV=production
|
||||
# Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for outbound calls (the directory API
|
||||
# client) at runtime.
|
||||
- HTTP_PROXY=${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
|
||||
- HTTPS_PROXY=${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
|
||||
- NO_PROXY=${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./config:/config:ro # jump-secrets.js (written by ensure_config/bootstrap)
|
||||
- jump-data:/var/lib/jump-host # generated host keys persist here
|
||||
|
||||
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ The SSO Manager and the proxy it fronts, both stood up by one `./setup.sh` run:
|
||||
|
||||
<a href="images/sso-dashboard.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/sso-dashboard.png" alt="SSO Manager dashboard" width="49%"></a>
|
||||
<a href="images/proxy-hosts.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/proxy-hosts.png" alt="Proxy host list" width="49%"></a>
|
||||
<a href="images/jump-dashboard.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/jump-dashboard.png" alt="Jump Host dashboard" width="49%"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
*(click either screenshot to view full size)*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
Submodule jump-host updated: 67e2fc54c2...4a70b5b27e
+1
-1
Submodule proxy updated: f4efdfb957...58204da3cb
@@ -49,6 +49,19 @@ CFG_DOMAIN=example.com
|
||||
# under an OU-style prefix). Leave unset to use the DN built from CFG_DOMAIN:
|
||||
#CFG_BASE_DN=dc=example,dc=com
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Optional outbound HTTP(S) proxy ──────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# For an isolated/offline/corporate-network test host that only reaches the
|
||||
# internet through an upstream HTTP proxy — NOT the theta42 "proxy" app.
|
||||
# Wired into every service's docker build (npm/apt) AND its running container
|
||||
# (SMTP, ACME/Let's Encrypt, DNS provider calls, the jump-host directory API
|
||||
# client). Leave unset to disable (the default); CFG_HTTPS_PROXY falls back to
|
||||
# CFG_HTTP_PROXY if unset, and CFG_NO_PROXY defaults to covering the stack's
|
||||
# own internal service names so container-to-container traffic never goes
|
||||
# through the proxy.
|
||||
#CFG_HTTP_PROXY=http://proxy.example.com:3128
|
||||
#CFG_HTTPS_PROXY=http://proxy.example.com:3128
|
||||
#CFG_NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,sso-manager,proxy,jump-host
|
||||
|
||||
# Optional — sensible defaults if left blank:
|
||||
#CFG_ORG=SSO Manager # app display name + outbound email org
|
||||
#CFG_ADMIN_UID=admin # initial SSO admin username
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -165,6 +165,22 @@ export CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED CFG_JUMP_HOST
|
||||
# When enabled, activate the compose profile so `up`/`ps` include the service.
|
||||
if [[ "$JUMP_ENABLED" == "1" ]]; then export COMPOSE_PROFILES="jump-host"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Optional outbound HTTP(S) proxy for docker build + the running containers ─
|
||||
# CFG_HTTP_PROXY / CFG_HTTPS_PROXY / CFG_NO_PROXY (from ./setup.env or the
|
||||
# environment) — NOT the theta42 "proxy" app; this is an upstream HTTP proxy
|
||||
# for reaching the internet (npm/apt during image builds, and SMTP/ACME/DNS
|
||||
# provider calls at runtime), useful on isolated/offline/corporate-network
|
||||
# test hosts. Off by default. docker-compose.yml passes these through as both
|
||||
# build args (Docker also recognizes them as predefined build ARGs) and
|
||||
# container environment on every service, so one setup.env entry covers the
|
||||
# whole stack.
|
||||
export CFG_HTTP_PROXY="${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}"
|
||||
export CFG_HTTPS_PROXY="${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}}"
|
||||
export CFG_NO_PROXY="${CFG_NO_PROXY:-localhost,127.0.0.1,sso-manager,proxy,jump-host}"
|
||||
if [[ -n "$CFG_HTTP_PROXY" ]]; then
|
||||
info "Using HTTP proxy for docker build + containers: $CFG_HTTP_PROXY"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 1. Update submodules to their latest release tag, verify build contexts ───
|
||||
# Submodules track release tags (vX.Y.Z), not the tip of master -- so
|
||||
# "update" means "move to the newest tag", not "move to the newest commit".
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
Submodule sso-manager-node updated: fc0d9104d0...18119d54aa
Reference in New Issue
Block a user