Merge pull request #103 from theta42/release/1.12.0

Bump sso-manager-node to v1.6.3

.github/workflows/lint.yml

@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ name: Lint
 
 # theta-env has no app code of its own to unit-test (it orchestrates the
 # proxy/sso-manager-node submodules) -- this checks the one thing that can
-# actually break silently: setup.sh and bootstrap.js.
+# actually break silently: setup.sh and bootstrap.js, plus a static
+# consistency check on the config bootstrap.js generates for jump-host
+# (test/check_jump_ldap_tls.js).
 on:
   pull_request:
     branches:
@@ -39,3 +41,6 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Syntax check
         run: node --check bootstrap/bootstrap.js
+
+      - name: Jump-host LDAP config consistency
+        run: node test/check_jump_ldap_tls.js

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -10,6 +10,225 @@ for what changed inside the apps it composes.
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [1.12.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.6.3](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.6.3) — fixes the root cause of a real "lost user" report: `routes/group.js` never invalidated the User cache on membership changes, so an account added to the `app_sso_service_account` marker group (which hides accounts from the Users page's People tab) could look like it had vanished for up to 5 minutes — and, separately, could be added to that group with no warning at all. Both fixed; see the linked release for detail.
+
+No `setup.sh` or compose change.
+
+## [1.11.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Added
+- **`test/check_jump_ldap_tls.js`**, wired into the `Lint` workflow: a static consistency check on the jump-secrets.js template `bootstrap.js` generates, so the `ldap://` + `tlsOptions` mistake that broke every SSH login in 1.10.0 fails CI before it ever reaches a real deployment again.
+- **A static "no native `alert()`/`confirm()`/`prompt()`" check** is now part of all three apps' own test suites (they block all further browser events on the page — see 1.9.0/1.10.0's release notes).
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.6.2](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.6.2) — fixes `DELETE /api/oauth/client/:id` (`client.remove is not a function`, a genuine 500 masked by tests that never checked the response status), plus the regression test above.
+- proxy -> [v1.5.2](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.5.2) — the regression test above.
+- jump-host -> [v1.7.1](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.7.1) — the regression test above.
+
+No `setup.sh` or compose change.
+
+## [1.10.0] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Fixed
+- **`bootstrap/bootstrap.js`'s jump-secrets.js template now points jump-host at `ldaps://sso-manager:636`**, not `ldap://sso-manager:389`. The plain-port URL combined with jump-host's `tlsOptions` made `ldapts` attempt implicit TLS against a port serving plaintext LDAP — slapd dropped every connection before any LDAP message parsed, so SSH password login failed for every account, with any password, indistinguishable from a wrong credential. Root-caused by standing up a local jump-host, editing its config, and calling `getUser`/`checkPassword` directly inside the container. **Existing deployments must edit `./config/jump-secrets.js` themselves** (this template only affects fresh bootstraps) — see theta42/theta-env#99. Companion defensive fix: [simpleworkjs/ldap v1.0.2](https://github.com/simpleworkjs/ldap/releases/tag/v1.0.2) now rejects this `ldap://` + `tlsOptions` combination outright.
+
+### Bumped
+- jump-host -> [v1.7.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.7.0) — adds self-service API tokens (create/list/rotate/revoke from its dashboard); jump-host previously had none.
+
+No `setup.sh` or compose change.
+
+## [1.9.0] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.6.1](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.6.1)
+- proxy -> [v1.5.1](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.5.1)
+
+Both apps had every native `alert()`/`confirm()` call removed, replaced by
+`@simpleworkjs/frontend`'s `app.messages.action`/`confirm`/`toast` (the
+same modules adopted in [1.8.0](#180---2026-07-27)). This was found live,
+mid browser-verification of that release: clicking sso-manager-node
+directory.ejs's "Rotate Client Secret" triggered a native `confirm()`,
+which blocks all further browser events on the page — a real hazard for
+anyone driving the app with browser automation, not just a cosmetic
+inconsistency. sso-manager-node also dropped `app.user.remove`/
+`app.oauthClient.remove` from `public/js/app.js` (dead code with a native
+`confirm()` guard and zero callers).
+
+No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change.
+
+## [1.8.0] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.6.0](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.6.0)
+- proxy -> [v1.5.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.5.0)
+- jump-host -> [v1.6.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.6.0)
+
+All three apps adopt the newly published `@simpleworkjs/frontend` package's
+`app.messages`, `app.modal`, and `app.validate` modules, replacing the
+vendored `app.util.actionMessage`/`actionConfirm`/`alert` in
+`public/lib/js/app-base.js` (byte-identical across all three apps) and the
+vendored `public/lib/js/val.js` (byte-identical in sso-manager-node and
+jump-host, and the same engine plus proxy-only DNS/hostname rules in proxy).
+Message content is now HTML-escaped — the ad hoc `app.util.alert()` this
+replaces had none — and `app.messages.action` falls back to a page-wide
+toast when there's no inline `.actionMessage` target on the page. proxy's
+`host`/`target`/`hostname` wildcard-DNS validation rules (mirroring
+`utils/hostname_validate.js`) move to its own `public/js/app.js`, registered
+via `$.validateSettings`, since they're proxy-specific and don't belong in
+the shared package's generic rule set (`eq`/`user`/`password`/`ip`).
+jump-host doesn't currently use any `[validate]` attributes, so its `val.js`
+swap is dedup/future-proofing rather than a behavior change.
+
+`app.api`/`app.auth`/`app.pubsub`/`app.socket` in each app's `app-base.js`
+are untouched: they're app-specific (a dual-mode callback/promise API with
+`auth-token` header injection) and not something the frontend package's
+generic `app.js` provides, so it isn't loaded.
+
+No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change.
+
+## [1.7.0] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.5.1](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.5.1)
+- jump-host -> [v1.5.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.5.0)
+
+Two production bugs fixed: `PUT /api/user/:uid` 500'd with an LDAP
+`ObjectClassViolationError` when setting `sshPublicKey` on any account
+predating the `ldapPublicKey` objectClass (notably the bootstrap admin) —
+and the exact same bug, in the shared `@simpleworkjs/ldap` package's
+`addSshKey`, was silently aborting SSH connections at jump-host's
+key-injection step for the same class of accounts. Both are fixed by
+ensuring the objectClass is present before writing the attribute. Also
+fixed: the Directory's "add resource" modal left the parent-Service
+dropdown blank when adding an OAuth Integration.
+
+Jump-host's web dashboard also gained a "Hosts you can reach" list
+(admins see "All hosts") — previously it only showed usage metrics with
+no way to see your actual access from the browser.
+
+No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change.
+
+## [1.6.0] - 2026-07-26
+
+### Bumped
+- jump-host -> [v1.4.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.4.0)
+
+Jump-host gains **standalone mode**: it can now run with no LDAP directory and
+no SSO Manager at all, storing users and hosts itself via
+`@simpleworkjs/orm` (Sequelize; SQLite by default, any Sequelize-supported
+dialect). This is an app-internal capability, opt-in via
+`standalone.enabled` in jump-host's own config — the bundled theta-env stack
+is unaffected and continues to wire jump-host to the shared LDAP directory
+and SSO Manager as before. Two bugs were also fixed in jump-host's SSH
+server: an ephemeral listen port (`0`) was silently overridden back to the
+default, and session listeners could miss a client's immediate `exec`/`shell`
+request.
+
+No `setup.sh`, compose, or config change on the theta-env side.
+
+## [1.5.0] - 2026-07-26
+
+### Bumped
+- sso-manager-node -> [v1.5.0](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.5.0)
+- proxy -> [v1.4.0](https://github.com/theta42/proxy/releases/tag/v1.4.0)
+- jump-host -> [v1.3.0](https://github.com/theta42/jump-host/releases/tag/v1.3.0)
+
+This release finishes the UI half of the unification that 1.4.0 deferred: the
+three apps now share one front-end shell. `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs`
+and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are byte-identical across sso-manager-node,
+proxy and jump-host, and everything per-app moved into each repo's new
+`nodejs/utils/ui.js` (nav items and the groups that may see them, footer links,
+favicon, profile/logout targets, update-banner on/off). Nav gating is one model
+everywhere — the shell reveals `.group-required-<cn>` from `GET /api/user/me`,
+normalising sso's LDAP DNs and the OIDC clients' group CNs to the same shape,
+with the clients' `isAdmin` flag exposed as a synthetic `admin` group. jQuery is
+4.0.0 and EJS 3.1.10 in all three.
+
+Five client-side bugs were fixed along the way, including two that broke real
+flows: `app.api.delete` ignored the callback that `formAJAX` passes (so
+DELETE-method forms — the proxy's host and DNS delete buttons — never refreshed),
+and the login page threw on every logged-out visit while revealing its card.
+
+No `setup.sh`, compose or config change: this is app-internal UI work. Verified
+by driving a full stack of all three apps in a browser — every page renders
+console-clean, nav gating is correct per role, and the OIDC login round trip
+completes on both OIDC clients.
+
+sso-manager-node 1.5.0:
+
+### Changed
+- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
+- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
+- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
+- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
+- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
+- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
+
+### Fixed
+- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
+- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
+- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
+- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
+
+### Fixed (sso-manager-node)
+- `public/lib/js/val.js` shadowed `message` with `let` inside `validateField`, so a custom rule's return value never reached `validateMessage` and the caller always saw the generic length message. Resolved by adopting the shared validator, which also brings the `target`/`hostname` rules and the real password policy (>= 8 chars, and either 12+ or 3 of 4 character classes) to this app.
+- `public/js/app.js` used `$.isFunction`, removed in jQuery 4.
+
+### Added (sso-manager-node)
+- `GET /api/user/me` now also reports `isAdmin` (membership in `app_sso_admin`), the single effective-rights flag the shared UI shell gates the update banner on. Group-level gating still reads `memberOf`.
+
+### Verified
+- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
+
+proxy 1.4.0:
+
+### Changed
+- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
+- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
+- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
+- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
+- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
+- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
+
+### Fixed
+- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
+- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
+- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
+- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
+
+### Added
+- `.group-required { display: none }` in `public/css/styles.css`, the base rule the shared gating model reveals against.
+- Admin-only nav items lost their inline `display: none` in favour of that class, and the brand link points at `/` instead of `#`.
+
+### Verified
+- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
+
+jump-host 1.3.0:
+
+### Changed
+- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
+- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
+- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
+- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
+- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
+- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
+
+### Fixed
+- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
+- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
+- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
+- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
+
+### Added
+- `.group-required { display: none }` in `public/css/styles.css`, the base rule the shared gating model reveals against.
+- `#spa-shell` dropped its inline `margin-top`; `styles.css` already sets it and the shared shell adjusts it when a banner is shown.
+
+### Verified
+- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
+
 ## [1.4.0] - 2026-07-25
 
 ### Bumped

bootstrap/bootstrap.js

@@ -527,7 +527,16 @@ function writeJumpSecrets(apiToken, oidc, localAdminPass) {
 module.exports = {
 \tname: ${JSON.stringify(sso.name || 'SSO Manager')},
 \tldap: {
-\t\turl: 'ldap://sso-manager:389',
+\t\t// ldaps:// (636), not ldap:// (389): @simpleworkjs/ldap's client always
+\t\t// sets tlsOptions (see jump-host's models/user_ldap.js), and ldapts
+\t\t// treats a non-empty tlsOptions as "use implicit TLS" regardless of the
+\t\t// URL scheme -- pointed at the plain port, that means it opens a raw TLS
+\t\t// handshake against a server expecting plaintext LDAP, which slapd just
+\t\t// drops (logged as "connection lost", no BIND ever attempted). This bit
+\t\t// jump-host silently: every SSH login failed with the generic
+\t\t// "Permission denied" for any password, because getUser()/checkPassword()
+\t\t// never even reached slapd.
+\t\turl: 'ldaps://sso-manager:636',
 \t\tbindDN: ${JSON.stringify(BIND_DN)},
 \t\tbindPassword: ${JSON.stringify(ADMIN_PASS)},
 \t\tuserBase: ${JSON.stringify(`ou=people,${BASE_DN}`)},

docker-compose.yml

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ services:
         # setup.sh sets this from the host, where the submodule resolves
         # correctly (git -C sso-manager-node rev-parse --short HEAD).
         GIT_COMMIT: ${SSO_GIT_COMMIT:-}
+        # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for npm/apt during the build (NOT
+        # the theta42 "proxy" app). Set CFG_HTTP_PROXY in setup.env; empty by
+        # default, so this is a no-op unless configured.
+        HTTP_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+        HTTPS_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+        NO_PROXY: ${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
     container_name: sso-manager
     restart: unless-stopped
     networks: [theta-net]
@@ -58,6 +64,11 @@ services:
       - NODE_PORT=3001
       - LDAP_SERVER_ID=${LDAP_SERVER_ID:-}
       - LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS=${LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS:-}
+      # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for outbound calls (SMTP, etc.) at
+      # runtime. See the build args above for the same setting during build.
+      - HTTP_PROXY=${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+      - HTTPS_PROXY=${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+      - NO_PROXY=${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
     volumes:
       # Operator-edited SSO secrets (sso-secrets.js). Read-WRITE so the bootstrap
       # can write the generated OAuth client creds into proxy-secrets.js. The
@@ -91,6 +102,11 @@ services:
         # setup.sh sets this from the host, where the submodule resolves
         # correctly (git -C proxy rev-parse --short HEAD).
         GIT_COMMIT: ${PROXY_GIT_COMMIT:-}
+        # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for npm/apt during the build. See
+        # the sso-manager service above for details.
+        HTTP_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+        HTTPS_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+        NO_PROXY: ${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
     container_name: proxy
     restart: unless-stopped
     networks: [theta-net]
@@ -110,6 +126,11 @@ services:
       # not from env. NODE_ENV/NODE_PORT are process env the app reads directly.
       - NODE_ENV=production
       - NODE_PORT=3000
+      # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for outbound calls (ACME/Let's
+      # Encrypt, DNS providers) at runtime.
+      - HTTP_PROXY=${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+      - HTTPS_PROXY=${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+      - NO_PROXY=${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
     volumes:
       # Operator-edited proxy secrets (proxy-secrets.js). READ-ONLY — the proxy
       # only reads it; the sso-manager bootstrap writes the OAuth creds. The
@@ -142,6 +163,11 @@ services:
       dockerfile: Dockerfile
       args:
         GIT_COMMIT: ${JUMP_GIT_COMMIT:-}
+        # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for npm/apt during the build. See
+        # the sso-manager service above for details.
+        HTTP_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+        HTTPS_PROXY: ${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+        NO_PROXY: ${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
     container_name: jump-host
     restart: unless-stopped
     networks: [theta-net]
@@ -153,6 +179,11 @@ services:
       - "${JUMP_WEB_BIND:-0.0.0.0}:${JUMP_WEB_PORT:-3002}:3002"  # web UI/API
     environment:
       - NODE_ENV=production
+      # Optional upstream HTTP(S) proxy for outbound calls (the directory API
+      # client) at runtime.
+      - HTTP_PROXY=${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}
+      - HTTPS_PROXY=${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-}
+      - NO_PROXY=${CFG_NO_PROXY:-}
     volumes:
       - ./config:/config:ro         # jump-secrets.js (written by ensure_config/bootstrap)
       - jump-data:/var/lib/jump-host  # generated host keys persist here

docs/index.md

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ The SSO Manager and the proxy it fronts, both stood up by one `./setup.sh` run:
 
 <a href="images/sso-dashboard.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/sso-dashboard.png" alt="SSO Manager dashboard" width="49%"></a>
 <a href="images/proxy-hosts.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/proxy-hosts.png" alt="Proxy host list" width="49%"></a>
+<a href="images/jump-dashboard.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/jump-dashboard.png" alt="Jump Host dashboard" width="49%"></a>
 
 *(click either screenshot to view full size)*
 

setup.env.example

@@ -49,6 +49,19 @@ CFG_DOMAIN=example.com
 # under an OU-style prefix). Leave unset to use the DN built from CFG_DOMAIN:
 #CFG_BASE_DN=dc=example,dc=com
 
+# ── Optional outbound HTTP(S) proxy ──────────────────────────────────────────
+# For an isolated/offline/corporate-network test host that only reaches the
+# internet through an upstream HTTP proxy — NOT the theta42 "proxy" app.
+# Wired into every service's docker build (npm/apt) AND its running container
+# (SMTP, ACME/Let's Encrypt, DNS provider calls, the jump-host directory API
+# client). Leave unset to disable (the default); CFG_HTTPS_PROXY falls back to
+# CFG_HTTP_PROXY if unset, and CFG_NO_PROXY defaults to covering the stack's
+# own internal service names so container-to-container traffic never goes
+# through the proxy.
+#CFG_HTTP_PROXY=http://proxy.example.com:3128
+#CFG_HTTPS_PROXY=http://proxy.example.com:3128
+#CFG_NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,sso-manager,proxy,jump-host
+
 # Optional — sensible defaults if left blank:
 #CFG_ORG=SSO Manager            # app display name + outbound email org
 #CFG_ADMIN_UID=admin            # initial SSO admin username

setup.sh

@@ -165,6 +165,22 @@ export CFG_JUMP_HOST_ENABLED CFG_JUMP_HOST
 # When enabled, activate the compose profile so `up`/`ps` include the service.
 if [[ "$JUMP_ENABLED" == "1" ]]; then export COMPOSE_PROFILES="jump-host"; fi
 
+# ── Optional outbound HTTP(S) proxy for docker build + the running containers ─
+# CFG_HTTP_PROXY / CFG_HTTPS_PROXY / CFG_NO_PROXY (from ./setup.env or the
+# environment) — NOT the theta42 "proxy" app; this is an upstream HTTP proxy
+# for reaching the internet (npm/apt during image builds, and SMTP/ACME/DNS
+# provider calls at runtime), useful on isolated/offline/corporate-network
+# test hosts. Off by default. docker-compose.yml passes these through as both
+# build args (Docker also recognizes them as predefined build ARGs) and
+# container environment on every service, so one setup.env entry covers the
+# whole stack.
+export CFG_HTTP_PROXY="${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}"
+export CFG_HTTPS_PROXY="${CFG_HTTPS_PROXY:-${CFG_HTTP_PROXY:-}}"
+export CFG_NO_PROXY="${CFG_NO_PROXY:-localhost,127.0.0.1,sso-manager,proxy,jump-host}"
+if [[ -n "$CFG_HTTP_PROXY" ]]; then
+	info "Using HTTP proxy for docker build + containers: $CFG_HTTP_PROXY"
+fi
+
 # ── 1. Update submodules to their latest release tag, verify build contexts ───
 # Submodules track release tags (vX.Y.Z), not the tip of master -- so
 # "update" means "move to the newest tag", not "move to the newest commit".

test/check_jump_ldap_tls.js

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+'use strict';
+
+// Regression guard for bootstrap.js's generated jump-secrets.js template:
+// its ldap block must use ldaps:// (implicit TLS, :636), never ldap:// (:389),
+// as long as tlsOptions is set alongside it.
+//
+// ldapts treats a non-empty tlsOptions as "use implicit TLS" regardless of URL
+// scheme, and jump-host's LDAP client always sets tlsOptions -- so ldap://
+// + tlsOptions opens a raw TLS handshake against a port serving plaintext
+// LDAP. The server silently drops the connection before any LDAP message
+// parses, and every operation (getUser, checkPassword, ...) then fails
+// identically -- indistinguishable from a wrong password. This shipped once
+// (every SSH login to jump-host failed, for any account, any password) before
+// being root-caused against a real deployment. Static, not a require()+exec
+// of bootstrap.js, because bootstrap.js is a self-running provisioning script
+// with real side effects (LDAP writes, API calls), not a library.
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const BOOTSTRAP_PATH = path.join(__dirname, '..', 'bootstrap', 'bootstrap.js');
+const src = fs.readFileSync(BOOTSTRAP_PATH, 'utf8');
+
+// Isolate the generated jump-secrets.js template (the backtick string
+// assigned to `body` inside writeJumpSecrets) rather than scanning the whole
+// file, so this only ever looks at what's actually written to the deployed
+// config -- not, say, a comment or an unrelated ldap:// URL elsewhere.
+// bootstrap.js's own source has literal backslash-t escape sequences inside
+// the backtick string (they only become real tabs when the template
+// literal is actually evaluated) -- so these patterns match `\t` as two
+// literal characters, not a real tab byte.
+const bodyMatch = /const body = `([\s\S]*?)`;\n\tfs\.writeFileSync\(JUMP_SECRETS/.exec(src);
+if (!bodyMatch) {
+	console.error('check_jump_ldap_tls: could not locate the jump-secrets.js template in bootstrap.js — did writeJumpSecrets change shape?');
+	process.exit(1);
+}
+const template = bodyMatch[1];
+
+// Bounded by the next top-level key (sso:) rather than the ldap block's own
+// closing brace, which is more robust to exactly how it's indented/escaped.
+const ldapBlockMatch = /ldap:\s*\{([\s\S]*?)\\tsso:\s*\{/.exec(template);
+if (!ldapBlockMatch) {
+	console.error('check_jump_ldap_tls: could not find the ldap: {...} block in the jump-secrets.js template.');
+	process.exit(1);
+}
+const ldapBlock = ldapBlockMatch[1];
+
+const hasTlsOptions = /tlsOptions\s*:/.test(ldapBlock);
+const urlMatch = /url:\s*'([^']+)'/.exec(ldapBlock);
+const url = urlMatch ? urlMatch[1] : null;
+
+if (!url) {
+	console.error('check_jump_ldap_tls: no url found in the ldap block.');
+	process.exit(1);
+}
+
+if (hasTlsOptions && !url.startsWith('ldaps://')) {
+	console.error(
+		`check_jump_ldap_tls: jump-secrets.js template sets tlsOptions but url is "${url}" (not ldaps://). ` +
+		'This is the exact bug that broke every SSH login to jump-host -- see the comment above this check.'
+	);
+	process.exit(1);
+}
+
+console.log(`check_jump_ldap_tls: OK (url=${url}, tlsOptions=${hasTlsOptions})`);