fix: agent REST router mounted before 404; promote opens pre-filled modal; Directory refresh; Vault OpenBao (v1.28.0) (#169)

- api_agent: REST router mounted synchronously in app.js (was post-listen, behind
  the 404 catch-all -> /api/agent/* 404'd); WS init stays on onListen
- directory.ejs: promote opens a pre-filled resource modal (Save confirms);
  addEdge/removeEdge call loadResources() (was undefined loadData -> stale table);
  addGroup/removeGroup refresh the Access column
- vault.ejs: 'Powered by OpenBao' header badge

.dockerignore

@@ -19,10 +19,13 @@
 !API.md
 !directory_spec.md
 !docs/**/*.md
+# The screenshots the README (served at /docs/overview) links. `COPY docs /docs`
+# in Dockerfile.openldap needs these present in the build context.
+!docs/images/**
 
-# Tests
-nodejs/tests/
-nodejs/*.test.js
+# Tests (excluded from production builds; test-runner Dockerfile copies them explicitly)
+# nodejs/tests/
+# nodejs/*.test.js
 
 # Host dependency tree — let the image run a clean `npm ci`. Also avoids
 # copying platform-wrong native modules (e.g. bcrypt built for the host OS).

.github/workflows/pr-tests.yml

@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ jobs:
           # directory layout (dc=example,dc=com) -- only the admin password
           # (normally supplied via a gitignored secrets.js) needs setting.
           app_ldap__bindPassword: your-ldap-password
+          # routes/oauth.js now refuses to start without a real jwtSecret.
+          # This is a non-secret test value; the container under test uses
+          # secrets.js.example's jwtSecret independently.
+          app_oauth__jwtSecret: ci-test-jwt-secret-do-not-use-in-production
         run: npm test
 
   test-summary:

.gitignore

@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ ops/cookbooks/vendor
 secrets.json
 secrets.js
 
+# Per-deployment secret files (real LDAP/SMTP/jwtSecret + generated OAuth
+# creds). theta-env bind-mounts ./config and generates/fills these at setup;
+# they must never be committed. The empty *.example templates ARE tracked.
+config/*-secrets.js
+
 # Jekyll build artifact (GitHub Pages builds remotely; ignore locally)
 docs/_site
 

API.md

@@ -703,6 +703,10 @@ The authenticated user is automatically set as the group owner.
 { "results": true, "message": "Added user uid to group group." }
 ```
 
+Returns `409` if the user is already a member — common in practice, since
+`groupOfNames` requires at least one member and so seeds whoever created the
+group into it.
+
 ---
 
 ### Remove User from Group
@@ -716,6 +720,66 @@ The authenticated user is automatically set as the group owner.
 
 ---
 
+### Nest a Group Inside Another
+
+**`PUT /api/group/:group/nested/:child`** — `app_sso_admin` or group owner
+
+Makes `:child` a member of `:group`, so everyone in `:child` is a member of
+`:group` at any depth.
+
+**Response:**
+```json
+{ "results": { "cn": "group", "member": ["..."] }, "message": "Nested child inside group." }
+```
+
+**Errors:**
+
+| Status | When |
+|--------|------|
+| `400` | `:group` and `:child` are the same group |
+| `409` | already nested, or the nesting would create a loop (`:child` already contains `:group`, directly or transitively) |
+
+---
+
+### Un-nest a Group
+
+**`DELETE /api/group/:group/nested/:child`** — `app_sso_admin` or group owner
+
+**Response:**
+```json
+{ "results": { "cn": "group", "member": ["..."] }, "message": "Removed child from group." }
+```
+
+**Errors:**
+
+| Status | When |
+|--------|------|
+| `409` | `:child` is the only member — `groupOfNames` requires at least one |
+
+---
+
+### Effective Membership
+
+**`GET /api/group/:group/effective`** — Any authenticated user
+
+Who a group actually grants. `direct` is users listed on the group itself
+(never groups); `nestedGroups` is what is nested into it; `effective` is every
+user reachable through the whole chain.
+
+**Response:**
+```json
+{
+  "results": {
+    "cn": "app_gitea_access",
+    "direct": ["cn=alice,ou=people,dc=example,dc=com"],
+    "nestedGroups": [{ "cn": "developers", "dn": "cn=developers,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com" }],
+    "effective": ["cn=alice,ou=people,dc=example,dc=com", "cn=bob,ou=people,dc=example,dc=com"]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
 ### Delete Group
 
 **`DELETE /api/group/:group`** — `app_sso_admin` or group owner
@@ -1135,6 +1199,143 @@ Configurable per-client via `token_lifetime`. Global defaults (in seconds):
 
 ---
 
+## Plugin Endpoints
+
+Base path: `/api/plugins`
+
+All endpoints require authentication and `app_sso_admin`, `app_sso_directory_admin`, or `app_super_admin` membership. Secret field values are always returned masked (`********`); they are stored in OpenBao at `secret/plugins/<instance-id>/conf`, never in the database row. See [Plugins](docs/plugins.html).
+
+### List Plugin Types
+
+**`GET /api/plugins/types`**
+
+Returns the installed plugin types and their `configSchema` (used to build the create-instance form).
+
+**Response:**
+```json
+{
+  "results": [
+    {
+      "type": "proxmox",
+      "category": "discovery",
+      "name": "Proxmox VE",
+      "description": "Discover VMs, containers, and hypervisor nodes from a Proxmox VE API endpoint.",
+      "configSchema": [
+        { "key": "url", "label": "API URL", "type": "url", "required": true },
+        { "key": "tokenId", "label": "Token ID", "type": "text", "required": true },
+        { "key": "tokenSecret", "label": "Token Secret", "type": "password", "required": true, "secret": true }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### List Plugin Instances
+
+**`GET /api/plugins/`**
+
+**Response:** `{ "results": [ { "id", "pluginType", "category", "name", "slug", "enabled", "cron", "config", "secrets": {…masked…}, "lastRunAt", "lastStatus", "lastError" } ] }`
+
+---
+
+### Get One Instance
+
+**`GET /api/plugins/:id`** — same shape as a list entry.
+
+---
+
+### Create Instance
+
+**`POST /api/plugins/`**
+
+`config` is a flat object of **all** field values (secret and non-secret); the server splits it — non-secret fields go to the DB row, secret fields to OpenBao. Creating an enabled instance schedules it and kicks one immediate run. `slug` is the discovery source name (lowercase letters/digits/_/-, max 64, unique).
+
+**Request:**
+```json
+{
+  "pluginType": "proxmox",
+  "name": "Proxmox — Home Lab",
+  "slug": "proxmox-homelab",
+  "cron": "0 * * * *",
+  "config": { "url": "https://pve:8006", "tokenId": "u@pam!t", "tokenSecret": "secret-value" }
+}
+```
+
+Errors: `400` if the plugin type is unknown, the slug is malformed/duplicated, or a required field is missing; `400` with an OpenBao hint if writing the secret fails (re-run `./setup.sh` with theta-suite ≥ v1.30.1).
+
+---
+
+### Update Instance
+
+**`PUT /api/plugins/:id`** — update `name`, `cron`, `enabled`, and non-secret `config`. Secret fields are changed via `PUT /:id/secrets`. Re-schedules if `cron` or `enabled` changed.
+
+---
+
+### Update Secrets
+
+**`PUT /api/plugins/:id/secrets`** — body is a flat object of secret field values. Blank/`********` values are ignored (kept as-is).
+
+---
+
+### Test Instance
+
+**`POST /api/plugins/:id/test`** — runs the plugin's `validate`. Returns `{ "ok": true }` or `400 { "ok": false, "error": "..." }`.
+
+---
+
+### Load / Unload / Run Now
+
+- **`POST /api/plugins/:id/load`** — enable + schedule + run now.
+- **`POST /api/plugins/:id/unload`** — unschedule + disable.
+- **`POST /api/plugins/:id/run`** — enqueue one immediate run (regardless of enabled).
+
+---
+
+### Last Run Status
+
+**`GET /api/plugins/:id/runs`** → `{ "results": { "lastRunAt", "lastStatus", "lastError" } }` (`lastStatus` is `ok` | `error` | `running`).
+
+---
+
+### Delete Instance
+
+**`DELETE /api/plugins/:id`** — unschedules, removes the OpenBao secret namespace, and deletes the row.
+
+## Configuration Endpoints
+
+Base path: `/api/conf`
+
+All endpoints require authentication and `app_sso_admin` membership. Runtime configuration (SMTP, discovery, OAuth) is stored in OpenBao at `secret/sso-manager/conf` and overlaid onto the live app config; changes take effect immediately and persist across restarts. Secret fields (`smtp.pass`, `oauth.jwtSecret`) are **always returned masked** (`********`); submit a blank or `********` value to keep the current stored secret, or a new non-blank value to replace it.
+
+### Get Configuration
+
+**`GET /api/conf`** — returns the editable config groups (`smtp`, `discovery`, `oauth`) with secret fields masked to `********`.
+
+**Response:**
+```json
+{
+  "smtp": { "host": "smtp.example.com", "port": 587, "secure": false, "user": "noreply@example.com", "pass": "********", "from": "SSO Manager <noreply@example.com>" },
+  "discovery": { },
+  "oauth": { "issuer": "https://sso.example.com", "jwtSecret": "********", "token_lifetime": { "access_token": 3600, "refresh_token": 2592000 } }
+}
+```
+
+### Save Configuration
+
+**`POST /api/conf`** — deep-merges the submitted groups into `secret/sso-manager/conf` (per-key shallow merge of nested objects) and re-applies them to the live config. A blank or `********` value for `smtp.pass` or `oauth.jwtSecret` preserves the stored secret.
+
+**Request:**
+```json
+{
+  "smtp": { "host": "smtp.example.com", "port": 587, "secure": false, "user": "noreply@example.com", "pass": "********", "from": "SSO Manager <noreply@example.com>" },
+  "oauth": { "issuer": "https://sso.example.com", "token_lifetime": { "access_token": 3600, "refresh_token": 2592000 } }
+}
+```
+
+**Response:** `{ "success": true }`
+
 ## Error Responses
 
 All endpoints return errors in this format:

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,10 +1,584 @@
+# v1.28.0
+- fix: `/api/agent/nodes` no longer 404s — the previous "unconditional mount" was still inside the post-listen `onListen` hook, so the REST router landed *behind* app.js's terminal 404 catch-all and every `/api/agent/*` request 404'd. The router is now mounted synchronously in `app.js` before the 404 handler; only the agent WebSocket setup runs on `onListen`.
+- feat: promoting a discovered inventory resource now opens the resource form pre-filled with the discovered data (name, kind, IP, subtype, …) for review; the modal's Save confirms the promote (creates the LDAP groups + marks it managed) instead of silently promoting.
+- fix: Directory table no longer goes stale after add/remove edge — `addEdge`/`removeEdge` called an undefined `loadData()`, which threw and left the host/parent linkage stale until a manual refresh; they now call `loadResources()`. `addGroup`/`removeGroup` also refresh so the Access column stays accurate.
+- feat: Vault page states it's powered by OpenBao (header badge linking to openbao.org).
+
+# v1.27.0
+- fix: Directory group names now match `docs/GROUPS.md` exactly — per-resource groups are `{site}_{kind}_{name}_{level}` (`site_local_host_theta-env_access`, `site_local_app_sso-manager_access`), with the kind always present and the resource name slug stripped of its kind prefix. Services map to the `app` kind. The access-request + resolver tests were updated to the documented convention.
+- fix: a site resource now carries only `god_admin` + the site-wide groups (`{site}_super_admin`, `{site}_everyone`); the kind-scoped aggregates are still created for nesting but are no longer surfaced on the site's modal.
+- fix: groups no longer appear 3× under a resource — the Directory self-heal (which runs on every load) was creating duplicate `ResourceGroup` links; linking is now idempotent (check-then-create).
+- fix: `/api/agent/nodes` no longer 404s — the agent REST router is mounted unconditionally instead of being gated on the WebSocket server being up.
+- fix: `POST /api/shared-secrets/` rejected valid slugs — the slug regex now allows underscores (was hyphens-only).
+- fix: `GET /api/shared-secrets/` crashed with `s.path is not a function` — the list spread dropped the instance's `path()` method; now uses the static `SharedSecret.pathFor`.
+- fix: promoting a discovered inventory resource crashed with `Resource.update is not a function` — `update` is an instance method; the promote handler now loads an instance and calls `update()` on it.
+- feat: Vault → Apps tab now lists minted app tokens (the "Minted apps" list) — each is a scoped OpenBao credential for an external service; sso renews them and the list shows renewal state, so a minted credential no longer vanishes after its once-only token display. New `GET /api/vault/apps`.
+- feat: Vault page documents itself — a `/docs/vault` help icon in the header, and the doc now covers the Apps + Shared tabs.
+- feat: discovery plugin cards show last-run time + status (ok/error) and a Logs button that opens the captured run log.
+
+# v1.26.1
+- fix: the legacy `app_super_admin` group is gone — `SUPER_ADMIN_GROUP` (nested into every resource's `_admin` group by auto-provisioning) is now `god_admin`, and `docker-entrypoint.sh` no longer seeds or nests `app_super_admin` (god_admin is nested into the `app_sso_*` groups directly). `isSuperAdmin` still recognizes a pre-existing `app_super_admin` as a migration alias, so an old deployment isn't stripped of rights until it's rebuilt.
+
+# v1.26.0
+- feat: complete the group model (docs/GROUPS.md) — `god_admin` is now seeded into LDAP and nested into `app_super_admin`; every site auto-provisions `{site}_super_admin`, `{site}_hosts_*`/`{site}_apps_*` aggregates and `{site}_everyone`; per-resource `_admin`/`_access` groups (named `{site}_{slug}_{level}`, the kind carried in the resource slug) are nested into the site aggregates so the inheritance lattice exists in LDAP, not just in the resolver. Site/aggregate groups are self-healed idempotently on every Directory load, so a directory seeded by an older release picks them up without a rebuild.
+- feat: the naming convention is now enforced server-side — `POST /api/directory-admin/groups` rejects a group CN that isn't a valid group for the target resource (its own `_admin`/`_access`/capability, a site aggregate, a site-level group, or `god_admin`), so the free-text field can no longer mint `*_accessmember`-style names
+- feat: `god_admin` is managed from the Directory — the site resource modal surfaces `god_admin` + the site-level groups as associated groups, so its members (and the site's) are editable right there
+- fix: Directory agent status dots no longer paint every host red when the `/api/agent/nodes` endpoint is unreachable (older app or transient outage) — they now show a neutral grey "agent service unreachable" instead of a false alarm
+- fix: Profile + API Tokens cards are both full-width on the profile page (the API card was a narrower centered block)
+- fix: in-app `/docs/<slug>` pages returned 500 — `Dockerfile.openldap` never copied the `docs/` tree into the image (only the root README/CHANGELOG/API/directory_spec), so every page but those few hit a missing-file error; the whole `docs/` dir now ships, and doc images are served at `/docs/images`
+- test: group resolver tests now cover the prefixed site-slug convention (`site_local_...` is kept verbatim, not re-slugified to `site-local`)
+
+# v1.25.0
+- feat: hierarchical group & permission model (docs/GROUPS.md) — god_admin, {site}_super_admin, {site}_hosts_*/{site}_apps_* aggregates, and per-resource {site}_host_<slug>_admin/access/<capability>; inheritance resolver (admin implies access, capabilities explicit), meta everyone/{site}_everyone groups
+- feat: remove the standalone Groups page — group management is tied to adopted Directory resources (help link to the model in the Directory toolbar)
+- feat: console admin recognizes god_admin and site-scoped super/app-admin groups (legacy app_sso_admin/app_super_admin kept as migration aliases)
+
+# v1.24.0
+- feat: Agents merged into the Directory — removed the standalone Agents page. Host rows show a green/yellow/red theta-agent status dot (healthy / high-load / not connected) and the resource modal gained a Metrics tab with live telemetry + discovery
+- feat: Discovery Plugins New-plugin modal — slug is now derived from the name (field removed), the cron field is a dropdown (hourly/daily/weekly + custom), and per-plugin settings are collected from the configSchema (e.g. Proxmox url/tokenId/tokenSecret) instead of an empty config
+- feat: Directory resource slug is now read-only and derived from the name
+- feat: Vault page restyled to match the rest of the site (bounded container, card + nav-tabs header, h4)
+- feat: navbar — the username is no longer underlined; only the active nav link is bold + underlined
+
+# v1.23.0
+- fix: /api/vault proxy never injected X-Vault-Token — the true root cause of the recurring vault 403 "permission denied". The proxy declared its hook with http-proxy-middleware v3 syntax (`on: { proxyReq }`), which the installed HPM v2 silently ignores, so every request reached OpenBao unauthenticated (and the client's sso auth headers were never stripped). Rewritten as v2 `onProxyReq`.
+- fix: vault proxy header injection ordered before `fixRequestBody` — the body write flushes headers, so setting X-Vault-Token after it silently failed on every POST/PUT (writes would still 403 even with the hook fixed)
+- fix: initORM add-only schema heal — `sequelize.sync()` never ALTERs existing tables, so columns added by newer releases (e.g. `PluginInstance.lastLog`, which crashed the scheduler on every boot of an upgraded deployment) are now detected via describeTable and added with addColumn (additive only, per-column fail-soft)
+- feat: external-app vault tokens are long-lived and auto-renewed — minted via the new `sso-app` token role (periodic 768h, falls back to sso-broker's 24h role until theta-suite setup.sh is re-run); sso stores each token's accessor (new VaultAppToken model — an accessor can renew/revoke but not authenticate) and renews all of them at boot + every 6h via auth/token/renew-accessor, so a downstream app's credential stays valid as long as sso runs with zero renewal code in the app
+- feat: re-minting an app token revokes the app's previous token via its stored accessor — exactly one live credential per app, no zombies
+- test: wire-level tests for the vault proxy (real HTTP round-trip asserting token injection, auth-header stripping, path rewrite, and POST body integrity) + app-token accessor lifecycle tests
+
+# v1.22.0
+- feat: Agents page — live list of connected theta-agent hosts with telemetry (CPU/RAM/disk/ZFS/GPU) + online status, updating via socket.io
+- security: auth + admin-gate the /api/agent REST routes (previously unauthenticated)
+
+# v1.21.0
+- fix: always reconcile OpenBao policy content before serving a (possibly cached) token, so stale stored policies can no longer cause a recurring vault 403 "permission denied"
+- feat: shared secrets — users can publish secrets to secret/shared/<owner>/<slug> and grant read access to other users and downstream apps (OpenBao ACL policy edits, applied live)
+- feat: shared-secrets API + Shared tab in the vault UI
+
+# v1.20.0
+- fix: OpenBao 403 on vault secrets list (directory list grants + policy self-heal)
+
+## v1.19.0
+- Added WebSocket endpoint for theta-agent C2
+
+# v1.18.0
+- feat: Add messaging plugins, Docker discovery, fix reconciliation
+
 # Changelog
 
 All notable changes to this project are documented here. Format loosely
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); versions
 correspond to git tags (`vX.Y.Z`) and `nodejs/package.json`'s `version`.
 
-## [Unreleased]
+## [1.17.2] - 2026-08-01
+
+Post-deploy fixes from testing the v1.31.0 stack, plus the SMS (VoIP.ms) and
+Terms-of-Service configuration the `/conf` page was missing. Seven issues:
+
+### Fixed
+- **Plugin slug is now auto-generated** from the instance name — the New Plugin
+  modal no longer asks for a Slug (it derived a stable, unique handle from the
+  name, appending `-2`, `-3`, … on collision). The generated slug still shows in
+  the table and the Edit (read-only) modal. `POST /api/plugins` `slug` is now
+  optional; an explicit slug is still accepted and validated. (`routes/api_plugins.js`,
+  `views/plugins.ejs`)
+- **Plugin schedule is a dropdown**, not a raw cron box: Hourly / Daily /
+  Weekly, plus **Custom** which reveals the raw 5-field cron input. Stored value
+  is still a cron string, so the server is unchanged. (`views/plugins.ejs`)
+- **`/vault` secrets list no longer 403s.** Root cause: the per-user, per-app,
+  and admin OpenBao policies granted `list` only on `secret/metadata/.../*`
+  (nested paths), never on the directory path itself — so listing a directory's
+  *contents* (which checks `list` on the directory, e.g. `secret/metadata/users/<uid>`
+  or the mount root `secret/metadata`) was denied. `vault_broker.js`'s
+  `userPolicyHcl`/`appPolicyHcl` now also grant `list` on the bare directory
+  path, and `ensurePolicy` now always re-writes the policy (idempotent) so
+  already-created `user-<uid>` policies pick up the new grant on the next
+  vault-page visit. The matching `sso-admin` mount-root grant ships in
+  theta-suite v1.31.1 (`setup.sh`), where `ensure_policy` is likewise made
+  always-write so re-running `./setup.sh` applies policy edits.
+- **`/profile` no longer shows literal `{{…}}` tags.** Three template fragments
+  sat outside the `jq-repeat="user"` scope, so they rendered raw: the card
+  header `Profile: {{user.uid}}`, the `Members of {{user.uid}}'s Group` tab
+  label, and the Admin Actions block's `{{#isActive}}`/`{{#isInactive}}`
+  buttons. The header/label are now populated by JS (the `Members` label
+  already had a setter pointing at a missing id); the Admin Actions block is
+  moved inside the scope so `{{uid}}`/`{{#isActive}}`/`{{#isInactive}}` render
+  and the correct Activate/Deactivate button shows. (`views/profile.ejs`)
+- **Editing a plugin now persists.** The Edit modal had been prefilled with the
+  masked secret values and rendered them as fields, but `PUT /:id` only saves
+  non-secret config — so an edited secret was silently dropped. The Edit modal
+  now shows **non-secret fields only** (secrets have their own Edit-Secrets
+  modal), removing the confusion. (`views/plugins.ejs`)
+- **nmap plugin: "NMAP not found at command location: nmap"** — the `nmap`
+  binary was not installed in the app image. `Dockerfile.openldap` now `apk
+  add`s `nmap` in the runtime stage, and `plugins/discovery/nmap.js` translates
+  the opaque node-nmap spawn-missing error into an actionable `lastError`.
+
+### Added
+- **SMS (VoIP.ms) configuration on `/conf`.** The existing VoIP.ms SMS sender
+  (`models/sms.js`, used for 2FA OTP delivery) was configurable only via env /
+  config files. It now has an SMS card on `/conf` (API username, DID, API
+  password), saved to OpenBao at `secret/sso-manager/conf` under `voipms`, with
+  the API password masked (`********`) and leave-blank-to-keep — mirroring the
+  SMTP card exactly. `models/sms.js` reads `conf.voipms.*` at call time, so a
+  saved change takes effect live without a restart. (`routes/api_conf.js`,
+  `views/conf.ejs`)
+- **Terms of Service editor moved to `/conf`** from the admin Overview
+  dashboard, where it never belonged. The same `app.tos.get`/`update` flow,
+  the "require all users to re-accept" checkbox, and the `app_sso_admin` gate
+  (matching `routes/tos.js`'s PUT gate) are preserved. The Overview page keeps
+  stats, notifications, and metrics. (`views/conf.ejs`, `views/overview.ejs`)
+
+### Notes
+- The `/vault` 403 fix is split across two repos: the sso-side per-user/app
+  policy grants and `ensurePolicy`-always-write ship here; the `sso-admin`
+  mount-root grant and `ensure_policy`-always-write ship in theta-suite v1.31.1.
+  Re-running `./setup.sh` after upgrading applies the sso-admin grant; per-user
+  policies self-heal on the next vault-page visit.
+
+## [1.17.1] - 2026-08-01
+
+Hardens the **runtime SMTP/OAuth secret handling** on the `/conf` admin page to
+match the plugin-secrets discipline: the SMTP password and OAuth JWT secret are
+no longer returned in cleartext by `GET /api/conf` or round-tripped through the
+form. They remain saved in OpenBao at `secret/sso-manager/conf` at runtime
+(unchanged) — only how they're surfaced to the admin changes.
+
+### Changed
+- **`GET /api/conf`** now masks `smtp.pass` and `oauth.jwtSecret` to `********`
+  (was: returned in cleartext). Non-secret fields (host, port, user, from,
+  secure, issuer, token lifetimes) are returned as before.
+- **`POST /api/conf`** now treats a blank or `********` secret-field submission
+  as "keep the current stored value" — so an admin editing the From address or
+  token lifetimes no longer has to re-enter (or leak) the SMTP password / JWT
+  secret. Only a genuinely new, non-blank value overwrites. The preserved values
+  are re-applied to live `conf` immediately, as before.
+- **`/conf` page** (`views/conf.ejs`): the Password and JWT Secret fields carry
+  a "leave unchanged to keep the current value stored in OpenBao" hint; the page
+  copy notes secret fields are masked. No JSON-textarea editing is involved —
+  SMTP is and remains configured through structured form fields.
+
+### Notes
+- SMTP (and OAuth) config was **already** saved to OpenBao at runtime before
+  this release (via `POST /api/conf` → `baoConf.set('sso-manager/conf')`, and
+  overlaid back at boot by `bao-conf.init`). This release closes the
+  cleartext-exposure gap; it does not move the storage path.
+- No theta-suite policy change required — `secret/sso-manager/conf` was already
+  granted to the `sso-broker` policy.
+
+## [1.17.0] - 2026-08-01
+
+A real **plugin system**: the half-built discovery plugins (statically
+configured in `sso-secrets.js`, only toggleable for cron/enabled) become
+**configurable, loadable/unloadable plugin instances** you manage from a
+dedicated **Plugins** page and the `/api/plugins` API, with multiple runtime
+copies of each type and per-instance secrets stored in OpenBao.
+
+### Added
+- **Plugin instances** — a new `PluginInstance` ORM model
+  (`nodejs/models/plugin_instance.js`, Sequelize) is the registry of
+  configured, scheduled plugin copies. Each has a `pluginType`, a unique
+  `slug` (the discovery source name), a cron schedule, an `enabled` flag
+  (load/unload), non-secret `config` (JSON), and last-run bookkeeping. Multiple
+  instances of the same type are supported.
+- **Plugin registry** (`nodejs/services/plugin_registry.js`) — generalizes the
+  one-shot discovery-plugin scan in `scheduler.js`. Plugin types are modules
+  under `nodejs/plugins/<category>/<type>.js` exporting a manifest
+  (`type`, `category`, `name`, `description`, `configSchema`, `validate`,
+  `run`/`discover`). Exposes `getTypes`, `getModule`, `splitConfig` (secret vs
+  non-secret), `mask`, and required-field helpers for the UI/API.
+- **Per-instance secrets in OpenBao** (`nodejs/utils/plugin_secrets.js`) —
+  `configSchema` fields flagged `secret:true` (e.g. a Proxmox `tokenSecret`,
+  UniFi `password`) are stored at `secret/plugins/<instance-id>/conf`, never in
+  the DB. The UI only ever sees masked (`********`) values. Plugins run
+  in-process (BullMQ workers), so they need no OpenBao token of their own — the
+  SSO reads/writes via the `sso-broker` token. **Requires theta-suite ≥ v1.30.1**
+  for the `sso-broker` policy grant on `secret/plugins/*`; the API fails-soft
+  with a clear error if absent.
+- **`/api/plugins` API** (`nodejs/routes/api_plugins.js`, replaces the old
+  `routes/plugins.js`) — `GET /types`, list/get/create/update/update-secrets/
+  test/load/unload/run/delete/runs. Admin-only
+  (`app_sso_admin` / `app_sso_directory_admin` / `app_super_admin`).
+- **Plugins page** (`/plugins`, `views/plugins.ejs`) + nav entry — instance
+  table with New/Edit/Edit-Secrets/Test/Run-now/Load/Unload/Delete, config forms
+  rendered from each type's `configSchema`.
+- **`validate`** ("Test" button) on the built-in Proxmox/UniFi/Nmap plugins.
+
+### Changed
+- `services/scheduler.js` now schedules from the `PluginInstance` table instead
+  of static `conf.discovery.plugins` + a Redis override hash. Each instance owns
+  a stable BullMQ JobScheduler id (`plugin:<instanceId>`) so load/unload
+  upsert/remove one schedule without disturbing the rest. Discovery plugins
+  reconcile results under the instance's `slug`.
+- The three discovery plugins (`plugins/discovery/{proxmox,unifi,nmap}.js`)
+  gained manifests (`configSchema`, `validate`, `run` alias). `nmap`'s
+  `targetRange` is non-secret; Proxmox `tokenSecret` and UniFi `password` are
+  secret.
+- The `/plugins` page route renders the page instead of redirecting to
+  `/directory`; the **Agents & Scheduler** tab was removed from `/directory`
+  (plugins are now managed on the Plugins page). The `/docs/agents` link is
+  aliased to `/docs/plugins`.
+- `docs/plugins.md`, `docs/vault.md`, `docs/_config.yml` (nav), and `API.md`
+  (Plugin Endpoints section) document the new system.
+
+### Legacy migration
+On first boot of v1.17.0, if the `PluginInstance` table is empty **and**
+`conf.discovery.plugins` has entries, one instance per configured type is seeded
+automatically (secret fields copied into OpenBao). After that the static
+config is ignored — manage plugins from the UI/API. Idempotent (guarded by the
+empty-table check).
+
+### Prerequisite
+**theta-suite ≥ v1.30.1** — re-run `./setup.sh` after upgrading so the
+`sso-broker` OpenBao policy is granted `secret/plugins/*`. Without it, storing
+plugin secrets fails with a clear error.
+
+## [1.16.1] - 2026-08-01
+
+Fix: the Configuration (`/conf`) and Vault (`/vault`) pages returned **401** for
+a logged-in admin. Both view routes did server-side auth using `req.user`, but
+this app's auth-token is a header set by client-side JS (localStorage), not a
+cookie — so `req.user` is undefined on a plain browser navigation.
+`permission.byGroup(undefined, …)` throws status 401, and the `middleware.auth`
+gate on `/vault` threw `Auth.errors.login()` (401) for the same reason.
+
+Both routes now render the shell unconditionally (like `/users`, `/directory`,
+`/overview`) and gate client-side: `conf.ejs` already called
+`app.auth.forceLogin(['admin','app_sso_admin'])`; `vault.ejs` now derives
+`isAdmin` + the personal namespace from `/api/user/me` after `forceLogin()`
+instead of server-rendering them. The `/api/conf` and `/api/vault` endpoints
+still enforce `app_sso_admin` + the OpenBao scope server-side, so protection is
+unchanged — only the view-route gating moved client-side where the session
+actually lives. Also removed a dead duplicate `/conf` route definition.
+
+## [1.16.0] - 2026-08-01
+
+OpenBao becomes the central secrets store for the theta42 stack, and the SSO
+Manager becomes its broker. This is the SSO's half of the move: it loads its
+own secrets from OpenBao, mints scoped tokens for users and external apps,
+and exposes a fixed, role-scoped personal-secrets UI.
+
+### Changed
+- **Secrets now load from OpenBao at boot** via
+  [@simpleworkjs/bao-conf](https://simpleworkjs.github.io/bao-conf/), which
+  deep-merges `secret/sso-manager/conf` over the file-loaded config
+  (replacing the old `utils/conf_manager.js`, which did a shallow-per-key
+  merge). `bin/www` runs `bao-conf.init()` after `models.initORM()` and
+  before `listen`. Fail-soft: if OpenBao is unreachable, boot continues from
+  `CONF_SECRETS`. The SSO authenticates with a scoped `VAULT_TOKEN` (policy
+  `sso-broker`), never the root token. The admin **Configuration** UI
+  (`/api/conf`) now writes through `bao-conf.set('sso-manager', …)`.
+- **`/api/vault` proxy reworked** — the old endpoint was an ungated
+  pass-through that never injected an `X-Vault-Token` (so the UI was both
+  ungated *and* broken). It is now `middleware.auth` → `scopeGuard` → a
+  token-injecting proxy. `scopeGuard` resolves a per-user (`user-<uid>`) or
+  per-admin (`sso-admin`) token via the new `utils/vault_broker.js`
+  (Redis-cached, minted through the `sso-broker` token role) and enforces a
+  path prefix as a second layer on top of the OpenBao policy. The client
+  `auth-token` is stripped; only the server-minted token reaches OpenBao.
+- **Vault UI reworked and renamed** (`views/vaultwarden.ejs` →
+  `views/vault.ejs`; the `/vault` route is now `middleware.auth`-gated).
+  Non-admin users see only their `secret/users/<uid>/` namespace; admins get
+  free-form path entry across `secret/` plus an **Apps** tab to mint scoped
+  tokens for external apps (`secret/apps/<name>/*`, shown once with copy +
+  `curl` convention).
+- Bumped package version to track the release tag.
+
+### Removed
+- `nodejs/utils/conf_manager.js` (replaced by `@simpleworkjs/bao-conf`).
+- `nodejs/views/vaultwarden.ejs` (renamed `vault.ejs`).
+
+### Security
+- **Committed-secrets remediation.** `config/sso-secrets.js` (LDAP bind
+  password, SMTP, `oauth.jwtSecret`) and `nodejs/test_plugins.js` (a
+  hardcoded Proxmox root API token and a UniFi password) were tracked on
+  master. They are now untracked + gitignored (`config/*-secrets.js`), and
+  `test_plugins.js` is deleted; `config/proxy-secrets.js.example` added as a
+  placeholder template. **The secrets remain in git history — rotation at
+  the providers is the real remediation and is the operator's to perform.**
+  OpenBao is now the authoritative store; the local files are seed artifacts
+  only.
+
+> Note: releases v1.12.0–v1.15.2 were tagged from merge PRs without
+> corresponding `CHANGELOG.md` entries or GitHub releases; this entry
+> resumes the changelog at v1.16.0.
+
+## [1.11.0] - 2026-07-31
+
+Closes the end-user half of the directory. The admin side could describe the lab; the user side could not tell anyone what they had or how to use it, and several of the paths meant to do so were silently returning nothing.
+
+### Fixed
+- **`GET /api/discovery/me` returned only `isPublic` resources for every human caller.** It resolved the caller's groups from `req.user.groups`, which does not exist — `req.user` is a `User` carrying `memberOf` (DNs). The empty list failed open into "no group-granted resources", so "My Services" on the profile page and the portal's service list were blank for everyone. The same bug made `isDirectoryAdmin()` false for real directory admins, silently downgrading them to the public metadata projection. Group CNs now come from `utils/user_groups.js`.
+- **The portal's "Discover More Services" was dead for every non-admin.** It called the admin-gated `directory-admin/resources` and swallowed the 403 into an empty array — so the one discovery feature never rendered for the audience it existed for. It now calls `/api/discovery/resources`.
+- **Services reported no address.** `/api/discovery/me` had reimplemented `Resource.getMyAccess` without its parent-walking address resolution, leaving clients to guess `address || ip`, which is exactly wrong for a service that is reached at its host's IP. Both paths now share `Resource.withResolvedAddress()`.
+- **Approving access for a user already in the target group threw a 500** and left the request stuck pending. `groupOfNames` requires at least one member, so a resource's auto-created groups are seeded with the creator's DN; the grant is now idempotent.
+- **`DELETE /api/directory-admin/resources/:id` deleted the resource before its edges and group links.** With no transaction, a failure mid-way orphaned rows pointing at a nonexistent id — invisible in the UI and poisonous to `getGraph()`. Dependents go first now.
+- `PUT /api/directory-admin/resources/:id` validated the body only after loading the row, and carried a dead if/else whose branches were identical.
+- `/api/directory-admin/audit-logs` shelled out to `tail` three times via `execSync`; replaced with a bounded async file read (no `child_process`, at most the trailing 256 KB).
+
+### Added
+- **End-user catalog at `/`**, and the first ungated nav item — previously every nav entry was admin-only and a normal user had no signposted destination. Search/filter, per-kind icons, and a **how to reach it** block per card: the URL for a service, the SSH invocation for a host (using the jump-host `uid_-_slug@host` grammar when `directory.jumpHost` is configured).
+- **Self-service access requests** — `AccessRequest` model plus `/api/access-requests` (create, list own, list decidable, approve, deny, withdraw). Approving performs the LDAP group add, so LDAP remains the access-control truth. Requests target a resource's `member`-level group, never its `_admin` one. Replaces the "coming soon" stub.
+- **Admin access visibility**: an Access column on the directory table showing member and group counts (and flagging links whose LDAP group has been deleted), plus a "what can this user reach" lookup — the reverse question, which previously had no UI at all. Backed by `GET /api/directory-admin/access-summary` and `/user-access/:uid`.
+- `conf.directory` — `jumpHost` and `defaultSshPort`, the connection conventions the catalog renders.
+- `tests/access_request.test.js` — the request → approve → grant-is-real loop end to end, including the regression guard for the `user.groups` bug.
+
+### Added — nested groups
+- **A group can now contain another group.** `groupOfNames.member` accepts any DN, so nesting needs no new schema; what it needs is *resolution*, which no released OpenLDAP performs — `memberOf` and `(member=X)` both return direct membership only. Two halves:
+  - **Server-side**: the all-in-one image now builds slapd from a pinned OpenLDAP master commit (`350e9eb3`) to get the **`nestgroup`** overlay (ITS#10161), enabled with `member-filter memberof-filter memberof-values`. `member-values` is deliberately omitted — it expands `member` when reading a group, which destroys the distinction between "listed here" and "reachable via nesting" and is not recoverable afterwards. `pw-sha2` is built from contrib in the same stage; without it every existing `{SSHA512}` password would be unverifiable.
+  - **Client-side**: `Group.list(dn)` computes the transitive closure itself (cycle-detected, depth-capped) when the server can't, selected by `conf.ldap.nestedGroupsServerSide` — which `docker-entrypoint.sh` derives from probing for `nestgroup.so` rather than hardcoding. Both paths are covered by the full suite.
+- `PUT`/`DELETE /api/group/:group/nested/:child` and `GET /api/group/:group/effective`, plus a **Nested** tab on each group card. Cycles are refused (409) rather than silently depth-truncated.
+- **`app_super_admin` is now seeded** (it never was) and nested into `app_sso_admin` / `app_sso_invite` / `app_sso_oauth_admin`, so the privilege is real LDAP membership visible to SSSD and sudo — not just a special case in `utils/permission.js`. Not nested into `app_sso_service_account`, which marks non-person accounts rather than granting anything.
+- Creating a directory resource nests `app_super_admin → <slug>_admin` and `<slug>_admin → <slug>_access`. Both previously required adding every super admin to every new group by hand, so they drifted.
+- `ldap_group_nesting_level = 5` in ldap-client's SSSD template, for hosts pointed at a server without `nestgroup`. Against the bundled slapd the existing `memberof=` access filter is already transitive, so SSH login inherits nesting for free.
+
+### Fixed
+- `PUT /api/group/:group/:uid` returned a bare **500** when the user was already a member — common, since `groupOfNames` requires a member and so seeds whoever created the group. Now a 409 that says so.
+- Un-nesting (or removing) the last member of a group returned a 500 `ObjectClassViolationError`; now a 409 explaining that a group must keep at least one member.
+- `GET /api/user/me` derived `isAdmin` from `memberOf`, which is only transitive when `nestgroup` is present. Against a stock server an admin holding their group via nesting would get `isAdmin=false` and lose the entire admin UI while still passing every server-side permission check.
+- `utils/permission.js`'s `byGroup` checked `group.member.includes(user.dn)` per group, seeing only direct membership.
+- `/api/directory-admin/access-summary` counted `member` values; it now counts the transitive closure, which matters precisely because `app_super_admin` is nested into every resource's admin group.
+- Broken `api.html` link in the published docs (`API.md` lives at the repo root, so Jekyll never rendered one); pointed at the source, and added an API entry to the docs nav.
+
+### Changed
+- `@simpleworkjs/directory-schema` bumped to `^1.1.0`, which declares the ten metadata keys the admin form has always written but the schema never listed (`port`, `externalPort`, `isExternalReachable`, `os`, `gitRepo`, `isCurrentSite` as public; `vmid`, `macAddress`, `installPath`, `systemdService` as admin-only). Undeclared keys are dropped for non-admin callers, which blanked the portal's `OS:` field, hid every service's port from users, and left machine tokens unable to read the port mapping the firewall consumer exists to render.
+- Resource metadata now includes `icon` and `tagline`, collected on the admin form (with a live icon preview) and rendered on the catalog cards.
+
+## [1.10.0] - 2026-07-30
+
+### Added
+- **`app_super_admin` cross-app group**: members are full admins here regardless of `app_sso_admin` membership. Bypassed centrally in `utils/permission.js`'s `byGroup`, folded into `GET /api/user/me`'s `isAdmin` flag, and added to nav/`forceLogin` gates. The same group is now also recognized by proxy and jump-host, and by `ldap-client`'s SSSD access filter (SSH login on every host).
+
+### Changed
+- **Renamed the Executive page to Overview** (route, view, `/api/metrics/overview`, nav label, docs). `/executive` kept as a 301 redirect alongside the existing `/admin`, `/notifications`, `/dashboard` legacy redirects.
+
+## [1.9.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Added
+- **Directory modal's Associated LDAP Groups tab now supports full membership management**: view, add, and remove members/owners of each associated group directly from the tab, reusing the same `PUT`/`DELETE group/:group/:uid` routes and member-mapping pattern already used on the Groups page.
+- **`app.util.revealItem()`** (in the shared `app-base.js`, byte-identical across the 3 apps): scrolls a just-added/-edited element into view and flashes its background. Wired into the Directory table, the Groups tab's member list, and the Groups page's create-group flow.
+
+### Changed
+- **Groups page's search/sort bar is now sticky**, staying visible while scrolling through a long group list. Introduces `--sw-content-offset` (set in `top.ejs` alongside `#spa-shell`'s margin-top) so an in-page sticky element can offset itself below the fixed navbar/update-banner instead of being hidden behind them.
+- **Directory table**: Kind/Name/Env/Host merged into a single "Resource" column.
+- `@simpleworkjs/frontend` bumped to `^0.2.7`.
+
+## [1.8.3] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Changed
+- **`profile.ejs`'s self-service API-token UI unified onto `app.modal`**, matching the pattern already shipped this round in `directory.ejs`, proxy, and jump-host: the static `#secretModal`/`#editModal` elements are retired in favor of the shared `app.modal` singleton, the always-visible inline create-form card becomes a "+ New Token" button + modal, and badge classes switch from `bg-*` to `text-bg-*`.
+- Checkmark-flash copy feedback (silently broken by FontAwesome's `<i>`→`<svg>` replacement) replaced with toast-based `copyFieldValue`, matching proxy and jump-host.
+
+## [1.8.2] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Fixed
+- **Creating a new OAuth integration didn't reliably show the "save this client secret now" reveal modal** — `saveResource()` called `app.modal.close()` immediately before conditionally showing the secret via `app.modal.open()`. `app.modal` is a singleton, and `close()` immediately followed by `open()` collides with Bootstrap's hide-transition guard. An intervening `await loadResources()` made this race unlikely to lose in practice, but not guaranteed to — found while fixing the same, guaranteed-to-lose bug in jump-host and proxy's API-token create flows.
+
+## [1.8.1] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Fixed
+- **The resource modal's "Associated LDAP Groups" autocomplete went empty after the first Add/Edit** — `loadLdapGroups()`'s fetch-once cache guard (`if (ldapGroupsCache) return;`) also skipped repopulating the `<datalist>` on every call after the first, but the modal body (including that `<datalist>`) is rebuilt fresh and empty on every `app.modal.open()`. Now the fetch is still cached, but the datalist is always repopulated.
+
+## [1.8.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Added
+- **Directory resource modal: General / Details / Associated LDAP Groups / Children tabs**, replacing one long form. The new Children tab lists a resource's existing children and lets you add another right from the modal.
+- **Resource audit trail**: `created_by`/`created_on`/`updated_by`/`updated_on`, shown in the modal's new footer (mirrors the convention already used by proxy's `Host` and jump-host's `ApiToken`). Existing resources predating this change show "—" until next edited.
+- **Linkable resource URLs**: `GET /directory/:slug` plus a client-side deep-link check make a resource's modal directly bookmarkable/shareable; the address bar updates to `/directory/{slug}` while its modal is open and reverts on close (including via the browser Back button).
+- **Auto-created LDAP groups are now prefixed with their nearest ancestor Site's slug** (e.g. `site_local_myhost_access` instead of `myhost_access`), so groups for same-named hosts/services under different sites no longer collide or look identical. Resources with no Site ancestor keep the old unprefixed naming.
+
+### Changed
+- `@simpleworkjs/frontend` bumped to 0.2.6: `app.modal` gained the `tabs`/`footer`/`url` options (all opt-in, existing callers unaffected) plus `showTab`/`on`/`deepLinkSlug`/`formatAudit`/`footerButtons` helpers — the shared building blocks behind this release's modal work, reusable by future entity modals in any of the 3 apps.
+
+### Fixed
+- The Directory's Associated LDAP Groups / Relationships lists no longer risk silently dropping their contents on a second modal open (a `jq-repeat`/DOM-rebuild timing race, now rendered manually instead).
+
+### Operational note
+The new `Resource` audit fields require a schema migration on any existing deployment: `ALTER TABLE Resource ADD COLUMN created_by VARCHAR(255); ALTER TABLE Resource ADD COLUMN created_on INTEGER; ALTER TABLE Resource ADD COLUMN updated_by VARCHAR(255); ALTER TABLE Resource ADD COLUMN updated_on INTEGER;` (adjust types for non-sqlite dialects) — `@simpleworkjs/orm`'s `sync()` only creates missing tables, it never alters existing ones.
+
+## [1.7.0] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Fixed
+- **`formAJAX`'s loading indicator showed literal HTML** ("&lt;div class=..."), not a spinner — it passed raw markup to `app.messages.action`, which HTML-escapes its message by design. Replaced with plain text.
+- **`POST /api/user/` (create) and `PUT /api/user/password` had no `message` field** in their response, so the success notification rendered empty. Added messages matching every other route's convention.
+- **The user landing on `/login` with a `?redirect=` had no explanation why** — happens whenever another app's "Log in with SSO" bounces an unauthenticated user through `/oauth/authorize`. Now shows a contextual banner explaining what's happening.
+
+### Changed
+- **Directory: tree view is now the only view** (the list/tree toggle is gone) — simpler, one code path.
+- **Directory: clicking a resource's name opens its detail modal**, not just the pencil/edit icon.
+
+Found via a fresh production install's feedback — see the [theta-env v1.13.0 release](https://github.com/theta42/theta-env/releases) for the full cross-repo summary.
+
+## [1.6.3] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Fixed
+- **Group membership changes (`PUT`/`DELETE /api/group/:group/:uid`) didn't invalidate the User cache**, so `isServiceAccount` (and anything else derived from `memberOf`) could stay stale for up to 5 minutes after a change. This is what caused a real "lost user" report — the account had landed in `app_sso_service_account` (which `users.ejs`'s People tab filters out entirely) and looked exactly like data loss, though nothing was ever deleted.
+
+### Added
+- **A confirmation before adding anyone to `app_sso_service_account`** via the Groups page — that group's whole purpose is to hide an account from the People tab, and there was no guardrail against doing that to a real person by mistake (which is how the bug above happened). Every other group's add-member flow is unchanged.
+
+## [1.6.2] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Fixed
+- **`DELETE /api/oauth/client/:id` 500'd** (`client.remove is not a function`) — `OAuthClient` wraps `@simpleworkjs/orm`'s `Resource` model, whose instance delete method is `.delete()`, not `.remove()`. The Directory Management UI was unaffected (its own delete routes already used `.delete()` correctly); only this legacy/raw API endpoint was broken. Found live against a real deployment's SSO API.
+
+### Added
+- **Regression tests**: PUT/DELETE on `/api/oauth/client/:id` now verify persistence with a follow-up GET rather than trusting the mutating response alone (this is what would have caught the bug above). A static check across all views/client-side scripts fails CI if any native `alert()`/`confirm()`/`prompt()` call appears — these block all further browser events on the page and were fully removed in 1.6.1.
+
+## [1.6.1] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Fixed
+- **Removed every native `alert()`/`confirm()` call**, replacing them with `app.messages.action`/`confirm`/`toast`. Native `confirm()` blocks all further browser events on the page (discovered live, mid browser-verification of the 1.6.0 `app.messages`/`app.modal` adoption, on `directory.ejs`'s "Rotate Client Secret" — it froze the whole tab). Also deleted `app.user.remove`/`app.oauthClient.remove` in `public/js/app.js`, which had native `confirm()` guards and zero callers anywhere in the app.
+
+## [1.6.0] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Changed
+- **Adopted `@simpleworkjs/frontend`'s `app.messages`, `app.modal`, and `app.validate` modules**, replacing the vendored `app.util.actionMessage`/`actionConfirm`/`alert` in `public/lib/js/app-base.js` and the vendored `public/lib/js/val.js`. Message content is now HTML-escaped (the vendored `alert()` this replaces had no escaping), and `app.messages.action` falls back to a page-wide toast when there's no inline `.actionMessage` target. `app.api`/`app.auth`/`app.pubsub`/`app.socket` are untouched — they're app-specific (dual-mode callback/promise API, `auth-token` header injection) and not something the frontend package's generic `app.js` provides.
+
+## [1.5.1] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Fixed
+- **`PUT /api/user/:uid` 500'd with `ObjectClassViolationError` (LDAP `0x41`) when setting `sshPublicKey`** on any account created before the `ldapPublicKey` auxiliary objectClass was added to new-user creation (e.g. the bootstrap `admin` account). `User.update`'s `sshPublicKey` handling and `User.addSSHkey` (`nodejs/models/user_ldap.js`) now add the `ldapPublicKey` objectClass first (ignoring `TypeOrValueExistsError` if already present), the same pattern already used for `dateOfBirth`/`theta42Person`.
+- **OAuth Integration parent dropdown was blank.** `populateHostDropdown` in `nodejs/views/directory.ejs` only built options for `kind === 'host'` and `kind === 'service'` — there was no branch for `kind === 'oauth'`, so choosing "OAuth Integration" in the Directory's add-resource modal left the parent-Service picker empty except the placeholder. Added the missing branch.
+
+## [1.5.0] - 2026-07-26
+
+### Changed
+- **Unified the front-end UI shell across the three theta42 apps.** `views/top.ejs`, `views/bottom.ejs` and `public/lib/js/app-base.js` are now byte-identical in sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host, so the apps look and behave the same and a shell change lands in one edit per repo instead of three divergent ones. Everything that differs between the apps moved into a new `nodejs/utils/ui.js`, exposed to every render as `ui` via `app.locals`: nav items and the groups that may see them, footer repo/license/docs/Terms links, favicon, the profile and post-logout targets, and whether the update banner exists at all.
+- **One nav-gating model everywhere.** `app-base.js` reveals `.group-required-<cn>` elements for each group the current user is in, read from `GET /api/user/me`. sso-manager-node reports LDAP DNs in `memberOf` and the OIDC clients report CNs in `groups`; both normalise to CNs client-side, and the clients' effective-rights `isAdmin` flag is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group — so one gating model covers a group-based provider and boolean-admin clients without either app learning the other's response shape.
+- **`GET /api/user/me` is fetched once per page load and cached** (`app.auth.loadUser`). The nav, per-view `forceLogin` and every group-gated element read that one promise instead of issuing their own request.
+- `app.auth.isLoggedIn` is dual-mode: it returns a Promise **and** invokes an optional node-style callback, so the async and callback call styles both work against one shared `top.ejs`.
+- `app.auth.forceLogin` no longer uses `$.holdReady` (removed in jQuery 4). An unauthenticated user is redirected to `/login?redirect=<path>`; group requirements are still enforced, and `logOut` now only clears the session, leaving the destination to the caller (`ui.logoutRedirect`).
+- Dependency alignment across all three apps: `jquery` `^4.0.0` and `ejs` `^3.1.10`.
+
+### Fixed
+- **`app.api.delete` dropped its callback when called by `formAJAX`.** `formAJAX` always passes the serialized form as the second argument, so a DELETE-method form's callback landed in the data slot and never ran. `delete` now accepts both `(url, callback)` and `(url, data, callback)`.
+- **`app.api.post`/`put` referenced an undefined `callback2`** and threw when handed a non-function callback. Both are now dual-mode Promise/callback.
+- **The login page's "reveal the card once we know you're logged out" branch threw** (`Cannot read properties of null`) whenever the logged-in check answered before the parser reached that element — which it always did without a stored token. It now runs on DOM ready.
+- **`logInRedirect` on the legacy `/login/<path>` form kept only the path.** The OIDC provider routes an unauthenticated authorization request through `/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…&state=…`; dropping the query there loses the entire authorization request. The suffix form now preserves its query string.
+
+### Fixed (sso-manager-node)
+- `public/lib/js/val.js` shadowed `message` with `let` inside `validateField`, so a custom rule's return value never reached `validateMessage` and the caller always saw the generic length message. Resolved by adopting the shared validator, which also brings the `target`/`hostname` rules and the real password policy (>= 8 chars, and either 12+ or 3 of 4 character classes) to this app.
+- `public/js/app.js` used `$.isFunction`, removed in jQuery 4.
+
+### Added (sso-manager-node)
+- `GET /api/user/me` now also reports `isAdmin` (membership in `app_sso_admin`), the single effective-rights flag the shared UI shell gates the update banner on. Group-level gating still reads `memberOf`.
+
+### Verified
+- Browser-verified against a full theta-env stack (sso-manager + proxy + jump-host): every top-level page renders with a clean console; nav gating is correct for admin and non-admin; `forceLogin`'s onboarding and group gates fire; `val.js` blocks a weak password and accepts a strong one through a real form submit; the DELETE-method forms work; and the OIDC login round trip (authorize with PKCE -> login -> consent -> callback -> token fragment) completes on both OIDC clients.
+
+## [1.4.0] - 2026-07-25
+
+### Security
+- **The directory discovery API leaked OAuth `client_secret_hash` (and any secret-ish metadata key) to every authenticated caller.** `Resource` doesn't override `toJSON`, so the ORM serialized `metadata` wholesale — including the `client_secret_hash` stored on `kind:'oauth'` resources — across `GET /api/discovery/resources`, `/graph`, `/me`, `/resources/:slug`, and the directory-admin `GET /api/directory-admin/resources`. Every discovery read endpoint and the admin list now route through `projectResource`/`projectResources` from `@simpleworkjs/directory-schema`, which unconditionally strips secret keys (anything matching `/secret|password|privatekey/i`, including `client_secret_hash`) and, for non-directory-admins, reduces metadata to a public allowlist. Admins never receive `client_secret_hash` either.
+
+### Fixed
+- **Directory discovery envelope drift.** `routes/discovery.js` (the `autoRouter(Resource)` mounted live at `app.js:87`) returned **bare arrays**, not the `{ results: [...] }` envelope the directory contract specifies — so jump-host's `data.results || []` collapsed every per-group query to `[]` and no user could bridge. Discovery is now served by explicit `/resources`, `/resources/:slug`, `/graph`, `/me` handlers that all return the `{ results }` envelope. The dead `routes/api_discovery.js` (mounted at `app.js:112`, *after* the 404 catcher) and its mount were removed.
+- `GET /api/discovery/resources?group=<cn>` now returns 200 with `{ results: [...] }` instead of 404 (the autoRouter's `search` supported `?group=`, but the route was effectively unreachable for jump-host's call pattern).
+
+### Added
+- Adopted the shared `@simpleworkjs/*` packages published under the simpleworkjs org:
+  - `@simpleworkjs/directory-schema` — the directory contract: the `kind` enum, `Resource`/`ResourceEdge`/`ResourceGroup` field defs, the `{ results }` envelope, the security projection (`projectResource`/`projectResources`/`isDirectoryAdmin`), and the discovery client. `models/resource.js` imports the field defs; the discovery + directory-admin routes use the projection.
+  - `@simpleworkjs/ldap` — `models/user_ldap.js` and `models/group_ldap.js` now take `escapeFilter`/`escapeDN` and `makeClient`/`withClient` from the shared package (via local wrappers that pass `conf`); sso keeps its rich `User.get`/`Group.get`/`User.login`/`User.addSSHkey` (posix/write-side stays app-local). sso's `makeClient` passes no `tlsOptions`, so cert validation is unchanged.
+  - `@simpleworkjs/app-stack` — unified `build_info` (`{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}`) and the `static-modules` mounting helper. `utils/build_info.js` and the static-modules loop in `routes/index.js` use the shared helpers.
+- New `tests/discovery.test.js` (jest + supertest, runs under the docker harness): locks in the `{ results }` envelope on `/resources`, `/graph`, `/me`, `/resources/:slug`, the `?group=` 200-regression, and the no-`client_secret_hash`/no-secret-key guarantee for every caller.
+
+### Changed
+- Dependency alignment: `ldapts` `^8.1.2` → `^8.1.8`. The new `@simpleworkjs/*` deps resolve from the npm registry (`^1.0.0`); no `file:`/`link:` entries in the lockfile, so `npm ci` is clean in docker builds.
+- `build_info` export shape changed from `{commit, version}` to `{buildVersion, buildHash, buildYear}` (the shared shape used by all three apps).
+
+## [1.3.2] - 2026-07-23
+
+### Fixed
+- **OAuth client management API returned `client_id: undefined` on every GET.** The ORM's `Model.toJSON()` only serializes schema fields, so the mapped `client_id`/`scopes`/`redirect_uris`/… that `OAuthClient.get()` attaches to the wrapped Resource were stripped from `GET /api/oauth/client` and `GET /api/oauth/client/:id` responses. The theta-env bootstrap (which lists clients and rotates by the returned `client_id`) then called `/api/oauth/client/undefined/rotate` and got a 500, aborting stack bring-up when `proxy-secrets.js` had no usable secret. `OAuthClient.get()` now emits an explicit public JSON shape (and deliberately omits `client_secret_hash`, so the secret hash no longer leaks over the API).
+- `OAuthClient.get()` no longer 500s on an unknown/`undefined` client id: `Resource.get()` returns `null` (it doesn't throw), which was dereferenced as `r.kind`. It now returns a clean 404.
+
+## [1.3.1] - 2026-07-23
+
+### Added
+- The Directory documentation (`docs/directory.md`) is now surfaced: registered in-app at `/docs/directory` ("Directory & Inventory"), help-linked from the Directory page header, and linked from the docs-site index. Extended with the shared slug conventions (`site_<name>`, `host_<hostname>` — as used by ldap-client and the theta-env seed), the automatic-registration story (theta-env stack seeding, ldap-client Linux host enrollment), and the API surface (admin at `/api/directory-admin`, read-only graph at `/api/discovery`).
+
+### Changed
+- Direct LDAP binds are described as first-class, not "legacy", across README, DEPLOYMENT.md, docs, and the Dockerfile: Linux hosts are a primary consumer of the directory (PAM/SSSD login, LDAP-backed `sudo` via `sudoRole`, SSH public keys via openssh-lpk) — exactly what the custom schemas exist for.
+
+## [1.3.0] - 2026-07-23
+
+### Added
+- **OAuth client management API** at `/api/oauth/client` (group `app_sso_oauth_admin`): list, create, update, delete, and rotate-secret for OAuth clients, backed by the Resource model. Accepts form-style string inputs (newline-separated `redirect_uris`/`allowed_groups`, space-separated `scopes`).
+- **Dockerized test suite**: `docker-compose -f docker-compose.test.yml up --build` spins up OpenLDAP + Redis + a test-runner that seeds the test user and runs the full jest suite (174 tests) against them. `tests/globalSetup.js` honors `REDIS_URL`.
+
+### Fixed
+- Completed the model-redis → `@simpleworkjs/orm` port that shipped half-finished in 1.2.1:
+  - `OtpToken.issue`/`verify` called nonexistent `find()`/`listDetail()` — every OTP login 500'd.
+  - Impersonation create/revoke called nonexistent `ImpersonationToken.listDetail()` — both endpoints 500'd.
+  - `OAuthClient` read `is_valid` from the Resource model, which has no such column — every client evaluated as disabled and **all `/oauth/authorize` requests were rejected with 400**. Client validity now lives in `metadata` (absent = valid).
+  - `OAuthClient.add` didn't set the required-unique `Resource.slug`; clients now get a slug derived from the client name.
+  - `GET /api/token/:name/:token` returned `{results: null}` with 200 for unknown tokens (orm `get()` returns null instead of throwing); now 404s.
+- `User.login` returns a clean 401 instead of crashing when neither `uid` nor `username` is supplied.
+- Depend on published `@simpleworkjs/orm` ^0.2.8 and `model-redis` ^1.6.0 instead of a local `file:` link that broke `npm ci` in docker builds.
+
+### Changed
+- Removed the Mobile Phone field from the user create/edit form.
+
+## [1.2.1] - 2026-07-22
+
+### Added
+- **Actionable Metrics**: New real-time metrics tracking for failed logins, top IPs, and service usage per user.
+- **LDAP Monitor**: Background service to parse OpenLDAP binds over port 389 and track metrics for legacy apps.
+- **UI Updates**: Executive dashboard now displays actionable metrics cards instead of raw logs. User profiles show individual service usage stats to admins.
+- **Directory Management**: Integrated site/host/service abstractions into directory UI and allowed associating OAuth apps directly to services.
+
+## [1.1.18] - 2026-07-21
+
+### Added
+- N-Way Multi-Master LDAP replication: `LDAP_SERVER_ID` + `LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS` configure `syncrepl` peers in the bundled OpenLDAP, and a new `/sites` page (nav: **Sites**) shows each configured peer's LDAP URL and live reachability.
+- A `location` property on users, editable from the profile and user-edit forms.
+
+### Fixed
+- `/sites` (added above) 500'd on every load: `views/sites.ejs` included nonexistent partials `header`/`footer` instead of this app's actual `top`/`bottom`. Fixed to match every other view.
+
+### Changed
+- Refreshed all README screenshots (dashboard, users, groups, OAuth apps) against the current UI, and added a new Sites & Replication screenshot.
+
+## [1.1.17] - 2026-07-18
+
+### Added
+- `conf.ldap.ldapsHost` and `conf.ldap.ldapsPort` config options (also settable via `app_ldap__ldapsHost` / `app_ldap__ldapsPort`). When `ldapsHost` is set, the `/integrations` page advertises that hostname for direct LDAPS binds instead of deriving it from the public OAuth issuer. This lets operators use an internal-only hostname (e.g. `ldap.internal.example.com` or `sso-manager` on the Docker network) and avoid port-forwarding 636 to the internet.
+- A contextual help panel on `/integrations` → LDAP explaining why LDAPS needs a hostname (not an IP), why 636 should not be publicly forwarded, and the recommended internal-DNS / Docker-internal alternatives.
+
+### Changed
+- `routes/index.js` now computes the displayed LDAPS URL from `conf.ldap.ldapsHost`/`ldapsPort` with fallback to the OAuth issuer host for backward compatibility.
+- `secrets.js.example`, `docs/configuration.md`, `docs/ldap.md`, and `DEPLOYMENT.md` document the new `ldapsHost`/`ldapsPort` options and recommended network layouts.
+- Bumped version to `1.1.17` in `nodejs/package.json`.
+
+## [1.1.16] - 2026-07-18
+
+### Security
+- Hardened LDAP filter and DN construction against injection. All user-supplied values interpolated into group filters (`models/group_ldap.js`) and RDN values used when adding users/groups (`models/user_ldap.js`) are now escaped before being sent to the LDAP server.
+- Replaced `Math.random()`-based token generation in `models/token.js`, `models/oauth_code.js`, and `models/oauth_client.js` with `crypto.randomUUID()` for session tokens, OAuth codes, access/refresh tokens, and client IDs.
+- Replaced `Math.random()`-based OTP generation in `OtpToken.issue()` with `crypto.randomInt()`.
+- `routes/oauth.js` now refuses to start if `oauth.jwtSecret` is missing or still set to the placeholder value, instead of falling back to a hardcoded public string.
+- Rendered docs and Terms-of-Service HTML in `routes/docs.js` and `routes/index.js` are now sanitized with `xss` to prevent stored XSS from malicious markdown.
+- Removed a `console.log` that wrote new-user data (including password hashes) to the log in `models/user_ldap.js`; reduced login-path error logging to `error.name`/`error.message` only.
+
+### Changed
+- Public-release packaging: removed `"private": true` from `nodejs/package.json` and bumped version to `1.1.16`.
+- CI workflow (`.github/workflows/pr-tests.yml`) now sets `app_oauth__jwtSecret` so the test suite can run against the new startup-time JWT validation.
+
+### Fixed
+- `models/email.js`: fixed a template bug where the rendered `from` address used `template.message` instead of `template.from`.
+
+## [1.1.15] - 2026-07-18
+
+### Changed
+- Rewrote `install.sh` as an idempotent git-clone installer, replacing the old flag-driven, copy-based one — `wget -O - .../install.sh | sudo bash` now works the same way it does for theta42/proxy. Installs to `/opt/theta42/sso-manager` (was `/opt/sso-manager`). First run only: bootstraps OpenLDAP with a generated admin password + JWT secret and seeds `/etc/sso-manager/secrets.js` (was `/opt/sso-manager/conf/secrets.js`, hand-filled from CLI flags); later runs never touch LDAP or the secrets file again. `ops/systemd/sso-manager.service` sets `CONF_SECRETS=/etc/sso-manager/secrets.js` to match.
+- `install.sh` now prints the version it's updating from/to (or "Already up to date") on every run.
+
+### Fixed
+- `install.sh` could hang indefinitely on a fresh host if a base package pulled in `tzdata` as a new dependency (no TTY for the interactive timezone prompt), or if the debconf `slapd/domain` value was malformed (a raw DN fragment instead of a dotted domain) — slapd's postinst hangs rather than failing cleanly on a bad domain. Both fixed.
+- `ops/ldap-setup.sh`'s ppolicy-overlay checks used an LDAP substring filter against an attribute that doesn't support substring matching, so they always reported the overlay as unconfigured even when it was correctly set up (stored as `{0}ppolicy`) — the final verification step always failed as a result. Fixed to filter on `(objectClass=olcOverlayConfig)` instead, matching every other check in that script.
 
 ## [1.1.14] - 2026-07-17
 
@@ -106,7 +680,17 @@ First tagged release. Establishes the `vX.Y.Z` tag convention that the in-app up
 - Unix/POSIX and LDAP bind-only service account support, distinct from real-person accounts.
 - Merged OAuth Apps + LDAP Info into a single Integrations page.
 
-[Unreleased]: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/compare/v1.1.14...HEAD
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [1.14.0] - 2026-08-01
+
+### Added
+- Added Configuration page in the UI to manage SSO configurations stored securely in OpenBao Vault.
+- Added Discovery plugin and Scheduler integration within the Directory.
+- Re-routed Vault proxy under `/api/vault` and implemented Vault authentication headers.
+
+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/compare/v1.1.16...HEAD
+[1.1.15]: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/compare/v1.1.14...v1.1.15
 [1.1.14]: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/compare/v1.1.13...v1.1.14
 [1.1.13]: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/compare/v1.1.12...v1.1.13
 [1.1.12]: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/compare/v1.1.11...v1.1.12
@@ -122,3 +706,7 @@ First tagged release. Establishes the `vX.Y.Z` tag convention that the in-app up
 [1.1.2]: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/compare/v1.1.1...v1.1.2
 [1.1.1]: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/compare/v1.1.0...v1.1.1
 [1.1.0]: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/releases/tag/v1.1.0
+
+## [1.19.6] - 2026-08-02
+### Fixed
+- Fixed Vault API returning 403 on the Secrets List due to `http-proxy-middleware` v2 rewriting the path incorrectly (it previously appended the `/api/vault/` mount path to the proxied Vault request).

DEPLOYMENT.md

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ bare-metal / advanced standalone use; most deployments should use the file.
 - Health check: `http://localhost:3001/health` → `{"status":"ok"}`
 - OIDC discovery: `http://localhost:3001/.well-known/openid-configuration`
 - LDAP (internal, app↔slapd): `ldap://localhost:389` (not mapped to the host)
-- LDAPS (for legacy apps / direct binds): `ldaps://<host>:636` (TLS)
+- LDAPS (direct binds: Linux hosts, LDAP-native apps): `ldaps://<host>:636` (TLS)
 
 ### API tokens (personal access tokens)
 
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ docker compose exec sso-manager ldapsearch -x -H ldap://localhost:389 \
 | `PORT` | `3001` | host port mapped to the UI |
 | `LDAPS_PORT` | `636` | host port mapped to LDAPS |
 | `LDAP_PORT` | `389` | uncomment the host mapping in compose to expose plain LDAP (not recommended) |
+| `LDAP_SERVER_ID` | empty | Unique integer ID (e.g. 1, 2) required to enable Multi-Master replication |
+| `LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS` | empty | Space-separated list of other sites' LDAP URLs for replication (e.g. `ldaps://site2:636`) |
 
 Any `app_*` var may also be set directly to override any config value (see the
 table at the top).
@@ -188,6 +190,12 @@ valid 10 years, SAN includes the CN + `localhost` + `127.0.0.1`) and listens on
 `ldap-certs` volume so it persists across container recreation — clients don't need
 to re-trust on every rebuild.
 
+The `/integrations` page derives its LDAPS URL from the OAuth issuer by default.
+To advertise a separate, internal-only hostname (e.g. `ldap.internal.example.com`
+or `sso-manager` for Docker-internal clients), set `conf.ldap.ldapsHost` in your
+secrets file or pass `app_ldap__ldapsHost=...`. See `docs/ldap.md` for
+recommended network layouts and how to match the cert SAN to the hostname.
+
 - **Trusting the self-signed cert** (clients): copy `/etc/openldap/certs/ldap.crt`
   out of the container and add it to the client's trusted CA store, or set
   `TLS_REQCERT never` for quick-and-dirty LAN use. Fetch it with:
@@ -328,14 +336,32 @@ OAuth client). Note: re-running bootstrap resets the bootstrap-admin and
 service-account passwords to the values in `./config/sso-secrets.js`; non-theta
 OAuth clients live in SSO Redis and are preserved by the volume.
 
+> **Note — the bundled slapd is built from source.** The all-in-one image
+> compiles OpenLDAP from a pinned upstream commit to get the `nestgroup`
+> overlay (nested groups; see `docs/directory.md`), because no 2.6.x release
+> ships it. One consequence: master uses **LMDB 1.0.0**, whose on-disk format is
+> mutually unreadable with the 0.9.x in OpenLDAP 2.6.x
+> (`MDB_INVALID: File is not an LMDB file`). Moving a directory between a 2.6.x
+> image and this one is a `slapcat` → `slapadd` reload, not a restart — the same
+> shape as "Restore — LDAP only" above. Verify after a rebuild:
+> `docker compose logs sso-manager | grep nestgroup` should report the overlay
+> as available.
+
 ---
 
 ## Method 2: Bare metal (Debian/Ubuntu)
 
-`install.sh` is an idempotent installer: it installs Node.js 20.x, installs and
-configures OpenLDAP (modules + overlays + custom schema + directory tree +
-required groups), deploys the app to `/opt/sso-manager`, and creates a systemd
-unit. Configuration is written to `/opt/sso-manager/conf/secrets.js` (file-based).
+`install.sh` is an idempotent installer: it installs Node.js 22.x and Redis,
+force-syncs the repo to `/opt/theta42/sso-manager`, and symlinks the systemd
+config from the repo. Re-run it to update — it prints the version you're
+updating from and to (or "Already up to date" if there's nothing new).
+
+On the **first run only** it also installs and configures OpenLDAP (modules +
+overlays + custom schema + directory tree + required groups — see
+`ops/ldap-setup.sh`) and seeds `/etc/sso-manager/secrets.js` with a generated
+LDAP admin password and JWT secret (SMTP is left as a placeholder). Once that
+file exists it's never touched again, and LDAP is never re-bootstrapped —
+edit the file and restart the service to change anything.
 
 ### Prerequisites
 
@@ -346,47 +372,50 @@ unit. Configuration is written to `/opt/sso-manager/conf/secrets.js` (file-based
 ### Install
 
 ```bash
-sudo ./install.sh \
-  -p 'your-ldap-password' \
-  -b 'dc=yourdomain,dc=com' \
-  -n 'Your Org' \
-  -o 3001
+wget -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/master/install.sh | sudo bash
 ```
 
-| Flag | Env var | Description |
-|------|---------|-------------|
-| `-p, --admin-pass` | `LDAP_ADMIN_PASS` | LDAP admin password (required) |
-| `-b, --base-dn` | `LDAP_BASE_DN` | Base DN (default `dc=example,dc=com`) |
-| `-n, --org-name` | `ORG_NAME` | Org name (default `SSO Manager`) |
-| `-o, --port` | `PORT` | HTTP port (default `3001`) |
-| `-j, --jwt-secret` | `JWT_SECRET` | JWT secret (default auto-generated) |
-| `-s, --smtp-config` | `SMTP_*` | SMTP as `host:port:user:pass` |
-| `--skip-ldap` | `SKIP_LDAP` | Skip LDAP setup (use existing) |
-| `--skip-app` | `SKIP_APP` | LDAP setup only |
-| `--dry-run` | `DRY_RUN` | Show actions without making changes |
+or, if you already have the repo checked out:
+
+```bash
+sudo ./install.sh
+```
+
+| Env var | Description |
+|---------|-------------|
+| `LDAP_BASE_DN` | Base DN (default `dc=example,dc=com`) — first run only |
+| `LDAP_ADMIN_PASS` | LDAP admin password (default auto-generated) — first run only |
+| `JWT_SECRET` | JWT secret (default auto-generated) — first run only |
+| `ORG_NAME` | Org name (default `SSO Manager`) — first run only |
+| `PORT` | HTTP port (default `3001`) — first run only |
+| `SKIP_LDAP` | `true` to skip OpenLDAP bootstrap entirely (point at an existing server yourself) |
+| `REPO_URL`, `REPO_DIR`, `BRANCH`, `SECRETS_FILE` | Override the defaults |
 
 ### Post-install
 
 ```bash
-sudo systemctl enable --now sso-manager
+sudo systemctl status sso-manager
 journalctl -fu sso-manager
 curl http://localhost:3001/health    # -> {"status":"ok"}
 ```
 
 ### What `install.sh` does
 
-1. Installs Node.js 20.x (NodeSource).
-2. Installs OpenLDAP (`slapd`) with: `pw-sha2`, `ppolicy`, `memberof`, `refint`
-   modules + overlays; the custom `theta42Person` schema (`dateOfBirth`); indexes;
-   `ou=people`/`ou=groups`/`ou=policies`; a default `pwdPolicy`; and the SSO groups.
-3. Installs the app to `/opt/sso-manager` and runs `npm ci --omit=dev`.
-4. Generates `conf/secrets.js` (LDAP/SMTP/JWT) and `conf/base.js` (generic defaults).
-5. Installs `sso-manager.service` (systemd), enabled on boot.
+1. Installs Node.js 22.x (NodeSource) and Redis.
+2. Clones/updates the repo at `/opt/theta42/sso-manager`.
+3. **First run only:** installs OpenLDAP (`slapd`) with `pw-sha2`, `ppolicy`,
+   `memberof`, `refint` modules + overlays; the custom `theta42Person` schema
+   (`dateOfBirth`); indexes; `ou=people`/`ou=groups`/`ou=policies`; a default
+   `pwdPolicy`; and the SSO groups — then seeds `/etc/sso-manager/secrets.js`.
+4. Symlinks `ops/systemd/sso-manager.service` into `/etc/systemd/system` and
+   runs `npm ci --omit=dev`.
+5. Enables and (re)starts the service.
 
-> For an existing LDAP server, run `sudo ./install.sh --skip-ldap …` and point the
-> app at it. For LDAP-only setup on a host that already runs the app elsewhere, use
-> `--skip-app`. To (re)configure overlays on an already-installed slapd, prefer
-> `ops/ldap-setup.sh` (idempotent, auto-detects the user database).
+> For an existing LDAP server, run with `SKIP_LDAP=true` and write
+> `/etc/sso-manager/secrets.js` yourself (see `secrets.js.example`) before
+> starting the service. To (re)configure overlays on an already-installed
+> slapd, use `ops/ldap-setup.sh` directly (idempotent, auto-detects the user
+> database).
 
 ---
 
@@ -465,8 +494,8 @@ netstat -tlnp | grep 389
 2. **Use LDAPS / StartTLS** for any LDAP connection that crosses the network. The
    bundled slapd listens on `ldaps:///` (636, TLS) and `ldap:///` (389, plain +
    StartTLS); port 389 is not mapped to the host by default so LAN clients can't
-   bind in cleartext. Direct-LDAP apps (legacy services, `theta42/proxy`) should
-   use `ldaps://…:636` or StartTLS.
+   bind in cleartext. Direct-LDAP consumers (Linux hosts, LDAP-native apps,
+   `theta42/proxy`) should use `ldaps://…:636` or StartTLS.
 3. **Persist `JWT_SECRET`** — if the Docker image auto-generates one and you don't
    set `JWT_SECRET`, issued tokens invalidate on container recreation.
 4. **Don't expose the UI's HTTP port to the internet** — terminate TLS at a front

Dockerfile.openldap

@@ -33,37 +33,119 @@ RUN if [ -n "$GIT_COMMIT" ]; then \
         && git rev-parse --short HEAD > /commit.txt; } 2>/dev/null || echo unknown > /commit.txt; \
     fi
 
+# ── OpenLDAP from source ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# We build slapd from OpenLDAP master rather than installing Alpine's packages,
+# for exactly one feature: the `nestgroup` overlay (ITS#10161, Howard Chu,
+# 2024-03-21), which evaluates nested groups server-side. Nothing in any 2.6.x
+# release can do this -- verified: 2.6.13 ships 26 overlay modules and
+# nestgroup is not among them -- and the alternative is resolving nesting
+# separately in every consumer (this app, SSSD on each host, jump-host, proxy),
+# where any consumer that forgets silently under-grants access.
+#
+# Consequence to know about: master ships LMDB 1.0.0, whose on-disk format the
+# 0.9.x used by 2.6.x cannot read, and vice versa
+# ("MDB_INVALID: File is not an LMDB file"). Moving an existing directory onto
+# this image is a slapcat/slapadd migration, not a restart. See DEPLOYMENT.md.
+FROM node:20-alpine AS ldapbuild
+
+# groff is not optional despite producing nothing we ship: the build descends
+# into doc/man unconditionally and its Makefile calls soelim, which groff
+# provides. Without it the whole `make` fails at the man-page stage
+# ("soelim: not found") long after slapd itself has compiled fine.
+RUN apk add --no-cache \
+        build-base autoconf automake libtool \
+        openssl-dev cyrus-sasl-dev \
+        git make pkgconf util-linux-dev groff
+
+# Pinned to an exact commit, not a branch tip. This is the directory server the
+# whole lab authenticates against; an unpinned `master` would mean every image
+# rebuild silently ships whatever landed upstream that morning, and a bad day on
+# master would take out logins with no way to tell what changed.
+#
+# TODO: drop this whole from-source stage once nestgroup ships in a release.
+# It is master-only today (ITS#10161, 2024-03-21); the 2.7 roadmap has slipped
+# from Fall 2024 to Fall 2025 and is still unreleased. When 2.7 lands with
+# nestgroup, revert to `apk add openldap openldap-overlay-nestgroup ...` --
+# the entrypoint already probes for nestgroup.so and needs no change, and the
+# app already keys off app_ldap__nestedGroupsServerSide either way.
+ARG OPENLDAP_COMMIT=350e9eb38b2270c2bad97c61ee02e85fb8f3196d
+
+WORKDIR /src
+RUN git init -q . \
+    && git remote add origin https://git.openldap.org/openldap/openldap.git \
+    && git fetch -q --depth 1 origin "${OPENLDAP_COMMIT}" \
+    && git checkout -q FETCH_HEAD \
+    && git rev-parse HEAD > /opt-openldap-commit.txt
+
+# Overlays are built as loadable modules (=mod) because docker-entrypoint.sh
+# `moduleload`s them individually; nestgroup joins that set.
+RUN ./configure \
+        --prefix=/opt/openldap \
+        --enable-slapd \
+        --enable-modules \
+        --enable-mdb \
+        --enable-memberof=mod \
+        --enable-refint=mod \
+        --enable-ppolicy=mod \
+        --enable-dynlist=mod \
+        --enable-nestgroup=mod \
+        --enable-syncprov=mod \
+        --enable-auditlog=mod \
+        --with-tls=openssl \
+        --with-cyrus-sasl \
+    && make depend \
+    && make -j"$(nproc)" \
+    && make install
+
+# pw-sha2 provides {SSHA512}, which every existing user password is stored as.
+# It lives in contrib and is not covered by the configure flags above, so it is
+# built separately against the just-built tree -- omitting it would make every
+# user password unverifiable.
+RUN cd contrib/slapd-modules/passwd/sha2 \
+    && make prefix=/opt/openldap OPENLDAP_SRC=/src \
+    && cp .libs/pw-sha2.so* /opt/openldap/libexec/openldap/
+
 FROM node:20-alpine
 
-# Install OpenLDAP and required packages.
-# Alpine splits OpenLDAP into many small subpackages; there is no catch-all
-# "openldap-overlays" package. We install exactly the backends/overlays/modules
-# the app depends on:
-#   openldap-back-mdb     : the mdb backend (slapd.conf uses `database mdb`)
-#   openldap-overlay-ppolicy   : ppolicy module + overlay (account locking)
-#   openldap-overlay-memberof  : reverse group membership
-#   openldap-overlay-refint    : referential integrity on group members
-#   openldap-passwd-sha2       : pw-sha2 module ({SSHA512} user password hashing)
-# Note: Alpine does NOT ship a ppolicy.schema file — on OpenLDAP 2.6 the ppolicy
-# schema is built into ppolicy.so and registered when the module loads, so
-# docker-entrypoint.sh loads it via `moduleload ppolicy` (no schema include).
-#   openssl : used by docker-entrypoint.sh to generate a JWT secret
+# Runtime libraries the from-source slapd links against, plus the app's own
+# deps. No openldap* packages here: everything LDAP comes from /opt/openldap.
+# libltdl (module loading -- slapd is useless without it, since every overlay
+# is a loadable module) and libuuid are pulled in by the source build but are
+# NOT dependencies of anything else here, so they must be named explicitly;
+# omitting them fails at runtime with "Error relocating ... lt_dlopenext:
+# symbol not found", not at build time.
 RUN apk add --no-cache \
-    openldap \
-    openldap-clients \
-    openldap-back-mdb \
-    openldap-overlay-ppolicy \
-    openldap-overlay-memberof \
-    openldap-overlay-refint \
-    openldap-passwd-sha2 \
+    openssl \
+    libsasl \
+    libltdl \
+    libuuid \
     dumb-init \
     bash \
-    openssl \
     redis \
+    nmap \
     && rm -rf /var/cache/apk/*
 
-# The openldap package already creates the `ldap` user/group, which slapd runs
-# as (see -u ldap -g ldap in docker-entrypoint.sh). Nothing to add here.
+COPY --from=ldapbuild /opt/openldap /opt/openldap
+# Which upstream commit this slapd was built from — so a running container can
+# answer "what am I actually running" without rebuilding.
+COPY --from=ldapbuild /opt-openldap-commit.txt /opt/openldap/COMMIT
+
+# The Alpine openldap package used to create these; nothing does now, and
+# docker-entrypoint.sh runs slapd as -u ldap -g ldap.
+RUN addgroup -S ldap 2>/dev/null || true \
+    && adduser -S -D -H -G ldap ldap 2>/dev/null || true
+
+# docker-entrypoint.sh invokes slapd/slappasswd/ldapadd/ldapsearch by bare name
+# and probes a list of candidate module directories, so putting the from-source
+# tree first on PATH is all that is needed to redirect it. Schemas are symlinked
+# into the conventional location because the entrypoint's slapd.conf includes
+# /etc/openldap/schema/*.schema, and the app's own schemas (theta42, sudo,
+# openssh-lpk) are copied there too.
+ENV PATH="/opt/openldap/bin:/opt/openldap/sbin:/opt/openldap/libexec:${PATH}"
+RUN mkdir -p /etc/openldap/schema \
+    && for f in /opt/openldap/etc/openldap/schema/*.schema; do \
+         ln -sf "$f" "/etc/openldap/schema/$(basename "$f")"; \
+       done
 
 WORKDIR /app
 
@@ -88,6 +170,7 @@ COPY nodejs/services ./services
 COPY nodejs/utils ./utils
 COPY nodejs/views ./views
 COPY nodejs/public ./public
+COPY nodejs/plugins ./plugins
 
 # routes/index.js reads path.join(__dirname, '../../tos.md') at boot. With the
 # app flattened into /app, __dirname is /app/routes and ../../ resolves to /,
@@ -99,9 +182,12 @@ COPY tos.md /tos.md
 # without internet access. Same flattened-path convention as tos.md above.
 COPY README.md /README.md
 COPY CHANGELOG.md /CHANGELOG.md
-COPY DEPLOYMENT.md /DEPLOYMENT.md
 COPY API.md /API.md
 COPY directory_spec.md /directory_spec.md
+# The docs/*.md tree (plus the images the docs link) is read at runtime too, so
+# the whole docs/ dir must land at /docs. Without this every in-app /docs/<slug>
+# page other than the root-level README/CHANGELOG/API/directory_spec 500s on the
+# fs.readFileSync in routes/docs.js (files missing from the image).
 COPY docs /docs
 
 # Baked commit hash from the gitinfo stage (see build_info.js).
@@ -129,7 +215,8 @@ COPY ops/schema/openssh-lpk.schema /etc/openldap/schema/openssh-lpk.schema
 # 3001: SSO Manager web interface (HTTP — terminate TLS at the front proxy)
 # 389:  LDAP  (plain + StartTLS) — used internally by the app; map to host only
 #       if you want LAN clients to bind without TLS (not recommended).
-# 636:  LDAPS — for legacy apps / direct LDAP binds over the network (TLS)
+# 636:  LDAPS — direct LDAP binds over the network (TLS): Linux host auth
+#       (PAM/SSSD, sudo, SSH keys) and LDAP-native apps
 EXPOSE 3001 389 636
 
 # Health check

Dockerfile.test-runner

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Test-runner image for SSO Manager.
+#
+# Installs all dependencies (including dev) and bundles the app code plus
+# the seed script. The entrypoint waits for LDAP + Redis, seeds the test
+# user, then runs whatever command is given (default: npm test).
+
+FROM node:20-alpine
+
+# Install OpenLDAP clients (ldapadd, ldapsearch) and bash for the seed script
+RUN apk add --no-cache openldap-clients bash
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+# Copy and install dependencies (including devDependencies for jest/supertest)
+COPY nodejs/package*.json ./
+RUN npm ci
+
+# Copy the application source
+COPY nodejs/app.js ./
+COPY nodejs/bin ./bin
+COPY nodejs/conf ./conf
+COPY nodejs/controller ./controller
+COPY nodejs/middleware ./middleware
+COPY nodejs/models ./models
+COPY nodejs/routes ./routes
+COPY nodejs/services ./services
+COPY nodejs/utils ./utils
+COPY nodejs/views ./views
+COPY nodejs/public ./public
+COPY nodejs/tests ./tests
+
+# SQLite database directory (config/inventory.sqlite for Resource model's ORM)
+RUN mkdir -p /app/config
+
+# Files expected at the flattened /app path (see Dockerfile.openldap notes)
+COPY tos.md /tos.md
+COPY README.md /README.md
+COPY CHANGELOG.md /CHANGELOG.md
+COPY API.md /API.md
+COPY directory_spec.md /directory_spec.md
+
+# Seed script and utility
+COPY test_seed.js ./test_seed.js
+COPY test/seed-test-user.sh /usr/local/bin/seed-test-user
+RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/seed-test-user
+
+# Default command: seed the test user, then run the test suite
+CMD ["sh", "-c", "seed-test-user && npm test"]

README.md

@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ phone-home, no hosted control plane, and no per-user pricing.
 | --- | --- |
 | [![Groups](docs/images/groups.png)](docs/images/groups.png) | [![OAuth clients](docs/images/oauth-clients.png)](docs/images/oauth-clients.png) |
 
+| Sites & Replication |
+| --- |
+| [![Sites](docs/images/sites.png)](docs/images/sites.png) |
+
 ## Features
 
 - **OpenID Connect / OAuth 2.0 provider** — issue your own access, refresh, and
@@ -37,13 +41,15 @@ phone-home, no hosted control plane, and no per-user pricing.
 - **Web management UI** — manage users, groups, and OAuth clients from a
   browser; invite and password-reset flows over email; user self-service for
   profile and API tokens.
-- **LDAPS for legacy apps** — apps that bind LDAP directly (Gitea, Emby, and
-  anything else that speaks LDAP) use LDAPS (636) or StartTLS against the same
-  directory, so you don't maintain a second user database for them.
+- **Direct LDAP binds** — Linux hosts (PAM/SSSD login, LDAP-backed `sudo`
+  rules, SSH public keys via openssh-lpk) and LDAP-native apps (Gitea, Emby,
+  and anything else that speaks LDAP) use LDAPS (636) or StartTLS against the
+  same directory, so you don't maintain a second user database for them.
 - **Personal access tokens** — any user can mint a long-lived bearer token to
   drive the management API from scripts or CI, scoped to their own permissions.
 - **All-in-one Docker image** — app + OpenLDAP + Redis in one container, or run
   the pieces separately against your own LDAP/Redis via `app_*` env config.
+- **Multi-Site Support (Geo-Location Scaling)** — built-in support for N-Way Multi-Master OpenLDAP replication across physical sites for HA and low latency.
 
 ## Why this over the alternatives
 
@@ -107,23 +113,47 @@ vars, LDAPS/TLS, and backups.
 
 ### 3. Bare metal on Debian/Ubuntu
 
-`install.sh` is an idempotent installer: it installs Node.js 20.x and OpenLDAP,
-configures the directory (modules, overlays, schema, the SSO groups), deploys
-the app to `/opt/sso-manager`, and creates a systemd unit.
-
-The only thing it requires is the LDAP admin password; the domain (base DN)
-defaults to `dc=example,dc=com` if you don't pass one:
+An automated installer installs Node.js, Redis, and (on first run) OpenLDAP —
+configuring the directory (modules, overlays, schema, the SSO groups) and
+seeding `/etc/sso-manager/secrets.js` with a generated admin password and JWT
+secret — then deploys the app to `/opt/theta42/sso-manager` and starts a
+systemd service:
 
 ```bash
-sudo ./install.sh -p 'your-ldap-password' -b 'dc=yourdomain,dc=com'
-sudo systemctl enable --now sso-manager
-curl http://localhost:3001/health    # -> {"status":"ok"}
+wget -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/master/install.sh | sudo bash
 ```
 
-Run `sudo ./install.sh -h` for all flags (`-n` org name, `-o` port, `-j` JWT
-secret, `-s` SMTP, `--skip-ldap` to use an existing LDAP, `--dry-run`). Re-run
-it to update. Full details in [DEPLOYMENT.md](DEPLOYMENT.md) under *Method 2:
-Bare metal*.
+That's it — LDAP and the app are both live afterward. Edit
+`/etc/sso-manager/secrets.js` (org name, SMTP, a non-default base DN, ...) and
+restart the service to customize. It's idempotent and safe to re-run —
+re-running it updates the app in place (never touching LDAP or the secrets
+file again) and prints the version you're updating from and to (e.g. `Updated
+v1.1.13 -> v1.1.14`), or `Already up to date` if there's nothing new. Full
+details, including env var overrides (`LDAP_BASE_DN`, `SKIP_LDAP`, ...), in
+[DEPLOYMENT.md](DEPLOYMENT.md) under *Method 2: Bare metal*.
+
+## Secrets
+
+Secrets are loaded from **OpenBao** at boot via
+[@simpleworkjs/bao-conf](https://simpleworkjs.github.io/bao-conf/), which
+deep-merges `secret/sso-manager/conf` over the file-loaded config (fail-soft:
+if OpenBao is unreachable, boot continues from `CONF_SECRETS`). The SSO
+authenticates to OpenBao with the scoped `VAULT_TOKEN` (env, policy
+`sso-broker`) — never the root token.
+
+The SSO also acts as the **vault broker** for the whole stack: it mints
+per-user (`user-<uid>`) and per-admin (`sso-admin`) tokens through the
+`sso-broker` token role and exposes the personal-secrets UI at **Vault → My
+Secrets** (`secret/users/<uid>/*`, server-side token injection + path-scope
+guard) and an admin **Apps** tab to mint scoped tokens for external apps
+(`secret/apps/<name>/*`). The old `utils/conf_manager.js` was replaced by
+`@simpleworkjs/bao-conf`; the admin **Configuration** UI (`/api/conf`) now
+writes `secret/sso-manager/conf` through `bao-conf.set`.
+
+The `config/*-secrets.js` files are operator-edit seed artifacts (gitignored),
+not the authoritative store. For the full architecture, policies, token model,
+and rotation procedure, see theta-env's
+**[Secrets docs](https://theta42.github.io/theta-env/secrets/)**.
 
 ## Architecture
 
@@ -145,7 +175,7 @@ Bare metal*.
 ┌────────────────────────┐
 │  OpenLDAP (slapd)      │
 │  - users / groups      │
-│  - LDAPS :636          │─── legacy apps bind directly
+│  - LDAPS :636          │─── Linux hosts + LDAP apps bind directly
 │  - StartTLS :389       │
 └────────────────────────┘
 ```

config/proxy-secrets.js.example

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Example proxy secrets file. theta-env generates a real ./config/proxy-secrets.js
+// from this shape at setup (with empty clientId/clientSecret), then bootstrap.js
+// writes the SSO-generated OAuth client creds into it AND into OpenBao
+// (secret/proxy/conf). The proxy loads it via @simpleworkjs/conf, then overlays
+// secret/proxy/conf from OpenBao via @simpleworkjs/bao-conf at boot.
+//
+// The real file is gitignored (config/*-secrets.js) — never commit live creds.
+// This .example is tracked to document the expected shape only.
+module.exports = {
+	oidc: {
+		// The SSO registers the proxy as an OAuth client and writes the real
+		// values here (and into OpenBao). "set-me" is the bootstrap placeholder.
+		clientId: 'set-me',
+		clientSecret: 'set-me',
+	},
+};

directory_spec.md

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 # Home-Lab Directory / Inventory — Design Spec
 
-Status: **Draft / agreed direction** (no code yet)
+Status: **Implemented** (v1.2.1+: model, admin API, UI; v1.3.x: automatic
+registration from theta-env + ldap-client). §9 adds the planned-consumer
+readiness review.
 Owner: wmantly
-Last updated: 2026-07-02
+Last updated: 2026-07-23
 
 ---
 
@@ -95,13 +97,24 @@ common query fields can be promoted to columns later.
 | column       | type        | notes |
 |--------------|-------------|-------|
 | `id`         | uuid / pk   | |
-| `kind`       | enum        | `proxmox_node` \| `container` \| `vm` \| `bare_metal` \| `service` |
+| `kind`       | enum        | `site` \| `host` \| `service` |
 | `name`       | text        | display name ("Home Assistant", "ct101") |
 | `slug`       | text unique | url-safe id used by the API |
 | `description`| text        | free text |
-| `metadata`   | jsonb       | `{ url, icon, fqdn, ip, port, tags[], … }` |
+| `metadata`   | jsonb       | `{ subType, ip, macAddress, address, vmid, port, externalPort, gitRepo, installPath, systemdService, os, kernel, isProduction, isExternalReachable, isPublic }` |
 | `created_at` / `updated_at` | timestamptz | |
 
+**Parent Enforcement Rules:**
+- A **Host** MUST have a parent **Site** or **Host**.
+- A **Service** MUST have a parent **Host**.
+- An **OAuth Integration** MUST have a parent **Service**.
+
+**LDAP Group Auto-Creation:**
+When a Host or Service is created, the system will automatically create two LDAP groups in the directory (if they do not already exist): 
+- `<slug>_access` (for standard user access)
+- `<slug>_admin` (for administrative access)
+Additional groups can still be linked manually.
+
 ### `resource_edge` — directed relationships (the graph)
 | column       | type   | notes |
 |--------------|--------|-------|
@@ -109,7 +122,7 @@ common query fields can be promoted to columns later.
 | `child_id`   | fk → resource | |
 | `relation`   | enum   | `runs_on` \| `hosts` \| `exposes` \| `depends_on` |
 
-Represents host←container←service (`hosts`/`runs_on`) and service→service
+Represents site←host←service (`hosts`/`runs_on`) and service→service
 (`depends_on`). Directed edges (not a single `parent_id` column) so a node can have
 multiple parents/children and multiple relation types.
 
@@ -164,12 +177,7 @@ Write endpoints (POST/PUT/DELETE) are **out of scope for v1**; population is man
 
 - **Interactive users:** existing session auth — `middleware.auth` validating the
   `auth-token` header (an `AuthToken`, `models/token.js`). No change.
-- **CI/CD (machine) access:** the app does **not yet** have a long-lived service
-  token — `AuthToken` is session-oriented. **Proposed small addition:** a
-  `ServiceToken` subclass in `models/token.js` (mirrors `AuthToken`/`ImpersonationToken`),
-  long-lived, read-only, passed in the same `auth-token` header. Track as its own
-  task; the discovery API should assume it exists but degrade to normal auth tokens
-  until then.
+- **CI/CD (machine) access:** scripts and external integrations (like jump hosts) will use the existing `ApiToken` system (Personal Access Tokens) passed in the `Authorization: Bearer sso_...` header. The `ApiToken` inherits the exact LDAP group permissions of the user who created it, seamlessly mapping to existing access controls.
 - **Read visibility (decision to confirm):** either (a) any authenticated user may
   read all resource metadata and only `/me` is filtered, or (b) list endpoints are
   themselves filtered to entitlement. Recommend **(a)** for a home lab — simpler,
@@ -195,7 +203,7 @@ Write endpoints (POST/PUT/DELETE) are **out of scope for v1**; population is man
 ## 7. Roadmap
 
 1. **v1 — Discovery API** (this spec's focus): SQL schema + migrations, read models,
-   `/api/discovery/*` endpoints, `ServiceToken` for CI/CD.
+   `/api/discovery/*` endpoints, `ApiToken` for CI/CD.
 2. **v2 — "My Access" dashboard**: swap `profile.ejs`'s static list for `/me`.
 3. **v3 — Admin CRUD UI**: manage resources/edges/group links (reusing `app.ui`
    widgets and the `oauth_clients.ejs` card+modal pattern); gated by
@@ -213,4 +221,149 @@ Write endpoints (POST/PUT/DELETE) are **out of scope for v1**; population is man
    `description` so LDAP-only external consumers see it? **Default: no** — keep LDAP
    for auth, SQL for inventory.
 4. **Read-visibility policy:** confirm option (a) vs (b) in §5.
-5. **Service token scope:** read-only globally, or per-token resource/kind scoping?
+5. **Service token scope:** Currently `ApiToken` shares the creator's full permissions. A future enhancement could scope tokens specifically to the Directory API.
+
+---
+
+## 9. Planned consumers — data-model & API readiness
+
+Five consumers the directory data should be able to power. None are being
+built yet; this section records what each needs, what already exists, and the
+gaps to close so the model/API never paints us into a corner.
+
+The recurring theme: **the graph model itself (Resource / ResourceEdge /
+ResourceGroup + LDAP groups) is sufficient for all five.** The gaps are
+(a) one new model (access requests), (b) machine-to-machine auth for the read
+API, (c) documented metadata conventions instead of new columns, and
+(d) change detection for the drift/sync consumers.
+
+### 9.1 End-user exploration ("Netflix-style" catalog + request access)
+
+A user browses everything that exists — part advertisement, part
+documentation — sees what they already have, and requests access to the rest.
+
+Already there:
+- `/api/discovery/me` (`getMyAccess`) — the "My Services" half.
+- `Resource.owner` + `<slug>_access` / `<slug>_admin` ResourceGroup links —
+  who approves, and which group an approval means joining.
+- The Notification model — the approval-request delivery mechanism.
+
+Gaps:
+1. **Catalog projection with metadata privacy.** `/api/discovery/resources`
+   returns full `metadata` to any authenticated user — including the OAuth
+   kind's `client_secret_hash`, and operator notes that may name internal
+   IPs. Needed: a per-kind public projection (name, description, kind,
+   subType, icon, address, hasAccess, requestable) and a private-key
+   convention for the rest (e.g. only `app_sso_directory_admin` sees full
+   metadata). This is a **fix worth doing before any catalog UI exists**.
+2. **`AccessRequest` model** — the one genuinely new model:
+   `{id, uid, resourceId, groupCn, status: pending|approved|denied, note,
+   requestedOn, decidedBy, decidedOn}`. Approval = LDAP group add + notify.
+   Endpoints: user POST/GET own; resource owner / directory admin
+   list/approve/deny.
+3. **Catalog metadata conventions**: `icon`, `tagline` (card-length blurb),
+   `requestable: false` for resources that shouldn't be advertised.
+
+### 9.2 SSH jump host (`username_-_{hostname-or-ip}@publicHost`)
+
+A public jump host parses the target out of the SSH username, checks the user
+may reach that host, and proxies the connection (WinSCP-friendly: one
+username string, no interactive menu needed — though an interactive picker on
+plain `username@` login is the same query).
+
+Already there:
+- Hosts carry `ip` (and `host_<hostname>` slugs to resolve by name).
+- Access is already group-based (`<slug>_access`), checkable via LDAP alone —
+  the jump host can run entirely off LDAP (SSSD) + one directory query.
+- User SSH keys are in LDAP (openssh-lpk) — the jump host authenticates the
+  real user without local accounts.
+
+Gaps:
+1. **Machine auth for the access query.** The jump host must ask "may user X
+   reach host Y" / "list hosts user X may reach" *about another user*.
+   `getMyAccess` only answers for the calling user. Needed: a
+   service-token-authenticated endpoint (`GET
+   /api/discovery/access/:uid[/:slug]`). `ServiceToken` already exists and
+   is even linked to a resource (`resource_id`) — what's missing is an auth
+   middleware that accepts it and a permission rule ("service tokens may
+   read access info, scoped read-only").
+2. **Connection metadata conventions** on hosts: `sshPort` (default 22),
+   optional `fqdn` (when IP is dynamic), optional `jumpVia` edge relation if
+   multi-hop topologies ever appear.
+3. Document the username grammar (`{uid}_-_{host-slug-or-ip}`) here so the
+   seed/ldap-client keep host slugs DNS-safe (they already are: slugify
+   strips everything but `[a-z0-9-]`).
+
+### 9.3 Firewall port-forward rules (build / update / drift-test)
+
+An automation renders the public firewall's forwarding table from the
+directory, applies it, and alerts on drift in either direction.
+
+Already there:
+- `metadata.port` / `metadata.externalPort` / `metadata.ip` /
+  `metadata.isExternalReachable` — the core mapping data, already seeded for
+  the stack's own services.
+
+Gaps:
+1. **Port-mapping convention is too thin for real rules**: no protocol, no
+   multi-port services. Adopt `metadata.portMappings: [{proto: "tcp"|"udp",
+   external: n, internal: n, comment}]` as the authoritative form
+   (`port`/`externalPort` stay as the simple single-mapping case).
+2. **Drift detection needs cheap change polling**: an `updated_on` timestamp
+   on resources surfaced in the graph API, or a graph-level etag/hash, so
+   the runner can poll without diffing full payloads. (The ORM already
+   publishes create/update events internally — a future push feed can ride
+   that; polling comes first.)
+3. Same **service-token read auth** as 9.2 — automation must not run on a
+   human's session token.
+
+### 9.4 Local DNS / mDNS
+
+A DNS (or mDNS advertiser) zone is generated from the directory: hosts get
+A records from `metadata.ip`, services get CNAMEs/records from their
+addresses, sites map to zones.
+
+Already there:
+- `host_<hostname>` + `ip` covers A records; `site_<name>` is a natural zone
+  boundary; service `address` yields names.
+
+Gaps:
+1. **Name conventions**: `metadata.dnsNames: []` for extra aliases, and a
+   documented rule for which name wins (slug vs `address` hostname). TTL
+   only if someone actually needs per-record TTLs — default is fine.
+2. Same **change detection** as 9.3 (poll `updated_on` / etag; push later).
+3. Nothing else — this consumer is nearly free once 9.3's conventions land.
+
+### 9.5 Access control for hosts
+
+Who may log in to / sudo on which machine, driven by the directory.
+
+Already there — this is the original point of the system:
+- `<slug>_access` / `<slug>_admin` groups are auto-provisioned per host;
+  ldap-client configures SSSD/PAM against the directory; `sudoRole` and
+  openssh-lpk schemas cover sudo and SSH keys.
+
+Gaps:
+1. **Close the loop in ldap-client**: joined hosts should set an SSSD access
+   filter (`access_provider = ldap`, filter on `host_<hostname>_access`
+   membership) so directory group membership *is* login permission, not just
+   identity. Today the registration exists but enforcement is host-side
+   convention.
+2. **`accessLevel` granularity**: ResourceGroup's `member`/`owner` maps to
+   login/admin today; if finer roles emerge (e.g. `login` vs `sudo` vs
+   `admin`), extend the enum — the join-table shape already supports it.
+
+### 9.6 Consolidated work list (model/API only, no consumers)
+
+Ordered by how much they unblock:
+
+1. **Metadata privacy projection** on the read API (blocks 9.1; fixes the
+   `client_secret_hash` exposure regardless of any consumer).
+2. **Service-token auth for `/api/discovery/*`** + `access/:uid` endpoint
+   (blocks 9.2, 9.3; ServiceToken model already exists).
+3. **`AccessRequest` model + endpoints** (blocks 9.1's request half).
+4. **Metadata conventions doc entries** (`sshPort`, `portMappings`,
+   `dnsNames`, `icon`, `tagline`, `requestable`) in `docs/directory.md` —
+   conventions, not schema changes; the json column already holds them.
+5. **`updated_on` in graph output / graph etag** (blocks drift/DNS
+   freshness; trivial once surfaced).

docker-compose.repl-test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+services:
+  site1:
+    build: .
+    container_name: sso_site1
+    environment:
+      - LDAP_SERVER_ID=1
+      - LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS=ldap://site2:389
+      - LDAP_BASE_DN=dc=test,dc=local
+      - LDAP_ADMIN_PASS=secret
+    ports:
+      - "3001:3001"
+      - "10389:389"
+    volumes:
+      - site1-ldap:/var/lib/ldap
+      - site1-redis:/data
+
+  site2:
+    build: .
+    container_name: sso_site2
+    environment:
+      - LDAP_SERVER_ID=2
+      - LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS=ldap://site1:389
+      - LDAP_BASE_DN=dc=test,dc=local
+      - LDAP_ADMIN_PASS=secret
+    ports:
+      - "3002:3001"
+      - "20389:389"
+    volumes:
+      - site2-ldap:/var/lib/ldap
+      - site2-redis:/data
+
+volumes:
+  site1-ldap:
+  site1-redis:
+  site2-ldap:
+  site2-redis:

docker-compose.test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# Docker Compose for running the SSO Manager test suite.
+#
+# Spins up:
+#   ldap   — OpenLDAP + Redis (all-in-one image, slapd + redis only, no app)
+#   redis  — Standalone Redis for the app's model/token storage
+#   test-runner — Seeds the test user, then runs `npm test`
+#
+# Usage:
+#   docker compose -f docker-compose.test.yml up --build
+#   # Or to run a specific test file:
+#   docker compose -f docker-compose.test.yml run --rm test-runner npx jest tests/auth.test.js
+#
+# The LDAP service uses the same Dockerfile.openldap image as production but
+# overrides the command to only start slapd + redis (the entrypoint handles
+# slapd.conf generation, directory initialization, and Redis startup before
+# running the given command — "sleep infinity" keeps it alive).
+#
+# The test-runner connects to ldap:389 and redis:6379 via Docker networking.
+# app_* env vars override conf/secrets.js (highest precedence in
+# @simpleworkjs/conf), so the production secrets.js is never read.
+
+services:
+  ldap:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: Dockerfile.openldap
+    environment:
+      - LDAP_BASE_DN=dc=test,dc=local
+      - LDAP_ADMIN_PASS=secret
+      - ORG_NAME=Test SSO
+    # The entrypoint starts slapd + redis, then runs whatever command is given.
+    # "sleep infinity" keeps the container alive so the test-runner can connect.
+    command: ["sleep", "infinity"]
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "ldapsearch -x -H ldap://localhost:389 -b '' -s base '(objectClass=*)' >/dev/null 2>&1"]
+      interval: 2s
+      timeout: 3s
+      retries: 20
+      start_period: 5s
+    volumes:
+      - ldap-data:/var/lib/ldap
+      - ldap-certs:/etc/openldap/certs
+
+  redis:
+    image: redis:7-alpine
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "ping"]
+      interval: 2s
+      timeout: 3s
+      retries: 15
+
+  test-runner:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: Dockerfile.test-runner
+    environment:
+      # Tell the app which environment it's in (loads conf/test.js for Redis prefix)
+      - NODE_ENV=test
+      # LDAP — point at the ldap service container
+      - app_ldap__url=ldap://ldap:389
+      - app_ldap__bindDN=cn=admin,dc=test,dc=local
+      - app_ldap__bindPassword=secret
+      - app_ldap__userBase=ou=people,dc=test,dc=local
+      - app_ldap__groupBase=ou=groups,dc=test,dc=local
+      # Redis — point at the redis service container
+      - app_redis__redisConf__url=redis://redis:6379
+      # Also used by tests/globalSetup.js (direct Redis client, not @simpleworkjs/conf)
+      - REDIS_URL=redis://redis:6379
+      # JWT secret (required by the app, not sensitive in test)
+      - app_oauth__jwtSecret=test-jwt-secret-for-testing-only
+      # App name
+      - app_name=Test SSO
+    depends_on:
+      ldap:
+        condition: service_healthy
+      redis:
+        condition: service_healthy
+
+volumes:
+  ldap-data:
+  ldap-certs:

docker-entrypoint.sh

@@ -76,11 +76,22 @@ fi
 # ── Locate the OpenLDAP module directory ────────────────────────────────────
 # slapd.conf needs `modulepath` to find pw-sha2/ppolicy/memberof/refint. The
 # path varies by distro; auto-detect rather than hardcode.
+# /opt/openldap/libexec/openldap is first: that is the from-source build (see
+# Dockerfile.openldap), which is the only one carrying the nestgroup overlay.
 MODULE_PATH=""
-for p in /usr/lib/openldap /usr/lib/ldap /usr/local/lib/openldap /opt/local/lib/openldap; do
+for p in /opt/openldap/libexec/openldap /usr/lib/openldap /usr/lib/ldap /usr/local/lib/openldap /opt/local/lib/openldap; do
     if [[ -d "$p" ]]; then MODULE_PATH="$p"; break; fi
 done
 
+# Nested-group support is only available when slapd was built with the
+# nestgroup overlay. Detect rather than assume, so this entrypoint still
+# produces a working slapd.conf against a distro OpenLDAP (where the app falls
+# back to resolving nesting itself -- see nodejs/models/group_ldap.js).
+NESTGROUP_AVAILABLE=0
+if [[ -n "$MODULE_PATH" && -f "$MODULE_PATH/nestgroup.so" ]]; then
+    NESTGROUP_AVAILABLE=1
+fi
+
 # ── TLS certificate for LDAPS / StartTLS ────────────────────────────────────
 # Legacy apps (e.g. the theta42/proxy, Gitea, Emby) bind to LDAP directly over the
 # network. To keep password binds off the wire in cleartext we expose LDAPS
@@ -125,6 +136,8 @@ include         /etc/openldap/schema/theta42.schema
 include         /etc/openldap/schema/sudo.schema
 include         /etc/openldap/schema/openssh-lpk.schema
 
+SERVER_ID_PLACEHOLDER
+
 # Module loading (pw-sha2 provides {SSHA512} used by the app for user passwords;
 # ppolicy/memberof/refint are the overlays the app depends on). On OpenLDAP 2.5+
 # the ppolicy schema (pwdPolicy, pwdAccountLockedTime, ...) is built into
@@ -137,6 +150,9 @@ moduleload      pw-sha2
 moduleload      ppolicy
 moduleload      memberof
 moduleload      refint
+moduleload      auditlog
+NESTGROUP_MODULE_PLACEHOLDER
+SYNCPROV_MODULE_PLACEHOLDER
 
 # TLS (LDAPS on 636 + StartTLS on 389). Cert/key paths are fixed; the files are
 # generated/mounted above. We accept clients without their own cert (the common
@@ -184,6 +200,14 @@ memberof-memberof-ad memberOf
 overlay         refint
 refint_attributes memberOf member manager owner
 
+NESTGROUP_OVERLAY_PLACEHOLDER
+
+# auditlog overlay (LDIF audit trail of all changes)
+overlay         auditlog
+auditlog        /var/lib/ldap/auditlog.ldif
+
+REPLICATION_BLOCK_PLACEHOLDER
+
 # Access controls
 access to attrs=userPassword
     by dn="BIND_DN_PLACEHOLDER" write
@@ -211,6 +235,61 @@ else
     sed -i "/^SLAPMODULEPATH$/d" /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
 fi
 
+# ── Nested groups (nestgroup overlay) ──
+# Three of the four flags, deliberately:
+#
+#   member-filter     (member=X) finds parent groups transitively. This is what
+#                     Group.list(dn) rides on -- the core access question.
+#   memberof-filter   (memberOf=X) matches members of nested groups. This is
+#                     what SSSD's ldap_access_filter uses, so SSH/sudo inherit
+#                     nesting without any client-side walking.
+#   memberof-values   expands memberOf when reading a user, so anything that
+#                     reads the attribute rather than searching still sees the
+#                     full picture.
+#
+# member-values is deliberately NOT enabled. It expands the `member` attribute
+# when reading a *group*, which sounds symmetric but destroys the distinction
+# between "listed on this group" and "reachable through a nested one" -- and
+# that distinction is not recoverable afterwards, because the raw values are
+# simply not returned. The Groups UI needs it to show nested groups as nested
+# rather than as a crowd of phantom users, and un-nesting needs it to know what
+# it is actually removing. Transitive *answers* come from the filter flags and
+# from Group.effectiveMembers(), which computes the closure explicitly.
+if [[ "$NESTGROUP_AVAILABLE" == "1" ]]; then
+    info "nestgroup overlay available — nested groups resolved server-side"
+    sed -i "s|^NESTGROUP_MODULE_PLACEHOLDER$|moduleload      nestgroup|" /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
+    NESTGROUP_BLOCK="# nestgroup overlay (server-side nested group evaluation)\noverlay         nestgroup\nnestgroup-base  ou=groups,${LDAP_BASE_DN}\nnestgroup-flags member-filter memberof-filter memberof-values"
+    sed -i "s|^NESTGROUP_OVERLAY_PLACEHOLDER$|${NESTGROUP_BLOCK}|" /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
+else
+    info "nestgroup overlay not present in ${MODULE_PATH:-<no module path>} — nested groups will be resolved by the app instead"
+    sed -i "/^NESTGROUP_MODULE_PLACEHOLDER$/d" /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
+    sed -i "/^NESTGROUP_OVERLAY_PLACEHOLDER$/d" /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
+fi
+
+# ── Multi-Master Replication Configuration ──
+if [[ -n "${LDAP_SERVER_ID:-}" && -n "${LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS:-}" ]]; then
+    info "Configuring Multi-Master replication (Server ID: ${LDAP_SERVER_ID})"
+    sed -i "s|^SERVER_ID_PLACEHOLDER|ServerID ${LDAP_SERVER_ID}|" /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
+    sed -i "s|^SYNCPROV_MODULE_PLACEHOLDER|moduleload      syncprov|" /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
+    
+    # Generate syncrepl blocks
+    REPL_BLOCK="overlay syncprov\nsyncprov-checkpoint 100 10\nsyncprov-sessionlog 100\n\n"
+    RID=100
+    for HOST in ${LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS}; do
+        RID=$((RID + 1))
+        REPL_BLOCK="${REPL_BLOCK}syncrepl rid=${RID}\n  provider=${HOST}\n  type=refreshAndPersist\n  retry=\"60 +\"\n  searchbase=\"${LDAP_BASE_DN}\"\n  bindmethod=simple\n  binddn=\"${LDAP_BIND_DN}\"\n  credentials=\"${LDAP_ADMIN_PASS}\"\n\n"
+    done
+    REPL_BLOCK="${REPL_BLOCK}mirrormode on\n"
+    
+    # Replace placeholder (awk is safer for multiline replacements than sed)
+    awk -v repl="$(printf '%b' "$REPL_BLOCK")" '{gsub(/REPLICATION_BLOCK_PLACEHOLDER/, repl)}1' /etc/openldap/slapd.conf > /etc/openldap/slapd.conf.tmp
+    mv /etc/openldap/slapd.conf.tmp /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
+else
+    sed -i "/^SERVER_ID_PLACEHOLDER/d" /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
+    sed -i "/^SYNCPROV_MODULE_PLACEHOLDER/d" /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
+    sed -i "/^REPLICATION_BLOCK_PLACEHOLDER/d" /etc/openldap/slapd.conf
+fi
+
 chown ldap:ldap /etc/openldap/slapd.conf 2>/dev/null || true
 chown -R ldap:ldap /var/lib/ldap 2>/dev/null || true
 
@@ -220,7 +299,7 @@ info "Starting OpenLDAP (base DN: ${LDAP_BASE_DN})..."
 # -h listens on ldap:///  (389: plain + StartTLS) and ldaps:/// (636: LDAPS).
 # ldapi:/// is intentionally omitted: its default socket dir doesn't exist on
 # Alpine and the container only uses simple bind over ldap://localhost:389.
-slapd -d 0 -u ldap -g ldap -f /etc/openldap/slapd.conf -h "ldap:/// ldaps:///" &
+slapd -d 256 -u ldap -g ldap -f /etc/openldap/slapd.conf -h "ldap:/// ldaps:///" >> /var/lib/ldap/slapd.log 2>&1 &
 SLAPD_PID=$!
 
 # Wait for slapd to answer the root DSE (means it's up, regardless of DB state).
@@ -276,7 +355,11 @@ EOF
     # Required SSO groups. The app gates admin/invite/oauth-admin on these;
     # app_sso_service_account is a marker (not a permission gate) for
     # non-person accounts -- see the Users page.
-    for group in app_sso_admin app_sso_invite app_sso_oauth_admin app_sso_service_account; do
+    #
+    # god_admin is the global super group (docs/GROUPS.md §2), the top of the
+    # group-inheritance lattice. It is seeded here so it exists from first boot;
+    # the theta-suite bootstrap puts the first admin person into it.
+    for group in god_admin app_sso_admin app_sso_invite app_sso_oauth_admin app_sso_service_account; do
         ldapadd -x -D "$LDAP_BIND_DN" -w "$LDAP_ADMIN_PASS" -H ldap://localhost:389 << EOF || true
 dn: cn=${group},ou=groups,${LDAP_BASE_DN}
 objectClass: groupOfNames
@@ -287,6 +370,27 @@ member: ${LDAP_BIND_DN}
 EOF
     done
 
+    # Nest god_admin into the SSO admin groups, so god admins hold those rights
+    # by membership rather than by a special case in app code. This is what makes
+    # the privilege visible to every consumer -- SSSD, sudo, anything binding
+    # LDAP directly -- instead of only to callers that happen to route through
+    # utils/permission.js.
+    #
+    # app_sso_service_account is deliberately excluded: it is a marker for
+    # non-person accounts, not a permission, and nesting admins into it would
+    # misclassify them as service accounts on the Users page.
+    if [[ "$NESTGROUP_AVAILABLE" == "1" ]]; then
+        for group in app_sso_admin app_sso_invite app_sso_oauth_admin; do
+            ldapmodify -x -D "$LDAP_BIND_DN" -w "$LDAP_ADMIN_PASS" -H ldap://localhost:389 >/dev/null 2>&1 << EOF || true
+dn: cn=${group},ou=groups,${LDAP_BASE_DN}
+changetype: modify
+add: member
+member: cn=god_admin,ou=groups,${LDAP_BASE_DN}
+EOF
+        done
+        info "Nested god_admin into the SSO admin groups"
+    fi
+
     info "LDAP directory initialized"
 else
     info "LDAP directory already initialized — skipping seed"
@@ -346,6 +450,14 @@ if [[ "${SECRETS_JS_MODE:-0}" != 1 ]]; then
     export app_ldap__bindPassword="${app_ldap__bindPassword:-$LDAP_ADMIN_PASS}"
     export app_ldap__userBase="${app_ldap__userBase:-ou=people,${LDAP_BASE_DN}}"
     export app_ldap__groupBase="${app_ldap__groupBase:-ou=groups,${LDAP_BASE_DN}}"
+    # Tell the app whether slapd resolves nested groups for it. When true the app
+    # trusts a plain (member=) search to be transitive; when false it computes
+    # the closure itself. Getting this wrong in the "true" direction silently
+    # under-grants, so it is derived from the same nestgroup.so probe that
+    # decides whether the overlay is configured at all -- never hardcoded.
+    if [[ "$NESTGROUP_AVAILABLE" == "1" ]]; then
+        export app_ldap__nestedGroupsServerSide="${app_ldap__nestedGroupsServerSide:-true}"
+    fi
     export app_oauth__jwtSecret="${app_oauth__jwtSecret:-$JWT_SECRET}"
     # OIDC issuer advertised in /.well-known/openid-configuration. Default to the
     # public https URL on the SSO subdomain of the LDAP domain; override with

docs/_config.yml

@@ -31,6 +31,17 @@ nav:
   - title: LDAP
     page: /ldap.html
     icon: fa-address-book
+  - title: Directory
+    page: /directory.html
+    icon: fa-server
+  - title: Plugins
+    page: /plugins.html
+    icon: fa-plug
+  # API.md lives at the repo root, not under docs/, so Jekyll never renders an
+  # api.html for it — link the source directly, same as the Changelog.
+  - title: API
+    url: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/blob/master/API.md
+    icon: fa-code
   - title: Changelog
     url: https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md
     icon: fa-list

docs/agents.md

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+---
+layout: default
+title: Theta Agent & Endpoint Management
+nav_order: 5
+---
+
+# Theta Agent & Endpoint Management
+
+The **Theta Agent** (`theta-agent`) is a unified, 2-way Command & Control (C2) endpoint management daemon written in Go for Linux hosts across your home lab, infrastructure, or data center. It connects outbound via a long-lived WebSocket connection to the central **SSO Manager** (`wss://<sso-host>/api/agent/ws`), enabling real-time host telemetry, automated host discovery, and local-first administrative management.
+
+---
+
+## Core Functionality
+
+### 1. Host Discovery & Inventory
+Upon establishing a WebSocket connection, the agent immediately pushes a comprehensive discovery payload:
+- **Hostname & Network Interfaces**: Hostname and all non-loopback IPv4 addresses and MACs.
+- **Operating System & Kernel**: Linux distribution, platform, and kernel version.
+- **Hardware Specs**: CPU model, total RAM (GB), and total root disk capacity (GB).
+- **Physical Location**: Location identifier string (e.g. `dc-01-rack-12`) configured in `agent.yml`.
+
+If the agent detects a network IP change, it automatically re-pushes an updated discovery payload to the SSO Manager.
+
+### 2. Real-Time Telemetry Streaming
+Every 30 seconds, the agent streams real-time performance metrics:
+- **CPU Load**: System-wide CPU utilization percentage.
+- **Memory Utilization**: RAM usage percentage and available memory.
+- **Disk Utilization**: Root filesystem usage percentage.
+- **ZFS Storage Health**: Health status of ZFS pools (e.g., `ONLINE`).
+- **NVIDIA GPU Load**: GPU compute utilization percentage (via `nvidia-smi`).
+
+---
+
+## Viewing in the SSO Manager
+
+Agent status and telemetry live on the **Directory** page — there is no separate
+Agents page. For each **host** resource that has a connected theta-agent, the
+Directory shows a status dot in the row:
+
+| Color | Meaning |
+| :--- | :--- |
+| **Green** | Connected, healthy (CPU/RAM/disk within limits). |
+| **Yellow** | Connected but under high load (CPU > 80% or RAM > 80% or disk > 90%). |
+| **Red** | Not connected (no agent, or the agent is offline). |
+
+Opening a host's resource modal reveals a **Metrics** tab with the agent's live
+telemetry (CPU/RAM/disk/ZFS/GPU) and discovery info (OS, kernel, IPs, location).
+The agent is joined to its host by hostname (`agent.discovery.hostname` ↔ the
+resource name), so name the Directory host the same as the machine's hostname.
+
+---
+
+## Local-First Security & Capability Matrix
+
+To protect hosts against unauthorized control, `theta-agent` enforces a **strict, local-first capability matrix** defined in `/etc/theta42/agent.yml`. Central SSO Manager requests are checked against local configuration before execution; permissions cannot be overridden remotely.
+
+| Capability | Config Key | Risk Level | Description & Impact |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| **Telemetry** | `telemetry` | Safe | Streams read-only system metrics (CPU, RAM, Disk, ZFS, GPU). |
+| **Configure LDAP** | `configure_ldap` | Moderate | Writes updated SSSD configuration to `/etc/sssd/sssd.conf` & restarts `sssd`. |
+| **Service Control** | `service_control` | High | Restarts systemd services listed in an explicit allowlist (e.g., `["nginx", "docker", "sssd"]`). |
+| **Reboot** | `reboot` | High | Triggers an immediate system reboot (`systemctl reboot`). |
+| **Arbitrary Bash** | `arbitrary_bash` | Critical | Executes raw bash scripts sent from the SSO Manager as `root` (used for automated GitOps). |
+
+---
+
+## High-Risk Command Verification (Protocol v1.1.0)
+
+High-risk management commands (`reboot`, `service_restart`, `configure_ldap`, `arbitrary_bash`, `update_binary`) are cryptographically verified using **Ed25519 signatures**:
+1. The SSO Manager canonicalizes the command payload (sorted keys, no whitespace).
+2. The payload is signed with the SSO Manager's Ed25519 private key.
+3. The Base64 signature is appended to the message payload.
+4. The agent verifies the signature against the configured `public_key` in `/etc/theta42/agent.yml` before executing the action.
+
+---
+
+## Installation & Deployment
+
+### Quick One-Liner Install
+Run the following command as `root` on the target Linux host:
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://<SSO_HOST>/resources/theta-agent/install.sh | sh -s -- --url "https://<SSO_HOST>" --token "<HOST_TOKEN>"
+```
+
+### Custom Config Wizard
+You can generate a Base64-encoded custom configuration using the **Install Agent** button on the **Directory Management** page in the SSO Manager UI:
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://<SSO_HOST>/resources/theta-agent/install.sh | sh -s -- "<BASE64_ENCODED_CONFIG>"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Configuration File Example (`/etc/theta42/agent.yml`)
+
+```yaml
+# /etc/theta42/agent.yml
+server_url: "wss://sso.example.com"
+auth_token: "your-unique-host-token"
+location: "dc-01-rack-12"
+public_key: "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEA..."
+
+capabilities:
+  telemetry: true
+  configure_ldap: true
+  reboot: false
+  service_control: ["nginx", "docker", "sssd"]
+  arbitrary_bash: false
+```
+
+---
+
+## Troubleshooting: agent can't connect (`dial tcp ... i/o timeout`)
+
+If the agent host logs `Dial error: dial tcp <ip>:443: i/o timeout` while
+connecting to `wss://<sso-host>/api/agent/ws`, the WebSocket path is usually
+fine — this is a **network/NAT** problem, not an agent or SSO bug. A host behind
+the same NAT that owns the SSO often cannot reach its own **public IP** (no
+hairpin/loopback NAT on many home routers), so the TCP dial times out even
+though the same address works from outside.
+
+Fix options:
+1. Point `agent.yml` `server_url` at an address the host can reach directly —
+   e.g. the SSO host's LAN IP (`http://<lan-ip>` or `http://<lan-ip>:3001` for a
+   no-TLS direct path).
+2. Enable **NAT reflection / hairpin NAT** on the router so LAN hosts can reach
+   their own public IP:443.
+3. Add a local route/firewall rule on the agent host for its public IP.
+
+> Note: on a deployment where the theta42 proxy fronts `sso.suite.example`, make
+> sure the proxy has a **persistent Host record** for the real SSO domain — not
+> just the `localtest.me` placeholder — so routing survives a proxy restart
+> (an in-memory lookup cache can mask a missing Redis record for up to ~1h).
+
+

docs/concepts-accounts.md

@@ -46,13 +46,36 @@ on, just like anyone else's.
 
 A **group** is just a named list of accounts, used to control access. This
 app has a handful of built-in groups that grant admin powers (e.g. only
-people in the `app_sso_admin` group can see the Users/Groups/Integrations
+people in the `app_sso_admin` group can see the Users/Groups/Directory/Overview
 pages at all), but you can also make your own groups for any app you
 connect — say, a group listing everyone who should be allowed into your
 photo server. Once a group exists, add or remove members from the
 **Groups** page, and point the other app's "who's allowed in" setting at
 that group's name.
 
+### Groups inside groups
+
+A group can contain another group, not just people — the *Nested* tab on any
+group card. Everyone in the inner group counts as a member of the outer one,
+however many levels deep it goes.
+
+This is mostly a way to stop repeating yourself. Make one `developers` group,
+nest it into the handful of things developers should reach, and adding a new
+developer to that one group grants all of them at once — instead of adding them
+to each individually and slowly drifting out of sync. The app already does this
+for itself: super admins are nested into every resource's admin group, and each
+admin group into its access group, so "can administer it" always implies "can
+use it".
+
+Two things it won't let you do: put a group inside itself (directly or round a
+longer loop), and empty a group completely — every group must keep at least one
+member.
+
+A note if you also manage the directory by hand: a group's member list shows
+what is *directly* listed on it. Someone who gets in through a nested group is
+a real member but won't appear there — the **Nested** tab shows what is nested,
+and the API's `effective` view lists everyone who actually gets in.
+
 ## Every account's personal group
 
 Separately from the groups above, every single account — person or

docs/concepts-api-tokens.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: A plain-language guide to personal access tokens in SSO Manager.
 
 This page explains what an API token is and when you'd want one. For the
 full list of API endpoints a token can call, see the
-[API reference](api.html).
+[API reference](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/blob/master/API.md).
 
 ## What's an API token, in plain terms?
 
@@ -54,6 +54,6 @@ it stops working right away.
 ## Want more detail?
 
 This page doesn't attempt to list every API endpoint or show request/
-response examples — for that, see the full [API reference](api.html).
+response examples — for that, see the full [API reference](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/blob/master/API.md).
 
 [← Back to Home](index.html)

docs/concepts-oauth-apps.md

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ what matters practically is the handful of concepts below.
 ## What's a "client"?
 
 Every app you connect is registered here as a **client** — a single entry
-on the Integrations page representing that one app. Registering a client
+in the Directory representing that one app. Registering a client
 gives you a **Client ID** and **Client Secret**: think of these like a
 username and password, but for the *app itself* rather than for a person.
 You paste them into the other app's own "Single Sign-On" or "OIDC" setup

docs/configuration.md

@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ raw strings otherwise.
 | `app_ldap__userBase=ou=people,dc=…` | `conf.ldap.userBase` | string |
 | `app_ldap__uidGidMin=1500` | `conf.ldap.uidGidMin` | number (new-user id floor) |
 | `app_ldap__uidGidReservedFloor=9000` | `conf.ldap.uidGidReservedFloor` | number (ids at/above this are ignored when allocating) |
+| `app_ldap__ldapsHost=ldap.internal.example.com` | `conf.ldap.ldapsHost` | string (hostname shown on `/integrations` for LDAPS binds; empty = derive from `oauth.issuer`) |
+| `app_ldap__ldapsPort=636` | `conf.ldap.ldapsPort` | number (port shown on `/integrations`) |
 | `app_oauth__jwtSecret=...` | `conf.oauth.jwtSecret` | string |
 | `app_oauth__issuer=https://sso.example.com` | `conf.oauth.issuer` | string |
 | `app_oauth__token_lifetime__access_token=3600` | `conf.oauth.token_lifetime.access_token` | number |

docs/directory.md

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+---
+layout: default
+title: Directory Management
+description: Managing your Home-Lab infrastructure, services, and LDAP access relationships via the SSO Directory API.
+---
+
+# Directory Management
+
+The SSO Manager ships with a built-in **Directory & Inventory Management** feature. Instead of just managing bare LDAP groups for your homelab, the Directory allows you to map out your infrastructure graph and assign rich metadata to your services.
+
+## Architecture
+
+The Directory models your homelab infrastructure using a parent-child graph (e.g. `Site -> Host -> Service`).
+
+There are three primary **Kinds** of resources you can define:
+- **Site**: A physical location, datacenter, or root node (e.g., `us-east`). Sites do not require parents.
+- **Host**: A physical machine, Proxmox node, virtual machine, or LXC container. A Host **must** have a parent Site or another Host.
+- **Service (App)**: An application, web service. A Service **must** have a parent Host or another Service.
+- **OAuth Integration**: An OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect client application. An OAuth integration **must** have a parent Service.
+
+By defining this hierarchy, the SSO Manager builds a queryable graph of your infrastructure.
+
+## Automatic LDAP Group Creation
+
+When you create a new **Host** or **Service** in the Directory via the web UI (or API), the SSO Manager will automatically provision two LDAP groups in your directory to govern access to that resource:
+
+1. `<slug>_access` (Member level access)
+2. `<slug>_admin` (Owner level access)
+
+For example, if you create a Service named "Emby" with the slug `app_emby`, the system will create the LDAP groups `app_emby_access` and `app_emby_admin`. You can then assign users to these groups, and they will immediately see the service populate on their "My Services" dashboard.
+
+## Resource Metadata
+
+Resources carry a flexible `metadata` JSON object that can store essential context for your applications. The UI natively supports the following metadata fields:
+
+### Common Metadata
+- **Sub Type**: Free-form text to categorize the resource (e.g., `proxmox_node`, `linux`, `lxc`, `web`).
+- **IP Address**: The internal IP address of the resource.
+- **MAC Address**: The hardware address of the primary interface.
+- **Host / URI Address**: The FQDN or URL of the resource (e.g., `https://emby.home.arpa`).
+- **Production Environment**: A boolean toggle indicating if the resource is in production.
+
+### Host Metadata
+- **VMID**: The hypervisor VM or Container ID (e.g. `101`).
+- **OS**: The operating system name (e.g. `Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS`).
+- **Kernel**: The kernel version string (e.g. `5.15.0-100-generic`).
+
+### Service Metadata
+- **Internal Port**: The local port the service binds to (e.g. `8080`).
+- **External Port**: The reverse-proxy or external port (defaults to Internal Port if left blank).
+- **Public (No Auth)**: Indicates if the service is exposed publicly without authentication.
+- **External Reachable**: Indicates if the service is accessible outside the VPN/local network.
+- **Git Repo**: The source code repository for the service (e.g. `https://github.com/...`).
+- **Install Path**: The filesystem path where the service is installed (e.g. `/opt/app`).
+- **Systemd Service**: The systemd unit name for the service (e.g. `app.service`).
+
+### Who sees which metadata
+
+Metadata keys are declared in `@simpleworkjs/directory-schema` with an `admin` flag, and every API response is passed through its projection. There are three tiers:
+
+- **Public** — returned to any authenticated caller, including machine (`ServiceToken`) callers: `ip`, `address`, `sshPort`, `fqdn`, `dnsNames`, `port`, `externalPort`, `portMappings`, `isExternalReachable`, `os`, `gitRepo`, `subType`, `icon`, `tagline`, `isPublic`, `isProduction`, `requestable`, `isCurrentSite`.
+- **Admin-only** — only for members of `app_sso_directory_admin` / `app_sso_admin`: `vmid`, `macAddress`, `installPath`, `systemdService`, and the OAuth config keys (`redirect_uris`, `scopes`, `allowed_groups`, `token_lifetime`).
+- **Never returned** — `client_secret_hash`, plus any key matching `/secret|password|privatekey/i`. Stripped on every path, admins included.
+
+Note that machine tokens are deliberately *not* admins, so anything a machine consumer needs (the firewall generator reads `port` / `externalPort` / `isExternalReachable`) has to be in the public tier. A metadata key that isn't declared at all is treated as admin-only and will silently vanish for normal users — if you add a field to the admin form, declare it in the schema package too.
+
+## Catalog & access requests
+
+The site root (`/`) is the end-user catalog — the only ungated page in the nav. It shows:
+
+- **My Access** — everything the signed-in user can reach (`GET /api/discovery/me`), each card carrying a **how to reach it** block: the URL for a service, or the SSH invocation for a host. When `directory.jumpHost` is set in the config, host cards render the jump-host form `ssh <uid>_-_<slug>@<jumpHost>`; otherwise they fall back to a direct `ssh <uid>@<ip>`.
+- **Discover More** — everything else in the directory, with a **Request access** button.
+- **My Requests** / **Awaiting My Approval** — pending requests, and the approve/deny queue for anyone who owns a requested resource.
+
+A request is a proposal to join an LDAP group. It targets the resource's `member`-level group (the `_access` one, never `_admin`), and approving it performs the LDAP group add — so LDAP stays the single access-control truth and the table is just the audit trail. Approvals are idempotent: approving for someone already in the group succeeds rather than erroring.
+
+Requests are decided by the resource's `owner`, or by any directory admin. Mark a resource `metadata.requestable = false` to keep it out of self-service.
+
+## Navigating the UI
+
+The Directory Management interface provides a **Tree View** toggle that visually nests your resources, making it easy to comprehend your network topography at a glance. You can also filter, search, and sort your entire infrastructure inventory. From the tree view, you can click the green `+` icon next to any resource to instantly add a child resource beneath it.
+
+<a href="images/directory.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/directory.png" alt="Directory & inventory list view" width="80%"></a>
+
+## Slug conventions
+
+Slugs are the stable identifiers automation keys off, so the tooling around the SSO Manager follows a shared convention:
+
+- **Sites**: `site_<name>` — e.g. `site_local`, `site_us-east`
+- **Hosts**: `host_<hostname>` — e.g. `host_pve1`, `host_web01`
+- **Services/apps**: a plain slug or `app_<name>` — e.g. `sso-manager`, `app_emby`
+
+The auto-created LDAP groups derive from the slug (`<slug>_access` / `<slug>_admin`), so keep slugs stable once access groups are in use.
+
+## Automatic registration
+
+You don't have to build the graph by hand — the theta42 tooling registers itself:
+
+### The stack itself (theta-env)
+
+[theta-env](https://github.com/theta42/theta-env)'s `./setup.sh` seeds the directory on every run with the stack it deploys:
+
+- a **site** (name from `CFG_SITE_NAME` in `setup.env`, default `local` → slug `site_local`) marked as the current site
+- the **host** the stack runs on (`host_<hostname>`), with IP, MAC address, OS, and kernel collected from the machine
+- the **services** it composes — SSO Manager, Proxy (management UI), OpenLDAP Directory (the LDAPS endpoint Linux hosts and LDAP-native apps bind to), and OpenResty Edge (the 80/443 data plane) — each with its address, internal port, and git repo
+- the proxy's auto-registered **OAuth client**, linked under its service
+
+The seed is idempotent and non-destructive: a resource whose slug already exists is considered operator-owned — the seed only fills in metadata fields you haven't set, and never overwrites your values.
+
+### Linux hosts (ldap-client)
+
+The `ldap-client` join script enrolls a Debian/Ubuntu machine for LDAP login (SSSD/PAM), LDAP-backed `sudo`, and SSH keys from the directory — and, when given an SSO API token, registers the machine as a `host_<hostname>` resource with its IP, MAC, OS, and kernel, parented to the site named by its configured location.
+
+## Consumers of the directory
+
+The inventory graph isn't just documentation — other components read it to make decisions:
+
+- **[Jump Host](https://theta42.github.io/jump-host/)** — an SSH jump host that resolves which downstream machines a user may reach from their LDAP groups × the directory's `host` resources (`GET /api/discovery/resources?group=<cn>`), then bridges them in. The `host_<hostname>` slugs and `host_<slug>_access` groups this directory creates are exactly what it keys off; a host's `metadata.ip` / `metadata.sshPort` tell it where to connect. So a machine registered here (by theta-env or ldap-client) becomes reachable through the jump host the moment a user is in its access group.
+
+Planned consumers (end-user catalog, firewall/DNS generation) and the model/API gaps they need are tracked in [`directory_spec.md`](https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node/blob/master/directory_spec.md) §9.
+
+## API
+
+All of the above uses the same admin API the UI does (group `app_sso_directory_admin` or `app_sso_admin`):
+
+- `GET/POST /api/directory-admin/resources`, `PUT/DELETE /api/directory-admin/resources/:id`
+- `GET/POST/DELETE /api/directory-admin/edges` — parent/child links (`hosts`, `oauth` relations)
+- `GET/POST/DELETE /api/directory-admin/groups` — resource ↔ LDAP group links
+- `GET /api/directory-admin/access-summary` — per-resource group + member counts (the Access column)
+- `GET /api/directory-admin/user-access/:uid` — the reverse lookup: every resource a given user can reach, and via which group
+- Read-only graph views (any authenticated user): `GET /api/discovery/resources`, `/api/discovery/resources/:slug`, `/api/discovery/graph`, `/api/discovery/me`
+
+Access requests are open to any authenticated user; deciding is gated per-resource inside the router (resource owner or directory admin):
+
+- `POST /api/access-requests` — `{slug | resourceId, groupCn?, note?}`
+- `GET /api/access-requests/mine` — the caller's own history
+- `GET /api/access-requests` — pending requests the caller may decide
+- `POST /api/access-requests/:id/approve` · `POST /api/access-requests/:id/deny`
+- `DELETE /api/access-requests/:id` — the requester withdraws their own pending request

docs/groups.md

@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+---
+layout: default
+title: Group & Permission Model
+nav_order: 3
+---
+
+# Theta42 Group & Permission Model
+
+This is the canonical reference for how **groups and permissions work** across the
+theta42 suite (SSO Manager, Proxy, Jump-Host) and how **downstream apps and Linux
+hosts** should read and use them. It is written to be implementable by both humans
+and LLM agents.
+
+Everything below assumes LDAP is the single source of truth for identity and group
+membership. Group membership is managed in the **SSO Manager Directory**, generated
+from adopted resources — there is **no standalone "Groups" page**.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Principles
+
+1. **Groups are a projection of the resource graph.** Every adopted host and app
+   in the Directory gets its own groups, auto-created from its identity. Group
+   membership is managed on the resource's modal.
+2. **Two orthogonal resource namespaces: `host` and `app`.** A host administers
+   hosts; an app administers apps. They do not inherit from each other.
+3. **Three levels per resource: `admin`, `access`, and opaque `capability`.**
+   `admin` implies `access`. Capabilities are explicit and never implied by
+   `admin`.
+4. **Multi-site by prefix.** Each site's groups are fully independent, scoped by
+   the site slug.
+5. **Hosts map, LDAP stays clean.** Directory groups are `groupOfNames` (RBAC)
+   with **no `gidNumber`**. A Linux host uses SSSD to import only the groups it
+   needs and generate their GIDs on the fly (see §8) — no mass import, no GID
+   bloat. Only the meta groups are never imported by hosts.
+6. **The directory is the only place groups are created.** `god_admin` is the sole
+   group that does not belong to a resource or site.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Group schema
+
+`S` = site slug (see §7 for normalization). `<host>`/`<app>` = the resource slug.
+`<capability>` = an opaque, app-defined capability token (see §4).
+
+| Group | Scope | Meaning |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| `god_admin` | global | **Everything, everywhere** (all sites, hosts, apps, consoles, all capabilities). The only non-site group. |
+| `S_super_admin` | site | Everything on site `S` (all hosts, apps, consoles, all capabilities at `S`). |
+| `S_hosts_admin` | site | Admin on **all hosts** at `S`. |
+| `S_hosts_access` | site | Access to **all hosts** at `S`. |
+| `S_hosts_<capability>` | site | Capability `<capability>` on **all hosts** at `S`. |
+| `S_host_<host>_admin` | host | Admin on host `<host>`. |
+| `S_host_<host>_access` | host | Access to host `<host>`. |
+| `S_host_<host>_<capability>` | host | Capability `<capability>` on host `<host>`. |
+| `S_apps_admin` | site | Admin on **all apps** at `S`. |
+| `S_apps_access` | site | Access to **all apps** at `S`. |
+| `S_apps_<capability>` | site | Capability `<capability>` on **all apps** at `S`. |
+| `S_app_<app>_admin` | app | Admin on app `<app>`. |
+| `S_app_<app>_access` | app | Access to app `<app>`. |
+| `S_app_<app>_<capability>` | app | Capability `<capability>` on app `<app>`. |
+
+### Meta groups (implicit membership — not POSIX, no gidNumber)
+
+| Group | Scope | Meaning |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| `everyone` | global | **All authenticated users**, any site. |
+| `S_everyone` | site | **All authenticated users** at site `S`. |
+
+These are resolved by the directory (any authenticated user passes), never
+enumerated as LDAP members, and cannot be used as Unix groups.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Naming, normalization & reserved rules
+
+- The **structural delimiter is `_`**. It appears only between the fixed segments
+  of a group name.
+- **Site, host, and app slugs never contain `_`.** Normalize to lowercase;
+  spaces and `_` → `-`; strip other non-`[a-z0-9-]`. A host named `Web 01` and a
+  site `Main Office` produce slugs `web-01` and `main-office`.
+- **Aggregate groups use the plural kind** (`hosts`, `apps`); per-resource groups
+  use the singular (`host`, `app`). This makes `S_hosts_admin` unambiguous even
+  if a host were named `admin` (that host would be `S_host_admin_admin`).
+- **The last segment is the level.** If it is `admin` or `access` it is a known
+  level; any other value is an **opaque capability** owned by a downstream app.
+- **Total length budget:** keep a group cn under ~120 chars; reject group
+  creation that would exceed it.
+- Groups are **`groupOfNames`** (RFC 2307bis) with **no `gidNumber`**. GIDs are
+  generated on the host by SSSD for only the groups that host imports (see §8).
+
+---
+
+## 4. Levels and opaque capabilities
+
+- **`admin`** — manage (create/update/delete/config) the resource.
+- **`access`** — use/read the resource.
+- **`<capability>`** — an arbitrary token the SSO does **not** interpret. The SSO
+  manages membership and exposes the group to the app; **the downstream app
+  defines and enforces what the capability means** (e.g. `emby_admin`,
+  `gitea_maintain`, `reboot`, `backup`).
+
+The directory recognizes `admin`, `access`, `super_admin`, and the meta groups.
+Everything else on a resource group is treated as an opaque capability group and
+passed through to consumers.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Permission resolution (inheritance)
+
+Define a user's **effective permission** on a resource by checking, from most
+specific to most general, whether they are a member of any applicable group. The
+rule: a higher group implies everything below it.
+
+### On host `H` at site `S`
+
+| Wanted | Granted if the user is a member of **any** of |
+| :--- | :--- |
+| **admin** on `H` | `god_admin` · `S_super_admin` · `S_hosts_admin` · `S_host_H_admin` |
+| **access** on `H` | (any admin rule above) · `S_hosts_access` · `S_host_H_access` |
+| **capability `C`** on `H` | `god_admin` · `S_super_admin` · `S_hosts_C` · `S_host_H_C` |
+
+### On app `A` at site `S`
+
+Identical, with `app`/`apps` substituted for `host`/`hosts`.
+
+### Management console (SSO / Proxy / Jump-Host)
+
+Each console is registered as an **app** on its site, so console admin is:
+
+`god_admin` · `S_super_admin` · `S_app_<console>_admin`
+
+### Pseudocode
+
+```
+def effective(resource, level_or_cap, site):
+    if user in "god_admin":                  return True
+    if user in f"{site}_super_admin":        return True
+    if level_or_cap in ("admin","access"):
+        agg = f"{site}_{resource.kind}s_{level_or_cap}"
+        if user in agg:                      return True
+    specific = f"{site}_{resource.kind}_{resource.slug}_{level_or_cap}"
+    if user in specific:                     return True
+    if level_or_cap == "access":             return effective(resource, "admin", site)
+    if level_or_cap == "admin":              return False          # access does not imply admin
+    return False
+```
+
+`everyone` / `S_everyone` are a special grantee: if a resource grants a group to
+`everyone` (or `S_everyone`), any authenticated user (at that site) passes.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Where groups live — the Directory, generated from adopted resources
+
+- There is **no standalone Groups page.** Group creation/management happens on an
+  **adopted resource** in the Directory.
+- When a host or app is **adopted** (promoted from Discovered Inventory to
+  managed), the directory auto-creates its `_admin` and `_access` groups (and
+  site aggregates if configured). Capability groups are created on demand.
+- Membership (add/remove users) and capability grants are managed on that
+  resource's modal.
+- Deleting a resource removes its per-resource groups.
+- The `S_super_admin`, `S_hosts_*`, `S_apps_*`, `S_everyone` site groups and the
+  global `god_admin`/`everyone` are managed at the site level (not on a single
+  host/app resource).
+
+---
+
+## 7. Multi-site isolation
+
+One LDAP tree can serve many sites ("Main Office", "Branch Office", "co-lo",
+"Mikes Homelab", …). Each site `S` has its own fully independent set of `S_*`
+groups behind its prefix. A `main-office_super_admin` or `main-office_hosts_admin`
+touches nothing in `branch-office_*` or `steves-homelab_*`. Only `god_admin` and
+`everyone` cross site boundaries.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Unix/POSIX groups — mapped on the host, not in LDAP
+
+Directory groups are **`groupOfNames`** (RFC 2307bis) and carry **no `gidNumber`**.
+There are hundreds of them and only a handful matter on any given host, so we do
+**not** bloat LDAP with GIDs. Instead, each Linux host uses SSSD to import only the
+groups it cares about and map them to GIDs **on the fly** (algorithmic ID mapping).
+This keeps the directory clean and the per-host surface tiny.
+
+### SSSD — generate GIDs on the fly, import only what you need
+
+```ini
+[domain/example]
+id_provider = ldap
+auth_provider = ldap
+ldap_uri = ldaps://ldap.example
+ldap_search_base = dc=example,dc=com
+
+# groupOfNames (RFC 2307bis) schema
+ldap_schema = rfc2307bis
+ldap_group_object_class = groupOfNames
+ldap_group_member = member
+
+# Map GIDs mathematically from the LDAP UUID — no gidNumber in LDAP
+ldap_id_mapping = true
+ldap_group_uuid = entryUUID
+
+# Import ONLY the groups this host needs (e.g. a naming convention or an OU)
+ldap_group_search_filter = (&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(cn=linux-*))
+```
+
+Key ideas:
+- `ldap_id_mapping = true` + `ldap_group_uuid = entryUUID` make SSSD derive a
+  stable GID for any group it imports, so **no `gidNumber` attribute is required**
+  in LDAP.
+- `ldap_group_search_filter` is the gatekeeper: SSSD imports only groups that
+  match, discarding the other hundreds. After changing the filter, clear the
+  cache (`sss_cache -E`; `rm -f /var/lib/sss/db/*`; restart sssd) and verify with
+  `getent group <cn>`.
+
+### What filter to use — the naming convention is the answer
+
+A host should import its **own** resource groups (plus any explicitly granted
+ones). Because the schema is predictable, `ldap-client` can generate the per-host
+`ldap_group_search_filter` from the enrolled host's identity, e.g. a host `web01`
+at site `main-office` imports:
+
+```
+(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(|(cn=main-office_host_web01_access)
+                               (cn=main-office_host_web01_admin)
+                               (cn=main-office_host_web01_sudo)))
+```
+
+So the operator (or ldap-client) selects a small allowlist of the host's `_access`
+/ `_admin` / capability groups to feed sudoers, SSH `AllowGroups`, and filesystem
+ACLs. **Only those groups are imported** — no GID bloat, no mass import.
+
+### Aliasing an LDAP group into a local group (e.g. `input`)
+
+SSSD cannot merge an LDAP group into a local group whose GID varies per host.
+Two host-side mechanisms cover it:
+
+- **pam_exec** — a script in the login stack adds the user to the local group for
+  the session:
+  ```sh
+  #!/bin/bash
+  if id -Gn "$PAM_USER" | grep -q "host_input"; then usermod -a -G input "$PAM_USER"; fi
+  ```
+  `session optional pam_exec.so /usr/local/bin/add_to_input.sh` in
+  `/etc/pam.d/common-session`.
+
+- **nss-groupmerge** — merge an LDAP group into a local group at NSS time
+  (`/etc/groupmerge.conf`: `input: host_input`, then `group: files sssd groupmerge`
+  in `/etc/nsswitch.conf`), so any service querying `input` sees the LDAP group's
+  members regardless of the local GID.
+
+### Meta groups
+
+`god_admin`, `everyone`, and `S_everyone` are NOT imported by hosts — they have
+implicit membership and are resolved by the directory only.
+
+---
+
+## 9. Downstream-app consumption guide
+
+A downstream app (Emby, Gitea, a custom service, a shell script) reads group
+membership from LDAP and interprets it as follows:
+
+1. **Discover the user's groups** — bind with the user's credentials (or use a
+   service account + `memberOf`). Groups are `groupOfNames` (member DN), so query
+   by the user's DN, e.g. `(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(member=<user_dn>))`, or use
+   the `memberOf` reverse attribute on the user's entry.
+2. **Match each group to a scope:**
+   - `god_admin` → the user is a global administrator.
+   - `{site}_super_admin` → site administrator for that site.
+   - `{site}_hosts_*` / `{site}_app_*` (aggregate) → applies to all hosts/apps at the site.
+   - `{site}_host_<host>_*` / `{site}_app_<app>_*` → applies to that one resource.
+   - `everyone` / `{site}_everyone` → the user is implicitly a member.
+3. **Interpret the last segment:**
+   - `admin` → full control of that resource.
+   - `access` → read/use.
+   - anything else → a capability **you** define; act on it or ignore it.
+4. A user with `{site}_host_web01_access` can reach `web01`; a user with
+   `{site}_host_web01_reboot` (if you define `reboot`) may reboot it; a user with
+   `{site}_app_emby_emby_admin` administers Emby.
+
+The app must **never** treat an unknown last segment as `admin` or `access`.
+
+---
+
+## 10. Migration from the legacy `app_*` groups
+
+The current global groups (`app_sso_admin`, `app_super_admin`,
+`app_sso_directory_admin`, `app_jump_admin`) are replaced by the new model:
+
+| Legacy | New |
+| :--- | :--- |
+| `app_super_admin` | `god_admin` |
+| `app_sso_admin` | `S_app_sso_admin` (+ `S_super_admin` for site admins) |
+| `app_sso_directory_admin` | `S_app_sso_admin` |
+| `app_jump_admin` | `S_app_jump_admin` |
+
+During the transition the legacy groups may be kept as short-lived aliases that
+resolve to the same effective permission; once everything is moved, remove them.
+
+---
+
+## 11. The management consoles are apps
+
+The SSO, Proxy, and Jump-Host each register themselves as an app on their site and
+receive their auto-generated groups (`S_app_sso_admin`, `S_app_proxy_admin`,
+`S_app_jump_admin`, plus `_access`). Their admin UIs gate on
+`god_admin` · `S_super_admin` · `S_app_<console>_admin`. This keeps everything
+self-consistent: the SSO is "just another app."

docs/index.md

@@ -22,10 +22,11 @@ one command).
 
 ## Screenshots
 
-<a href="images/dashboard.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/dashboard.png" alt="Dashboard" width="49%"></a>
+<a href="images/dashboard.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/dashboard.png" alt="Overview dashboard" width="49%"></a>
 <a href="images/users.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/users.png" alt="User list" width="49%"></a>
 <a href="images/groups.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/groups.png" alt="Groups" width="49%"></a>
-<a href="images/oauth-clients.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/oauth-clients.png" alt="OAuth clients" width="49%"></a>
+<a href="images/directory.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/directory.png" alt="Directory & inventory" width="49%"></a>
+<a href="images/oauth-clients.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/oauth-clients.png" alt="OAuth client (edit view)" width="49%"></a>
 
 *(click any screenshot to view full size)*
 
@@ -52,10 +53,14 @@ backend, that's the niche.
 - **Web management UI** — users, groups, and OAuth clients from a browser;
   invite and password-reset flows over email; self-service profile + API
   tokens.
-- **LDAPS for legacy apps** — anything that binds LDAP directly (Gitea,
-  Emby, …) uses LDAPS/StartTLS against the same directory.
+- **Direct LDAP binds** — anything that binds LDAP directly (Linux hosts
+  via PAM/SSSD, Gitea, Emby, …) uses LDAPS/StartTLS against the same
+  directory.
 - **All-in-one Docker image** — app + OpenLDAP + Redis in one container, or
   run the pieces separately via `app_*` env config.
+- **Geo-Location Scaling** — built-in support for N-Way Multi-Master OpenLDAP [replication](replication.html) across physical sites.
+- **[Directory & Inventory](directory.html)** — map sites, hosts, and services as a graph with rich metadata (IP/MAC, OS/kernel, ports, git repos), auto-provisioned access groups, and automatic registration from theta-env and ldap-client. Drives directory-aware tools like the [SSH jump host](https://theta42.github.io/jump-host/).
+- **[Theta Agent & Endpoint C2](agents.html)** — 2-way Go daemon (`theta-agent`) for real-time telemetry (CPU, RAM, Disk, ZFS, GPU), automated host discovery, SSSD/LDAP configuration, and local capability-controlled management operations.
 
 ## Get it
 
@@ -75,5 +80,7 @@ That's the standalone quick start. For the full set of install options
 
 - **[Proxy](https://theta42.github.io/proxy/)** — an OIDC + LDAP-aware
   reverse proxy, designed to sit in front of this SSO.
+- **[Jump Host](https://theta42.github.io/jump-host/)** — an SSH jump host that
+  uses this SSO's directory to decide who may reach which machine.
 - **[theta-env](https://theta42.github.io/theta-env/)** — runs this SSO
   Manager and the proxy together with one command.

docs/ldap.md

@@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ description: SSO Manager's bundled OpenLDAP directory — schema, service accoun
 
 SSO Manager runs an OpenLDAP directory holding your users and groups. The app
 authenticates against it over `localhost:389` (inside the all-in-one container)
-and exposes **LDAPS** (`ldaps://…:636`, TLS) for legacy apps that bind LDAP
-directly — Gitea, Emby, the theta42/proxy, etc.
+and exposes **LDAPS** (`ldaps://…:636`, TLS) for anything that binds LDAP
+directly — Linux hosts (PAM/SSSD, sudo rules, SSH keys), Gitea, Emby, the
+theta42/proxy, etc.
 
 ## Directory layout
 
@@ -58,8 +59,41 @@ way or use `slappasswd -h '{SSHA512}'`.
 Groups are `cn=<name>,ou=groups,<base>` (`groupOfNames`) with a `member`
 attribute listing member DNs. The `memberOf` overlay populates reverse
 membership (`memberOf` on the user); `refint` keeps it consistent on
-add/remove. **Admin permission checks read the group's `member` list**, not
-`memberOf` on the user.
+add/remove.
+
+Note that `groupOfNames` requires **at least one member**, which has two
+consequences worth knowing: whoever creates a group is automatically seeded
+into it, and removing the last member (user *or* nested group) is refused with
+a 409 rather than leaving an invalid entry behind.
+
+### Nested groups
+
+A `member` DN may be another group's, not just a user's — that is how nesting
+is stored, with no extra schema. Everyone in the nested group is a member of
+the outer one, at any depth. Manage it on the **Groups** page under each
+group's *Nested* tab, or via the API:
+
+```
+PUT    /api/group/:group/nested/:child    nest :child inside :group
+DELETE /api/group/:group/nested/:child    un-nest
+GET    /api/group/:group/effective        direct users, nested groups, and the
+                                          full transitive set of users
+```
+
+Cycles are refused (409) rather than truncated — a loop makes "who is in this
+group" unanswerable. Two standing relationships are wired automatically: the
+cross-app `app_super_admin` is nested into every resource's `<slug>_admin`
+group, and each `<slug>_admin` into its `<slug>_access` group, so administering
+something implies being able to use it.
+
+**Resolving nesting is a client-side job on stock OpenLDAP.** No 2.6.x release
+can evaluate nested groups; `memberOf` and a `(member=X)` filter both return
+direct membership only. The bundled slapd is therefore built from source with
+the `nestgroup` overlay (see *Modules + overlays* below), and the app is told so
+via `ldap.nestedGroupsServerSide`. Against any other server the app computes the
+closure itself — same answers, more queries. Either way, **never read `memberOf`
+directly to make an access decision**; use `utils/user_groups.js`'s `groupCns()`,
+which is correct in both modes.
 
 ### Personal groups
 
@@ -74,15 +108,15 @@ instead from the owning user's own profile page ("Members of `<uid>`'s
 group", admin-only) — add other accounts as supplementary members, e.g. to
 share write access to files owned by this group.
 
-The SSO requires three groups (seeded automatically by the entrypoint /
-`install.sh`):
+The SSO seeds these groups automatically (entrypoint / `install.sh`):
 
 | Group | Grants |
 |-------|--------|
+| `app_super_admin` | cross-app super admin. Nested into the three below, so its members hold those rights transitively rather than by a special case in app code — and the privilege is visible to LDAP-native consumers (SSSD, sudo) too. |
 | `app_sso_admin` | full admin (users, groups, settings) |
 | `app_sso_oauth_admin` | OAuth client management |
 | `app_sso_invite` | invitation management |
-| `app_sso_service_account` | not a permission — marks a `posixAccount` as a non-person service account (see *Service accounts* below) |
+| `app_sso_service_account` | not a permission — marks a `posixAccount` as a non-person service account (see *Service accounts* below). Deliberately **not** nested into, since it changes how an account is displayed rather than what it may do. |
 
 ## TLS (LDAPS / StartTLS)
 
@@ -118,6 +152,81 @@ volumes:
 
 The entrypoint leaves existing certs untouched (idempotent).
 
+## Choosing the LDAPS hostname
+
+The `/integrations` page advertises an **LDAPS URL** for direct LDAP binds. By
+default it derives that URL from the public OAuth issuer (e.g.
+`https://sso.example.com` → `ldaps://sso.example.com:636`). That is convenient,
+but it implies LDAP clients reach your directory through the same public
+hostname — which usually means port-forwarding 636 through your router.
+
+**Do not port-forward LDAPS (636) to the public internet.** LDAP simple binds
+have no rate limiting and are a brute-force target. Instead, use one of these
+internal-only patterns and set `conf.ldap.ldapsHost` (or
+`app_ldap__ldapsHost`) so the `/integrations` page shows the right URL.
+
+### 1. Same Docker / local network host (best for apps on this machine)
+
+If the LDAP client runs on the same Docker network as the SSO Manager (for
+example, the bundled `theta-env` stack), use the internal service name:
+
+```
+ldaps://sso-manager:636
+```
+
+In `conf/secrets.js`:
+
+```javascript
+ldap: {
+  ldapsHost: 'sso-manager',
+  ldapsPort: 636,
+}
+```
+
+The proxy in theta-env already uses this internally. The bundled slapd cert
+includes `sso-manager` in its SAN when `LDAP_CERT_CN` is left at its default,
+so hostname verification works without extra setup.
+
+### 2. LAN host behind your router (best for separate home-lan machines)
+
+Create an internal-only DNS record — e.g. `ldap.internal.example.com` →
+`192.168.1.10` — using your router, Pi-hole, or a local `hosts` file. Then get
+or generate a cert whose SAN/CN matches that internal name:
+
+- **Let's Encrypt wildcard** (`*.internal.example.com`) works if you own the
+  public domain and can complete DNS-01 challenge; the record itself can stay
+  private/routable only inside your LAN.
+- **Internal CA** is fine for a pure LAN: run a small CA, issue a cert for
+  `ldap.internal.example.com`, and distribute the CA cert to clients.
+- **Self-signed** with `LDAP_CERT_CN=ldap.internal.example.com` also works; copy
+  the generated `ldap.crt` to each client and trust it.
+
+In `conf/secrets.js`:
+
+```javascript
+ldap: {
+  ldapsHost: 'ldap.internal.example.com',
+  ldapsPort: 636,
+}
+```
+
+The URL on `/integrations` becomes `ldaps://ldap.internal.example.com:636`.
+
+### 3. Public hostname (acceptable only behind a VPN/firewall)
+
+If a remote host must bind LDAP, put it behind a VPN (Tailscale, WireGuard,
+etc.) or a tightly locked-down firewall rule. In that case the public hostname
+may be appropriate, but the LDAPS port should still not be reachable from the
+open internet.
+
+### Why not just use the LDAP server's IP address?
+
+TLS clients verify the server name against the certificate. Connecting to
+`ldaps://192.168.1.10:636` with a cert issued for `*.internal.example.com`
+will fail hostname verification unless you disable cert checks — which removes
+most of the security benefit of LDAPS. Always use a hostname that matches the
+cert.
+
 ## Service accounts
 
 A service account is a normal `posixAccount` for something that isn't a
@@ -232,11 +341,37 @@ needs:
 
 - **Modules:** `pw-sha2` (the app stores user passwords as `{SSHA512}`),
   `ppolicy`, `memberof`, `refint`.
+- **Optional — `nestgroup`:** server-side nested-group evaluation. Not in any
+  released OpenLDAP (added to master as ITS#10161 in March 2024; 2.7 is still
+  unreleased), so the bundled image builds slapd from a pinned upstream commit.
+  Without it the app resolves nesting itself and everything still works — leave
+  `ldap.nestedGroupsServerSide` at `false`. With it, set that to `true` and
+  configure:
+
+  ```
+  overlay         nestgroup
+  nestgroup-base  ou=groups,<base>
+  nestgroup-flags member-filter memberof-filter memberof-values
+  ```
+
+  Flags are **space-separated**; the comma form the man page's `{a, b, c}`
+  notation suggests is rejected. `member-values` is deliberately omitted — it
+  expands the `member` attribute when reading a group, which destroys the
+  distinction between "listed here" and "reachable through a nested group", and
+  the raw values are then unrecoverable. Transitive answers come from the filter
+  flags and from `GET /api/group/:group/effective`.
+
+  One more consequence of building from master: it ships **LMDB 1.0.0**, whose
+  on-disk format is mutually unreadable with the 0.9.x in 2.6.x
+  (`MDB_INVALID: File is not an LMDB file`). Moving a directory between the two
+  is a `slapcat` → `slapadd` reload, not a restart.
 - **Custom schema:** the `theta42Person` auxiliary objectClass with
   `dateOfBirth` — see `ops/ldap-setup.sh` for the LDIF.
 - **Directory tree:** `ou=people`, `ou=groups`, `ou=policies` under the base DN,
   a default `pwdPolicy` at `cn=ppolicy,ou=policies,<base>`.
-- **Required groups:** `app_sso_admin`, `app_sso_invite`, `app_sso_oauth_admin`.
+- **Required groups:** `app_sso_admin`, `app_sso_invite`, `app_sso_oauth_admin`,
+  and `app_super_admin` (the cross-app super-admin group; the bundled entrypoint
+  also nests it into the first three).
 
 `ops/ldap-setup.sh -p <admin-password>` configures all of the above
 idempotently against a running slapd (auto-detects the database holding your

docs/oauth.md

@@ -53,20 +53,18 @@ An OAuth client represents an app that authenticates against the SSO. Each has:
 
 ### Managing clients
 
-Clients are managed from the web UI (as a member of the `app_sso_oauth_admin`
-group) or the HTTP API at `/api/oauth/client` (auth via the `auth-token` header
-from a login):
+Clients are managed directly from the **Directory** tab in the web UI. They are modeled as resources of `kind: oauth` and must belong to a parent Service.
 
-| Method | Path | Action |
-|--------|------|--------|
-| `GET` | `/api/oauth/client` | list clients |
-| `POST` | `/api/oauth/client` | create a client (returns the raw `client_secret` once) |
-| `GET` | `/api/oauth/client/:id` | get one |
-| `PUT` | `/api/oauth/client/:id` | update redirect URIs / scopes / groups |
-| `DELETE` | `/api/oauth/client/:id` | delete |
-| `POST` | `/api/oauth/client/:id/rotate` | rotate the secret (returns the new raw secret once) |
+| Action | How to do it |
+|--------|--------------|
+| **Create** | Click the green **+** on a parent Service to add a child resource. Choose **OAuth Integration**. The raw `client_secret` is shown once upon creation. |
+| **Edit** | Click the edit pencil on the OAuth resource in the Directory list or tree. You can update redirect URIs, scopes, allowed groups, and token TTLs. |
+| **Delete** | Click the trash can on the OAuth resource in the Directory list. |
+| **Rotate Secret** | Open the edit modal for the OAuth resource and click **Rotate Client Secret**. The new raw secret is shown once. |
 
-> All client-management endpoints are gated by the `app_sso_oauth_admin` group.
+> All client-management actions use the standard Directory API (`/api/directory-admin/resources`) and are gated by the `app_sso_directory_admin` group.
+
+<a href="images/oauth-clients.png" target="_blank"><img src="images/oauth-clients.png" alt="Editing an OAuth client resource" width="80%"></a>
 
 ## Scopes
 

docs/plugins.md

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+# Plugins
+
+The SSO Manager runs **plugins** as scheduled background tasks. A plugin
+**type** is an installed module; a plugin **instance** is a configured, loadable
+copy of a type. You can create, edit, load/unload, run, and delete instances
+from the **Plugins** page (or the `/api/plugins` API), and you can run several
+instances of the same type — e.g. two Proxmox endpoints, each with its own URL
+and token on its own schedule.
+
+Per-instance **secrets** are stored in [OpenBao](https://openbao.org/) at
+`secret/plugins/<instance-id>/conf`, not in `sso-secrets.js`. The admin UI only
+ever shows them masked (`********`); the plugin reads them at run time. This
+needs theta-suite ≥ v1.30.1 (which grants the `sso-broker` OpenBao policy
+`secret/plugins/*`); re-run `./setup.sh` after upgrading.
+
+## Plugin types
+
+A plugin type is a module under `nodejs/plugins/<category>/<type>.js`. The
+filename basename (without `.js`) is the `type`; the parent directory is the
+`category`. The built-ins ship under `plugins/discovery/`:
+
+- `proxmox` — Proxmox VE (URL + API token)
+- `unifi` — UniFi Network controller (URL + username/password)
+- `nmap` — nmap OS + port scan (a target range; no credentials)
+
+A module exports a **manifest**:
+
+```javascript
+module.exports = {
+  // Identity — `type`/`category` default to the file/dir name but can be set
+  // explicitly. `name`/`description` show up in the UI.
+  type: 'proxmox',
+  category: 'discovery',
+  name: 'Proxmox VE',
+  description: 'Discover VMs, containers, and nodes from a PVE endpoint.',
+
+  // Drives the admin UI form, API validation, and secret masking. Fields with
+  // `secret: true` are stored in OpenBao; the rest live in the DB row.
+  configSchema: [
+    { key: 'url',         label: 'API URL',       type: 'url',      required: true },
+    { key: 'tokenId',     label: 'Token ID',      type: 'text',     required: true },
+    { key: 'tokenSecret', label: 'Token Secret',  type: 'password', required: true, secret: true }
+  ],
+
+  // "Test" button: validate the config (don't do the work). Return
+  // { ok: true } or { ok: false, error: '...' }. Optional.
+  validate: async (config) => { … },
+
+  // The work. `run` is the generalized contract name; the discovery plugins
+  // also keep `discover` as an alias for back-compat. For `category:
+  // 'discovery'`, the scheduler passes the result to the discovery reconciler.
+  run: async (config) => { return { resources, edges }; },
+  discover: async (config) => { return { resources, edges }; }
+};
+```
+
+`run(config)` receives the merged non-secret config + secret values as one flat
+object (e.g. `{ url, tokenId, tokenSecret }`). For a discovery plugin it
+returns `{ resources, edges }`; the reconciler upserts them into the resource
+graph attributed to the instance's **slug** (the `discovery_sources` name).
+
+### Writing a custom plugin type
+
+Drop a `.js` file under `nodejs/plugins/discovery/` (or a new category directory)
+following the manifest above. New types are picked up at boot, so restart the
+SSO Manager after adding one. Runtime load/unload is per-**instance** only —
+adding a new type still needs a restart.
+
+## The Plugins page
+
+Under **Plugins** (nav, admin-only — `app_sso_admin` / `app_sso_directory_admin`
+/ `app_super_admin`):
+
+- **New Plugin** — pick a type, name it, choose a unique slug (the discovery
+  source name + the URL the resource graph attributes results to), set a cron
+  schedule, and fill in the config form (secret fields are password inputs).
+  Creating it schedules it and kicks one immediate run.
+- **Edit** — name, cron, and non-secret config.
+- **Edit Secrets** (key icon) — password fields, prefilled masked. Leave a
+  field blank to keep its current value.
+- **Test** (vial icon) — runs the plugin's `validate`.
+- **Run now** (play icon) — enqueues one immediate run regardless of state.
+- **Load / Unload** — enable/disable the schedule without deleting the instance.
+- **Delete** — removes the schedule, the OpenBao secret namespace, and the row.
+
+## API
+
+All endpoints are mounted at `/api/plugins`, require an authenticated admin
+(`app_sso_admin` / `app_sso_directory_admin` / `app_super_admin`), and return
+secret values masked.
+
+| Method + path | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `GET /api/plugins/types` | list installed plugin types + their `configSchema` |
+| `GET /api/plugins` | list instances (with masked secrets + last-run state) |
+| `GET /api/plugins/:id` | one instance |
+| `POST /api/plugins` | create — body `{ pluginType, name, slug, cron, config }` where `config` is a flat object of all field values; secret fields are split into OpenBao |
+| `PUT /api/plugins/:id` | update name/cron/enabled + non-secret config |
+| `PUT /api/plugins/:id/secrets` | update secret fields (blank = keep) |
+| `POST /api/plugins/:id/test` | run `validate` → `{ ok }` or `{ ok:false, error }` |
+| `POST /api/plugins/:id/load` | enable + schedule + run now |
+| `POST /api/plugins/:id/unload` | unschedule + disable |
+| `POST /api/plugins/:id/run` | enqueue one immediate run |
+| `DELETE /api/plugins/:id` | unschedule + remove OpenBao secrets + delete row |
+| `GET /api/plugins/:id/runs` | `{ lastRunAt, lastStatus, lastError }` |
+
+## Scheduler internals
+
+The scheduler ([BullMQ](https://docs.bullmq.io/) over Redis) gives each instance
+a stable JobScheduler id (`plugin:<instanceId>`); load/unload upsert/remove
+that one schedule without disturbing the others. A daily `garbage_collect` job
+prunes discovery resources not seen in > 7 days.
+
+### Legacy migration
+
+Before this system, plugins were configured statically in `sso-secrets.js`:
+
+```javascript
+module.exports = {
+  discovery: {
+    plugins: {
+      proxmox: { enabled: true, cron: '0 * * * *', url: '…', tokenId: '…', tokenSecret: '…' }
+    }
+  }
+};
+```
+
+On the first boot of SSO Manager ≥ v1.17.0, if the `PluginInstance` table is
+empty **and** `conf.discovery.plugins` has entries, one instance per configured
+type is seeded automatically (secret fields copied into OpenBao). After that the
+table is non-empty and the static config is ignored — manage plugins from the
+UI/API instead. The migration is idempotent (guarded by the empty-table check).

docs/replication.md

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+---
+layout: default
+title: Geo-Location Scaling (Replication)
+---
+
+# Geo-Location Scaling (Replication)
+
+SSO Manager is built to be a self-contained identity provider, but if you have multiple physical sites, you may want a local copy of the directory at each site to ensure low latency and high availability.
+
+## Why and when to use this?
+- **High Availability (HA)**: If your primary site goes completely offline, your other sites can still authenticate users locally without depending on a WAN link.
+- **Low Latency**: Applications at a remote site can bind directly to their local LDAP server (`localhost` or LAN IP) instead of traversing the internet to query the primary site, making logins blazing fast.
+- **Independent Failure Domains**: By replicating only the LDAP directory (the source of truth) and keeping session state (Redis) independent, you prevent complex "split-brain" scenarios in the web UI. A failure at Site A won't bring down Site B.
+
+By default, the `sso-manager` Docker container runs a single, independent OpenLDAP instance. However, you can enable **N-Way Multi-Master Replication** via environment variables.
+
+## How it works
+
+In an N-Way Multi-Master setup, every site runs a fully active OpenLDAP server (`slapd`).
+- **Reads and Writes anywhere**: A user can change their password or update their profile at Site A, Site B, or Site C.
+- **Conflict Resolution**: OpenLDAP's `syncrepl` engine uses Context Sequence Numbers (CSN) to track changes. If Site A goes offline and a user changes their password at Site B, Site A will automatically pull the newest changes the moment it rejoins the cluster.
+- **Independent Redis**: Session data, API Tokens, and OAuth Clients are stored in Redis. By design, Redis is NOT replicated in this geographic setup. This ensures that a failure at Site A never causes Site B's Redis to become read-only, which would break the web UI at Site B. OAuth clients must be configured per-site.
+
+## Configuration
+
+To enable replication, you must pass two environment variables to the `sso-manager` container:
+
+1. `LDAP_SERVER_ID`: A unique integer for this node (e.g., `1`, `2`, `3`). This MUST be unique across the cluster.
+2. `LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS`: A space-separated list of the LDAP URLs of all **other** nodes in the cluster.
+
+### Example using `theta-env` / Docker Compose
+
+**Site 1 (`setup.env` or `docker-compose.yml`)**
+```env
+LDAP_SERVER_ID=1
+LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS="ldaps://sso.site2.com:636 ldaps://sso.site3.com:636"
+```
+
+**Site 2 (`setup.env` or `docker-compose.yml`)**
+```env
+LDAP_SERVER_ID=2
+LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS="ldaps://sso.site1.com:636 ldaps://sso.site3.com:636"
+```
+
+**Site 3 (`setup.env` or `docker-compose.yml`)**
+```env
+LDAP_SERVER_ID=3
+LDAP_REPLICATION_HOSTS="ldaps://sso.site1.com:636 ldaps://sso.site2.com:636"
+```
+
+Once configured, the container's entrypoint will automatically load the `syncprov` module, enable `mirrormode`, and generate the necessary `syncrepl` blocks in `/etc/openldap/slapd.conf`.
+
+## User Locations
+
+When creating or editing a user, you can specify their **Location (Site)**. This maps directly to the standard LDAP `l` (localityName) attribute, allowing you to track which physical site a user belongs to natively within the directory.

docs/vault.md

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# Vault Secrets Management
+
+The Vault Secrets feature integrates with OpenBao to provide a secure key-value store for your environment. It allows you to store sensitive information like passwords, API keys, and credentials, ensuring they are encrypted and access-controlled.
+
+## Usage
+
+You can access the Vault UI from the application's top navigation bar. 
+
+### Creating Secrets
+
+1. Click on the **New Secret** button.
+2. Enter a **Secret Path**. This acts as the name/identifier of your secret (e.g., `db-credentials`).
+3. Enter the **Secret Data** in JSON format. For example:
+   ```json
+   {
+     "username": "admin",
+     "password": "supersecretpassword123"
+   }
+   ```
+4. Click **Save Secret**.
+
+### Reading and Editing Secrets
+
+* To view a secret, click on its name in the **Secrets List**.
+* To update an existing secret, select it and click the **Edit** button. You can then modify the JSON data and save your changes.
+
+### OpenBao Integration
+
+The secrets are stored in an OpenBao backend configured in development mode. The default KV (Key-Value) version 2 engine is mounted at `secret/`. The built-in UI uses the `/api/vault/secret/` API endpoints to interact with OpenBao.
+
+## Apps tab (admin)
+
+The **Apps** tab mints a scoped OpenBao token for an **external application** so it can read its own configuration out of OpenBao — a downstream-app credential, not a per-user secret.
+
+1. Enter an app **name** (e.g. `my-service`) and click **Mint token**.
+2. A token is shown **once** — copy it into the external app now; it cannot be recovered later. The app uses it as the `X-Vault-Token` header against `secret/apps/<name>/*` (see the connection convention shown on the page).
+3. The **Minted apps** list shows every token you've created (metadata only — the token itself is never stored). sso keeps each token alive by renewing it periodically, so a downstream app's credential stays valid as long as sso runs. If an app shows a **renewal error**, re-mint it here — that revokes the old token and issues a fresh one.
+
+The token is scoped to `secret/apps/<name>/*` only (policy `app-<name>`), so a compromised token can't touch any other secret.
+
+## Shared tab
+
+The **Shared** tab lets you share a secret with another user (or app) without copying the value around.
+
+1. **New** — give the secret a name (slug) and its JSON data. The owner has full read/write on `secret/shared/<uid>/<slug>`.
+2. Open a secret and use **Grants** to share it with a user or app; the grantee's OpenBao policy is edited immediately so the share takes effect with no token re-mint. Revoking a grant removes access at the ACL.
+3. The data itself is read through the normal Vault proxy using each user's own session, so OpenBao enforces read access per-request.
+
+## API Access
+
+If you need to programmatically access the secrets, you can interact directly with the OpenBao API using the root token (in dev mode):
+
+```bash
+# Example: Read a secret via the API
+curl -H "X-Vault-Token: root" -H "Authorization: Bearer <your-sso-token>" http://<your-sso-host>/api/vault/secret/data/<your-secret-path>
+```

install.sh

@@ -1,719 +1,230 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# install.sh - Idempotent standalone installer for Theta42 SSO Manager
-# For Debian/Ubuntu systems
 #
-# This script:
-#   1. Installs Node.js 20.x
-#   2. Installs and configures OpenLDAP with required schemas/overlays
-#   3. Deploys the SSO Manager application
-#   4. Sets up systemd services
+# Install / update Theta42 SSO Manager on a fresh or existing host.
 #
-# Usage:
-#   sudo ./install.sh [OPTIONS]
+# This script is idempotent: run it to install, and re-run it to update. It
+# installs system dependencies (Node, OpenLDAP, Redis), force-syncs the repo at
+# $REPO_DIR to its remote branch, and symlinks the systemd config straight from
+# the repo. Because the config is symlinked, an update is just "sync the repo +
+# restart" -- the files under /etc/systemd always track the repo.
 #
-# Options:
-#   -p, --admin-pass PASSWORD    LDAP admin password (required, or set via LDAP_ADMIN_PASS env)
-#   -b, --base-dn DN             Base DN (default: dc=example,dc=com)
-#   -n, --org-name NAME          Organization name shown in UI/email (default: SSO Manager)
-#   -o, --port PORT              HTTP port for SSO Manager (default: 3001)
-#   -j, --jwt-secret SECRET      JWT secret for OAuth (default: auto-generated)
-#   -s, --smtp-config CONFIG     SMTP config as host:port:user:pass
-#   --skip-ldap                  Skip LDAP installation (use existing LDAP)
-#   --skip-app                   Skip application installation (LDAP setup only)
-#   --dry-run                    Show what would be done without making changes
-#   -h, --help                   Show this help
+# Secrets live at $SECRETS_FILE (/etc/sso-manager/secrets.js by default),
+# outside the repo checkout so they survive the hard reset below. FIRST RUN
+# ONLY (no $SECRETS_FILE yet): installs and configures OpenLDAP (modules,
+# overlays, custom schema, directory tree, required SSO groups -- see
+# ops/ldap-setup.sh), generates an LDAP admin password + JWT secret unless
+# given via env, and seeds $SECRETS_FILE with those values plus SMTP
+# placeholders. Edit that file (SMTP, org name, ...) and re-run this script to
+# apply changes -- once it exists it is never touched again, and LDAP is never
+# re-bootstrapped.
 #
-# Environment variables (alternative to flags):
-#   LDAP_ADMIN_PASS, LDAP_BASE_DN, PORT, JWT_SECRET, SMTP_*
-
+# Intended to be driven by CI/CD with no human writes on prod: the checkout is
+# hard-reset to origin/$BRANCH on every run, so the box deterministically
+# mirrors the repo (any drift on the box is discarded).
+#
+# Usage: sudo ./install.sh   (override with REPO_URL=, REPO_DIR=, BRANCH=,
+#                             SECRETS_FILE=, LDAP_BASE_DN=, LDAP_ADMIN_PASS=,
+#                             JWT_SECRET=, ORG_NAME=, PORT=, SKIP_LDAP=true)
 set -euo pipefail
+# Never block on an interactive git credential prompt in CI.
+export GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0
+# Never block on an interactive debconf prompt (e.g. tzdata, pulled in as a
+# dependency of redis-server/slapd on a box that's never configured it).
+export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
 
-# ── Defaults ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-BASE_DN="${LDAP_BASE_DN:-dc=example,dc=com}"
-ADMIN_PASS="${LDAP_ADMIN_PASS:-}"
+REPO_URL="${REPO_URL:-https://github.com/theta42/sso-manager-node.git}"
+REPO_DIR="${REPO_DIR:-/opt/theta42/sso-manager}"
+BRANCH="${BRANCH:-master}"
+NODE_MAJOR=22
+SECRETS_FILE="${SECRETS_FILE:-/etc/sso-manager/secrets.js}"
+
+LDAP_BASE_DN="${LDAP_BASE_DN:-dc=example,dc=com}"
 ORG_NAME="${ORG_NAME:-SSO Manager}"
 PORT="${PORT:-3001}"
-JWT_SECRET="${JWT_SECRET:-}"
-SMTP_HOST="${SMTP_HOST:-}"
-SMTP_PORT="${SMTP_PORT:-587}"
-SMTP_USER="${SMTP_USER:-}"
-SMTP_PASS="${SMTP_PASS:-}"
 SKIP_LDAP="${SKIP_LDAP:-false}"
-SKIP_APP="${SKIP_APP:-false}"
-DRY_RUN="${DRY_RUN:-false}"
 
-INSTALL_DIR="/opt/sso-manager"
-SYSTEMD_DIR="/etc/systemd/system"
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-
-# Colors for output
-RED='\033[0;31m'
-GREEN='\033[0;32m'
-YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
-NC='\033[0m' # No Color
-
-# ── Helper functions ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-info() { echo -e "${GREEN}[INFO]${NC} $*"; }
-warn() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC} $*" >&2; }
-error() { echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $*" >&2; }
-dry_run() { if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == "true" ]]; then echo "[DRY-RUN] $*"; fi; }
-
-usage() {
-    grep '^#' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'
-    exit 0
-}
-
-# Parse arguments
-while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
-    case $1 in
-        -p|--admin-pass)
-            ADMIN_PASS="$2"
-            shift 2
-            ;;
-        -b|--base-dn)
-            BASE_DN="$2"
-            shift 2
-            ;;
-        -n|--org-name)
-            ORG_NAME="$2"
-            shift 2
-            ;;
-        -o|--port)
-            PORT="$2"
-            shift 2
-            ;;
-        -j|--jwt-secret)
-            JWT_SECRET="$2"
-            shift 2
-            ;;
-        -s|--smtp-config)
-            IFS=':' read -r SMTP_HOST SMTP_PORT SMTP_USER SMTP_PASS <<< "$2"
-            shift 2
-            ;;
-        --skip-ldap)
-            SKIP_LDAP="true"
-            shift
-            ;;
-        --skip-app)
-            SKIP_APP="true"
-            shift
-            ;;
-        --dry-run)
-            DRY_RUN="true"
-            shift
-            ;;
-        -h|--help)
-            usage
-            ;;
-        *)
-            error "Unknown option: $1"
-            usage
-            ;;
-    esac
-done
-
-# Validate required parameters
-if [[ -z "$ADMIN_PASS" ]]; then
-    error "LDAP admin password is required (-p or LDAP_ADMIN_PASS env)"
-    exit 1
+if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
+	echo "This script must be run as root (try: sudo $0)" >&2
+	exit 1
 fi
 
-# Generate JWT secret if not provided
-if [[ -z "$JWT_SECRET" ]]; then
-    JWT_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
-    info "Generated JWT secret: ${JWT_SECRET:0:8}..."
+# Symlink $1 -> $2, replacing whatever is already at $2 (idempotent).
+link(){
+	ln -sfn "$1" "$2"
+	echo "linked $2 -> $1"
+}
+
+# Read the "version" field out of a package.json without depending on Node
+# being installed yet (this runs before the Node.js install step below).
+pkg_version(){
+	sed -n 's/^[[:space:]]*"version":[[:space:]]*"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' "$1" | head -1
+}
+
+# Installed version before this run touches anything, for the upgrade banner
+# at the end. Empty on a fresh install (no prior checkout).
+CURRENT_VERSION=""
+if [ -f "$REPO_DIR/nodejs/package.json" ]; then
+	CURRENT_VERSION="$(pkg_version "$REPO_DIR/nodejs/package.json")"
 fi
 
-# Derive the DNS domain from the base DN (dc=foo,dc=bar -> foo.bar) for email
-# sender defaults. Override with LDAP_DOMAIN if set.
-if [[ -z "${LDAP_DOMAIN:-}" ]]; then
-    LDAP_DOMAIN=$(echo "$BASE_DN" | sed 's/^dc=//; s/,dc=/./g')
+# FIRST_RUN gates OpenLDAP bootstrap + secrets seeding below -- both only ever
+# happen once, the first time this script runs on a host (i.e. before
+# $SECRETS_FILE exists). Every later run only updates the code.
+FIRST_RUN=0
+[ -f "$SECRETS_FILE" ] || FIRST_RUN=1
+
+echo "==> Base packages"
+apt-get update
+apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+	build-essential redis-server \
+	wget gnupg ca-certificates curl git
+
+echo "==> Node.js ${NODE_MAJOR}.x apt source"
+install -d -m 0755 /etc/apt/keyrings
+curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/gpgkey/nodesource-repo.gpg.key \
+	| gpg --dearmor --yes -o /etc/apt/keyrings/nodesource.gpg
+echo "deb [signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/nodesource.gpg] https://deb.nodesource.com/node_${NODE_MAJOR}.x nodistro main" \
+	> /etc/apt/sources.list.d/nodesource.list
+
+echo "==> Install Node.js"
+apt-get update
+apt-get install -y nodejs
+
+echo "==> Redis"
+systemctl enable --now redis-server
+
+echo "==> Repo checkout at ${REPO_DIR} (branch ${BRANCH})"
+install -d "$(dirname "$REPO_DIR")"
+if [ -d "$REPO_DIR/.git" ]; then
+	# Force the box to match the remote branch exactly. No human edits configs
+	# on prod, so discarding local drift is the desired, deterministic behavior.
+	git -C "$REPO_DIR" fetch --prune origin
+	git -C "$REPO_DIR" checkout -B "$BRANCH" "origin/$BRANCH"
+	git -C "$REPO_DIR" reset --hard "origin/$BRANCH"
+	git -C "$REPO_DIR" clean -fd
+else
+	git clone --branch "$BRANCH" "$REPO_URL" "$REPO_DIR"
 fi
 
-# ── System checks ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-check_root() {
-    if [[ $EUID -ne 0 ]]; then
-        error "This script must be run as root (sudo)"
-        exit 1
-    fi
-}
-
-check_os() {
-    if [[ ! -f /etc/debian_version ]]; then
-        error "This script is for Debian/Ubuntu systems only"
-        exit 1
-    fi
-    info "Detected $(cat /etc/os-release | grep PRETTY_NAME | cut -d'"' -f2)"
-}
-
-# ── Package installation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-install_package() {
-    local pkg="$1"
-    if dpkg -l | grep -q "^ii  $pkg "; then
-        info "Package $pkg is already installed"
-        return 0
-    fi
-    dry_run "Would install package: $pkg"
-    [[ "$DRY_RUN" == "true" ]] && return 0
-    apt-get update -qq
-    apt-get install -y -qq "$pkg"
-    info "Installed $pkg"
-}
-
-install_nodejs() {
-    if command -v node &>/dev/null && node --version | grep -q "v20"; then
-        info "Node.js 20.x is already installed"
-        return 0
-    fi
-    dry_run "Would install Node.js 20.x"
-    [[ "$DRY_RUN" == "true" ]] && return 0
-
-    info "Installing Node.js 20.x..."
-    # Use NodeSource repository for Node.js 20.x
-    apt-get update -qq
-    apt-get install -y -qq curl gnupg ca-certificates
-    curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash - >/dev/null 2>&1
-    apt-get install -y -qq nodejs
-    info "Installed Node.js $(node --version)"
-}
-
-# ── OpenLDAP installation and configuration ───────────────────────────────────
-install_openldap() {
-    if command -v slapd &>/dev/null; then
-        info "OpenLDAP is already installed"
-        return 0
-    fi
-    dry_run "Would install OpenLDAP"
-    [[ "$DRY_RUN" == "true" ]] && return 0
-
-    info "Installing OpenLDAP..."
-
-    # Pre-seed debconf for non-interactive installation
-    debconf-set-selections << EOF
-slapd slapd/internal/adminpw string $ADMIN_PASS
-slapd slapd/password1 string $ADMIN_PASS
-slapd slapd/password2 string $ADMIN_PASS
-slapd slapd/domain string ${BASE_DN#dc=}
-slapd slapd/backend string MDB
-slapd shared/organization string $ORG_NAME
-slapd slapd/purge_database boolean true
-slapd slapd/move_old_database boolean true
-slapd slapd/invalid_config boolean true
-EOF
-
-    apt-get update -qq
-    apt-get install -y -qq slapd ldap-utils
-
-    # Configure ldap.conf
-    cat > /etc/ldap/ldap.conf << LDAPCONF
-BASE   $BASE_DN
-URI    ldap://localhost
-LDAPCONF
-
-    # Set proper permissions
-    chmod 644 /etc/ldap/ldap.conf
-
-    info "OpenLDAP installed"
-}
-
-configure_openldap() {
-    info "Configuring OpenLDAP..."
-    dry_run "Would configure OpenLDAP with base DN: $BASE_DN"
-    [[ "$DRY_RUN" == "true" ]] && return 0
-
-    # Wait for slapd to be ready
-    for i in {1..10}; do
-        if ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=config" "(objectClass=*)" dn >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            info "OpenLDAP is ready"
-            break
-        fi
-        sleep 1
-    done
-
-    # Detect the database DN for our suffix
-    DB_DN=$(ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=config" \
-        "(&(objectClass=olcDatabaseConfig)(olcSuffix=${BASE_DN}))" dn 2>/dev/null \
-        | grep "^dn:" | head -1 | sed 's/^dn: //')
-
-    if [[ -z "$DB_DN" ]]; then
-        # Try to find any database and update its suffix
-        DB_DN=$(ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=config" \
-            "(objectClass=olcDatabaseConfig)" dn 2>/dev/null \
-            | grep "^dn:" | head -1 | sed 's/^dn: //')
-
-        if [[ -n "$DB_DN" ]]; then
-            info "Updating database suffix to $BASE_DN"
-            ldapmodify -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: $DB_DN
-changetype: modify
-replace: olcSuffix
-olcSuffix: $BASE_DN
-EOF
-        fi
-    fi
-
-    if [[ -z "$DB_DN" ]]; then
-        error "Could not detect OpenLDAP database configuration"
-        return 1
-    fi
-
-    info "Using database: $DB_DN"
-
-    # 1. Load pw-sha2 module
-    if ! ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=config" "(objectClass=olcModuleList)" olcModuleLoad 2>/dev/null | grep -q "pw-sha2"; then
-        info "Loading pw-sha2 module..."
-        ldapmodify -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: cn=module{0},cn=config
-changetype: modify
-add: olcModuleLoad
-olcModuleLoad: pw-sha2
-EOF
-    else
-        info "pw-sha2 module already loaded"
-    fi
-
-    # 2. Load ppolicy module
-    if ! ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=config" "(objectClass=olcModuleList)" olcModuleLoad 2>/dev/null | grep -q "ppolicy"; then
-        info "Loading ppolicy module..."
-        ldapmodify -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: cn=module{0},cn=config
-changetype: modify
-add: olcModuleLoad
-olcModuleLoad: ppolicy
-EOF
-    else
-        info "ppolicy module already loaded"
-    fi
-
-    # 3. Load memberof module
-    if ! ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=config" "(objectClass=olcModuleList)" olcModuleLoad 2>/dev/null | grep -q "memberof"; then
-        info "Loading memberof module..."
-        ldapmodify -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: cn=module{1},cn=config
-changetype: modify
-add: olcModuleLoad
-olcModuleLoad: memberof
-EOF
-    else
-        info "memberof module already loaded"
-    fi
-
-    # 4. Load refint module
-    if ! ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=config" "(objectClass=olcModuleList)" olcModuleLoad 2>/dev/null | grep -q "refint"; then
-        info "Loading refint module..."
-        ldapmodify -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: cn=module{1},cn=config
-changetype: modify
-add: olcModuleLoad
-olcModuleLoad: refint
-EOF
-    else
-        info "refint module already loaded"
-    fi
-
-    # 5. Add ppolicy overlay
-    if ! ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "$DB_DN" "(olcOverlay=*ppolicy*)" dn 2>/dev/null | grep -qi "ppolicy"; then
-        info "Adding ppolicy overlay..."
-        ldapadd -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: olcOverlay=ppolicy,$DB_DN
-objectClass: olcOverlayConfig
-objectClass: olcPPolicyConfig
-olcOverlay: ppolicy
-olcPPolicyDefault: cn=ppolicy,ou=policies,$BASE_DN
-olcPPolicyUseLockout: TRUE
-EOF
-    else
-        info "ppolicy overlay already configured"
-    fi
-
-    # 6. Add memberof overlay
-    if ! ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "$DB_DN" "(olcOverlay=*memberof*)" dn 2>/dev/null | grep -qi "memberof"; then
-        info "Adding memberof overlay..."
-        ldapadd -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: olcOverlay=memberof,$DB_DN
-objectClass: olcConfig
-objectClass: olcMemberOf
-objectClass: olcOverlayConfig
-objectClass: top
-olcOverlay: memberof
-olcMemberOfDangling: ignore
-olcMemberOfRefInt: TRUE
-olcMemberOfGroupOC: groupOfNames
-olcMemberOfMemberAD: member
-olcMemberOfMemberOfAD: memberOf
-EOF
-    else
-        info "memberof overlay already configured"
-    fi
-
-    # 7. Add refint overlay
-    if ! ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "$DB_DN" "(olcOverlay=*refint*)" dn 2>/dev/null | grep -qi "refint"; then
-        info "Adding refint overlay..."
-        ldapadd -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: olcOverlay=refint,$DB_DN
-objectClass: olcConfig
-objectClass: olcOverlayConfig
-objectClass: olcRefintConfig
-objectClass: top
-olcOverlay: refint
-olcRefintAttribute: memberof member manager owner
-EOF
-    else
-        info "refint overlay already configured"
-    fi
-
-    # 8. Add database indexes
-    info "Configuring database indexes..."
-    for index in "mail eq,sub" "uid eq,sub" "cn eq,sub" "member eq" "uidNumber eq" "gidNumber eq"; do
-        attr=$(echo "$index" | cut -d' ' -f1)
-        types=$(echo "$index" | cut -d' ' -f2)
-        ldapmodify -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// << EOF || true
-dn: $DB_DN
-changetype: modify
-add: olcDbIndex
-olcDbIndex: $attr $types
-EOF
-    done
-
-    # 9. Load custom theta42 schema
-    if ! ldapsearch -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=schema,cn=config" "(olcObjectClasses=*theta42Person*)" olcObjectClasses 2>/dev/null | grep -q "theta42"; then
-        info "Loading custom theta42 schema..."
-        ldapadd -Q -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: cn=theta42,cn=schema,cn=config
-objectClass: olcSchemaConfig
-cn: theta42
-olcAttributeTypes: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1.1
-  NAME 'dateOfBirth'
-  DESC 'Date of birth in ISO 8601 format YYYY-MM-DD'
-  EQUALITY caseExactMatch
-  SUBSTR caseExactSubstringsMatch
-  SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15
-  SINGLE-VALUE )
-olcObjectClasses: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2.1
-  NAME 'theta42Person'
-  DESC 'Theta42 SSO extended person attributes'
-  AUXILIARY
-  MAY ( dateOfBirth ) )
-EOF
-    else
-        info "theta42 schema already loaded"
-    fi
-
-    # 10. Create base directory structure
-    BIND_DN="cn=admin,$BASE_DN"
-
-    # Create base DN if it doesn't exist
-    if ! ldapsearch -x -D "$BIND_DN" -w "$ADMIN_PASS" -H ldapi:/// -b "$BASE_DN" -s base "(objectClass=*)" dn 2>/dev/null | grep -q "dn:"; then
-        info "Creating base DN structure..."
-        DC_VALUE="${BASE_DN#dc=}"
-        DC_VALUE="${DC_VALUE%%,*}"
-
-        ldapadd -x -D "$BIND_DN" -w "$ADMIN_PASS" -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: $BASE_DN
-objectClass: dcObject
-objectClass: organization
-dc: $DC_VALUE
-o: $ORG_NAME
-EOF
-    else
-        info "Base DN already exists"
-    fi
-
-    # Create OUs
-    for ou in people groups policies; do
-        dn="ou=$ou,$BASE_DN"
-        if ! ldapsearch -x -D "$BIND_DN" -w "$ADMIN_PASS" -H ldapi:/// -b "$dn" -s base "(objectClass=*)" dn 2>/dev/null | grep -q "dn:"; then
-            info "Creating $ou OU..."
-            ldapadd -x -D "$BIND_DN" -w "$ADMIN_PASS" -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: ou=$ou,$BASE_DN
-objectClass: organizationalUnit
-ou: $ou
-EOF
-        else
-            info "OU $ou already exists"
-        fi
-    done
-
-    # 11. Create default ppolicy
-    if ! ldapsearch -x -D "$BIND_DN" -w "$ADMIN_PASS" -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=ppolicy,ou=policies,$BASE_DN" -s base "(objectClass=*)" dn 2>/dev/null | grep -q "dn:"; then
-        info "Creating default ppolicy..."
-        ldapadd -x -D "$BIND_DN" -w "$ADMIN_PASS" -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: cn=ppolicy,ou=policies,$BASE_DN
-objectClass: top
-objectClass: organizationalRole
-objectClass: pwdPolicy
-cn: ppolicy
-pwdAttribute: 2.5.4.35
-pwdLockout: FALSE
-pwdMustChange: FALSE
-pwdAllowUserChange: TRUE
-EOF
-    else
-        info "Default ppolicy already exists"
-    fi
-
-    # 12. Create required SSO groups
-    for group in app_sso_admin app_sso_invite app_sso_oauth_admin; do
-        dn="cn=$group,ou=groups,$BASE_DN"
-        if ! ldapsearch -x -D "$BIND_DN" -w "$ADMIN_PASS" -H ldapi:/// -b "$dn" -s base "(objectClass=*)" dn 2>/dev/null | grep -q "dn:"; then
-            info "Creating group: $group"
-            ldapadd -x -D "$BIND_DN" -w "$ADMIN_PASS" -H ldapi:/// << EOF
-dn: $dn
-objectClass: groupOfNames
-objectClass: top
-cn: $group
-description: $ORG_NAME $group group
-member: $BIND_DN
-EOF
-        else
-            info "Group $group already exists"
-        fi
-    done
-
-    info "OpenLDAP configuration complete"
-}
-
-# ── Application installation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-install_app() {
-    info "Installing SSO Manager application..."
-    dry_run "Would install application to $INSTALL_DIR"
-    [[ "$DRY_RUN" == "true" ]] && return 0
-
-    # Create installation directory
-    mkdir -p "$INSTALL_DIR"
-
-    # Copy application files
-    info "Copying application files..."
-    cp -r "$SCRIPT_DIR/nodejs/"* "$INSTALL_DIR/"
-
-    # Install npm dependencies
-    info "Installing npm dependencies..."
-    cd "$INSTALL_DIR"
-    npm ci --only=production --quiet
-
-    # Create secrets configuration
-    info "Creating application configuration..."
-    cat > "$INSTALL_DIR/conf/secrets.js" << SECRETEOF
-'use strict';
-
-module.exports = {
-    port: $PORT,
-    ldap: {
-        url: 'ldap://localhost',
-        bindDN: 'cn=admin,$BASE_DN',
-        bindPassword: '$ADMIN_PASS',
-        userBase: 'ou=people,$BASE_DN',
-        groupBase: 'ou=groups,$BASE_DN',
-    },
-    smtp: {
-        host: '${SMTP_HOST:-localhost}',
-        port: ${SMTP_PORT:-587},
-        user: '${SMTP_USER:-}',
-        pass: '${SMTP_PASS:-}',
-        from: '${ORG_NAME} <noreply@${LDAP_DOMAIN}>',
-    },
-    voipms: {
-        username: '${VOIPMS_USER:-}',
-        password: '${VOIPMS_PASS:-}',
-        did: '${VOIPMS_DID:-}',
-    },
-    oauth: {
-        issuer: '',
-        jwtSecret: '$JWT_SECRET',
-        token_lifetime: {
-            access_token: 3600,
-            refresh_token: 2592000
-        }
-    },
-};
-SECRETEOF
-
-    # Create base configuration
-    cat > "$INSTALL_DIR/conf/base.js" << BASEEOF
-'use strict';
-
-module.exports = {
-    name: "$ORG_NAME",
-    userModel: 'ldap',
-    redis: {
-        prefix: 'sso_manager_'
-    },
-    ldap: {
-        url: 'ldap://localhost',
-        bindDN: 'cn=admin,$BASE_DN',
-        bindPassword: '__IN SECRETS FILE__',
-        userBase: 'ou=people,$BASE_DN',
-        groupBase: 'ou=groups,$BASE_DN',
-        userFilter: '(objectClass=posixAccount)',
-        userNameAttribute: 'uid'
-    },
-    oauth: {
-        issuer: '',
-        jwtSecret: '__in secrets file__',
-        token_lifetime: {
-            access_token: 3600,
-            refresh_token: 2592000
-        }
-    },
-    smtp: {
-        host: 'localhost',
-        port: 587,
-        secure: false,
-        from: '$ORG_NAME <noreply@$LDAP_DOMAIN>',
-    },
-};
-BASEEOF
-
-    # Set ownership
-    chown -R root:root "$INSTALL_DIR"
-    chmod -R 755 "$INSTALL_DIR"
-
-    info "Application installed to $INSTALL_DIR"
-}
-
-# ── Systemd service configuration ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-install_systemd() {
-    info "Installing systemd service..."
-    dry_run "Would install systemd service"
-    [[ "$DRY_RUN" == "true" ]] && return 0
-
-    cat > "$SYSTEMD_DIR/sso-manager.service" << UNITEOF
-[Unit]
-Description=Theta42 SSO Manager
-Documentation=file://$INSTALL_DIR/README.md
-After=network.target slapd.service
-Wants=slapd.service
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=root
-WorkingDirectory=$INSTALL_DIR
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/node $INSTALL_DIR/bin/www
-Restart=on-failure
-RestartSec=5
-Environment=NODE_ENV=production
-Environment=NODE_PORT=$PORT
-
-# Security hardening
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
-UNITEOF
-
-    systemctl daemon-reload
-    systemctl enable sso-manager.service
-
-    info "Systemd service installed"
-}
-
-# ── Verification ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-verify_installation() {
-    info "Verifying installation..."
-
-    local errors=0
-
-    # Check OpenLDAP
-    if command -v slapd &>/dev/null; then
-        if systemctl is-active --quiet slapd; then
-            info "✓ OpenLDAP is running"
-        else
-            warn "✗ OpenLDAP is not running"
-            ((errors++))
-        fi
-    else
-        warn "✗ OpenLDAP is not installed"
-        ((errors++))
-    fi
-
-    # Check application
-    if [[ -d "$INSTALL_DIR" ]]; then
-        info "✓ Application is installed"
-    else
-        warn "✗ Application is not installed"
-        ((errors++))
-    fi
-
-    # Check systemd service
-    if systemctl is-enabled --quiet sso-manager.service 2>/dev/null; then
-        info "✓ Systemd service is enabled"
-    else
-        warn "✗ Systemd service is not enabled"
-        ((errors++))
-    fi
-
-    if [[ $errors -eq 0 ]]; then
-        info "Installation verified successfully"
-    else
-        warn "Installation completed with $errors issue(s)"
-    fi
-
-    return $errors
-}
-
-# ── Main execution ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-main() {
-    echo
-    echo "=============================================="
-    echo "  Theta42 SSO Manager Installer"
-    echo "=============================================="
-    echo
-    echo "Configuration:"
-    echo "  Base DN:     $BASE_DN"
-    echo "  Port:        $PORT"
-    echo "  Install dir: $INSTALL_DIR"
-    echo "  Skip LDAP:   $SKIP_LDAP"
-    echo "  Skip App:    $SKIP_APP"
-    echo
-
-    check_root
-    check_os
-
-    if [[ "$SKIP_LDAP" != "true" ]]; then
-        echo
-        info "=== Installing OpenLDAP ==="
-        install_openldap
-        configure_openldap
-    fi
-
-    if [[ "$SKIP_APP" != "true" ]]; then
-        echo
-        info "=== Installing SSO Manager ==="
-        install_nodejs
-        install_app
-        install_systemd
-    fi
-
-    echo
-    verify_installation
-
-    echo
-    echo "=============================================="
-    echo "  Installation Complete!"
-    echo "=============================================="
-    echo
-
-    if [[ "$SKIP_APP" != "true" ]]; then
-        info "Start the service with: systemctl start sso-manager"
-        info "View logs with: journalctl -fu sso-manager"
-        info "Access the UI at: http://localhost:$PORT"
-    fi
-
-    if [[ "$SKIP_LDAP" != "true" ]]; then
-        echo
-        info "LDAP Configuration:"
-        info "  Base DN:     $BASE_DN"
-        info "  Bind DN:     cn=admin,$BASE_DN"
-        info "  Admin pass:  (set by you)"
-        echo
-        info "Required SSO groups created:"
-        info "  - app_sso_admin"
-        info "  - app_sso_invite"
-        info "  - app_sso_oauth_admin"
-    fi
-
-    echo
-}
-
-main
+NEW_VERSION="$(pkg_version "$REPO_DIR/nodejs/package.json")"
+
+if [ "$FIRST_RUN" -eq 1 ] && [ "$SKIP_LDAP" != "true" ]; then
+	echo "==> First run: bootstrapping OpenLDAP (base DN: ${LDAP_BASE_DN})"
+	LDAP_ADMIN_PASS="${LDAP_ADMIN_PASS:-$(openssl rand -base64 24 | tr -d '=+/')}"
+	JWT_SECRET="${JWT_SECRET:-$(openssl rand -hex 32)}"
+	BIND_DN="cn=admin,${LDAP_BASE_DN}"
+	# slapd/domain wants a dotted DNS domain (e.g. "example.com"), not the raw
+	# DN -- "dc=foo,dc=bar" -> "foo.bar". A malformed value here (e.g. the raw
+	# DN with only the leading "dc=" stripped) makes slapd's postinst hang
+	# indefinitely instead of failing cleanly.
+	LDAP_DOMAIN="$(echo "$LDAP_BASE_DN" | sed 's/^dc=//; s/,dc=/./g')"
+
+	if ! command -v slapd >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		debconf-set-selections <<-EOF
+		slapd slapd/internal/adminpw password ${LDAP_ADMIN_PASS}
+		slapd slapd/password1 password ${LDAP_ADMIN_PASS}
+		slapd slapd/password2 password ${LDAP_ADMIN_PASS}
+		slapd slapd/domain string ${LDAP_DOMAIN}
+		slapd shared/organization string ${ORG_NAME}
+		slapd slapd/purge_database boolean true
+		slapd slapd/move_old_database boolean true
+		EOF
+		apt-get install -y slapd ldap-utils
+		cat > /etc/ldap/ldap.conf <<-EOF
+		BASE   ${LDAP_BASE_DN}
+		URI    ldap://localhost
+		EOF
+		systemctl enable --now slapd
+	else
+		echo "    slapd already installed -- assuming it already serves ${LDAP_BASE_DN}"
+	fi
+
+	echo "==> Directory structure (ou=people, ou=groups)"
+	for ou in people groups; do
+		dn="ou=${ou},${LDAP_BASE_DN}"
+		if ldapsearch -x -D "$BIND_DN" -w "$LDAP_ADMIN_PASS" -H ldap://localhost -b "$dn" -s base "(objectClass=*)" dn 2>/dev/null | grep -q "^dn:"; then
+			echo "    ${dn} already exists"
+		else
+			ldapadd -x -D "$BIND_DN" -w "$LDAP_ADMIN_PASS" -H ldap://localhost <<-EOF
+			dn: ${dn}
+			objectClass: organizationalUnit
+			ou: ${ou}
+			EOF
+			echo "    ${dn} created"
+		fi
+	done
+
+	echo "==> LDAP modules, overlays, schema, policy, SSO groups"
+	"$REPO_DIR/ops/ldap-setup.sh" -p "$LDAP_ADMIN_PASS" -b "$LDAP_BASE_DN" -D "$BIND_DN"
+
+	echo "==> Seeding ${SECRETS_FILE}"
+	install -d -m 0750 "$(dirname "$SECRETS_FILE")"
+	cat > "$SECRETS_FILE" <<-SECRETSEOF
+	'use strict';
+
+	// Generated by install.sh on $(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ). Edit freely --
+	// this file is never overwritten by a later run of install.sh.
+	// LDAP admin password + JWT secret below were auto-generated; SMTP is a
+	// placeholder (email delivery won't work until you fill it in).
+
+	module.exports = {
+	    port: ${PORT},
+	    name: '${ORG_NAME}',
+	    ldap: {
+	        url: 'ldap://localhost',
+	        bindDN: '${BIND_DN}',
+	        bindPassword: '${LDAP_ADMIN_PASS}',
+	        userBase: 'ou=people,${LDAP_BASE_DN}',
+	        groupBase: 'ou=groups,${LDAP_BASE_DN}',
+	    },
+	    smtp: {
+	        host: 'smtp.example.com',
+	        port: 587,
+	        secure: false,
+	        user: 'noreply@${LDAP_DOMAIN}',
+	        pass: 'set-me',
+	        from: '${ORG_NAME} <noreply@${LDAP_DOMAIN}>',
+	    },
+	    oauth: {
+	        issuer: '',
+	        jwtSecret: '${JWT_SECRET}',
+	        token_lifetime: {
+	            access_token: 3600,
+	            refresh_token: 2592000,
+	        },
+	    },
+	};
+	SECRETSEOF
+	chmod 600 "$SECRETS_FILE"
+	echo "    seeded ${SECRETS_FILE} (LDAP + JWT are live; SMTP is a placeholder)"
+	echo "        \$EDITOR ${SECRETS_FILE}"
+	echo "    then re-run this script (or: sudo systemctl restart sso-manager)"
+elif [ "$FIRST_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+	echo "==> SKIP_LDAP=true -- not bootstrapping OpenLDAP or seeding ${SECRETS_FILE}"
+	echo "    Write it yourself (see secrets.js.example) before starting sso-manager."
+else
+	echo "==> ${SECRETS_FILE} already exists, leaving LDAP + secrets untouched"
+fi
+
+echo "==> Symlink systemd config from the repo"
+link "$REPO_DIR/ops/systemd/sso-manager.service" /etc/systemd/system/sso-manager.service
+
+echo "==> Node dependencies"
+# Deterministic, production-only install from the lockfile. Falls back to a
+# plain install if the lockfile and manifest are out of step.
+( cd "$REPO_DIR/nodejs" && { npm ci --omit=dev || npm install --omit=dev; } )
+
+echo "==> Services"
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl enable --now sso-manager.service
+systemctl restart sso-manager.service
+
+echo "==> Done."
+if [ -z "$CURRENT_VERSION" ]; then
+	echo "    Installed v${NEW_VERSION}."
+elif [ "$CURRENT_VERSION" = "$NEW_VERSION" ]; then
+	echo "    Already up to date (v${NEW_VERSION})."
+else
+	echo "    Updated v${CURRENT_VERSION} -> v${NEW_VERSION}."
+fi
+echo "    Update later with: sudo BRANCH=${BRANCH} $0"

nodejs/app.js

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ app.contoller = require('./controller');
 
 // Background services (self-initializing on require).
 require('./services/update_check');
+require('./services/ldap_monitor');
 
 // Push pubsub over the socket and back.
 app.onListen.push(function(){
@@ -42,7 +43,11 @@ app.onListen.push(function(){
       // socket.broadcast.emit('P2PSub', msg);
     });
   });
-}); 
+  
+  // Initialize Theta Agent WebSockets. The REST router is already mounted
+  // synchronously above (see the /api/agent mount); this hook only wires the WS.
+  require('./routes/api_agent').initAgentWebSockets(app);
+});
 
 // Gzip text responses (HTML/JS/CSS/JSON). The admin UI loads ~13 separate,
 // uncompressed vendor JS/CSS files on every full page navigation (a
@@ -60,10 +65,16 @@ app.set('trust proxy', 1);
 app.set('views', path.join(__dirname, 'views'));
 app.set('view engine', 'ejs');
 
+// Per-app values for the shared UI shell (views/top.ejs + views/bottom.ejs).
+// Set as an app local so every res.render has it, including routes that don't
+// spread the routers' `values` object.
+app.locals.ui = require('./utils/ui');
+
 // Have express server static content( images, CSS, browser JS) from the public
 // local folder. maxAge is short since this is the app's own JS/CSS, which
 // changes on every deploy and isn't cache-busted/fingerprinted.
-app.use('/static', express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'public'), {maxAge: '1h'}))
+app.use('/static', express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'public'), {maxAge: '1h'}));
+app.use('/resources', express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'public/resources'), {maxAge: '1h'}));
 
 // Routes for front end content.
 app.use('/', require('./routes/index'));
@@ -83,18 +94,47 @@ app.use('/api/token', middleware.auth, require('./routes/token'));
 
 app.use('/api/group', middleware.auth, require('./routes/group'));
 app.use('/api/notification', middleware.auth, require('./routes/notification'));
+app.use('/api/discovery', middleware.auth, require('./routes/discovery'));
+app.use('/api/directory-admin', middleware.auth, require('./routes/api_directory_admin'));
+// Self-service access requests — any authenticated user may ask; deciding is
+// gated per-resource inside the router (owner or directory admin).
+app.use('/api/access-requests', middleware.auth, require('./routes/access_request'));
 app.use('/api/update-check', middleware.auth, require('./routes/update_check'));
 app.use('/api/tos', middleware.auth, require('./routes/tos'));
-
+app.use('/api/metrics', middleware.auth, require('./routes/api_metrics'));
+app.use('/api/conf', middleware.auth, require('./routes/api_conf'));
 // Self-service API tokens (PATs) — owner-scoped, no admin group required.
 app.use('/api/api-token', middleware.auth, require('./routes/api_token'));
 
+// theta-agent REST API. Mounted SYNCHRONOUSLY (before the 404 catch-all below),
+// not from an onListen hook — a router registered post-listen would sit behind
+// the terminal 404 handler and make every /api/agent/* request 404. The agent
+// WebSocket handler (routes/api_agent.initAgentWebSockets) still runs on onListen.
+app.use('/api/agent', require('./routes/api_agent'));
+
 // OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect
 app.use('/oauth', oauthRouter);
-app.use('/api/oauth/client', middleware.auth, require('./routes/oauth_client'));
 app.use('/api/oauth', middleware.auth, oauthApiRouter);
+app.use('/api/oauth/client', middleware.auth, require('./routes/oauth_client'));
 app.get('/.well-known/openid-configuration', discovery);
+app.use('/api/webhook', require('./routes/webhook'));
+// Plugin instances — loadable/unloadable, configurable plugin copies with
+// per-instance secrets in OpenBao (secret/plugins/*). Admin-only (gated inside
+// the router to app_sso_admin / app_sso_directory_admin).
+app.use('/api/plugins', middleware.auth, require('./routes/api_plugins'));
 
+// OpenBao vault API. The broker mints a server-side scoped token per user
+// (per-user user-<uid> or, for admins, sso-admin), enforces the path prefix
+// (scopeGuard), and injects ONLY that token into the proxied request — the
+// client's sso auth headers are stripped and never reach OpenBao. Non-admins
+// are confined to secret/users/<uid>/*; admins roam all of secret/. The
+// admin-only app-token mint route is mounted BEFORE the proxy so it isn't
+// shadowed by the catch-all /api/vault proxy.
+const vaultBroker = require('./utils/vault_broker');
+app.use('/api/vault/apps', middleware.auth, vaultBroker.mintAppRouter);
+app.use('/api/vault', middleware.auth, vaultBroker.scopeGuard, vaultBroker.vaultProxy());
+// Shared secrets (metadata + grants; data reads go through /api/vault proxy).
+app.use('/api/shared-secrets', middleware.auth, require('./routes/api_shared_secrets'));
 
 // Catch 404 and forward to error handler. If none of the above routes are
 // used, this is what will be called.
@@ -105,7 +145,7 @@ app.use(function(req, res, next) {
   next(err);
 });
 
-// Error handler. This is where `next()` will go on error
+// Error handling
 app.use(function(err, req, res, next) {
   const SILENT_404S = ['/.well-known/'];
   const isSilent404 = err.status === 404 && SILENT_404S.some(p => req.url.startsWith(p));
@@ -117,5 +157,18 @@ app.use(function(err, req, res, next) {
   }
 
   res.status(err.status || 500);
-  res.json({name: err.name, message: err.message});
+  if (req.accepts('html') && !req.originalUrl.startsWith('/api/')) {
+    const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
+    const buildInfo = require('./utils/build_info');
+    res.render('error', { 
+      name: conf.name, 
+      title: 'Error',
+      titleIcon: '',
+      logo: conf.logo,
+      error: err,
+      ...buildInfo
+    });
+  } else {
+    res.json({name: err.name, message: err.message});
+  }
 });

nodejs/bin/www

@@ -25,13 +25,52 @@ var server = http.createServer(app);
 var io = require('socket.io')(server);
 app.io = io;
 
-/**
- * Listen on provided port, on all network interfaces.
- */
+const WebSocket = require('ws');
+const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ noServer: true });
+server.on('upgrade', (request, socket, head) => {
+  // We only handle upgrade for /api/agent/ws.
+  // Socket.IO handles its own upgrades natively because it attaches directly to `server`.
+  if (request.url.startsWith('/api/agent/ws')) {
+    wss.handleUpgrade(request, socket, head, (ws) => {
+      wss.emit('connection', ws, request);
+    });
+  }
+});
+app.wss = wss;
 
-server.listen(port);
-server.on('error', onError);
-server.on('listening', onListening);
+const models = require('../models');
+
+/**
+ * Initialize ORM, then Listen on provided port, on all network interfaces.
+ */
+models.initORM().then(() => {
+  // Overlay secret/sso-manager/conf from OpenBao over the file-loaded conf.
+  // Fail-soft: if OpenBao is unreachable, conf keeps the ./config/sso-secrets.js
+  // values and boot continues. (Same position the old conf_manager held, so
+  // call-time conf readers — which is how sso consumes its secrets — are
+  // unaffected; nothing in sso captures a secret at require time.)
+  return require('@simpleworkjs/bao-conf').init({ path: 'sso-manager', conf });
+}).then(() => {
+  server.listen(port);
+  server.on('error', onError);
+  server.on('listening', onListening);
+
+  // Initialize scheduler
+  const { initScheduler } = require('../services/scheduler');
+  initScheduler(conf.discovery).catch(err => {
+    console.error('Failed to initialize scheduler:', err);
+  });
+
+  // Keep external-app vault tokens alive: renew every stored accessor now and
+  // on an interval (see vault_broker.startAppTokenRenewal). Only meaningful
+  // when OpenBao is configured; without VAULT_TOKEN the loop's calls fail soft.
+  if (process.env.VAULT_TOKEN) {
+    require('../utils/vault_broker').startAppTokenRenewal();
+  }
+}).catch(err => {
+  console.error('Failed to initialize ORM:', err);
+  process.exit(1);
+});
 
 /**
  * Normalize a port into a number, string, or false.

nodejs/conf/base.js

@@ -22,6 +22,18 @@ module.exports = {
 		groupBase: 'ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com',
 		userFilter: '(objectClass=posixAccount)',
 		userNameAttribute: 'uid',
+		// Hostname/port advertised on the /integrations page for direct-LDAP
+		// clients. Leave ldapsHost empty to derive it from the OAuth issuer host.
+		// Set it to an internal-only name (e.g. 'ldap.internal.example.com' or
+		// 'sso-manager' on the Docker network) so external clients don't need a
+		// public 636 port forward. See docs/ldap.md.
+		ldapsHost: '',
+		ldapsPort: 636,
+		// True when slapd carries the `nestgroup` overlay, which resolves nested
+		// groups server-side. Set automatically by docker-entrypoint.sh for the
+		// all-in-one image; leave false when pointing at a stock OpenLDAP (no
+		// 2.6.x release ships nestgroup) and the app resolves nesting itself.
+		nestedGroupsServerSide: false,
 		// New users/personal groups (see addPosixAccount/addPosixGroup in
 		// models/user_ldap.js) get the next uid/gidNumber >= uidGidMin.
 		// Existing entries >= uidGidReservedFloor are ignored when computing
@@ -45,13 +57,15 @@ module.exports = {
 		password: '__in secrets file__',
 		did:      '__in secrets file__',
 	},
-	smtp: {
-		host: 'localhost',
-		port: 587,
-		secure: false,
-		user: 'noreply@example.com',
-		pass: '__in secrets file__',
-		from: 'SSO Manager <noreply@example.com>',
+	directory: {
+		// Public SSH jump host fronting the lab, if there is one (the jump-host
+		// component). When set, a host card in the catalog shows the real
+		// invocation — `ssh <uid>_-_<slug>@<jumpHost>` — instead of a bare
+		// `ssh <uid>@<ip>` that only works from inside the LAN. Empty is fine;
+		// the card falls back to the direct form.
+		jumpHost: '',
+		// Default SSH port assumed when a host carries no metadata.sshPort.
+		defaultSshPort: 22,
 	},
 	service: {
 		updateCheck: {

nodejs/docs/plugins.md

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+# Plugins
+
+The SSO Manager runs **plugins** as scheduled background tasks. A plugin
+**type** is an installed module; a plugin **instance** is a configured, loadable
+copy of a type. You can create, edit, load/unload, run, and delete instances
+from the **Plugins** page (or the `/api/plugins` API), and you can run several
+instances of the same type — e.g. two Proxmox endpoints, each with its own URL
+and token on its own schedule.
+
+Per-instance **secrets** are stored in [OpenBao](https://openbao.org/) at
+`secret/plugins/<instance-id>/conf`, not in `sso-secrets.js`. The admin UI only
+ever shows them masked (`********`); the plugin reads them at run time. This
+needs theta-suite ≥ v1.30.1 (which grants the `sso-broker` OpenBao policy
+`secret/plugins/*`); re-run `./setup.sh` after upgrading.
+
+## Plugin types
+
+A plugin type is a module under `nodejs/plugins/<category>/<type>.js`. The
+filename basename (without `.js`) is the `type`; the parent directory is the
+`category`. The built-ins ship under `plugins/discovery/`:
+
+- `proxmox` — Proxmox VE (URL + API token)
+- `unifi` — UniFi Network controller (URL + username/password)
+- `nmap` — nmap OS + port scan (a target range; no credentials)
+
+A module exports a **manifest**:
+
+```javascript
+module.exports = {
+  // Identity — `type`/`category` default to the file/dir name but can be set
+  // explicitly. `name`/`description` show up in the UI.
+  type: 'proxmox',
+  category: 'discovery',
+  name: 'Proxmox VE',
+  description: 'Discover VMs, containers, and nodes from a PVE endpoint.',
+
+  // Drives the admin UI form, API validation, and secret masking. Fields with
+  // `secret: true` are stored in OpenBao; the rest live in the DB row.
+  configSchema: [
+    { key: 'url',         label: 'API URL',       type: 'url',      required: true },
+    { key: 'tokenId',     label: 'Token ID',      type: 'text',     required: true },
+    { key: 'tokenSecret', label: 'Token Secret',  type: 'password', required: true, secret: true }
+  ],
+
+  // "Test" button: validate the config (don't do the work). Return
+  // { ok: true } or { ok: false, error: '...' }. Optional.
+  validate: async (config) => { … },
+
+  // The work. `run` is the generalized contract name; the discovery plugins
+  // also keep `discover` as an alias for back-compat. For `category:
+  // 'discovery'`, the scheduler passes the result to the discovery reconciler.
+  run: async (config) => { return { resources, edges }; },
+  discover: async (config) => { return { resources, edges }; }
+};
+```
+
+`run(config)` receives the merged non-secret config + secret values as one flat
+object (e.g. `{ url, tokenId, tokenSecret }`). For a discovery plugin it
+returns `{ resources, edges }`; the reconciler upserts them into the resource
+graph attributed to the instance's **slug** (the `discovery_sources` name).
+
+### Writing a custom plugin type
+
+Drop a `.js` file under `nodejs/plugins/discovery/` (or a new category directory)
+following the manifest above. New types are picked up at boot, so restart the
+SSO Manager after adding one. Runtime load/unload is per-**instance** only —
+adding a new type still needs a restart.
+
+## The Plugins page
+
+Under **Plugins** (nav, admin-only — `app_sso_admin` / `app_sso_directory_admin`
+/ `app_super_admin`):
+
+- **New Plugin** — pick a type, name it, choose a unique slug (the discovery
+  source name + the URL the resource graph attributes results to), set a cron
+  schedule, and fill in the config form (secret fields are password inputs).
+  Creating it schedules it and kicks one immediate run.
+- **Edit** — name, cron, and non-secret config.
+- **Edit Secrets** (key icon) — password fields, prefilled masked. Leave a
+  field blank to keep its current value.
+- **Test** (vial icon) — runs the plugin's `validate`.
+- **Run now** (play icon) — enqueues one immediate run regardless of state.
+- **Load / Unload** — enable/disable the schedule without deleting the instance.
+- **Delete** — removes the schedule, the OpenBao secret namespace, and the row.
+
+## API
+
+All endpoints are mounted at `/api/plugins`, require an authenticated admin
+(`app_sso_admin` / `app_sso_directory_admin` / `app_super_admin`), and return
+secret values masked.
+
+| Method + path | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `GET /api/plugins/types` | list installed plugin types + their `configSchema` |
+| `GET /api/plugins` | list instances (with masked secrets + last-run state) |
+| `GET /api/plugins/:id` | one instance |
+| `POST /api/plugins` | create — body `{ pluginType, name, slug, cron, config }` where `config` is a flat object of all field values; secret fields are split into OpenBao |
+| `PUT /api/plugins/:id` | update name/cron/enabled + non-secret config |
+| `PUT /api/plugins/:id/secrets` | update secret fields (blank = keep) |
+| `POST /api/plugins/:id/test` | run `validate` → `{ ok }` or `{ ok:false, error }` |
+| `POST /api/plugins/:id/load` | enable + schedule + run now |
+| `POST /api/plugins/:id/unload` | unschedule + disable |
+| `POST /api/plugins/:id/run` | enqueue one immediate run |
+| `DELETE /api/plugins/:id` | unschedule + remove OpenBao secrets + delete row |
+| `GET /api/plugins/:id/runs` | `{ lastRunAt, lastStatus, lastError }` |
+
+## Scheduler internals
+
+The scheduler ([BullMQ](https://docs.bullmq.io/) over Redis) gives each instance
+a stable JobScheduler id (`plugin:<instanceId>`); load/unload upsert/remove
+that one schedule without disturbing the others. A daily `garbage_collect` job
+prunes discovery resources not seen in > 7 days.
+
+### Legacy migration
+
+Before this system, plugins were configured statically in `sso-secrets.js`:
+
+```javascript
+module.exports = {
+  discovery: {
+    plugins: {
+      proxmox: { enabled: true, cron: '0 * * * *', url: '…', tokenId: '…', tokenSecret: '…' }
+    }
+  }
+};
+```
+
+On the first boot of SSO Manager ≥ v1.17.0, if the `PluginInstance` table is
+empty **and** `conf.discovery.plugins` has entries, one instance per configured
+type is seeded automatically (secret fields copied into OpenBao). After that the
+table is non-empty and the static config is ignored — manage plugins from the
+UI/API instead. The migration is idempotent (guarded by the empty-table check).

nodejs/docs/vault.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# Vault Secrets Management
+
+The Vault Secrets feature integrates with OpenBao to provide a secure key-value store for your environment. It allows you to store sensitive information like passwords, API keys, and credentials, ensuring they are encrypted and access-controlled.
+
+## Usage
+
+You can access the Vault UI from the application's top navigation bar. 
+
+### Creating Secrets
+
+1. Click on the **New Secret** button.
+2. Enter a **Secret Path**. This acts as the name/identifier of your secret (e.g., `db-credentials`).
+3. Enter the **Secret Data** in JSON format. For example:
+   ```json
+   {
+     "username": "admin",
+     "password": "supersecretpassword123"
+   }
+   ```
+4. Click **Save Secret**.
+
+### Reading and Editing Secrets
+
+* To view a secret, click on its name in the **Secrets List**.
+* To update an existing secret, select it and click the **Edit** button. You can then modify the JSON data and save your changes.
+
+### OpenBao Integration
+
+The secrets are stored in an OpenBao backend configured in development mode. The default KV (Key-Value) version 2 engine is mounted at `secret/`. The built-in UI uses the `/api/vault/secret/` API endpoints to interact with OpenBao.
+
+## API Access
+
+If you need to programmatically access the secrets, you can interact directly with the OpenBao API using the root token (in dev mode):
+
+```bash
+# Example: Read a secret via the API
+curl -H "X-Vault-Token: root" -H "Authorization: Bearer <your-sso-token>" http://<your-sso-host>/api/vault/secret/data/<your-secret-path>
+```

nodejs/merge_dups.js

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+const { Resource } = require('./models/resource');
+const { initORM } = require('./models/index');
+
+async function run() {
+  await initORM();
+  const all = await Resource.list();
+  console.log(`Found ${all.length} resources`);
+  
+  const byIp = {};
+  const byName = {};
+  
+  for (const r of all) {
+    if (!r.metadata) r.metadata = {};
+    
+    // gather IPs
+    const ips = new Set();
+    if (r.metadata.address) ips.add(r.metadata.address);
+    if (r.metadata.interfaces) {
+      r.metadata.interfaces.forEach(i => { if (i.ip) ips.add(i.ip); });
+    }
+    
+    for (const ip of ips) {
+      if (!byIp[ip]) byIp[ip] = [];
+      byIp[ip].push(r);
+    }
+    
+    const nameLower = (r.name || '').toLowerCase();
+    if (nameLower) {
+      if (!byName[nameLower]) byName[nameLower] = [];
+      byName[nameLower].push(r);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Find duplicates
+  const toDelete = new Set();
+  
+  for (const ip in byIp) {
+    if (byIp[ip].length > 1) {
+      // Sort so managed/older is kept
+      const group = byIp[ip].sort((a, b) => {
+        const aM = a.metadata?.managed ? 1 : 0;
+        const bM = b.metadata?.managed ? 1 : 0;
+        if (aM !== bM) return bM - aM;
+        return a.created_on - b.created_on;
+      });
+      
+      const primary = group[0];
+      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i++) {
+        const sec = group[i];
+        if (toDelete.has(sec.id) || toDelete.has(primary.id)) continue;
+        console.log(`Merging ${sec.name} into ${primary.name} due to IP ${ip}`);
+        
+        // merge metadata
+        const m1 = primary.metadata || {};
+        const m2 = sec.metadata || {};
+        
+        const mergedMeta = { ...m2, ...m1 };
+        
+        // merge interfaces
+        const intfs = [...(m1.interfaces||[]), ...(m2.interfaces||[])];
+        const uniqIntfs = [];
+        const seenIps = new Set();
+        for (const intf of intfs) {
+          if (intf.ip && seenIps.has(intf.ip)) continue;
+          if (intf.ip) seenIps.add(intf.ip);
+          uniqIntfs.push(intf);
+        }
+        mergedMeta.interfaces = uniqIntfs;
+        
+        const sources = new Set([...(m1.discovery_sources||[]), ...(m2.discovery_sources||[])]);
+        mergedMeta.discovery_sources = [...sources];
+        
+        await primary.update({
+          metadata: mergedMeta,
+          description: primary.description || sec.description
+        });
+        
+        toDelete.add(sec.id);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (const name in byName) {
+    if (byName[name].length > 1) {
+      // Sort so managed/older is kept
+      const group = byName[name].sort((a, b) => {
+        const aM = a.metadata?.managed ? 1 : 0;
+        const bM = b.metadata?.managed ? 1 : 0;
+        if (aM !== bM) return bM - aM;
+        return a.created_on - b.created_on;
+      });
+      
+      const primary = group[0];
+      for (let i = 1; i < group.length; i++) {
+        const sec = group[i];
+        if (toDelete.has(sec.id) || toDelete.has(primary.id)) continue;
+        console.log(`Merging ${sec.name} into ${primary.name} due to name ${name}`);
+        
+        // merge metadata
+        const m1 = primary.metadata || {};
+        const m2 = sec.metadata || {};
+        
+        const mergedMeta = { ...m2, ...m1 };
+        
+        // merge interfaces
+        const intfs = [...(m1.interfaces||[]), ...(m2.interfaces||[])];
+        const uniqIntfs = [];
+        const seenIps = new Set();
+        for (const intf of intfs) {
+          if (intf.ip && seenIps.has(intf.ip)) continue;
+          if (intf.ip) seenIps.add(intf.ip);
+          uniqIntfs.push(intf);
+        }
+        mergedMeta.interfaces = uniqIntfs;
+        
+        const sources = new Set([...(m1.discovery_sources||[]), ...(m2.discovery_sources||[])]);
+        mergedMeta.discovery_sources = [...sources];
+        
+        await primary.update({
+          metadata: mergedMeta,
+          description: primary.description || sec.description
+        });
+        
+        toDelete.add(sec.id);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Delete merged items
+  for (const id of toDelete) {
+    console.log(`Deleting merged resource ${id}`);
+    const r = all.find(r => r.id === id);
+    if (r) await r.delete();
+  }
+
+  console.log(`Merged ${toDelete.size} items.`);
+  process.exit(0);
+}
+
+run().catch(console.error);

nodejs/middleware/auth.js

@@ -9,10 +9,23 @@ async function auth(req, res, next){
 		// the same /api/* routes the UI uses.
 		const authz = req.header('authorization') || '';
 		if(authz.slice(0, 7).toLowerCase() === 'bearer '){
-			const user = await Auth.checkApiToken(authz.slice(7));
-			if(user && user.uid){
-				req.user = user;
-				return next();
+			const tokenStr = authz.slice(7);
+			if (tokenStr.startsWith('sso_')) {
+				const user = await Auth.checkApiToken(tokenStr);
+				if(user && user.uid){
+					req.user = user;
+					return next();
+				}
+			} else {
+				// Machine token (ServiceToken)
+				const { ServiceToken } = require('../models/token');
+				let svcToken;
+				try { svcToken = await ServiceToken.get(tokenStr); } catch(e) {}
+				if (svcToken && svcToken.is_valid) {
+					req.user = { uid: svcToken.resource_id, isMachine: true, name: 'Machine Account' };
+					req.resourceId = svcToken.resource_id;
+					return next();
+				}
 			}
 		}
 

nodejs/models/access_request.js

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Self-service access requests: the "request" half of the directory catalog.
+//
+// A request is a *proposal to join an LDAP group*. Approving one does exactly
+// what an admin would have done by hand -- add the user to `groupCn` -- so LDAP
+// remains the single access-control truth and this table is only the paper
+// trail of who asked, who decided, and when. Nothing here grants anything on
+// its own; a row with status 'approved' whose LDAP write failed is a row that
+// grants no access, which is the safe direction.
+
+const { Model } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
+
+const STATUS = {
+  PENDING: 'pending',
+  APPROVED: 'approved',
+  DENIED: 'denied',
+  CANCELLED: 'cancelled',
+};
+
+class AccessRequest extends Model {
+  static fields = {
+    id: { type: 'uuid', primaryKey: true },
+    // The requesting user's uid (not dn): dn changes if the directory is
+    // restructured, uid is the stable handle used everywhere else in the app.
+    uid: { type: 'string', isRequired: true },
+    resource: { type: 'hasOne', model: 'Resource' }, // creates resourceId
+    // The group joining which satisfies this request. Captured at request time
+    // so a later re-link of the resource's groups can't silently redirect a
+    // pending approval at a different group than the one that was reviewed.
+    groupCn: { type: 'string', isRequired: true },
+    status: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, default: STATUS.PENDING },
+    note: { type: 'text' },
+    requestedOn: { type: 'integer' },
+    decidedBy: { type: 'string' },
+    decidedOn: { type: 'integer' },
+    decisionNote: { type: 'text' },
+  };
+
+  // The one request that blocks a new one: same user, same group, still open.
+  // Denied/cancelled requests deliberately do not block -- circumstances change
+  // and a user may ask again.
+  static async findOpen(uid, groupCn) {
+    const rows = await this.list({ where: { uid, groupCn, status: STATUS.PENDING } });
+    return rows[0] || null;
+  }
+
+  static async listForUser(uid) {
+    return this.list({ where: { uid } });
+  }
+
+  static async listPending() {
+    return this.list({ where: { status: STATUS.PENDING } });
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { AccessRequest, STATUS };

nodejs/models/auth.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Auth.login = async function(data){
 
 		return {user, token}
 	}catch(error){
-		console.error("AUTH LOGIN error:", error);
+		console.error("AUTH LOGIN error:", error.name, error.message);
 		throw this.errors.login();
 	}
 };

nodejs/models/email.js

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Mail.sendTemplate = async function(to, template, context, from){
 		to,
 		mustache.render(template.subject, context),
 		mustache.render(template.message, context),
-		from || (template.from && mustache.render(template.message, context))
+		from || (template.from && mustache.render(template.from, context))
 	)
 };
 

nodejs/models/group_ldap.js

@@ -3,23 +3,22 @@
 const { Client, Attribute, Change } = require('ldapts');
 const { LRUCache } = require('lru-cache');
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf').ldap;
+// Connection + escaping from the shared @simpleworkjs/ldap package. Local
+// wrappers preserve the no-arg call signatures; see user_ldap.js for rationale.
+const { makeClient: _makeClient, withClient: _withClient, escapeFilter, escapeDN } = require('@simpleworkjs/ldap');
+const escapeLDAPSearchValue = escapeFilter;
+const escapeLDAPDNValue = escapeDN;
 
 function makeClient() {
-	return new Client({ url: conf.url });
+	return _makeClient(conf);
 }
 
 async function withClient(fn) {
-	const client = makeClient();
-	try {
-		await client.bind(conf.bindDN, conf.bindPassword);
-		return await fn(client);
-	} finally {
-		await client.unbind().catch(() => {});
-	}
+	return _withClient(conf, fn);
 }
 
 async function getGroups(client, member){
-	let memberFilter = member ? `(member=${member})`: ''
+	let memberFilter = member ? `(member=${escapeLDAPSearchValue(member)})`: ''
 
 	let groups = (await client.search(conf.groupBase, {
 		scope: 'sub',
@@ -35,7 +34,8 @@ async function getGroups(client, member){
 }
 
 async function addGroup(client, data){
-	await client.add(`cn=${data.name},${conf.groupBase}`, {
+	const safeName = escapeLDAPDNValue(data.name);
+	await client.add(`cn=${safeName},${conf.groupBase}`, {
 		cn: data.name,
 		member: data.owner,
 		description: data.description,
@@ -112,18 +112,190 @@ async function cachedListDetail() {
 	return promise;
 }
 
+// --- Nested groups -------------------------------------------------------
+//
+// `groupOfNames.member` holds DNs, and nothing says those DNs must be users --
+// a group DN is a perfectly legal member. That is how nesting is stored here:
+// as-is, no extra schema, no denormalization, the nesting visible in LDAP
+// exactly as an admin entered it.
+//
+// What LDAP will NOT do is resolve it. The memberof overlay records only
+// *direct* membership, and a `(member=<dn>)` filter likewise finds only the
+// groups that list the DN literally. So transitivity is computed here, and
+// every membership question in the app must go through these helpers or it
+// will silently see one level and grant nothing for a nested group.
+//
+// The whole group set is one subtree search, so the closure is computed in
+// memory rather than issuing a query per level. `resolverCache` keeps that
+// search off the hot path for bursts; it is cleared by every write below, so
+// the only staleness it can introduce is from edits made outside this app.
+// Auth decisions ride on this, hence the deliberately short TTL.
+
+const NESTING_TTL_MS = 15 * 1000;
+const MAX_NESTING_DEPTH = Number(conf.groupNestingDepth) > 0 ? Number(conf.groupNestingDepth) : 10;
+
+const resolverCache = new LRUCache({ max: 1, ttl: NESTING_TTL_MS, ttlAutopurge: true });
+
+async function allGroupsForResolver() {
+	const hit = resolverCache.get('all');
+	if (hit) return hit;
+	const promise = withClient(async (client) => {
+		const groups = await getGroups(client);
+		return groups.map(g => ({ ...g }));
+	}).then(plain => {
+		resolverCache.set('all', plain);
+		return plain;
+	}).catch(err => {
+		resolverCache.delete('all');
+		throw err;
+	});
+	resolverCache.set('all', promise);
+	return promise;
+}
+
+const lc = dn => String(dn || '').toLowerCase();
+
+// dn -> [groups that list dn as a member]. One pass, reused for every lookup.
+function buildParentIndex(groups) {
+	const parents = new Map();
+	for (const group of groups) {
+		for (const member of [].concat(group.member || []).filter(Boolean)) {
+			const key = lc(member);
+			if (!parents.has(key)) parents.set(key, []);
+			parents.get(key).push(group);
+		}
+	}
+	return parents;
+}
+
+// Every group `dn` belongs to, directly or through any chain of nested groups.
+// Breadth-first with a visited set, so a cycle (A in B, B in A) terminates
+// instead of hanging, and MAX_NESTING_DEPTH bounds a pathological chain.
+function closureUp(dn, groups) {
+	const parents = buildParentIndex(groups);
+	const found = new Map(); // cn -> group
+	const seen = new Set([lc(dn)]);
+	let frontier = [lc(dn)];
+
+	for (let depth = 0; depth < MAX_NESTING_DEPTH && frontier.length; depth++) {
+		const next = [];
+		for (const current of frontier) {
+			for (const group of parents.get(current) || []) {
+				const groupDn = lc(group.dn);
+				if (seen.has(groupDn)) continue;
+				seen.add(groupDn);
+				found.set(group.cn, group);
+				// The group itself is now a member to look up: this is the step
+				// that makes the walk transitive rather than one-level.
+				next.push(groupDn);
+			}
+		}
+		frontier = next;
+	}
+	return [...found.values()];
+}
+
+// Every member DN reachable from a group, split into the users it effectively
+// grants and the groups it nests. `direct` is kept separate so the UI can show
+// "3 members, 12 effective" and so removal stays unambiguous.
+function closureDown(group, groups) {
+	const byDn = new Map(groups.map(g => [lc(g.dn), g]));
+	const users = new Set();
+	const nested = new Map();
+	const seen = new Set([lc(group.dn)]);
+	let frontier = [group];
+
+	for (let depth = 0; depth < MAX_NESTING_DEPTH && frontier.length; depth++) {
+		const next = [];
+		for (const current of frontier) {
+			for (const member of [].concat(current.member || []).filter(Boolean)) {
+				const key = lc(member);
+				const asGroup = byDn.get(key);
+				if (asGroup) {
+					if (seen.has(key)) continue;
+					seen.add(key);
+					nested.set(asGroup.cn, asGroup);
+					next.push(asGroup);
+				} else {
+					users.add(member);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		frontier = next;
+	}
+	return { users: [...users], nested: [...nested.values()] };
+}
+
 var Group = {};
 
+// Set when slapd carries the nestgroup overlay (docker-entrypoint.sh exports
+// app_ldap__nestedGroupsServerSide=true after detecting nestgroup.so). With it,
+// a plain `(member=<dn>)` search already returns the full transitive set and the
+// in-app closure is redundant work on every request. Without it -- e.g. pointed
+// at a stock 2.6.x server, which no release ships nestgroup in -- the app must
+// compute the closure itself or nested groups silently grant nothing.
+const SERVER_SIDE_NESTING = String(conf.nestedGroupsServerSide) === 'true';
+
+// Transitive: every group CN this member belongs to, at any nesting depth.
+// Callers making an access decision must use this rather than reading
+// `memberOf`, which a server without nestgroup only ever populates one level
+// deep.
 Group.list = async function(member){
 	if (member) {
-		return withClient(async (client) => {
-			const groups = await getGroups(client, member);
-			return groups.map(group => group.cn);
-		});
+		if (SERVER_SIDE_NESTING) {
+			return withClient(async (client) => {
+				const groups = await getGroups(client, member);
+				return groups.map(group => group.cn);
+			});
+		}
+		const groups = await allGroupsForResolver();
+		return closureUp(member, groups).map(group => group.cn);
 	}
 	return (await cachedListDetail()).map(group => group.cn);
 }
 
+// The members a group effectively grants: users reached through any chain of
+// nested groups, plus the nested groups themselves for display.
+Group.effectiveMembers = async function(cn){
+	const groups = await allGroupsForResolver();
+	const group = groups.find(g => g.cn === cn);
+	if (!group) {
+		let error = new Error('GroupNotFound');
+		error.name = 'GroupNotFound';
+		error.message = `LDAP:${cn} does not exists`;
+		error.status = 404;
+		throw error;
+	}
+	const { users, nested } = closureDown(group, groups);
+	const directMembers = [].concat(group.member || []).filter(Boolean);
+	const groupDns = new Set(groups.map(g => lc(g.dn)));
+	return {
+		cn: group.cn,
+		direct: directMembers.filter(dn => !groupDns.has(lc(dn))),
+		nestedGroups: nested.map(g => ({ cn: g.cn, dn: g.dn })),
+		effective: users,
+	};
+};
+
+// Would adding `childDn` to `parentCn` create a cycle? A group may not contain
+// itself, nor anything that already (transitively) contains it -- such a chain
+// makes membership unanswerable, and callers would rely on the depth cap to
+// stop rather than getting a real answer.
+Group.wouldCycle = async function(parentCn, childDn){
+	const groups = await allGroupsForResolver();
+	const parent = groups.find(g => g.cn === parentCn);
+	if (!parent) return false;
+	if (lc(parent.dn) === lc(childDn)) return true;
+	const child = groups.find(g => lc(g.dn) === lc(childDn));
+	if (!child) return false; // a user DN can never close a cycle
+	// Adding child under parent is a cycle exactly when parent is already
+	// reachable downward from child.
+	const { nested } = closureDown(child, groups);
+	return nested.some(g => lc(g.dn) === lc(parent.dn));
+};
+
+Group.clearResolverCache = function(){ resolverCache.clear(); };
+
 Group.listDetail = async function(member){
 	if (member) {
 		return withClient(async (client) => getGroups(client, member));
@@ -139,9 +311,10 @@ Group.get = async function(data){
 	}
 
 	return withClient(async (client) => {
+		const safeName = escapeLDAPSearchValue(data.name);
 		let group = (await client.search(conf.groupBase, {
 			scope: 'sub',
-			filter: `(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(cn=${data.name}))`,
+			filter: `(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(cn=${safeName}))`,
 			attributes: ['cn', 'description', 'member', 'owner', 'createTimestamp', 'modifyTimestamp'],
 		})).searchEntries[0];
 
@@ -165,6 +338,7 @@ Group.add = async function(data){
 	return withClient(async (client) => {
 		await addGroup(client, data);
 		cache.clear();
+		resolverCache.clear();
 		return this.get(data);
 	});
 }
@@ -173,6 +347,7 @@ Group.addMember = async function(user){
 	await withClient(async (client) => addMember(client, this, user));
 	this.member = [].concat(this.member || []).concat([user.dn]);
 	cache.clear();
+	resolverCache.clear();
 	return this;
 };
 
@@ -185,6 +360,7 @@ Group.removeMember = async function(user){
 	}
 	this.member = [].concat(this.member || []).filter(dn => dn !== user.dn);
 	cache.clear();
+	resolverCache.clear();
 	return this;
 };
 
@@ -192,6 +368,7 @@ Group.addOwner = async function(user){
 	await withClient(async (client) => addOwner(client, this, user));
 	this.owner = [].concat(this.owner || []).concat([user.dn]);
 	cache.clear();
+	resolverCache.clear();
 	return this;
 };
 
@@ -204,12 +381,14 @@ Group.removeOwner = async function(user){
 	}
 	this.owner = [].concat(this.owner || []).filter(dn => dn !== user.dn);
 	cache.clear();
+	resolverCache.clear();
 	return this;
 };
 
 Group.remove = async function(){
 	await withClient(async (client) => client.del(this.dn));
 	cache.clear();
+	resolverCache.clear();
 	return true;
 }
 

nodejs/models/index.js

@@ -1,14 +1,81 @@
 'use strict';
 
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
-const {setUpTable} = require('model-redis');
+const { setUpTable } = require('model-redis');
 
+// Keep model-redis for the ones not yet ported
 const Table = setUpTable(conf.redis);
-
 module.exports = Table;
 
-require('./token');
+const { Token, AuthToken, InviteToken, ImpersonationToken, PasswordResetToken, OtpToken, ServiceToken } = require('./token');
 require('./verification');
-require('./oauth_client');
 require('./oauth_code');
 require('./api_token');
+
+const { init } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
+const { Resource, ResourceEdge, ResourceGroup } = require('./resource');
+const { AccessRequest } = require('./access_request');
+const { Webhook } = require('./webhook');
+const { PluginInstance } = require('./plugin_instance');
+const { SharedSecret } = require('./shared_secret');
+const { SharedSecretGrant } = require('./shared_secret_grant');
+const { VaultAppToken } = require('./vault_app_token');
+async function initORM() {
+  const ormConf = conf.orm || {
+    dialect: 'sqlite',
+    storage: './config/inventory.sqlite',
+    logging: false
+  };
+  ormConf.redis = conf.redis;
+
+  console.log('[initORM] Starting ORM initialization...');
+  try {
+    await init({
+      conf: { orm: ormConf },
+      models: [
+        Resource, ResourceEdge, ResourceGroup, AccessRequest, Webhook, PluginInstance,
+        SharedSecret, SharedSecretGrant, VaultAppToken,
+        Token, AuthToken, InviteToken, ImpersonationToken, PasswordResetToken, OtpToken, ServiceToken
+      ]
+    });
+    console.log('[initORM] ORM initialized successfully');
+    console.log('[initORM] Resource.orm =', !!Resource.orm, 'Token.orm =', !!Token.orm);
+    await healSchema();
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error('[initORM] ORM initialization failed:', err.message);
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+
+// Add-only schema heal. @simpleworkjs/orm runs sequelize.sync() WITHOUT alter,
+// which creates missing tables but never touches existing ones — so a column
+// added in a newer release (e.g. PluginInstance.lastLog) simply never appears
+// in an upgraded deployment's database and every query on the model fails
+// ("no such column"). This walks each Sequelize model and ADDs any attribute
+// missing from its table. Strictly additive (never drops or retypes), works on
+// any dialect via the query interface, and fail-soft per column so one bad
+// attribute can't take the boot down.
+async function healSchema() {
+  const adapter = Resource.orm && Resource.orm.adapters && Resource.orm.adapters.sequelize;
+  if (!adapter || !adapter.sequelize) return;
+  const sequelize = adapter.sequelize;
+  const qi = sequelize.getQueryInterface();
+  for (const SM of Object.values(sequelize.models)) {
+    const table = SM.getTableName();
+    let existing;
+    try { existing = await qi.describeTable(table); }
+    catch (e) { continue; } // no table yet — sync() handles creation
+    for (const [name, attr] of Object.entries(SM.getAttributes())) {
+      const col = attr.field || name;
+      if (existing[col]) continue;
+      try {
+        await qi.addColumn(table, col, attr);
+        console.log(`[initORM] schema heal: added missing column ${table}.${col}`);
+      } catch (e) {
+        console.error(`[initORM] schema heal: could not add ${table}.${col}:`, e.message);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports.initORM = initORM;

nodejs/models/oauth_client.js

@@ -1,50 +1,137 @@
 'use strict';
 
-const Table = require('.');
+const { Resource } = require('./resource');
 const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
-const UUID = function b(a){return a?(a^Math.random()*16>>a/4).toString(16):([1e7]+-1e3+-4e3+-8e3+-1e11).replace(/[018]/g,b)};
+const crypto = require('crypto');
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
+const UUID = () => crypto.randomUUID();
 
 const defaultLifetime = (conf.oauth && conf.oauth.token_lifetime) || {
 	access_token: 3600,
 	refresh_token: 2592000
 };
 
-class OAuthClient extends Table {
-	static _key = 'client_id';
-	static _keyMap = {
-		'client_id':          {default: UUID, type: 'string'},
-		'client_secret_hash': {isRequired: true, type: 'string', isPrivate: true},
-		'name':               {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 1, max: 255},
-		'description':        {default: '', type: 'string'},
-		'redirect_uris':      {default: [], type: 'object'},
-		'scopes':             {default: ['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'groups'], type: 'object'},
-		'allowed_groups':     {default: [], type: 'object'},
-		'token_lifetime':     {default: function(){ return Object.assign({}, defaultLifetime) }, type: 'object'},
-		'created_by':         {isRequired: true, type: 'string'},
-		'created_on':         {default: function(){ return (new Date).getTime() }},
-		'is_valid':           {default: true, type: 'boolean'},
-	}
-
+class OAuthClient {
 	static async add(data) {
-		const raw_secret = UUID();
-		data.client_secret_hash = await bcrypt.hash(raw_secret, 10);
-		data.client_id = UUID();
-		const client = await this.create(data);
-		client._raw_secret = raw_secret;
-		return client;
+		const raw_secret = crypto.randomUUID();
+		const client_id = crypto.randomUUID();
+		const client_secret_hash = await bcrypt.hash(raw_secret, 10);
+
+		// Generate a unique slug from the client name
+		let slug = data.name.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, '-').replace(/^-|-$/g, '') || 'oauth-client';
+		// Ensure uniqueness by appending a suffix if needed
+		const existing = await Resource.list({ where: { slug } });
+		if (existing.length) slug = `${slug}-${client_id.slice(0, 8)}`;
+
+		const r = await Resource.create({
+			id: client_id,
+			kind: 'oauth',
+			name: data.name,
+			slug: slug,
+			description: data.description || '',
+			owner: data.created_by,
+			metadata: {
+				client_secret_hash,
+				redirect_uris: data.redirect_uris || [],
+				scopes: data.scopes || ['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'groups'],
+				allowed_groups: data.allowed_groups || [],
+				token_lifetime: data.token_lifetime || { ...defaultLifetime }
+			}
+		});
+		
+		r._raw_secret = raw_secret;
+		r.client_id = client_id;
+		return r;
+	}
+	static async get(client_id) {
+			const notFound = () => {
+				const e = new Error('OAuthClient not found');
+				e.status = 404;
+				return e;
+			};
+			let r;
+			try {
+				r = await Resource.get(client_id);
+			} catch (_) {
+				throw notFound();
+			}
+			// Resource.get() returns null (does not throw) for a missing id —
+			// guard it so a bad/undefined client_id is a clean 404, not a
+			// "Cannot read properties of null (reading 'kind')" 500.
+			if (!r || r.kind !== 'oauth') throw notFound();
+		// Map metadata to top-level properties to satisfy routes/oauth.js without rewriting it
+		r.client_id = r.id;
+		r.client_secret_hash = r.metadata.client_secret_hash;
+		r.redirect_uris = r.metadata.redirect_uris || [];
+		r.scopes = r.metadata.scopes || ['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'groups'];
+		r.allowed_groups = r.metadata.allowed_groups || [];
+		r.token_lifetime = r.metadata.token_lifetime || { ...defaultLifetime };
+		// Resource has no is_valid column; validity lives in metadata (absent = valid)
+		r.is_valid = r.metadata.is_valid !== false;
+		r.verifySecret = async (secret) => bcrypt.compare(secret, r.client_secret_hash);
+		
+		r.rotateSecret = async () => {
+			const raw_secret = crypto.randomUUID();
+			r.metadata.client_secret_hash = await bcrypt.hash(raw_secret, 10);
+			await r.update({ metadata: r.metadata });
+			return raw_secret;
+		};
+
+		// The ORM Model.toJSON() only serializes schema fields, so the mapped
+		// properties above (client_id, scopes, redirect_uris, …) would be
+		// stripped from any res.json() — that's why GET /api/oauth/client
+		// returned client_id: undefined and the bootstrap's rotate blew up.
+		// Emit the public shape explicitly. client_secret_hash is deliberately
+		// omitted so it never leaks over the API.
+		r.toJSON = function () {
+			return {
+				client_id: r.id,
+				id: r.id,
+				kind: r.kind,
+				name: r.name,
+				slug: r.slug,
+				owner: r.owner,
+				description: r.description,
+				redirect_uris: r.redirect_uris,
+				scopes: r.scopes,
+				allowed_groups: r.allowed_groups,
+				token_lifetime: r.token_lifetime,
+				is_valid: r.is_valid,
+			};
+		};
+
+		// proxy update to handle metadata correctly
+		const originalUpdate = r.update.bind(r);
+		r.update = async (data) => {
+			if (data.redirect_uris !== undefined) r.metadata.redirect_uris = data.redirect_uris;
+			if (data.scopes !== undefined) r.metadata.scopes = data.scopes;
+			if (data.allowed_groups !== undefined) r.metadata.allowed_groups = data.allowed_groups;
+			if (data.token_lifetime !== undefined) r.metadata.token_lifetime = data.token_lifetime;
+			if (data.is_valid !== undefined) r.metadata.is_valid = data.is_valid;
+
+			const updateData = { metadata: r.metadata };
+			if (data.name !== undefined) updateData.name = data.name;
+			if (data.description !== undefined) updateData.description = data.description;
+			
+			return originalUpdate(updateData);
+		};
+
+		return r;
 	}
 
-	async verifySecret(secret) {
-		return bcrypt.compare(secret, this.client_secret_hash);
+	static async list() {
+		const resources = await Resource.list({ where: { kind: 'oauth' } });
+		return Promise.all(resources.map(r => this.get(r.id)));
 	}
 
-	async rotateSecret() {
-		const raw_secret = UUID();
-		await this.update({ client_secret_hash: await bcrypt.hash(raw_secret, 10) });
-		return raw_secret;
+	static async listDetail() {
+		return this.list();
+	}
+
+	static async verifySecret(client_id, secret) {
+		const client = await this.get(client_id);
+		return client.verifySecret(secret);
 	}
 }
-OAuthClient.register();
 
 module.exports = { OAuthClient };

nodejs/models/oauth_code.js

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 'use strict';
 
 const Table = require('.');
-const UUID = function b(a){return a?(a^Math.random()*16>>a/4).toString(16):([1e7]+-1e3+-4e3+-8e3+-1e11).replace(/[018]/g,b)};
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const UUID = () => crypto.randomUUID();
 
 // Shared base keyMap matching Token's schema so these behave as tokens
 const tokenKeyMap = {

nodejs/models/plugin_instance.js

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// PluginInstance — the registry of configured, loadable plugin copies.
+//
+// The SSO plugin system (see nodejs/services/plugin_registry.js) distinguishes
+// **plugin types** (the .js modules under nodejs/plugins/<category>/<type>.js)
+// from **plugin instances** — a configured, loadable/unloadable *copy* of a
+// type. You can have several instances of the same type (e.g. two Proxmox
+// endpoints with their own URLs + tokens), each on its own schedule.
+//
+// This table holds the *non-secret* per-instance state: which type it is, its
+// schedule (cron), whether it's loaded (enabled), and its non-secret config.
+// Per-instance **secrets** (the configSchema fields flagged `secret:true`,
+// e.g. a Proxmox `tokenSecret` or UniFi `password`) live in OpenBao at
+// `secret/plugins/<id>/conf` (see nodejs/utils/plugin_secrets.js) — never in
+// the DB. The DB row's `config` JSON column holds only non-secret field values.
+//
+// `slug` is the discovery source name passed to DiscoveryReconciler.reconcile,
+// so a discovery instance's resources are attributed to a stable, human-chosen
+// name rather than its uuid. Unique, so two instances can't shadow each other
+// in the resource graph's `discovery_sources`.
+//
+// Like Resource/AccessRequest, there is no ORM auto-timestamp hook: the route
+// handler stamps created_by/on + updated_by/on explicitly on every write (see
+// routes/api_plugins.js). `id` (uuid) is generated by the ORM on create.
+
+const { Model } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
+
+const STATUS = {
+  OK: 'ok',
+  ERROR: 'error',
+  RUNNING: 'running',
+};
+
+class PluginInstance extends Model {
+  static fields = {
+    id: { type: 'uuid', primaryKey: true },
+    // A registered plugin type slug (matches a manifest `type`). Validated
+    // against the registry before a row is created.
+    pluginType: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, min: 1, max: 64 },
+    // The plugin's category (e.g. 'discovery'). Copied from the manifest at
+    // create time so the scheduler can dispatch without re-reading the registry
+    // on every run (and so a later type removal still shows what the instance was).
+    category: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, default: 'discovery', min: 1, max: 64 },
+    // Human label for the instance.
+    name: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, min: 1, max: 120 },
+    // Stable handle: discovery source name + unique constraint. Lowercase
+    // alnum + hyphen/underscore to stay safe as a resource-graph slug.
+    slug: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, unique: true, min: 1, max: 64 },
+    // Loaded into the scheduler? `false` = unloaded (no scheduled runs).
+    enabled: { type: 'boolean', default: true },
+    // Cron schedule (5-field). The scheduler turns this into a BullMQ
+    // repeatable JobScheduler.
+    cron: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, default: '0 * * * *' },
+    // Non-secret configSchema field values. Secret fields are NOT here.
+    config: { type: 'json', default: {} },
+    // Last-run bookkeeping, updated by the scheduler worker.
+    lastRunAt: { type: 'integer' },
+    lastStatus: { type: 'string' },
+    lastError: { type: 'text' },
+    lastLog: { type: 'text' },
+    // Audit stamps (set by the route handler, not by an ORM hook).
+    created_by: { type: 'string' },
+    created_on: { type: 'integer' },
+    updated_by: { type: 'string' },
+    updated_on: { type: 'integer' },
+  };
+
+  // All instances the scheduler should run: enabled only. Loaded fresh each
+  // boot / load; not cached on the model (the scheduler is the source of truth
+  // for what's actually scheduled).
+  static async listEnabled() {
+    return this.list({ where: { enabled: true } });
+  }
+
+  // Look up by slug — used by tests + the reconciler when only a slug is known.
+  static async getBySlug(slug) {
+    const rows = await this.list({ where: { slug } });
+    return rows[0] || null;
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { PluginInstance, STATUS };

nodejs/models/resource.js

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+const { Model } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
+
+const { Group } = require('./group_ldap');
+
+class Resource extends Model {
+  static exposedMethods = [
+    { method: 'search', route: 'resources', verb: 'get', args: { from: 'query' } },
+    { method: 'getBySlug', route: 'resources/:slug', verb: 'get', args: { from: 'params', names: ['slug'] } },
+    { method: 'getGraph', route: 'graph', verb: 'get' },
+    { method: 'getMyAccess', route: 'me', verb: 'get', args: { from: 'user' } }
+  ];
+
+  static async search(query) {
+    const graph = await this.getGraph();
+    let resources = graph.resources;
+    
+    if (query.kind) {
+      resources = resources.filter(r => r.kind === query.kind);
+    }
+    
+    if (query.group) {
+      const rgs = await ResourceGroup.list({ where: { groupCn: query.group } });
+      const allowedIds = new Set(rgs.map(rg => rg.resourceId));
+      resources = resources.filter(r => allowedIds.has(r.id));
+    }
+
+    if (query.parent) {
+      const parents = graph.resources.filter(r => r.slug === query.parent);
+      if (parents.length > 0) {
+        const parentId = parents[0].id;
+        const childIds = new Set(graph.edges.filter(e => e.parentId === parentId).map(e => e.childId));
+        resources = resources.filter(r => childIds.has(r.id));
+      } else {
+        resources = [];
+      }
+    }
+    return resources;
+  }
+
+  static async getBySlug(slug) {
+    const graph = await this.getGraph();
+    const resource = graph.resources.find(r => r.slug === slug);
+    if (!resource) {
+      let err = new Error('Resource not found');
+      err.status = 404;
+      throw err;
+    }
+    
+    const parents = graph.edges.filter(e => e.childId === resource.id);
+    const children = graph.edges.filter(e => e.parentId === resource.id);
+    
+    return {
+      ...resource,
+      parents,
+      children
+    };
+  }
+
+  static async getGraph() {
+    const resources = await this.list();
+    const edges = await ResourceEdge.list();
+    
+    // Convert to simple objects so we can mutate metadata properties safely
+    const resObjs = resources.map(r => {
+      const obj = r.toJSON ? r.toJSON() : { ...r };
+      obj.metadata = obj.metadata || {};
+      return obj;
+    });
+    
+    // Bubble up production status: if any child is prod, parent is prod
+    const isProdCache = new Map();
+    function checkProd(resId, visited = new Set()) {
+      if (isProdCache.has(resId)) return isProdCache.get(resId);
+      if (visited.has(resId)) return false; // Cycle prevention
+      
+      visited.add(resId);
+      const r = resObjs.find(x => x.id === resId);
+      if (!r) return false;
+      
+      // If intrinsically prod, return true
+      if (r.metadata.isProduction) {
+        isProdCache.set(resId, true);
+        return true;
+      }
+      
+      // Check children
+      const childrenIds = edges.filter(e => e.parentId === resId).map(e => e.childId);
+      for (const cid of childrenIds) {
+        if (checkProd(cid, visited)) {
+          isProdCache.set(resId, true);
+          return true;
+        }
+      }
+      
+      isProdCache.set(resId, false);
+      return false;
+    }
+    
+    let maxUpdated = 0;
+    resObjs.forEach(r => {
+      r.metadata.isProduction = checkProd(r.id);
+      if (r.updated_on && r.updated_on > maxUpdated) maxUpdated = r.updated_on;
+    });
+
+    return { resources: resObjs, edges, updated_on: maxUpdated || Date.now() };
+  }
+
+  // Stamp `resolvedAddress` on each resource: its own address/ip if it has one,
+  // otherwise the nearest ancestor's. A service usually carries no address of
+  // its own -- it is reached at the host it runs on -- so "how do I reach this"
+  // is only answerable from the graph, never from the row alone. Every caller
+  // that answers that question for a user (getMyAccess, GET /api/discovery/me)
+  // must go through here, or services come back unreachable.
+  static async withResolvedAddress(resources) {
+    if (!resources || !resources.length) return [];
+    const graph = await this.getGraph();
+
+    const resolve = (resId, visited = new Set()) => {
+      if (visited.has(resId)) return null; // prevent cycles
+      visited.add(resId);
+
+      const res = graph.resources.find(r => r.id === resId);
+      if (!res) return null;
+      if (res.metadata && res.metadata.address) return res.metadata.address;
+      if (res.metadata && res.metadata.ip) return res.metadata.ip;
+
+      for (const edge of graph.edges.filter(e => e.childId === resId)) {
+        const found = resolve(edge.parentId, visited);
+        if (found) return found;
+      }
+      return null;
+    };
+
+    return resources.map(r => {
+      const data = r.toJSON ? r.toJSON() : { ...r };
+      data.metadata = data.metadata || {};
+      data.resolvedAddress = resolve(data.id);
+      return data;
+    });
+  }
+
+  static async getMyAccess(userDn) {
+    const userGroups = await Group.list(userDn);
+    if (!userGroups || userGroups.length === 0) return [];
+
+    const resourceGroups = await ResourceGroup.list({
+      where: { groupCn: { in: userGroups } }
+    });
+
+    const resourceIds = [...new Set(resourceGroups.map(rg => rg.resourceId))];
+    if (resourceIds.length === 0) return [];
+
+    return this.withResolvedAddress(await this.list({ where: { id: { in: resourceIds } } }));
+  }
+
+  static fields = {
+    id: { type: 'uuid', primaryKey: true },
+    kind: { type: 'string', isRequired: true },
+    name: { type: 'string', isRequired: true },
+    slug: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, unique: true },
+    owner: { type: 'string' },
+    description: { type: 'text' },
+    metadata: { type: 'json', default: {} },
+    // Not isRequired: @simpleworkjs/orm has no auto-timestamp hook, so these
+    // are set explicitly by the route handler on every create/update (see
+    // routes/api_directory_admin.js). Existing rows predating this change
+    // simply read back undefined -- callers must render a fallback.
+    created_by: { type: 'string' },
+    created_on: { type: 'integer' },
+    updated_by: { type: 'string' },
+    updated_on: { type: 'integer' },
+    edgesAsParent: { type: 'hasMany', model: 'ResourceEdge', remoteKey: 'parentId' },
+    edgesAsChild: { type: 'hasMany', model: 'ResourceEdge', remoteKey: 'childId' },
+    groups: { type: 'hasMany', model: 'ResourceGroup', remoteKey: 'resourceId' }
+  };
+
+  // Walk parent ResourceEdges from resourceId up to the nearest ancestor
+  // whose kind === 'site', returning its slug (or null if none exists -- a
+  // top-level resource with no site parent keeps its unprefixed group name).
+  static async findAncestorSiteSlug(resourceId, visited = new Set()) {
+    if (visited.has(resourceId)) return null;
+    visited.add(resourceId);
+
+    const parentEdges = await ResourceEdge.list({ where: { childId: resourceId } });
+    for (const edge of parentEdges) {
+      const parent = await this.get(edge.parentId);
+      if (!parent) continue;
+      if (parent.kind === 'site') return parent.slug;
+      const found = await this.findAncestorSiteSlug(parent.id, visited);
+      if (found) return found;
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+class ResourceEdge extends Model {
+  static fields = {
+    id: { type: 'uuid', primaryKey: true },
+    parent: { type: 'hasOne', model: 'Resource' }, // Creates parentId
+    child: { type: 'hasOne', model: 'Resource' }, // Creates childId
+    relation: { type: 'string', isRequired: true }
+  };
+}
+
+class ResourceGroup extends Model {
+  static fields = {
+    id: { type: 'uuid', primaryKey: true },
+    resource: { type: 'hasOne', model: 'Resource' }, // Creates resourceId
+    groupCn: { type: 'string', isRequired: true },
+    accessLevel: { type: 'string', isRequired: true }
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  Resource,
+  ResourceEdge,
+  ResourceGroup
+};

nodejs/models/shared_secret.js

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// SharedSecret — a secret the owner has published to the shared namespace so it
+// can be shared with other users and/or downstream apps.
+//
+// The secret DATA lives in OpenBao at `secret/shared/<ownerUid>/<slug>` (KV-v2),
+// never in the DB. This row is metadata only (owner + slug + description) and is
+// the source of truth for the UI (which shares exist). ACCESS CONTROL is enforced
+// entirely by OpenBao ACL policies: the owner's `user-<uid>` policy grants full
+// R/W on `secret/shared/<ownerUid>/*`, and each grantee's policy content is
+// edited to add `read` on the exact shared path (see vault_broker.js — policy
+// content is parsed live at token use, so a grant takes effect immediately with
+// no token re-mint). `secretId` on SharedSecretGrant links grantees to this row.
+//
+// `slug` is unique and immutable in practice — it is embedded in the shared path
+// and in grantee policy rules, so changing it would require rewriting policies.
+// Like PluginInstance, there is no ORM auto-timestamp hook: route handlers stamp
+// created_by/on + updated_by/on on every write. `id` (uuid) is generated by the
+// ORM on create.
+
+const { Model } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
+
+class SharedSecret extends Model {
+  static fields = {
+    id: { type: 'uuid', primaryKey: true },
+    // Human slug embedded in the OpenBao path: secret/shared/<ownerUid>/<slug>.
+    // Unique so two owners can't collide on the same shared path.
+    slug: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, unique: true, min: 1, max: 64 },
+    // The publishing user's uid — also the shared path's namespace segment.
+    ownerUid: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, min: 1, max: 64 },
+    // Optional human description shown in the Shared tab.
+    description: { type: 'text' },
+    // Audit stamps (set by the route handler, not by an ORM hook).
+    created_by: { type: 'string' },
+    created_on: { type: 'integer' },
+    updated_by: { type: 'string' },
+    updated_on: { type: 'integer' },
+  };
+
+  // Full OpenBao KV-v2 path for this shared secret (logical path, no data/metadata).
+  static pathFor(ownerUid, slug) {
+    return `shared/${ownerUid}/${slug}`;
+  }
+
+  path() {
+    return SharedSecret.pathFor(this.ownerUid, this.slug);
+  }
+
+  // Look up by slug (unique). Returns the row or null.
+  static async getBySlug(slug) {
+    const rows = await this.list({ where: { slug } });
+    return rows[0] || null;
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { SharedSecret };

nodejs/models/shared_secret_grant.js

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// SharedSecretGrant — who can read a shared secret. Each row says "grantee
+// <granteeId> (a user uid or an app name) has <capability> on the shared secret
+// <secretId>".
+//
+// This table is the metadata/UX record of a grant. The actual ENFORCEMENT lives
+// in OpenBao ACL policy content: when a grant is created, vault_broker.js
+// recomputes the grantee's policy HCL (`user-<uid>` or `app-<name>`) to include
+// `read` on the exact shared path and rewrites it. Because OpenBao parses policy
+// content live at token use, the grant applies to the grantee's existing token
+// immediately (no re-mint). Revoking removes the rule and rewrites the policy.
+//
+// granteeType distinguishes the two principal kinds:
+//   'user' — a user uid → grantee's `user-<uid>` policy is edited
+//   'app'  — an app name → grantee's `app-<name>` policy is edited (downstream apps)
+// capability is currently always 'read' (grantees are read-only); the column is
+// a string so later capabilities could be added without a migration.
+//
+// No ORM auto-timestamp hook: route handlers stamp created_by/on + updated_by/on.
+// Uniqueness on (secretId, granteeType, granteeId) prevents duplicate grants.
+
+const { Model } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
+
+const GRANTEE_TYPES = ['user', 'app'];
+const CAPABILITIES = ['read'];
+
+class SharedSecretGrant extends Model {
+  static fields = {
+    id: { type: 'uuid', primaryKey: true },
+    // FK to SharedSecret.id.
+    secretId: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, min: 1 },
+    // 'user' (a uid) or 'app' (an app name) — which policy to edit.
+    granteeType: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, min: 1 },
+    // The grantee's uid (for 'user') or app name (for 'app').
+    granteeId: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, min: 1, max: 64 },
+    // Access level — 'read' today.
+    capability: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, default: 'read' },
+    // Audit stamps (set by the route handler, not by an ORM hook).
+    created_by: { type: 'string' },
+    created_on: { type: 'integer' },
+    updated_by: { type: 'string' },
+    updated_on: { type: 'integer' },
+  };
+
+  // All grants for a given grantee (user uid or app name). Used to rebuild the
+  // grantee's policy content so every granted shared path is present/absent.
+  static async listForGrantee(granteeType, granteeId) {
+    return this.list({ where: { granteeType, granteeId } });
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { SharedSecretGrant, GRANTEE_TYPES, CAPABILITIES };

nodejs/models/sms.js

@@ -10,6 +10,21 @@ function toE164Digits(number) {
 }
 
 async function send(to, message) {
+	const { PluginInstance } = require('./plugin_instance');
+	const registry = require('../services/plugin_registry');
+	const pluginSecrets = require('../utils/plugin_secrets');
+
+	const instances = await PluginInstance.find({ category: 'messaging', enabled: true });
+	if (instances.length > 0) {
+		const inst = instances[0];
+		const manifest = registry.getManifest(inst.pluginType);
+		if (manifest && manifest.sendMessage) {
+			const secrets = await pluginSecrets.read(inst.id).catch(() => ({}));
+			const config = { ...inst.config, ...secrets };
+			return manifest.sendMessage(config, { to, message });
+		}
+	}
+
 	const params = new URLSearchParams({
 		api_username: conf.username,
 		api_password: conf.password,

nodejs/models/token.js

@@ -1,21 +1,17 @@
 'use strict';
 
-const Table = require('.');
-const UUID = function b(a){return a?(a^Math.random()*16>>a/4).toString(16):([1e7]+-1e3+-4e3+-8e3+-1e11).replace(/[018]/g,b)};
+const { Model } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const UUID = () => crypto.randomUUID();
 
-
-class Token extends Table{
-	static _key = 'token';
-	static _keyMap = {
-		'created_by': {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 3, max: 500},
-		'created_on': {default: function(){return (new Date).getTime()}},
-		'updated_on': {default: function(){return (new Date).getTime()}, always: true},
-		'token': {default: UUID, type: 'string', min: 36, max: 36, isPrivate: true},
-		'is_valid': {default: true, type: 'boolean'},	
-	}
-
-	constructor(...args){
-		super(...args);
+class Token extends Model {
+	static adapterName = 'redis';
+	static fields = {
+		token: { type: 'string', primaryKey: true, default: UUID, isPrivate: true, min: 36, max: 36 },
+		created_by: { isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 3, max: 500 },
+		created_on: { type: 'integer', default: function(){return (new Date).getTime()} },
+		updated_on: { type: 'integer', default: function(){return (new Date).getTime()}, always: true },
+		is_valid: { default: true, type: 'boolean' }
 	}
 
 	async check(){
@@ -27,12 +23,10 @@ class Token extends Table{
 	}
 }
 
-Token.register();
-
 class AuthToken extends Token{
-	static _keyMap = {
-		...super._keyMap,
-		user: {model: 'User', rel: 'one', localKey: 'created_by'},
+	static fields = {
+		...Token.fields,
+		user: {model: 'User', type: 'hasOne', localKey: 'created_by'},
 	}
 
 	static async create(data){
@@ -41,11 +35,10 @@ class AuthToken extends Token{
 
 	}
 }
-AuthToken.register();
 
 class InviteToken extends Token{
-	static _keyMap = {
-		...super._keyMap,
+	static fields = {
+		...Token.fields,
 		claimed_by:  {default: '__NONE__', isRequired: false, type: 'string'},
 		mail:        {default: '__NONE__', type: 'string'},
 		mail_token:  {default: '__NONE__', type: 'string'},
@@ -67,14 +60,13 @@ class InviteToken extends Token{
 		}
 	}
 }
-InviteToken.register();
 
 class ImpersonationToken extends Token {
-	static _keyMap = {
-		...super._keyMap,
+	static fields = {
+		...Token.fields,
 		target_uid: {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 1, max: 200},
 		temp_hash:  {isRequired: true, type: 'string', min: 1, max: 500},
-		expires_at: {default: function(){ return (new Date).getTime() + 7200000 }, type: 'number'},
+		expires_at: {default: function(){ return (new Date).getTime() + 7200000 }, type: 'integer'},
 	}
 
 	get isExpired() {
@@ -86,42 +78,48 @@ class ImpersonationToken extends Token {
 		return this.create(data);
 	}
 }
-ImpersonationToken.register();
 
 class PasswordResetToken extends Token {}
-PasswordResetToken.register();
 
 class OtpToken extends Token {
-	static _keyMap = {
-		...Token._keyMap,
+	static fields = {
+		...Token.fields,
 		uid:        {isRequired: true, type: 'string'},
 		code:       {isRequired: true, type: 'string'},
 		method:     {isRequired: true, type: 'string'},
-		expires_at: {default: function(){ return (new Date).getTime() + 600000 }, type: 'number'},
+		expires_at: {default: function(){ return (new Date).getTime() + 600000 }, type: 'integer'},
 	};
 
 	get isExpired() {
 		return (new Date).getTime() > this.expires_at;
 	}
 
-	// Factory method — named `issue` to avoid shadowing Token's `create(data)`
 	static async issue(uid, method) {
-		const existing = await this.listDetail({uid});
+		const existing = await this.list({where: {uid}});
 		for (const t of existing) {
 			if (t.is_valid) await t.update({is_valid: false});
 		}
-		const code = String(Math.floor(100000 + Math.random() * 900000));
+		const code = String(crypto.randomInt(100000, 1000000));
 		return this.create({uid, code, method, created_by: uid});
 	}
 
 	static async verify(uid, code) {
-		const tokens = await this.listDetail({uid});
+		const tokens = await this.list({where: {uid}});
 		const match = tokens.find(t => t.is_valid && !t.isExpired && t.code === code);
 		if (!match) return null;
 		await match.update({is_valid: false});
 		return match;
 	}
 }
-OtpToken.register();
+class ServiceToken extends Token {
+	static fields = {
+		...Token.fields,
+		resource_id: {isRequired: true, type: 'string'}
+	}
+	
+	static async issue(resource_id, created_by) {
+		return this.create({resource_id, created_by});
+	}
+}
 
-module.exports = {Token, InviteToken, AuthToken, ImpersonationToken, PasswordResetToken, OtpToken};
+module.exports = {Token, InviteToken, AuthToken, ImpersonationToken, PasswordResetToken, OtpToken, ServiceToken};

nodejs/models/user_ldap.js

@@ -9,6 +9,14 @@ const {Token, InviteToken, PasswordResetToken} = require('./token');
 const {Group} = require('./group_ldap');
 const {UserVerification} = require('./verification');
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf').ldap;
+// Connection + escaping come from the shared @simpleworkjs/ldap package. The
+// wrappers below preserve this file's no-arg call signatures (makeClient() /
+// withClient(fn)) so no call site changes; sso's makeClient passes no
+// tlsOptions, which the shared client forwards as undefined — identical to the
+// previous `new Client({ url: conf.url })`.
+const { makeClient: _makeClient, withClient: _withClient, escapeFilter, escapeDN } = require('@simpleworkjs/ldap');
+const escapeLDAPSearchValue = escapeFilter;
+const escapeLDAPDNValue = escapeDN;
 
 function hashPasswordSSHA512(password) {
 	const salt = crypto.randomBytes(8);
@@ -23,26 +31,11 @@ const cache = new LRUCache({
 });
 
 function makeClient() {
-	return new Client({ url: conf.url });
+	return _makeClient(conf);
 }
 
 async function withClient(fn) {
-	const client = makeClient();
-	try {
-		await client.bind(conf.bindDN, conf.bindPassword);
-		return await fn(client);
-	} finally {
-		await client.unbind().catch(() => {});
-	}
-}
-
-// Helper to escape LDAP filter values (crucial for security)
-function escapeLDAPSearchValue(val) {
-    return val.replace(/\\/g, '\\5c')
-              .replace(/\*/g, '\\2a')
-              .replace(/\(/g, '\\28')
-              .replace(/\)/g, '\\29')
-              .replace(/\0/g, '\\00');
+	return _withClient(conf, fn);
 }
 
 // Compute the next available uid/gidNumber: the highest existing value below
@@ -72,7 +65,8 @@ async function addPosixGroup(client, data){
 
 	data.gidNumber = nextPosixId(groups, 'gidNumber');
 
-	await client.add(`cn=${data.cn},${conf.groupBase}`, {
+	const safeCn = escapeLDAPDNValue(data.cn);
+	await client.add(`cn=${safeCn},${conf.groupBase}`, {
 	  cn: data.cn,
 	  gidNumber: data.gidNumber,
 	  objectclass: [ 'posixGroup', 'top' ]
@@ -94,6 +88,7 @@ async function addPosixAccount(client, data){
 
 	data.uidNumber = nextPosixId(people, 'uidNumber');
 
+	const safeCn = escapeLDAPDNValue(data.cn);
 	const entry = {
 		cn: data.cn,
 		sn: data.sn,
@@ -130,6 +125,10 @@ async function addPosixAccount(client, data){
 		entry.dateOfBirth = data.dob;
 	}
 
+	if (data.location) {
+		entry.l = data.location;
+	}
+
 	// userPassword is optional -- a service account with no password set
 	// simply can't bind (no special enforcement needed, that's the default
 	// LDAP simple-bind behavior for an entry lacking the attribute).
@@ -143,7 +142,7 @@ async function addPosixAccount(client, data){
 		entry.manager = [].concat(data.manager);
 	}
 
-	await client.add(`cn=${data.cn},${conf.userBase}`, entry);
+	await client.add(`cn=${safeCn},${conf.userBase}`, entry);
 
 	return data
 
@@ -171,7 +170,6 @@ async function addLdapUser(client, data){
 			delete data.userPassword;
 		}
 
-		console.log('addLdapUser', data)
 		group = await addPosixGroup(client, data);
 		data = await addPosixAccount(client, group);
 
@@ -206,6 +204,7 @@ const user_parse = function(data){
 		data.username = data[conf.userNameAttribute]
 		data.userPassword = undefined;
 	}
+	data.location = data.l ? String(data.l) : '';
 	// Use truthy strings so jq-repeat section blocks ({{#isActive}}) fire correctly
 	data.isActive   = data.pwdAccountLockedTime ? '' : 'active';
 	data.isInactive = data.pwdAccountLockedTime ? 'inactive' : '';
@@ -296,6 +295,9 @@ User.listDetail = async function(){
 			obj.onboardingRequired = obj.onboardingNeeds.length > 0 ? 'yes' : '';
 			obj.isServiceAccount   = serviceAccountDNs.has(String(obj.dn).toLowerCase()) ? 'yes' : '';
 			obj.managerUids        = obj.manager.map(dn => dnToUid.get(String(dn).toLowerCase()) || dn);
+			// hasSshKey is a boolean flag for the UI -- sshPublicKey may be an array,
+			// and Mustache's {{#sshPublicKey}}...{{/sshPublicKey}} iterates over each item.
+			obj.hasSshKey          = obj.sshPublicKey ? 'yes' : '';
 
 			return obj;
 		}));
@@ -474,6 +476,19 @@ User.update = async function(data){
 			}
 
 			if(data.sshPublicKey){
+				// Ensure the auxiliary objectClass is present before setting the attribute
+				// -- accounts created before ldapPublicKey was added to addPosixAccount's
+				// objectclass list (e.g. the bootstrap admin) won't have it yet.
+				try {
+					await client.modify(this.dn, [
+						new Change({
+							operation: 'add',
+							modification: new Attribute({ type: 'objectClass', values: ['ldapPublicKey'] }),
+						}),
+					]);
+				} catch(e) {
+					if(e.name !== 'TypeOrValueExistsError') throw e;
+				}
 				await client.modify(this.dn, [
 					new Change({
 						operation: 'replace',
@@ -504,6 +519,16 @@ User.update = async function(data){
 				this.dateOfBirth = data.dateOfBirth;
 			}
 
+			if(data.location !== undefined){
+				await client.modify(this.dn, [
+					new Change({
+						operation: 'replace',
+						modification: new Attribute({ type: 'l', values: [data.location] }),
+					}),
+				]);
+				this.location = data.location;
+			}
+
 			if(data.manager !== undefined){
 				// Client sends uids; resolve each to a DN before writing --
 				// manager (COSINE, SUP distinguishedName) stores DNs, not uids.
@@ -748,7 +773,7 @@ User.setActive = async function(active) {
 				]);
 			} else {
 				await client.modify(this.dn, [
-					new Change({ operation: 'replace', modification: new Attribute({ type: 'pwdAccountLockedTime', values: ['000001010000Z'] }) }),
+					new Change({ operation: 'replace', modification: new Attribute({ type: 'pwdAccountLockedTime', values: ['00000101000000Z'] }) }),
 				]);
 			}
 		});
@@ -763,7 +788,7 @@ User.setActive = async function(active) {
 			throw e;
 		}
 	}
-	this.pwdAccountLockedTime = active ? undefined : '000001010000Z';
+	this.pwdAccountLockedTime = active ? undefined : '00000101000000Z';
 	this.isActive   = active ? 'active' : '';
 	this.isInactive = active ? '' : 'inactive';
 	cache.clear();
@@ -775,6 +800,19 @@ User.addSSHkey = async function(data) {
 	let result;
 	try {
 		await withClient(async (client) => {
+			// Ensure the auxiliary objectClass is present before setting the attribute
+			// -- accounts created before ldapPublicKey was added to addPosixAccount's
+			// objectclass list (e.g. the bootstrap admin) won't have it yet.
+			try {
+				await client.modify(user.dn, [
+					new Change({
+						operation: 'add',
+						modification: new Attribute({ type: 'objectClass', values: ['ldapPublicKey'] }),
+					}),
+				]);
+			} catch(e) {
+				if (e.name !== 'TypeOrValueExistsError') throw e;
+			}
 			await client.modify(user.dn, [
 				new Change({
 					operation: 'add',
@@ -799,7 +837,7 @@ User.addSSHkey = async function(data) {
 // memberUid (RFC 2307, posixGroup) is a bare username, not a DN, unlike
 // groupOfNames' `member` used by app_sso_* groups in group_ldap.js.
 function personalGroupDN(uid){
-	return `cn=${uid},${conf.groupBase}`;
+	return `cn=${escapeLDAPDNValue(uid)},${conf.groupBase}`;
 }
 
 User.getPersonalGroupMembers = async function(uid) {
@@ -861,8 +899,21 @@ User.invite = async function(data = {}){
 
 User.login = async function(data){
 	try{
+		if (!data.uid && !data.username) {
+			let error = new Error('Invalid Credentials, login failed.');
+			error.name = 'LDAPLoginFailed';
+			error.status = 401;
+			throw error;
+		}
 		let user = await this.get(data.uid || data.username);
 
+		if (user.pwdAccountLockedTime) {
+			let error = new Error('Invalid Credentials, login failed.');
+			error.name = 'LDAPLoginFailed';
+			error.status = 401;
+			throw error;
+		}
+
 		const loginClient = makeClient();
 		try {
 			await loginClient.bind(user.dn, data.password);
@@ -873,7 +924,7 @@ User.login = async function(data){
 		return user;
 
 	}catch(error){
-		console.error("USER LOGIN error:", error);
+		console.error("USER LOGIN error:", error.name, error.message);
 		throw error;
 	}
 };

nodejs/models/vault_app_token.js

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// VaultAppToken — the ACCESSOR of an OpenBao token minted for an external app
+// from the vault UI (Apps tab), so sso can keep the token alive.
+//
+// The token itself is shown ONCE at mint and never stored (a stolen accessor
+// cannot authenticate — it can only look up, renew, or revoke its token, and
+// only the sso broker's policy grants those endpoints). App tokens are minted
+// through the sso-app role as PERIODIC tokens: they live forever, but only if
+// something renews them inside every period window. That something is sso's
+// renewal loop (vault_broker.startAppTokenRenewal), which walks these rows and
+// POSTs auth/token/renew-accessor on a timer — so a downstream app's credential
+// stays valid as long as sso itself is running, with no renewal code needed in
+// the downstream app.
+//
+// One row per app name: re-minting an app's token revokes the previous token
+// via its accessor (no zombie credentials) and replaces the row.
+
+const { Model } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
+
+class VaultAppToken extends Model {
+  static fields = {
+    id: { type: 'uuid', primaryKey: true },
+    // The external app's name — also its policy (app-<name>) and KV namespace
+    // (secret/apps/<name>/). Unique: one live token per app.
+    name: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, unique: true, min: 1, max: 64 },
+    // The minted token's accessor (renew/revoke handle, cannot authenticate).
+    accessor: { type: 'string', isRequired: true, max: 128 },
+    // Renewal bookkeeping, updated by the renewal loop.
+    lastRenewedAt: { type: 'integer' },
+    lastError: { type: 'text' },
+    // Audit stamps (set by the route handler, not by an ORM hook).
+    created_by: { type: 'string' },
+    created_on: { type: 'integer' },
+  };
+
+  static async getByName(name) {
+    const rows = await this.list({ where: { name } });
+    return rows[0] || null;
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { VaultAppToken };

nodejs/models/webhook.js

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+const { Model } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
+
+class Webhook extends Model {
+  static fields = {
+    id: { type: 'uuid', primaryKey: true },
+    name: { type: 'string', isRequired: true },
+    url: { type: 'string', isRequired: true },
+    events: { type: 'json', default: [] }, // e.g. ['discovery.new_device', 'resource.updated']
+    secret: { type: 'string' },
+    isActive: { type: 'boolean', default: true },
+    created_on: { type: 'integer' },
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = { Webhook };

nodejs/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "t42-sso-manager",
-  "version": "1.1.14",
-  "private": true,
+  "version": "1.28.0",
+  "description": "A very simple LDAP management and SSO system",
   "author": [
     {
       "name": "William Mantly",
@@ -23,26 +23,39 @@
   "dependencies": {
     "@fortawesome/fontawesome-free": "^7.3.0",
     "@popperjs/core": "^2.11.8",
+    "@simpleworkjs/app-stack": "^1.0.0",
+    "@simpleworkjs/bao-conf": "^1.0.0",
     "@simpleworkjs/conf": "^1.2.0",
+    "@simpleworkjs/directory-schema": "^1.1.0",
+    "@simpleworkjs/frontend": "^0.2.7",
+    "@simpleworkjs/ldap": "^1.0.0",
+    "@simpleworkjs/orm": "^0.2.8",
     "bcrypt": "^6.0.0",
     "bootstrap": "^5.3.8",
+    "bullmq": "^6.0.3",
     "compression": "^1.8.1",
     "ejs": "^3.1.10",
     "express": "^5.2.1",
     "express-rate-limit": "^8.5.2",
     "extend": "^3.0.2",
+    "http-proxy-middleware": "^2.0.10",
+    "ioredis": "^6.0.0",
     "jq-repeat": "^2.2.0",
-    "jquery": "^3.7.1",
+    "jquery": "^4.0.0",
     "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.3",
-    "ldapts": "^8.1.2",
+    "ldapts": "^8.1.8",
     "lru-cache": "^11.5.1",
     "marked": "^9.1.6",
-    "model-redis": "^0.4.0",
+    "model-redis": "^1.6.0",
     "moment": "^2.30.1",
     "mustache": "^4.2.0",
+    "node-fetch": "^2.7.0",
+    "node-nmap": "^4.0.0",
     "nodemailer": "^9.0.0",
     "p2psub": "^0.2.0",
-    "socket.io": "^4.8.3"
+    "socket.io": "^4.8.3",
+    "ws": "^8.21.1",
+    "xss": "^1.0.15"
   },
   "license": "MIT",
   "repository": {

nodejs/patch.diff

@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+diff --git a/nodejs/views/directory.ejs b/nodejs/views/directory.ejs
+index c7646a4..411b56f 100644
+--- a/nodejs/views/directory.ejs
++++ b/nodejs/views/directory.ejs
+@@ -3,7 +3,26 @@
+ <div class="container mt-4">
+   <div class="row">
+     <div class="col-12">
+-			<div class="card shadow">
++      <ul class="nav nav-tabs mb-3" id="directoryTabs" role="tablist">
++        <li class="nav-item" role="presentation">
++          <button class="nav-link active" id="directory-tab" data-bs-toggle="tab" data-bs-target="#directory-tab-pane" type="button" role="tab" aria-controls="directory-tab-pane" aria-selected="true">
++            <i class="fa-solid fa-server"></i> Directory
++          </button>
++        </li>
++        <li class="nav-item" role="presentation">
++          <button class="nav-link" id="discovery-tab" data-bs-toggle="tab" data-bs-target="#discovery-tab-pane" type="button" role="tab" aria-controls="discovery-tab-pane" aria-selected="false">
++            <i class="fa-solid fa-network-wired"></i> Discovery
++          </button>
++        </li>
++        <li class="nav-item" role="presentation">
++          <button class="nav-link" id="plugins-tab" data-bs-toggle="tab" data-bs-target="#plugins-tab-pane" type="button" role="tab" aria-controls="plugins-tab-pane" aria-selected="false">
++            <i class="fa-solid fa-plug"></i> Plugins & Scheduler
++          </button>
++        </li>
++      </ul>
++      <div class="tab-content" id="directoryTabsContent">
++        <div class="tab-pane fade show active" id="directory-tab-pane" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="directory-tab">
++			<div class="card shadow border-top-0">
+ 				<div class="card-header d-flex flex-wrap justify-content-between align-items-center gap-2">
+ 				    <div>
+     					<i class="fa-solid fa-server"></i> Directory Management
+@@ -74,6 +93,148 @@
+           </table>
+         </div>
+       </div>
++      
++      <!-- Discovery Tab Pane -->
++      <div class="tab-pane fade" id="discovery-tab-pane" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="discovery-tab">
++        <div class="card shadow border-top-0">
++          <div class="card-header d-flex flex-wrap justify-content-between align-items-center gap-2">
++            <div>
++              <i class="fa-solid fa-network-wired"></i> Network Discovery Dashboard
++            </div>
++            <div class="d-flex flex-wrap gap-2 align-items-center">
++              <input type="text" id="discovery-search-filter" class="form-control form-control-sm shadow-sm" placeholder="Search resources..." onkeyup="renderDiscoveryTable()" style="width: 250px;">
++              <select id="discovery-filter-managed" class="form-select form-select-sm shadow-sm" onchange="renderDiscoveryTable()" style="width: 150px;">
++                <option value="unmanaged">Unmanaged Only</option>
++                <option value="managed">Managed Only</option>
++                <option value="all">All Resources</option>
++              </select>
++            </div>
++          </div>
++          <div class="card-header actionMessage" style="display:none"></div>
++          <div class="p-3 pb-0 text-muted small border-bottom">
++            <i class="fa-solid fa-circle-info"></i> Auto-discovered network resources. Promote unmanaged devices to track them in the Directory.
++            <a href="/docs/discovery" class="text-reset float-end" title="Help"><i class="fa-solid fa-circle-question"></i></a>
++          </div>
++          <div class="table-responsive">
++            <table class="card-body table table-hover mb-0 align-middle">
++              <thead class="table-light">
++                <tr>
++                  <th class="ps-3">Name / Source</th>
++                  <th>Type</th>
++                  <th>IP Address</th>
++                  <th>Status</th>
++                  <th class="text-end pe-3">Actions</th>
++                </tr>
++              </thead>
++              <tbody id="discovery-list" jq-repeat="discoveryResources">
++                <tr id="discovery-row-{{slug}}">
++                  <td class="ps-3">
++                    <div class="fw-bold">{{name}}</div>
++                    <div class="text-muted small">
++                      <i class="fa-solid fa-plug pe-1"></i> {{#metadata.source}}{{metadata.source}}{{/metadata.source}}{{^metadata.source}}Manual{{/metadata.source}}
++                    </div>
++                  </td>
++                  <td>
++                    <span class="badge bg-secondary">{{kind}}</span>
++                    {{#metadata.subType}}
++                      <span class="badge bg-light text-dark border">{{metadata.subType}}</span>
++                    {{/metadata.subType}}
++                  </td>
++                  <td>
++                    {{#metadata.ip}}<div class="font-monospace small"><i class="fa-solid fa-network-wired pe-1"></i>{{metadata.ip}}</div>{{/metadata.ip}}
++                    {{^metadata.ip}}<span class="text-muted small fst-italic">Unknown IP</span>{{/metadata.ip}}
++                    {{#metadata.interfaces.length}}
++                    <div class="mt-1 small text-muted">
++                      {{#metadata.interfaces}}
++                        <div><i class="fa-solid fa-microchip pe-1"></i> {{mac}} {{#ip}}<span class="text-black-50">({{ip}})</span>{{/ip}}</div>
++                      {{/metadata.interfaces}}
++                    </div>
++                    {{/metadata.interfaces.length}}
++                  </td>
++                  <td>
++                    {{#metadata.managed}}
++                      <span class="badge bg-success rounded-pill px-2"><i class="fa-solid fa-check"></i> Managed</span>
++                    {{/metadata.managed}}
++                    {{^metadata.managed}}
++                      <span class="badge bg-warning text-dark rounded-pill px-2"><i class="fa-solid fa-ghost"></i> Unmanaged</span>
++                    {{/metadata.managed}}
++                  </td>
++                  <td class="text-end pe-3">
++                    {{^metadata.managed}}
++                      <button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-primary" onclick="promoteResource('{{slug}}')" title="Promote to Managed">
++                        <i class="fa-solid fa-arrow-up-right-dots"></i> Promote
++                      </button>
++                    {{/metadata.managed}}
++                    {{#metadata.managed}}
++                      <button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-secondary" disabled title="Already Managed">
++                         Promoted
++                      </button>
++                    {{/metadata.managed}}
++                  </td>
++                </tr>
++              </tbody>
++              <tbody id="discovery-empty-state" style="display: none;">
++                <tr>
++                  <td colspan="5" class="text-center py-5 text-muted">
++                    <i class="fa-solid fa-magnifying-glass fs-2 mb-3 text-black-50"></i>
++                    <h5>No resources found</h5>
++                    <p>Check your filters or ensure the discovery agents are running.</p>
++                  </td>
++                </tr>
++              </tbody>
++            </table>
++          </div>
++        </div>
++      </div>
++      
++      <!-- Plugins Tab Pane -->
++      <div class="tab-pane fade" id="plugins-tab-pane" role="tabpanel" aria-labelledby="plugins-tab">
++        <div class="card shadow border-top-0">
++          <div class="card-header d-flex flex-wrap justify-content-between align-items-center gap-2">
++            <div>
++              <i class="fa-solid fa-plug"></i> Plugins & Scheduler
++            </div>
++          </div>
++          <div class="p-3 pb-0 text-muted small border-bottom">
++            <i class="fa-solid fa-circle-info"></i> Manage background tasks and schedules. <a href="/docs/plugins">Learn how to make and use custom plugins</a>.
++          </div>
++          <div class="table-responsive">
++            <table class="card-body table table-hover mb-0 align-middle">
++              <thead class="table-light">
++                <tr>
++                  <th class="ps-3">Plugin Name</th>
++                  <th>Cron Schedule</th>
++                  <th>Status</th>
++                  <th>Actions</th>
++                </tr>
++              </thead>
++              <tbody id="plugins-list" jq-repeat="plugins">
++                <tr>
++                  <td class="ps-3 fw-bold">{{name}}</td>
++                  <td><input type="text" class="form-control form-control-sm font-monospace" id="cron-{{name}}" value="{{cron}}" style="max-width: 150px;"></td>
++                  <td>
++                    {{#enabled}}<span class="badge bg-success">Enabled</span>{{/enabled}}
++                    {{^enabled}}<span class="badge bg-secondary">Disabled</span>{{/enabled}}
++                  </td>
++                  <td>
++                    <button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-primary" onclick="updatePlugin('{{name}}')" title="Save Schedule">Save</button>
++                    {{#enabled}}<button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-danger" onclick="togglePlugin('{{name}}', false)">Disable</button>{{/enabled}}
++                    {{^enabled}}<button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-success" onclick="togglePlugin('{{name}}', true)">Enable</button>{{/enabled}}
++                  </td>
++                </tr>
++              </tbody>
++              <tbody id="plugins-empty-state" style="display: none;">
++                <tr>
++                  <td colspan="4" class="text-center py-4 text-muted">
++                    No plugins configured.
++                  </td>
++                </tr>
++              </tbody>
++            </table>
++          </div>
++        </div>
++      </div>
++      
+     </div>
+   </div>
+ </div>
+@@ -413,14 +574,144 @@
+         const parentEdge = allEdges.find(e => e.childId === r.id);
+         if (parentEdge) {
+            r.parentId = parentEdge.parentId;
+-           const parent = resourcesById[parentEdge.parentId];
++        const parent = resourcesById[parentEdge.parentId];
+            if (parent) r.hostName = parent.name;
+         }
+         rawResources.push(r);
+       }
++       function openAddModal(parent_id, kind) {
++    if(parent_id){
++      $('#newResourceParent').val(parent_id);
++      $('#newResourceKind').val(kind);
++      var currentLabel = "Resource";
++      if(kind === 'Host'){ currentLabel = 'Host'; }
++      else if(kind === 'Site'){ currentLabel = 'Site'; }
++      
++      $('#newResourceLabel').text('Add Child ' + currentLabel);
++    }else{
++      $('#newResourceParent').val('');
++      $('#newResourceKind').val('Host');
++      $('#newResourceLabel').text('Add Resource');
++    }
++    
++    // Clear input
++    $('#newResourceName').val('');
++    $('#addResourceModal').modal('show');
++  }
++
++  // --- DISCOVERY SCRIPTS ---
++  let allDiscoveryResources = [];
++
++  function loadDiscoveryResources() {
++    app.api.get('discovery/resources', function(err, res) {
++      if(err) {
++        $('.actionMessage').html('<div class="alert alert-danger">' + (err.message || 'Error loading resources') + '</div>').show();
++        return;
++      }
++      allDiscoveryResources = res.results || [];
++      renderDiscoveryTable();
++    });
++  }
++
++  function renderDiscoveryTable() {
++    const search = $('#discovery-search-filter').val().toLowerCase();
++    const managedFilter = $('#discovery-filter-managed').val();
++
++    const filtered = allDiscoveryResources.filter(r => {
++      if(search && !r.name.toLowerCase().includes(search) && !r.slug.toLowerCase().includes(search)) return false;
++      const isManaged = !!(r.metadata && r.metadata.managed);
++      if(managedFilter === 'managed' && !isManaged) return false;
++      if(managedFilter === 'unmanaged' && isManaged) return false;
++      return true;
++    });
++
++    $.scope.discoveryResources.empty();
++    for(const r of filtered) {
++      $.scope.discoveryResources.push(r);
++    }
++    
++    if(filtered.length === 0) {
++      $('#discovery-list').hide();
++      $('#discovery-empty-state').show();
++    } else {
++      $('#discovery-list').show();
++      $('#discovery-empty-state').hide();
++    }
++  }
++
++  function promoteResource(slug) {
++    if(!confirm("Are you sure you want to promote this resource? This will generate SSO LDAP groups for it.")) return;
++    app.api.post('discovery/promote/' + slug, {}, function(err, res) {
++      if(err) {
++        alert("Error promoting resource: " + (err.message || err));
++        return;
++      }
++      const resource = allDiscoveryResources.find(r => r.slug === slug);
++      if(resource) {
++        resource.metadata = resource.metadata || {};
++        resource.metadata.managed = true;
++      }
++      $('.actionMessage').html('<div class="alert alert-success alert-dismissible"><button type="button" class="btn-close" data-bs-dismiss="alert"></button>Successfully promoted! Created groups: ' + res.groups.join(', ') + '</div>').show();
++      renderDiscoveryTable();
++      renderTable(); // Also update directory tab
++    });
++  }
++
++  // --- PLUGINS SCRIPTS ---
++  function loadPlugins() {
++    app.api.get('plugins', function(err, res) {
++      if(err) {
++        alert("Error loading plugins: " + (err.message || err));
++        return;
++      }
++      const plugins = res.results || {};
++      const pluginNames = Object.keys(plugins);
+       
+-      renderTable();
++      $.scope.plugins.empty();
++      if(pluginNames.length === 0) {
++        $('#plugins-list').hide();
++        $('#plugins-empty-state').show();
++      } else {
++        pluginNames.forEach(name => {
++          const config = plugins[name];
++          $.scope.plugins.push({
++            name: name,
++            cron: config.cron || '',
++            enabled: config.enabled
++          });
++        });
++        $('#plugins-list').show();
++        $('#plugins-empty-state').hide();
++      }
++    });
++  }
+ 
++  function updatePlugin(name) {
++    const cron = $('#cron-' + name).val();
++    app.api.put('plugins/' + name, {cron: cron}, function(err, res) {
++      if(err) { alert("Failed to save: " + err.message); return; }
++      alert("Saved schedule successfully.");
++    });
++  }
++  
++  function togglePlugin(name, enable) {
++    app.api.put('plugins/' + name, {enabled: enable}, function(err, res) {
++      if(err) { alert("Failed to toggle: " + err.message); return; }
++      loadPlugins();
++    });
++  }
++
++  $(document).ready(function(){
++    renderTable();
++    loadDiscoveryResources();
++    loadPlugins();
++    
++    // Auto-open modal if hash is present
++    if(window.location.hash && window.location.hash.startsWith('#modal-')) {
++      const slug = window.location.hash.replace('#modal-', '');
++      setTimeout(() => openEditModal(slug), 500);
++    }
++  }); 
+       // Type-ahead for the "what can this user reach" lookup. Non-blocking: the
+       // input accepts a free-typed uid whether or not the list ever arrives.
+       loadDirectoryUsers().then(function(users) {

nodejs/plugins/discovery/docker.js

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+const http = require('http');
+
+module.exports = {
+  type: 'docker',
+  category: 'discovery',
+  name: 'Docker Daemon',
+  description: 'Discover running containers and networks from a local or remote Docker daemon.',
+  configSchema: [
+    { key: 'socketPath', label: 'Docker Socket Path', type: 'text', required: false, placeholder: '/var/run/docker.sock' },
+    { key: 'tcpHost', label: 'TCP Host (e.g., http://10.0.0.1:2375)', type: 'url', required: false, placeholder: '' }
+  ],
+
+  validate: async (config) => {
+    if (!config.socketPath && !config.tcpHost) {
+      return { ok: false, error: 'Must provide either socketPath or tcpHost' };
+    }
+    return { ok: true };
+  },
+
+  discover: async (config) => {
+    const isTcp = !!config.tcpHost;
+    
+    const requestOptions = {
+      path: '/containers/json',
+      method: 'GET'
+    };
+
+    if (isTcp) {
+      const url = new URL(config.tcpHost);
+      requestOptions.host = url.hostname;
+      requestOptions.port = url.port || (url.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80);
+      requestOptions.protocol = url.protocol;
+    } else {
+      requestOptions.socketPath = config.socketPath || '/var/run/docker.sock';
+    }
+
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      const req = http.request(requestOptions, (res) => {
+        let body = '';
+        res.on('data', chunk => body += chunk);
+        res.on('end', () => {
+          if (res.statusCode !== 200) {
+            return reject(new Error(`Docker API error: ${res.statusCode} ${body}`));
+          }
+          
+          try {
+            const containers = JSON.parse(body);
+            const resources = [];
+            const edges = [];
+
+            for (const c of containers) {
+              const name = c.Names && c.Names.length > 0 ? c.Names[0].replace(/^\//, '') : c.Id.substring(0, 12);
+              const slug = `docker-cnt-${c.Id.substring(0, 12)}`;
+              
+              const ports = (c.Ports || []).map(p => p.PublicPort ? `${p.PublicPort}:${p.PrivatePort}` : `${p.PrivatePort}`).join(', ');
+              
+              resources.push({
+                kind: 'container',
+                name: name,
+                slug: slug,
+                metadata: {
+                  image: c.Image,
+                  state: c.State,
+                  status: c.Status,
+                  ports: ports
+                }
+              });
+            }
+
+            resolve({ resources, edges });
+          } catch (e) {
+            reject(new Error(`Failed to parse Docker response: ${e.message}`));
+          }
+        });
+      });
+
+      req.on('error', (e) => reject(new Error(`Docker connection error: ${e.message}`)));
+      req.end();
+    });
+  }
+};

nodejs/plugins/discovery/nmap.js

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+const nmap = require('node-nmap');
+nmap.nmapLocation = "nmap"; // default
+
+module.exports = {
+  // Plugin manifest — see nodejs/services/plugin_registry.js. `targetRange` is
+  // not secret (it's a network range to scan), so it lives in the DB row, not
+  // OpenBao. nmap itself has no credentials to test, so `validate` only checks
+  // the range parses — running a real scan is what `run` does.
+  type: 'nmap',
+  category: 'discovery',
+  name: 'Nmap Network Scan',
+  description: 'Discover hosts and services on a network range using nmap OS + port scans.',
+  configSchema: [
+    { key: 'targetRange', label: 'Target Range', type: 'text', required: true, placeholder: '192.168.1.0/24' }
+  ],
+
+  validate: async (config) => {
+    const { targetRange } = config;
+    if (!targetRange) return { ok: false, error: 'Missing targetRange' };
+    // nmap accepts CIDR (a.b.c.d/24), ranges (a.b.c.d-50), and host lists. We
+    // only sanity-check shape here — reject anything with shell metacharacters
+    // or whitespace, since node-nmap passes this straight to the nmap binary.
+    if (/\s|[;|&$`<>]/.test(targetRange)) {
+      return { ok: false, error: 'targetRange must not contain whitespace or shell metacharacters' };
+    }
+    return { ok: true };
+  },
+
+  discover: async (config) => {
+    const { targetRange } = config;
+    if (!targetRange) throw new Error("Missing targetRange for Nmap");
+
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      // OsAndPortScan requires root (for -O). NmapScan does a basic port scan (TCP connect if non-root).
+      // Pass custom arguments in constructor so node-nmap includes them before spawning nmap process.
+      // -Pn: treat all hosts as online (skip ping/ARP host discovery which fails inside Docker containers NAT/bridge)
+      // -sT: TCP connect scan (unprivileged scan compatible with container environments)
+      // -F: fast scan (100 top ports)
+      // --min-rate 100: speed up scan rate
+      const customFlags = ['-Pn', '-sT', '-F', '--min-rate', '100'];
+      const scan = new nmap.NmapScan(targetRange, customFlags);
+      
+      if (config.log) config.log(`Starting nmap scan: ${scan.command.join(' ')}`);
+
+      scan.on('complete', function(data) {
+        if (config.log) config.log(`Scan complete. Found ${data ? data.length : 0} hosts.`);
+        const resources = [];
+        const edges = [];
+
+        for (const host of data) {
+          if (!host.ip) continue;
+          const hostId = host.mac ? host.mac.replace(/:/g, '') : host.ip.replace(/\\./g, '_');
+          const hostSlug = `nmap-host-${hostId}`;
+          
+          const interfaces = [{ mac: host.mac || null, ip: host.ip }];
+          
+          resources.push({
+            kind: 'host',
+            name: host.hostname || host.ip,
+            slug: hostSlug,
+            metadata: { interfaces, os: host.osNmap }
+          });
+
+          if (host.openPorts && host.openPorts.length > 0) {
+            for (const port of host.openPorts) {
+              const svcSlug = `nmap-svc-${hostId}-${port.port}`;
+              resources.push({
+                kind: 'service',
+                name: `${port.service} on ${port.port}`,
+                slug: svcSlug,
+                metadata: { port: port.port, protocol: port.protocol }
+              });
+              edges.push({ parentSlug: hostSlug, childSlug: svcSlug, relation: 'exposes' });
+            }
+          }
+        }
+        resolve({ resources, edges });
+      });
+
+      scan.on('error', function(error) {
+        // node-nmap's spawn-missing-binary message ("NMAP not found at command
+        // location: nmap") is opaque to an admin reading lastError. Translate
+        // it into something actionable. (The Dockerfile installs nmap in the
+        // app image; this only fires if someone runs outside the container or
+        // strips the package.)
+        var msg = (error && error.message) || String(error);
+        if (/nmap.*not found|command location/i.test(msg)) {
+          reject(new Error('nmap binary not installed in the container image (rebuild with Dockerfile.openldap, which apk-adds nmap)'));
+        } else {
+          reject(error);
+        }
+      });
+
+      scan.startScan();
+    });
+  },
+
+  // Generalized plugin contract alias for `discover`. See proxmox.js for why
+  // this references module.exports rather than `this`.
+  run: async (config) => module.exports.discover(config)
+};

nodejs/plugins/discovery/proxmox.js

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+const fetch = require('node-fetch');
+const https = require('https');
+
+// Custom agent to bypass self-signed certs typical in Proxmox
+const agent = new https.Agent({
+  rejectUnauthorized: false
+});
+
+module.exports = {
+  // Plugin manifest — see nodejs/services/plugin_registry.js. `configSchema`
+  // drives the admin UI form and validation; fields flagged `secret:true` are
+  // stored in OpenBao (secret/plugins/<instance-id>/conf), never in the DB.
+  type: 'proxmox',
+  category: 'discovery',
+  name: 'Proxmox VE',
+  description: 'Discover VMs, containers, and hypervisor nodes from a Proxmox VE API endpoint.',
+  configSchema: [
+    { key: 'url',         label: 'API URL',      type: 'url',      required: true, placeholder: 'https://pve.example:8006' },
+    { key: 'tokenId',     label: 'Token ID',     type: 'text',     required: true, placeholder: 'user@pam!token' },
+    { key: 'tokenSecret', label: 'Token Secret', type: 'password', required: true, secret: true }
+  ],
+
+  // "Test" button in the UI: hit the unauthenticated version endpoint with the
+  // API token to confirm the URL + token are valid before scheduling runs.
+  validate: async (config) => {
+    const { url, tokenId, tokenSecret } = config;
+    if (!url || !tokenId || !tokenSecret) return { ok: false, error: 'Missing url, tokenId, or tokenSecret' };
+    try {
+      const res = await fetch(`${url}/api2/json/version`, { headers: { 'Authorization': `PVEAPIToken=${tokenId}=${tokenSecret}` }, agent });
+      if (!res.ok) return { ok: false, error: `Proxmox API rejected the token (${res.status})` };
+      return { ok: true };
+    } catch (err) {
+      return { ok: false, error: err.message };
+    }
+  },
+
+  discover: async (config) => {
+    let { url, tokenId, tokenSecret } = config;
+    if (!url || !tokenId || !tokenSecret) {
+      throw new Error("Missing Proxmox config");
+    }
+
+    const headers = {
+      'Authorization': `PVEAPIToken=${tokenId}=${tokenSecret}`
+    };
+    
+    // Ensure URL has no trailing slash
+    url = url.endsWith('/') ? url.slice(0, -1) : url;
+
+    const resources = [];
+    const edges = [];
+
+    // 1. Get Nodes
+    const resNodes = await fetch(`${url}/api2/json/nodes`, { headers, agent });
+    if(!resNodes.ok) {
+        const errText = await resNodes.text();
+        throw new Error(`Proxmox API error on nodes: ${resNodes.status} ${errText}`);
+    }
+    const nodes = (await resNodes.json()).data;
+
+    for (const node of nodes) {
+      if (node.status !== 'online') continue;
+      
+      const nodeSlug = `pve-node-${node.node}`;
+      resources.push({
+        kind: 'host',
+        name: node.node,
+        slug: nodeSlug,
+        metadata: {
+          subType: 'hypervisor',
+          os: 'Proxmox VE',
+          isProduction: true,
+          interfaces: [] 
+        }
+      });
+
+      // 2. Get VMs for this node
+      const resVms = await fetch(`${url}/api2/json/nodes/${node.node}/qemu`, { headers, agent });
+      const vms = resVms.ok ? ((await resVms.json()).data || []) : [];
+
+      for (const vm of vms) {
+        const vmSlug = `vm-${vm.vmid}`;
+        const isTemplate = vm.template === 1;
+        
+        let ips = [];
+        let macs = [];
+        
+        // Enrich from QEMU guest agent if running
+        if (vm.status === 'running') {
+            try {
+                const agentRes = await fetch(`${url}/api2/json/nodes/${node.node}/qemu/${vm.vmid}/agent/network-get-interfaces`, { headers, agent });
+                if (agentRes.ok) {
+                    const agentData = (await agentRes.json()).data;
+                    if (agentData && agentData.result) {
+                        for (const iface of agentData.result) {
+                            if (iface['hardware-address'] && iface['hardware-address'] !== '00:00:00:00:00:00') macs.push(iface['hardware-address']);
+                            if (iface['ip-addresses']) {
+                                for (const ip of iface['ip-addresses']) {
+                                    if (ip['ip-address-type'] === 'ipv4' && ip['ip-address'] !== '127.0.0.1') {
+                                        ips.push(ip['ip-address']);
+                                    }
+                                }
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            } catch(e) {}
+        }
+        
+        // Enrich from VM config to at least get MAC if agent failed/stopped
+        try {
+            const configRes = await fetch(`${url}/api2/json/nodes/${node.node}/qemu/${vm.vmid}/config`, { headers, agent });
+            if (configRes.ok) {
+                const confData = (await configRes.json()).data;
+                for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+                    if (confData[`net${i}`]) {
+                        const m = confData[`net${i}`].match(/(?:virtio|e1000|rtl8139|vmxnet3)=([0-9a-fA-F:]+)/);
+                        if(m) macs.push(m[1].toLowerCase());
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        } catch(e) {}
+
+        const interfaces = [...new Set(macs)].map((mac, i) => ({ mac, ip: ips[i] || null }));
+
+        resources.push({
+          kind: isTemplate ? 'template' : 'host',
+          name: vm.name || `VM ${vm.vmid}`,
+          slug: vmSlug,
+          metadata: {
+            subType: isTemplate ? 'template' : 'vm',
+            vmid: vm.vmid,
+            isProduction: vm.status === 'running',
+            interfaces,
+            ip: ips[0] || null
+          }
+        });
+        edges.push({ parentSlug: nodeSlug, childSlug: vmSlug, relation: 'hosts' });
+      }
+
+      // 3. Get LXCs for this node
+      const resLxcs = await fetch(`${url}/api2/json/nodes/${node.node}/lxc`, { headers, agent });
+      const lxcs = resLxcs.ok ? ((await resLxcs.json()).data || []) : [];
+
+      for (const lxc of lxcs) {
+        const lxcSlug = `lxc-${lxc.vmid}`;
+        const isTemplate = lxc.template === 1;
+        
+        let ips = [];
+        let macs = [];
+        
+        // Enrich from LXC config
+        try {
+            const configRes = await fetch(`${url}/api2/json/nodes/${node.node}/lxc/${lxc.vmid}/config`, { headers, agent });
+            if (configRes.ok) {
+                const confData = (await configRes.json()).data;
+                for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+                    if (confData[`net${i}`]) {
+                        const hwMatch = confData[`net${i}`].match(/hwaddr=([0-9a-fA-F:]+)/);
+                        const ipMatch = confData[`net${i}`].match(/ip=([0-9\.]+)/); // Ignores dhcp
+                        if(hwMatch) macs.push(hwMatch[1].toLowerCase());
+                        if(ipMatch) ips.push(ipMatch[1]);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        } catch(e) {}
+
+        const interfaces = [...new Set(macs)].map((mac, i) => ({ mac, ip: ips[i] || null }));
+
+        resources.push({
+          kind: isTemplate ? 'template' : 'host',
+          name: lxc.name || `LXC ${lxc.vmid}`,
+          slug: lxcSlug,
+          metadata: {
+            subType: isTemplate ? 'template' : 'lxc',
+            vmid: lxc.vmid,
+            isProduction: lxc.status === 'running',
+            interfaces,
+            ip: ips[0] || null
+          }
+        });
+        edges.push({ parentSlug: nodeSlug, childSlug: lxcSlug, relation: 'hosts' });
+      }
+    }
+
+    return { resources, edges };
+  },
+
+  // The generalized plugin contract calls `run`; the discovery plugins keep
+  // `discover` as their implementation name for back-compat, and `run` is just
+  // an alias. Referenced via module.exports (not `this`) so it survives being
+  // detached and called as a bare function reference.
+  run: async (config) => module.exports.discover(config)
+};

nodejs/plugins/discovery/unifi.js

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+const fetch = require('node-fetch');
+const https = require('https');
+
+const agent = new https.Agent({
+  rejectUnauthorized: false
+});
+
+module.exports = {
+  // Plugin manifest — see nodejs/services/plugin_registry.js. `password` is
+  // secret and stored in OpenBao (secret/plugins/<instance-id>/conf).
+  type: 'unifi',
+  category: 'discovery',
+  name: 'UniFi Network',
+  description: 'Discover UniFi network devices and clients from a UniFi Controller / UDM endpoint.',
+  configSchema: [
+    { key: 'url',      label: 'Controller URL', type: 'url',      required: true, placeholder: 'https://unifi.example:8443' },
+    { key: 'user',     label: 'Username',       type: 'text',     required: true },
+    { key: 'password', label: 'Password',       type: 'password', required: true, secret: true }
+  ],
+
+  // "Test": attempt the UDM login (falls back to the legacy controller login);
+  // succeeds only if one of the two login endpoints returns 200.
+  validate: async (config) => {
+    const { url, user, password } = config;
+    if (!url || !user || !password) return { ok: false, error: 'Missing url, user, or password' };
+    try {
+      let loginRes = await fetch(`${url}/api/auth/login`, {
+        method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ username: user, password }), agent
+      });
+      if (!loginRes.ok) {
+        loginRes = await fetch(`${url}/api/login`, {
+          method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ username: user, password }), agent
+        });
+      }
+      if (!loginRes.ok) return { ok: false, error: `UniFi auth failed (${loginRes.status})` };
+      return { ok: true };
+    } catch (err) {
+      return { ok: false, error: err.message };
+    }
+  },
+
+  discover: async (config) => {
+    const { url, user, password } = config;
+    if (!url || !user || !password) {
+      throw new Error("Missing Unifi config");
+    }
+
+    // 1. Authenticate
+    let loginRes = await fetch(`${url}/api/auth/login`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ username: user, password }),
+      agent
+    });
+
+    let isUdm = true;
+    if (!loginRes.ok) {
+      loginRes = await fetch(`${url}/api/login`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ username: user, password }),
+        agent
+      });
+      isUdm = false;
+    }
+
+    if (!loginRes.ok) {
+      throw new Error(`Unifi auth failed: ${loginRes.status}`);
+    }
+
+    const cookie = loginRes.headers.get('set-cookie');
+    // UniFi often requires the CSRF token from the cookie
+    let csrf = '';
+    if (cookie) {
+      const match = cookie.match(/csrf_token=([^;]+)/);
+      if (match) csrf = match[1];
+    }
+    const headers = { 'Cookie': cookie, 'X-Csrf-Token': csrf };
+
+    const resources = [];
+    const edges = [];
+
+    const basePath = isUdm ? '/proxy/network' : '';
+
+    // 2. Get Devices (Switches/APs)
+    const devRes = await fetch(`${url}${basePath}/api/s/default/stat/device`, { headers, agent });
+    const devData = (await devRes.json()).data || [];
+
+    for (const dev of devData) {
+      const devSlug = `unifi-device-${dev.mac.replace(/:/g, '')}`;
+      resources.push({
+        kind: 'network_device',
+        name: dev.name || dev.model,
+        slug: devSlug,
+        metadata: {
+          make: 'Ubiquiti',
+          model: dev.model,
+          firmware: dev.version,
+          interfaces: [{ mac: dev.mac, ip: dev.ip }]
+        }
+      });
+    }
+
+    // 3. Get Clients
+    const clientRes = await fetch(`${url}${basePath}/api/s/default/stat/sta`, { headers, agent });
+    const clientData = (await clientRes.json()).data || [];
+
+    for (const client of clientData) {
+      const clientSlug = `unifi-client-${client.mac.replace(/:/g, '')}`;
+      resources.push({
+        kind: 'host', // Or unmanaged_device initially
+        name: client.hostname || client.name || client.mac,
+        slug: clientSlug,
+        metadata: {
+          interfaces: [{ mac: client.mac, ip: client.ip }]
+        }
+      });
+      
+      // If we know which switch/AP it's on
+      if (client.ap_mac) {
+        const apSlug = `unifi-device-${client.ap_mac.replace(/:/g, '')}`;
+        edges.push({ parentSlug: apSlug, childSlug: clientSlug, relation: 'connected_to' });
+      }
+    }
+
+    return { resources, edges };
+  },
+
+  // Generalized plugin contract alias for `discover`. See proxmox.js for why
+  // this references module.exports rather than `this`.
+  run: async (config) => module.exports.discover(config)
+};

nodejs/plugins/messaging/twilio.js

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+const https = require('https');
+
+module.exports = {
+  type: 'twilio',
+  category: 'messaging',
+  name: 'Twilio SMS',
+  description: 'Send SMS messages (like 2FA codes) via Twilio.',
+  
+  configSchema: [
+    { key: 'accountSid', label: 'Account SID', type: 'text', required: true },
+    { key: 'authToken', label: 'Auth Token', type: 'password', required: true, secret: true },
+    { key: 'fromNumber', label: 'From Phone Number', type: 'text', required: true, placeholder: '+15551234567' }
+  ],
+
+  validate: async (config) => {
+    if (!config.accountSid || !config.authToken) return { ok: false, error: 'Missing credentials' };
+    if (!config.fromNumber) return { ok: false, error: 'Missing fromNumber' };
+    return { ok: true };
+  },
+
+  sendMessage: async (config, payload) => {
+    const { to, message } = payload;
+    if (!to || !message) throw new Error("Missing 'to' or 'message' in payload");
+
+    const data = new URLSearchParams();
+    data.append('To', to);
+    data.append('From', config.fromNumber);
+    data.append('Body', message);
+
+    const postData = data.toString();
+
+    const options = {
+      hostname: 'api.twilio.com',
+      port: 443,
+      path: `/2010-04-01/Accounts/${config.accountSid}/Messages.json`,
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: {
+        'Authorization': 'Basic ' + Buffer.from(config.accountSid + ':' + config.authToken).toString('base64'),
+        'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
+        'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(postData)
+      }
+    };
+
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      const req = https.request(options, (res) => {
+        let body = '';
+        res.on('data', chunk => body += chunk);
+        res.on('end', () => {
+          if (res.statusCode >= 200 && res.statusCode < 300) {
+            resolve(JSON.parse(body));
+          } else {
+            reject(new Error(`Twilio API Error: ${res.statusCode} ${body}`));
+          }
+        });
+      });
+      req.on('error', reject);
+      req.write(postData);
+      req.end();
+    });
+  }
+};

nodejs/plugins/messaging/webhook.js

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+const https = require('https');
+const http = require('http');
+
+module.exports = {
+  type: 'webhook',
+  category: 'messaging',
+  name: 'Universal REST Webhook',
+  description: 'Send a generic HTTP POST request with a custom JSON payload. Variables {{to}} and {{message}} will be replaced.',
+  
+  configSchema: [
+    { key: 'url', label: 'Webhook URL', type: 'url', required: true, placeholder: 'https://api.example.com/send' },
+    { key: 'method', label: 'HTTP Method', type: 'text', required: true, placeholder: 'POST' },
+    { key: 'headers', label: 'Custom Headers (JSON)', type: 'text', required: false, placeholder: '{"Authorization": "Bearer ...", "Content-Type": "application/json"}' },
+    { key: 'payloadTemplate', label: 'Payload Template', type: 'text', required: true, placeholder: '{"recipient": "{{to}}", "text": "{{message}}"}' },
+    { key: 'apiSecret', label: 'API Secret / Auth Token', type: 'password', required: false, secret: true }
+  ],
+
+  validate: async (config) => {
+    if (!config.url) return { ok: false, error: 'URL is required' };
+    if (!config.payloadTemplate) return { ok: false, error: 'Payload template is required' };
+    try {
+      if (config.headers) JSON.parse(config.headers);
+    } catch (e) {
+      return { ok: false, error: 'Headers must be valid JSON' };
+    }
+    return { ok: true };
+  },
+
+  sendMessage: async (config, payload) => {
+    const { to, message } = payload;
+    let payloadStr = config.payloadTemplate || '{}';
+    
+    // Replace template variables safely
+    payloadStr = payloadStr.replace(/\{\{to\}\}/g, to).replace(/\{\{message\}\}/g, message);
+
+    // If there is an API secret, replace {{secret}} in the headers or url
+    let headersObj = {};
+    if (config.headers) {
+      try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(config.headers);
+        for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(parsed)) {
+          headersObj[k] = config.apiSecret ? String(v).replace(/\{\{secret\}\}/g, config.apiSecret) : v;
+        }
+      } catch(e) {}
+    }
+
+    if (!headersObj['Content-Type']) {
+      headersObj['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
+    }
+
+    const urlObj = new URL(config.url);
+    const options = {
+      hostname: urlObj.hostname,
+      port: urlObj.port || (urlObj.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80),
+      path: urlObj.pathname + urlObj.search,
+      method: config.method || 'POST',
+      headers: headersObj
+    };
+
+    const client = urlObj.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http;
+
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      const req = client.request(options, (res) => {
+        let body = '';
+        res.on('data', chunk => body += chunk);
+        res.on('end', () => {
+          if (res.statusCode >= 200 && res.statusCode < 300) {
+            resolve({ status: res.statusCode, body });
+          } else {
+            reject(new Error(`Webhook failed: ${res.statusCode} ${body}`));
+          }
+        });
+      });
+      req.on('error', reject);
+      req.write(payloadStr);
+      req.end();
+    });
+  }
+};

nodejs/public/css/styles.css

@@ -3,10 +3,22 @@ nav.navbar{
 	padding-right: 1em;
 }
 
+/* Only the active top-nav link is bold + underlined; the username is plain. */
+.top-nav a.active{
+	font-weight: bold;
+	text-decoration: underline;
+}
+
 body {
 	display: flex;
 	flex-direction: column;
 	min-height: 100vh;
+	/* Height of the fixed navbar (plus the update banner, while shown --
+	   see top.ejs's showUpdateBanner/dismissUpdateBanner). Lets an in-page
+	   sticky element offset itself below both fixed elements via
+	   `top: var(--sw-content-offset)` instead of colliding with them at the
+	   viewport's true top:0. */
+	--sw-content-offset: 4.5rem;
 }
 
 #spa-shell {

nodejs/public/js/app.js

@@ -67,13 +67,6 @@ app.user = (function(app){
 		});
 	}
 
-	function remove(args, callack){
-		if(!confirm('Delete '+ args.uid+ 'user?')) return false;
-		app.api.delete('user/'+ args.uid, function(error, data){
-			callack(error, data);
-		});
-	}
-
 	function changePassword(args, callack){
 		app.api.put('users/'+ arg.uid || '', args, function(error, data){
 			callack(error, data);
@@ -110,7 +103,7 @@ app.user = (function(app){
 		return m ? m[1] : dn;
 	}
 
-	return {list, remove, createInvite, setActive, dnToUid};
+	return {list, createInvite, setActive, dnToUid};
 
 })(app);
 
@@ -306,13 +299,6 @@ app.oauthClient = (function(app){
 		});
 	}
 
-	function remove(args, callack){
-		if(!confirm('Delete OAuth client "' + args.client_id + '"?')) return false;
-		app.api.delete('oauth/client/' + args.client_id, function(error, data){
-			callack(error, data);
-		});
-	}
-
 	function update(args, callack){
 		app.api.put('oauth/client/' + args.client_id, args, function(error, data){
 			callack(error, data);
@@ -325,7 +311,7 @@ app.oauthClient = (function(app){
 		});
 	}
 
-	return { list, add, remove, update, rotateSecret };
+	return { list, add, update, rotateSecret };
 })(app);
 
 app.tos = (function(app){
@@ -396,7 +382,7 @@ app.impersonate = (function(app){
 
 app.token = (function(app){
 	function list(name, callack){
-		if($.isFunction(name)){
+		if(typeof name === 'function'){
 			callack = name;
 			name = '';
 		}

nodejs/public/lib/js/app-base.js

@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+// Shared client framework for the theta42 apps.
+//
+// This file is byte-identical across sso-manager-node, proxy and jump-host —
+// per-app behaviour comes from the server (the `ui` locals in views/top.ejs and
+// the /api/user/me response), never from edits to this file. Edit all three
+// copies together.
+//
+// jQuery 4 safe: no $.isFunction, no $.holdReady.
+
 var app = {};
 
 app.pubsub = (function(){
@@ -45,7 +54,7 @@ app.pubsub = (function(){
 app.socket = (function(app){
 	// $.getScript('/socket.io/socket.io.js')
 	// <script type="text/javascript" src="/socket.io/socket.io.js"></script>
-	
+
 	var socket;
 	$(document).ready(function(){
 		socket = io({
@@ -75,11 +84,17 @@ app.socket = (function(app){
 app.api = (function(app){
 	var baseURL = '/api/'
 
-	function post(url, data, callback){
-		if (!$.isFunction(callback)) {
-			return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+	// post/put/delete are dual-mode: pass a callback for the node-style
+	// (error, data, status) form, or omit it to get a Promise that resolves
+	// with the parsed body and rejects with the error body. get/options return
+	// the jqXHR, which is itself thenable, so `await app.api.get(...)` works.
+
+	function body(method, url, data, callback){
+		if(typeof callback !== 'function'){
+			return new Promise(function(resolve, reject){
 				$.ajax({
-					type: 'POST', url: baseURL+url,
+					type: method,
+					url: baseURL+url,
 					headers: { 'auth-token': app.auth.getToken() },
 					data: JSON.stringify(data),
 					contentType: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
@@ -88,9 +103,11 @@ app.api = (function(app){
 			});
 		}
 		return $.ajax({
-			type: 'POST',
+			type: method,
 			url: baseURL+url,
-			headers:{ 'auth-token': app.auth.getToken() },
+			headers:{
+				'auth-token': app.auth.getToken()
+			},
 			data: JSON.stringify(data),
 			contentType: "application/json; charset=utf-8",
 			dataType: "json",
@@ -104,40 +121,27 @@ app.api = (function(app){
 		});
 	}
 
+	function post(url, data, callback){
+		return body('POST', url, data, callback);
+	}
+
 	function put(url, data, callback){
-		if (!$.isFunction(callback)) {
-			return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-				$.ajax({
-					type: 'PUT', url: baseURL+url,
-					headers: { 'auth-token': app.auth.getToken() },
-					data: JSON.stringify(data),
-					contentType: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
-					dataType: 'json',
-				}).done(resolve).fail(function(xhr){ reject(xhr.responseJSON || {}); });
-			});
-		}
-		return $.ajax({
-			type: 'PUT',
-			url: baseURL+url,
-			headers:{ 'auth-token': app.auth.getToken() },
-			data: JSON.stringify(data),
-			contentType: "application/json; charset=utf-8",
-			dataType: "json",
-			complete: function(res, text){
-				callback(
-					text !== 'success' ? res.statusText : null,
-					JSON.parse(res.responseText),
-					res.status
-				);
-			}
-		});
+		return body('PUT', url, data, callback);
 	}
 
-	function remove(url, callback){
-		if (!$.isFunction(callback)) {
-			return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+	// Called both as (url, callback) and — from formAJAX, which always passes
+	// the serialized form as the second argument — as (url, data, callback).
+	// No request body is sent either way.
+	function remove(url, data, callback){
+		if(typeof data === 'function'){
+			callback = data;
+			data = undefined;
+		}
+		if(typeof callback !== 'function'){
+			return new Promise(function(resolve, reject){
 				$.ajax({
-					type: 'DELETE', url: baseURL+url,
+					type: 'DELETE',
+					url: baseURL+url,
 					headers: { 'auth-token': app.auth.getToken() },
 					contentType: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
 					dataType: 'json',
@@ -147,7 +151,9 @@ app.api = (function(app){
 		return $.ajax({
 			type: 'DELETE',
 			url: baseURL+url,
-			headers:{ 'auth-token': app.auth.getToken() },
+			headers:{
+				'auth-token': app.auth.getToken()
+			},
 			contentType: "application/json; charset=utf-8",
 			dataType: "json",
 			complete: function(res, text){
@@ -202,7 +208,10 @@ app.api = (function(app){
 })(app)
 
 app.auth = (function(app){
-	var user = {};
+	// One in-flight/cached GET /api/user/me per page load. Every gating
+	// decision (nav items, per-view forceLogin, group-required elements) reads
+	// this same promise instead of re-fetching.
+	var userPromise = null;
 
 	function setToken(token){
 		localStorage.setItem('APIToken', token);
@@ -216,35 +225,70 @@ app.auth = (function(app){
 		try{
 			return await app.api.get('user/me');
 		}catch(error){
-			if(error?.status === 401) return null;
-			throw error
+			if(error && error.status === 401) return null;
+			throw error;
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Cached current user, or false when there's no token at all. Callers that
+	// need a fresh copy (after a login or a profile change) pass force.
+	function loadUser(force){
+		if(force || !userPromise){
+			userPromise = getToken() ? getUser() : Promise.resolve(null);
+			userPromise = userPromise.then(function(user){
+				app.auth.user = app.auth.perms = user || null;
+				return user;
+			});
+		}
+		return userPromise;
+	}
+
+	// The apps report group membership two ways: sso-manager-node returns LDAP
+	// DNs in `memberOf`, the OIDC clients return plain CNs in `groups`. Both
+	// normalise to a list of CNs. `isAdmin` (the clients' effective-rights flag)
+	// is exposed as a synthetic `admin` group so one gating model covers both.
+	function groupCNs(user){
+		var raw = (user && (user.memberOf || user.groups)) || [];
+		if(!Array.isArray(raw)) raw = [raw];
+		var names = raw.map(function(group){
+			return String(group).split(',')[0].replace(/^cn=/i, '');
+		});
+		if(user && user.isAdmin && names.indexOf('admin') === -1) names.push('admin');
+		return names;
+	}
+
 	async function memberOf(groupNameToFind, user){
-		try{
-			user = user || await app.auth.asyncUser;
-			groupNameToFind = Array.isArray(groupNameToFind) ? groupNameToFind : [groupNameToFind]
+		user = user || await loadUser();
+		if(!user) return false;
+		groupNameToFind = Array.isArray(groupNameToFind) ? groupNameToFind : [groupNameToFind];
 
-			for(let group of user.memberOf){
-				group = group.split(',ou=groups')[0].replace('cn=', '');
-				if(groupNameToFind.includes(group)) return true;
-			}
-
-			return false;
-
-		}catch(error){
-			throw(error);
-		}
+		return groupCNs(user).some(function(group){
+			return groupNameToFind.includes(group);
+		});
 	}
 
-	async function isLoggedIn(){
-		if(getToken()){
-			user = await app.auth.asyncUser;
-			return user;
-		}else{
-			return false;
+	// True when the logged-in user is a global admin (per user/me). Sync — only
+	// meaningful once isLoggedIn/forceLogin has resolved.
+	function isAdmin(){
+		return !!(app.auth.perms && app.auth.perms.isAdmin);
+	}
+
+	// Dual-mode: returns a Promise resolving to the user (or false), and calls
+	// an optional node-style callback with the same result.
+	function isLoggedIn(callback){
+		var promise = loadUser().then(function(user){
+			return user || false;
+		});
+
+		if(typeof callback === 'function'){
+			promise.then(function(user){
+				callback(null, user);
+			}, function(error){
+				callback(error, false);
+			});
 		}
+
+		return promise;
 	}
 
 	function logIn(args, callback){
@@ -252,62 +296,125 @@ app.auth = (function(app){
 			if(data.login){
 				setToken(data.token);
 			}
+			loadUser(true);
 			callback(error, !!data.token);
 		});
 	}
 
+	// Clears the session only — the caller decides where to go next (the nav's
+	// Log Out button uses ui.logoutRedirect).
 	function logOut(callback){
 		localStorage.removeItem('APIToken');
-		location.replace(`/login${location.href.replace(location.origin, '')}`);
-		callback();
+		userPromise = null;
+		app.auth.user = app.auth.perms = null;
+		if(typeof callback === 'function') callback();
 	}
 
+	// Constrain a redirect target to a same-origin absolute path. Rejects
+	// absolute URLs (open redirect), protocol-relative "//host" and "/\host",
+	// and non-path schemes like "javascript:" (XSS). Falls back to "/".
+	function safeInternalPath(path){
+		if(typeof path !== 'string' || path.charAt(0) !== '/'
+				|| path.charAt(1) === '/' || path.charAt(1) === '\\'){
+			return '/';
+		}
+		return path;
+	}
+
+	// Consume an app token handed back by the OIDC callback via the URL
+	// fragment (#token=…&redirect=…). Stores it, strips the fragment, and
+	// forwards to the intended page. Returns true if a token was consumed.
+	function consumeTokenFragment(){
+		if(!location.hash) return false;
+		var params = new URLSearchParams(location.hash.replace(/^#/, ''));
+		var token = params.get('token');
+		if(!token) return false;
+
+		setToken(token);
+		// redirect comes from the URL fragment (attacker-controllable); only
+		// allow a same-origin path so it can't become an open redirect / XSS.
+		var redirect = safeInternalPath(params.get('redirect') || '/');
+		// Drop the token from the address bar before navigating on.
+		history.replaceState(null, '', location.pathname + location.search);
+		window.location.href = redirect;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	// Page-level gate. jQuery 4 removed $.holdReady, so an unauthenticated or
+	// unauthorised user is kept off the page by a redirect / an error panel
+	// rather than by pausing document ready.
+	//
+	// `requiredGroups` is a group CN or an OR-list of them; the synthetic
+	// `admin` group covers the OIDC clients' isAdmin flag.
 	async function forceLogin(requiredGroups){
-		$.holdReady(true);
-		if(!await app.auth.isLoggedIn()) app.auth.logOut(function(){});
+		var user = await loadUser();
+
+		if(!user){
+			logOut(function(){});
+			location.replace('/login?redirect=' + encodeURIComponent(
+				location.pathname + location.search
+			));
+			return false;
+		}
 
 		if(user.onboardingRequired && location.pathname !== '/onboarding'){
 			location.replace('/onboarding');
+			return false;
 		}
 
-		if(requiredGroups){
-			if(!await memberOf(requiredGroups)){
-				console.log("Does not have permission!!!")
-				app.util.actionMessage(
-					`<h1>
-						<i class="fa-solid fa-triangle-exclamation"></i>
-						<b>You do not have permission to be here.</b>
-						<i class="fa-solid fa-triangle-exclamation"></i>
-					</h1>`,
-					$('#spa-shell'),
-					'danger',
-				);
-				throw new Error("User does not have permission");
-			}
+		if(requiredGroups && !await memberOf(requiredGroups, user)){
+			app.messages.action(
+				`<h1>
+					<i class="fa-solid fa-triangle-exclamation"></i>
+					<b>You do not have permission to be here.</b>
+					<i class="fa-solid fa-triangle-exclamation"></i>
+				</h1>`,
+				$('#spa-shell'),
+				'danger',
+			);
+			throw new Error("User does not have permission");
 		}
 
-		$.holdReady(false);	
+		return user;
 	}
 
+	// Where to go after a successful login: the ?redirect= query param, or the
+	// legacy /login/<path> suffix form, constrained to a same-origin path. The
+	// suffix form keeps its query string — /login/oauth/authorize?client_id=…
+	// is how the OIDC provider sends an unauthenticated user through login.
 	function logInRedirect(){
-		window.location.href = location.href.replace(location.origin+'/login', '') || '/'
+		var params = new URLSearchParams(location.search);
+		var target = params.get('redirect')
+			|| location.href.replace(location.origin + '/login', '')
+			|| '/';
+		window.location.href = safeInternalPath(target);
 	}
 
 	return {
 		getToken: getToken,
 		setToken: setToken,
+		getUser: getUser,
+		loadUser: loadUser,
+		groupCNs: groupCNs,
+		memberOf: memberOf,
+		isAdmin: isAdmin,
 		isLoggedIn: isLoggedIn,
+		safeInternalPath: safeInternalPath,
+		consumeTokenFragment: consumeTokenFragment,
+		user: null,
+		perms: null,
 		logIn: logIn,
 		logOut: logOut,
 		forceLogin,
 		logInRedirect,
-		getUser,
-		memberOf,
 	}
 
 })(app);
-app.auth.asyncUser = app.auth.getUser();
 
+// Back-compat alias for views that awaited the cached user directly.
+Object.defineProperty(app.auth, 'asyncUser', {
+	get: function(){ return app.auth.loadUser(); },
+});
 
 app.user = (function(app){
 	function list(callback){
@@ -338,6 +445,72 @@ app.user = (function(app){
 
 })(app);
 
+// Local (app-managed) permissions and groups. Only the OIDC-client apps serve
+// these endpoints; the calls are inert elsewhere.
+app.permission = (function(app){
+	function list(callback){
+		app.api.get('permission/', function(error, data){
+			callback(error, data);
+		});
+	}
+
+	function subjects(callback){
+		app.api.get('permission/subjects', function(error, data){
+			callback(error, data);
+		});
+	}
+
+	function add(args, callback){
+		app.api.post('permission/', args, function(error, data){
+			callback(error, data);
+		});
+	}
+
+	function remove(id, callback){
+		app.api.delete('permission/' + encodeURIComponent(id), function(error, data){
+			callback(error, data);
+		});
+	}
+
+	return {list, subjects, add, remove};
+
+})(app);
+
+app.group = (function(app){
+	function list(callback){
+		app.api.get('group/', function(error, data){
+			callback(error, data);
+		});
+	}
+
+	function add(args, callback){
+		app.api.post('group/', args, function(error, data){
+			callback(error, data);
+		});
+	}
+
+	function remove(name, callback){
+		app.api.delete('group/' + encodeURIComponent(name), function(error, data){
+			callback(error, data);
+		});
+	}
+
+	function addMember(name, username, callback){
+		app.api.post('group/' + encodeURIComponent(name) + '/members', {username}, function(error, data){
+			callback(error, data);
+		});
+	}
+
+	function removeMember(name, username, callback){
+		app.api.delete('group/' + encodeURIComponent(name) + '/members/' + encodeURIComponent(username), function(error, data){
+			callback(error, data);
+		});
+	}
+
+	return {list, add, remove, addMember, removeMember};
+
+})(app);
+
 app.util = (function(app){
 
 	function getUrlParameter(name){
@@ -347,65 +520,15 @@ app.util = (function(app){
 		return results === null ? '' : decodeURIComponent(results[1].replace(/\+/g, ' '));
 	};
 
-	function actionMessage(message, $targetPassed, type, callback){
-		message = message || '';
-
-		let $target = $targetPassed.closest('div.card').find('.actionMessage');
-		if(!$target.length) $target = $($targetPassed.find('.actionMessage')[0]);
-
-		type = type || 'info';
-		callback = callback || function(){};
-
-		if($target.html() === message) return;
-
-		if($target.html()){
-			$target.slideUp('fast', function(){
-				$target.html('')
-				$target.removeClass (function(index, className){
-					return (className.match (/(^|\s)bg-\S+/g) || []).join(' ');
-				});
-				if(message) return actionMessage(message, $target, type, callback);
-				$target.hide()
-			})
-		}else{
-			if(type) $target.addClass('bg-' + type);
-
-			if(!message.includes('<button')) message += `
-				<button class="action-close btn btn-sm btn-outline-dark float-end">
-					<i class="fa-solid fa-xmark"></i>
-				</button>
-			`
-			$target.html(message).slideDown('fast');
-		}
-		setTimeout(callback,10)
-	}
-
-	function actionConfirm(message, $target, type, callback){
-		return new Promise((resolve, reject) =>{
-			let id = crypto.randomUUID();
-			message = `
-				<h4 class"align-middle" >
-					<i class="fa-solid fa-triangle-exclamation"></i>
-					<b>${message}</b>
-					<span class="float-end">
-						<button type="button" class="btn btn-success confirm-${id}" data-confirm="true">
-							<i class="fa-solid fa-circle-check"></i>
-							Confirm
-						</button>
-						<button type="button" class="btn btn-danger confirm-${id}">
-							<i class="fa-solid fa-circle-stop"></i>
-							Cancel
-						</button>
-					</span>
-				</h4>
-			`
-			actionMessage(message, $target, type);
-			$("body").on('click', `.confirm-${id}`, function(){
-				actionMessage('', $target, type);
-				resolve(!!$(this).data('confirm'));
-			});
-		});
-
+	// escapeHtml/actionMessage/actionConfirm moved to @simpleworkjs/frontend's
+	// app.util.escapeHtml and app.messages.action/confirm.
+	function escapeHtml(s){
+		return String(s == null ? '' : s)
+			.replace(/&/g, '&amp;')
+			.replace(/</g, '&lt;')
+			.replace(/>/g, '&gt;')
+			.replace(/"/g, '&quot;')
+			.replace(/'/g, '&#39;');
 	}
 
 	$.fn.serializeObject = function() {
@@ -415,8 +538,11 @@ app.util = (function(app){
 		for (let {name, value} of $(this).serializeArray()) {
 			console.log(name, value)
 			if (obj[name] === undefined) {
-				if (!value 
+				if (!value
 					&& !$(this).parent().find(`[name="${name}"]`).attr('value')
+					// Keep empty <textarea>s so a cleared field is submitted (and
+					// can reset a list, e.g. the per-host IP/header controls).
+					&& !$(this).filter(`textarea[name="${name}"]`).length
 				){
 					continue;
 				}
@@ -458,30 +584,79 @@ app.util = (function(app){
 		document.body.removeChild(element);
 	}
 
+	// Scroll a just-added/-edited element into view and flash its
+	// background, so the user's eye lands on the row that changed instead of
+	// it silently appearing/updating somewhere off-screen. Takes a jQuery
+	// object or a raw DOM node (e.g. jq-repeat's `item.__jq_$el`).
+	function revealItem(el){
+		var node = el && el.jquery ? el[0] : el;
+		if (!node) return;
+		if (typeof node.scrollIntoView === 'function') {
+			node.scrollIntoView({behavior: 'smooth', block: 'center'});
+		}
+		var prevTransition = node.style.transition;
+		var prevBg = node.style.backgroundColor;
+		node.style.transition = 'background-color 1.5s ease';
+		node.style.backgroundColor = 'var(--bs-success-bg-subtle, #d1e7dd)';
+		setTimeout(function(){
+			node.style.backgroundColor = prevBg;
+			setTimeout(function(){ node.style.transition = prevTransition; }, 1500);
+		}, 300);
+	}
+
 	return {
 		downloadFile: downloadFile,
 		getUrlParameter: getUrlParameter,
-		actionMessage: actionMessage,
-		actionConfirm,
+		escapeHtml: escapeHtml,
+		revealItem: revealItem,
 	}
 })(app);
 
-$( document ).ready(async function(){
+// Reveal every .group-required-<cn> element the current user's groups entitle
+// them to. Elements carrying .group-required start hidden (styles.css), so a
+// user who is in no groups — or who isn't logged in — simply never sees them.
+// The synthetic 'login' group is special: it's true for any authenticated user.
+app.auth.applyGroupVisibility = function(user){
+	var groups = app.auth.groupCNs(user);
+	var isLoggedIn = !!user;
 
-	// Show content if the user has the correct group
-	for(let group of (await app.auth.asyncUser)?.memberOf || []){
+	var style = document.getElementById('group-required-rules');
+	if(!style){
+		style = document.createElement('style');
+		style.id = 'group-required-rules';
+		document.head.appendChild(style);
+	}
+
+	for(var group of groups){
 		try{
-			group = group.split(',ou=groups')[0].replace('cn=', '');
-
-			const sheet = document.styleSheets[0];
-			const selector = `.group-required-${group}`;
-			const cssText = `${selector} { display: revert !important; }`;
-			sheet.insertRule(cssText, sheet.cssRules.length);
+			style.sheet.insertRule(
+				`.group-required-${CSS.escape(group)} { display: revert !important; }`,
+				style.sheet.cssRules.length
+			);
 		}catch(error){
-			
+			// A group whose CN isn't a usable CSS identifier just gates nothing.
 		}
 	}
 
+	// The 'login' group is synthetic — it means "any authenticated user".
+	// Reveal .group-required-login for any logged-in user.
+	if(isLoggedIn){
+		try{
+			style.sheet.insertRule(
+				`.group-required-login { display: revert !important; }`,
+				style.sheet.cssRules.length
+			);
+		}catch(error){
+			// Ignore CSS escape errors.
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+$( document ).ready(async function(){
+
+	// Show content the user's groups entitle them to.
+	app.auth.applyGroupVisibility(await app.auth.loadUser());
+
 	$('div.row').fadeIn('slow'); //show the page
 
 	//panel button's
@@ -502,9 +677,9 @@ $( document ).ready(async function(){
 		$(this).closest('.card').slideUp('fast');
 	});
 
-	$('.actionMessage').on('click', 'button.action-close', function(event){
-		app.util.actionMessage(null, $(this));
-	});
+	// action-close click handling is wired by @simpleworkjs/frontend's
+	// app.messages.js (delegated on document, so it also covers messages
+	// rendered after this ready handler runs).
 
 	setInterval(()=>{
 		$('.momentFromNow').each((idx, el)=>{
@@ -535,20 +710,17 @@ function formAJAX(btn){
 	var method = ($form.attr('method') || 'post').toLowerCase();
 
 	if($form.validate && !$form.validate()){
-		app.util.actionMessage('Please fix the form errors.', $form, 'danger')
+		app.messages.action('Please fix the form errors.', $form, 'danger')
 		return false;
 	}
-	
-	app.util.actionMessage( 
-		`<div class="spinner-border" role="status">
-			<span class="visually-hidden">Loading...</span>
-		</div>`,
-		$form,
-		'info'
-	);
+
+	// Plain text: app.messages.action HTML-escapes its message (by design,
+	// see @simpleworkjs/frontend), so raw markup like a spinner <div> would
+	// render literally instead of as an element.
+	app.messages.action('Saving…', $form, 'info');
 
 	app.api[method]($form.attr('action'), formData, function(error, data){
-		app.util.actionMessage(data.message, $form, error ? 'danger' : 'success'); //re-populate table
+		app.messages.action(data.message, $form, error ? 'danger' : 'success'); //re-populate table
 		$form.validateClear();
 		if(!error){
 			$form.trigger("reset");
@@ -556,7 +728,7 @@ function formAJAX(btn){
 		}else{
 			console.log('formAJAX res error', error, data)
 			if(data && data.name === 'ObjectValidateError'){
-				app.util.actionMessage('Please fix the form errors', $form, 'danger'); //re-populate table
+				app.messages.action('Please fix the form errors', $form, 'danger'); //re-populate table
 			}
 			if(data && data.keys){
 				console.log('form key errors', data.keys)
@@ -567,4 +739,3 @@ function formAJAX(btn){
 		}
 	});
 }
-

nodejs/public/lib/js/val.js

@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-( function( $ ) {
-	var settings = {
-		rule: {
-			eq: function(value, options){
-				var compare = $('[name=' + options + ']').val();
-	 
-				if ( value != compare ) {
-					return "Miss-match";
-				}
-			}
-		},
-	};
-
-	$.fn.validate = function(event) {
-		// let	thisSettings = $.extend(true, settings, settingsObj);
-		let hasErrors = false;
-
-		if(this.is('[validate]')) return this.validateField(event);
-
-		if(!this.attr('isValid')){
-			console.log('adding reset event')
-			this.on('reset', function(){
-				$(this).attr('isValid', false);
-				$(this).validateClear();
-			})
-		}
-
-		this.find('[validate]').each(function(){
-			if(!$(this).validateField()) hasErrors = true;
-		});
-		
-		this.attr('isValid', !hasErrors);
-
-		if(hasErrors && event) event.preventDefault();
-
-		return !hasErrors;
-	};
-
-	$.fn.validateClear = function(){
-		$(this).find('input').each(function(){
-			$(this).removeClass('is-invalid');
-			$(this).removeClass('is-valid');
-		})
-	}
-
-	$.fn.validateField = function(){
-		var attr = this.attr('validate').split(':'); //array of params
-		var	rule = attr[0];
-		var	options = attr[1];
-		var	value = this.val(); //link to input value
-		var message;
-
-		if(this.prop('disabled')) return true;
-
-
-		//checks if field is required, and length 
-		if(!isNaN(options) && value.length < options){
-			message = `Must be ${options} characters`;
-		}
-
-		//checks if empty to stop processing 
-		if(!isNaN(options) && value.length === 0) {
-		}else if(rule in settings.rule){
-			let message = settings.rule[rule].apply(this, [value, options]);
-		}
-
-		this.validateMessage(message)
-		return !message;
-	}
-
-	$.fn.validateMessage = function(message){
-		if(message && message !== true){
-			this.closest('.form-group').find('b.invalid-feedback').html(message);
-			this.addClass('is-invalid');
-		}else{
-			this.removeClass('is-invalid');
-			this.addClass('is-valid');
-		}
-		return this;
-	};
-
-	jQuery.extend({
-		validateSettings: function( settingsObj ) {
-			$.extend( true, settings, settingsObj );
-		},
-
-		validateInit: function( ettingsObj ) {
-			$( '[action]' ).on( 'submit', function ( event, settingsObj ){
-				$( this ).validate( settingsObj, event );
-			});
-		}
-	});
-
-}( jQuery ));
-
-$.validateSettings({
-	rule:{
-		ip: function( value ) {
-			value = value.split( '.' );
- 
-			if ( value.length != 4 ) {
-				return "Malformed IP";
-			}
- 
-			$.each( value, function( key, value ) {
-				if( value > 255 || value < 0 ) {
-					return "Malformed IP";
-				}
-			});
-		},
-
-		host: function( value ) {
-			var reg = /^(?=.{1,255}$)[0-9A-Za-z](?:(?:[0-9A-Za-z]|-){0,61}[0-9A-Za-z])?(?:\.[0-9A-Za-z](?:(?:[0-9A-Za-z]|-){0,61}[0-9A-Za-z])?)*\.?$/;
-			if ( reg.test( value ) === false ) {
-				return "Invalid";
-			}
-		},
-
-		user: function( value ) {
-			var reg = /^[a-z0-9\_\-\@\.]{1,32}$/;
-			if ( reg.test( value ) === false ) {
-				return "Invalid";
-			}
-		},
- 
-		password: function( value ) {
-			var reg = /^(?=[^\d_].*?\d)\w(\w|[!@#$%]){1,48}/;
-			if ( reg.test( value ) === false ) {
-				return "Weak password, Try again";
-			}
-		}
-	}
-});

nodejs/public/resources/theta-agent/install.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+set -e
+
+# --- Configuration ---
+# In a real environment, these would be derived from the script's download URL
+# or passed as additional arguments. For now, we use the most recent release.
+BINARY_URL="${BINARY_URL:-}"
+CONFIG_DIR="/etc/theta42"
+CONFIG_FILE="$CONFIG_DIR/agent.yml"
+BIN_PATH="/usr/local/bin/theta-agent"
+SERVICE_FILE="/etc/systemd/system/theta-agent.service"
+
+# Colors for output
+RED='\033[0;31m'
+GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+NC='\033[0m' # No Color
+
+log() { echo -e "${GREEN}[+]${NC} $1"; }
+error() { echo -e "${RED}[!]${NC} $1"; exit 1; }
+
+# 1. Root check
+if [ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]; then
+  error "This script must be run as root."
+fi
+
+# 2. Argument Parsing
+URL=""
+TOKEN=""
+B64_CONFIG=""
+
+while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
+  case $1 in
+    --url)
+      URL="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --token)
+      TOKEN="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    *)
+      B64_CONFIG="$1"
+      shift
+      ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+# Validation
+if [ -z "$B64_CONFIG" ] && [ -z "$URL" ] || [ -z "$B64_CONFIG" ] && [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
+  error "Missing required configuration. Either provide a base64 encoded config, or both --url and --token."
+  echo "Usage examples:"
+  echo "  sh install.sh \"BASE64_CONFIG\""
+  echo "  sh install.sh --url \"https://sso.local\" --token \"secret-token\""
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+# 3. Resolve binary URL dynamically if not specified
+if [ -z "$BINARY_URL" ]; then
+  if [ -n "$URL" ]; then
+    BINARY_URL="${URL%/}/resources/theta-agent/theta-agent-linux-amd64"
+  elif [ -n "$B64_CONFIG" ]; then
+    EXTRACTED_URL=$(echo "$B64_CONFIG" | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^\s*server_url:' | awk -F'"' '{print $2}' | tr -d ' ' || true)
+    if [ -n "$EXTRACTED_URL" ]; then
+      HTTP_URL=$(echo "$EXTRACTED_URL" | sed -e 's/^wss:\/\//https:\/\//' -e 's/^ws:\/\//http:\/\//')
+      BINARY_URL="${HTTP_URL%/}/resources/theta-agent/theta-agent-linux-amd64"
+    fi
+  fi
+fi
+if [ -z "$BINARY_URL" ]; then
+  BINARY_URL="https://sso.example.com/resources/theta-agent/theta-agent-linux-amd64"
+fi
+
+log "Downloading binary from $BINARY_URL..."
+curl -fsSL "$BINARY_URL" -o "$BIN_PATH" || error "Failed to download binary."
+chmod +x "$BIN_PATH"
+
+# 4. Setup configuration
+log "Preparing configuration directory $CONFIG_DIR..."
+mkdir -p "$CONFIG_DIR"
+chmod 755 "$CONFIG_DIR"
+
+if [ -n "$B64_CONFIG" ]; then
+  log "Decoding and writing configuration from base64..."
+  echo "$B64_CONFIG" | base64 -d > "$CONFIG_FILE" || error "Failed to decode base64 configuration."
+else
+  log "Generating minimal configuration from arguments..."
+  # Create a minimal yaml with the provided URL and Token
+  cat <<EOF > "$CONFIG_FILE"
+server_url: "$URL"
+auth_token: "$TOKEN"
+location: "unknown"
+capabilities:
+  telemetry: true
+  configure_ldap: false
+  reboot: false
+  service_control: []
+  arbitrary_bash: false
+EOF
+fi
+chmod 600 "$CONFIG_FILE"
+
+# 5. Setup systemd service
+log "Creating systemd service unit..."
+cat <<EOF > "$SERVICE_FILE"
+[Unit]
+Description=Theta Agent Unified Endpoint Management
+After=network.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+ExecStart=$BIN_PATH
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+StandardOutput=syslog
+StandardError=syslog
+SyslogIdentifier=theta-agent
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+EOF
+
+# 6. Start the agent
+log "Enabling and starting Theta Agent..."
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl enable theta-agent
+systemctl start theta-agent
+
+log "Theta Agent installation complete!"
+log "Verify status with: systemctl status theta-agent"
+log "Check logs with: journalctl -u theta-agent -f"

nodejs/routes/access_request.js

@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Self-service access requests. Mounted at /api/access-requests (app.js).
+//
+// The loop this closes: a user browses the catalog, finds something they cannot
+// reach, asks for it; the resource's owner (or a directory admin) approves; the
+// approval performs the LDAP group add. LDAP stays the access-control truth --
+// this router never invents a permission, it only automates the group add an
+// admin would otherwise do by hand, and records who decided.
+
+const router = require('express').Router();
+const { Resource, ResourceGroup } = require('../models/resource');
+const { AccessRequest, STATUS } = require('../models/access_request');
+const { Group } = require('../models/group_ldap');
+const { User } = require('../models/user_ldap');
+const { Mail } = require('../models/email');
+const { groupCns } = require('../utils/user_groups');
+const { envelope, projectResource } = require('@simpleworkjs/directory-schema');
+
+const DIRECTORY_ADMIN_GROUPS = ['app_sso_directory_admin', 'app_sso_admin', 'app_super_admin'];
+
+function httpError(status, message) {
+  const err = new Error(message);
+  err.status = status;
+  return err;
+}
+
+// May `user` decide requests against `resource`? The resource's own owner is
+// the primary approver -- that is the point of Resource.owner -- with directory
+// admins as the catch-all so an unowned or orphaned resource is never stuck.
+async function canDecide(user, resource, callerGroups) {
+  if (resource && resource.owner && resource.owner === user.uid) return true;
+  return callerGroups.some(g => DIRECTORY_ADMIN_GROUPS.includes(g));
+}
+
+// The group that satisfies a request for this resource. Prefers an explicit
+// choice, else the `member`-level link (the "just let me use it" group) over an
+// `owner`-level one -- requesting a resource should never silently escalate to
+// its admin group.
+async function resolveGroupCn(resourceId, requested) {
+  const links = await ResourceGroup.list({ where: { resourceId } });
+  if (!links.length) {
+    throw httpError(409, 'This resource has no access group linked, so it cannot be requested.');
+  }
+  if (requested) {
+    const match = links.find(l => l.groupCn === requested);
+    if (!match) throw httpError(400, `"${requested}" is not an access group for this resource.`);
+    return match.groupCn;
+  }
+  const member = links.find(l => l.accessLevel === 'member');
+  return (member || links[0]).groupCn;
+}
+
+// Best-effort notification. A mail failure must never fail the request itself --
+// the row is the source of truth and the approver can find it in the UI.
+async function notify(uid, subject, message) {
+  try {
+    const user = await User.get({ uid });
+    if (!user || !user.mail) return;
+    await Mail.sendTemplate(user.mail, 'notification', {
+      givenName: user.givenName || uid,
+      subject,
+      message,
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error(`access-request: notification to ${uid} failed:`, err.message);
+  }
+}
+
+// POST /api/access-requests  { slug | resourceId, groupCn?, note? }
+router.post('/', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    if (req.user.isMachine) throw httpError(403, 'Machine accounts cannot request access.');
+
+    let resource;
+    if (req.body.slug) {
+      const found = await Resource.list({ where: { slug: req.body.slug } });
+      resource = found[0];
+    } else if (req.body.resourceId) {
+      resource = await Resource.get(req.body.resourceId);
+    }
+    if (!resource) throw httpError(404, 'Resource not found');
+
+    const md = resource.metadata || {};
+    // Opt-out, not opt-in: everything in the catalog is requestable unless an
+    // admin has explicitly marked it otherwise.
+    if (md.requestable === false) {
+      throw httpError(409, 'This resource is not available for self-service requests.');
+    }
+
+    const groupCn = await resolveGroupCn(resource.id, req.body.groupCn);
+
+    const callerGroups = await groupCns(req.user);
+    if (callerGroups.includes(groupCn)) {
+      throw httpError(409, 'You already have access to this resource.');
+    }
+
+    const existing = await AccessRequest.findOpen(req.user.uid, groupCn);
+    if (existing) throw httpError(409, 'You already have a pending request for this resource.');
+
+    const request = await AccessRequest.create({
+      uid: req.user.uid,
+      resourceId: resource.id,
+      groupCn,
+      status: STATUS.PENDING,
+      note: req.body.note || '',
+      requestedOn: Date.now(),
+    });
+
+    if (resource.owner) {
+      await notify(
+        resource.owner,
+        `Access request: ${resource.name}`,
+        `<p><strong>${req.user.uid}</strong> has requested access to <strong>${resource.name}</strong> (group <code>${groupCn}</code>).</p>` +
+        (req.body.note ? `<p>Their note: ${req.body.note}</p>` : '') +
+        `<p>Review it on the Directory page.</p>`
+      );
+    }
+
+    res.json(envelope(request));
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// GET /api/access-requests/mine — the caller's own request history.
+router.get('/mine', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const rows = await AccessRequest.listForUser(req.user.uid);
+    res.json(envelope(await decorate(rows)));
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// GET /api/access-requests — pending requests the caller may decide.
+router.get('/', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const callerGroups = await groupCns(req.user);
+    const isAdmin = callerGroups.some(g => DIRECTORY_ADMIN_GROUPS.includes(g));
+    const pending = await AccessRequest.listPending();
+
+    let visible = pending;
+    if (!isAdmin) {
+      // A plain resource owner sees only requests against resources they own.
+      const owned = await Resource.list({ where: { owner: req.user.uid } });
+      const ownedIds = new Set(owned.map(r => r.id));
+      visible = pending.filter(r => ownedIds.has(r.resourceId));
+    }
+    res.json(envelope(await decorate(visible)));
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// Attach the resource name/slug each row refers to. The UI needs it on every
+// list and would otherwise issue one lookup per row.
+async function decorate(rows) {
+  if (!rows.length) return [];
+  const resources = await Resource.list();
+  const byId = new Map(resources.map(r => [r.id, r]));
+  return rows.map(row => {
+    const data = row.toJSON ? row.toJSON() : { ...row };
+    const resource = byId.get(data.resourceId);
+    data.resource = resource
+      ? { id: resource.id, name: resource.name, slug: resource.slug, kind: resource.kind }
+      : null;
+    return data;
+  });
+}
+
+// POST /api/access-requests/:id/approve  { decisionNote? }
+router.post('/:id/approve', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const request = await AccessRequest.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!request) throw httpError(404, 'Request not found');
+    if (request.status !== STATUS.PENDING) {
+      throw httpError(409, `This request was already ${request.status}.`);
+    }
+
+    const resource = await Resource.get(request.resourceId);
+    const callerGroups = await groupCns(req.user);
+    if (!(await canDecide(req.user, resource, callerGroups))) {
+      throw httpError(403, 'You do not have permission to decide this request.');
+    }
+
+    // The LDAP write happens FIRST and is allowed to throw. Marking a request
+    // approved without the group add would show the user a grant they do not
+    // actually have -- a pending row is recoverable, a lying one is not.
+    const group = await Group.get(request.groupCn);
+    const user = await User.get({ uid: request.uid });
+    try {
+      await group.addMember(user);
+    } catch (err) {
+      // "already a member" is the goal state, not a failure. This happens
+      // routinely: groupOfNames requires at least one member, so creating a
+      // resource seeds its auto-created groups with the creator's DN, and an
+      // admin may also grant access by hand while a request sits pending.
+      // Without this the request would 500 and stay pending forever.
+      const alreadyMember = err.name === 'TypeOrValueExistsError' || err.code === 20;
+      if (!alreadyMember) throw err;
+    }
+    User.clearCache(); // membership feeds cached isAdmin / group-gated nav
+
+    const updated = await request.update({
+      status: STATUS.APPROVED,
+      decidedBy: req.user.uid,
+      decidedOn: Date.now(),
+      decisionNote: req.body.decisionNote || '',
+    });
+
+    await notify(
+      request.uid,
+      `Access approved: ${resource ? resource.name : request.groupCn}`,
+      `<p>Your request for <strong>${resource ? resource.name : request.groupCn}</strong> was approved by ${req.user.uid}.</p>` +
+      `<p>You may need to sign out and back in for the change to take effect everywhere.</p>`
+    );
+
+    res.json(envelope(updated));
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// POST /api/access-requests/:id/deny  { decisionNote? }
+router.post('/:id/deny', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const request = await AccessRequest.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!request) throw httpError(404, 'Request not found');
+    if (request.status !== STATUS.PENDING) {
+      throw httpError(409, `This request was already ${request.status}.`);
+    }
+
+    const resource = await Resource.get(request.resourceId);
+    const callerGroups = await groupCns(req.user);
+    if (!(await canDecide(req.user, resource, callerGroups))) {
+      throw httpError(403, 'You do not have permission to decide this request.');
+    }
+
+    const updated = await request.update({
+      status: STATUS.DENIED,
+      decidedBy: req.user.uid,
+      decidedOn: Date.now(),
+      decisionNote: req.body.decisionNote || '',
+    });
+
+    await notify(
+      request.uid,
+      `Access request declined: ${resource ? resource.name : request.groupCn}`,
+      `<p>Your request for <strong>${resource ? resource.name : request.groupCn}</strong> was declined.</p>` +
+      (req.body.decisionNote ? `<p>Reason: ${req.body.decisionNote}</p>` : '')
+    );
+
+    res.json(envelope(updated));
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// DELETE /api/access-requests/:id — requester withdraws their own pending request.
+router.delete('/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const request = await AccessRequest.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!request) throw httpError(404, 'Request not found');
+    if (request.uid !== req.user.uid) {
+      throw httpError(403, 'You can only withdraw your own requests.');
+    }
+    if (request.status !== STATUS.PENDING) {
+      throw httpError(409, `This request was already ${request.status}.`);
+    }
+    const updated = await request.update({ status: STATUS.CANCELLED, decidedOn: Date.now() });
+    res.json(envelope(updated));
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;

nodejs/routes/api_agent.js

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+'use strict';
+
+const express = require('express');
+const middleware = require('../middleware/auth');
+const permission = require('../utils/permission');
+const agentManager = require('../utils/agent_manager');
+
+const ADMIN_GROUPS = ['app_sso_admin', 'app_super_admin', 'app_sso_directory_admin'];
+
+// ── REST API (mounted synchronously in app.js, BEFORE the 404 catch-all) ──
+// This is a plain Express Router exported directly so app.js can
+// `app.use('/api/agent', require('./routes/api_agent'))` at require time. It
+// must NOT be mounted from the onListen hook (which runs after the 404
+// catch-all is already on the stack): a router registered behind that terminal
+// handler would make every /api/agent/* request 404, no matter the WS server
+// state. The WebSocket handler is separate (initAgentWebSockets below) and is
+// the only part that needs the post-listen onListen hook.
+const router = express.Router();
+
+// The agent WebSocket (/api/agent/ws) is handled by the raw `wss` upgrade server
+// in bin/www with its own ?token= auth — unaffected by the express middleware
+// here. These REST routes are admin-facing, so they're auth + admin gated.
+router.use(middleware.auth);
+router.use(async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    await permission.byGroup(req.user, ADMIN_GROUPS);
+    next();
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err && (err.status === 401 || err.name === 'Insufficient Permission')) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ status: 'error', message: 'admin only' });
+    }
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+router.get('/nodes', (req, res) => {
+  res.json({
+    status: 'ok',
+    agents: agentManager.getConnectedAgents(),
+    publicKey: agentManager.publicKeyPem
+  });
+});
+
+router.post('/nodes/:token/command', (req, res) => {
+  const { token } = req.params;
+  const { command, payload, isHighRisk } = req.body;
+
+  if (!command) {
+    return res.status(400).json({ status: 'error', message: 'Command type is required' });
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS = ['reboot', 'service_restart', 'configure_ldap', 'arbitrary_bash', 'update_binary'];
+    const requiresSigning = isHighRisk || HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS.includes(command);
+
+    const msg = agentManager.sendCommand(token, command, payload || {}, requiresSigning);
+    res.json({ status: 'ok', sentMessage: msg });
+  } catch (err) {
+    res.status(400).json({ status: 'error', message: err.message });
+  }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;
+module.exports.initAgentWebSockets = function initAgentWebSockets(app) {
+  // WebSocket handler only needs the WS server; runs from the onListen hook.
+  if (!app.wss) return;
+  app.wss.on('connection', (ws, req) => {
+    const url = new URL(req.url, `http://${req.headers.host || 'localhost'}`);
+    const token = url.searchParams.get('token') || req.headers['authorization'];
+
+    if (!token) {
+      ws.close(4001, 'Unauthorized: Missing token');
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const remoteAddr = req.socket.remoteAddress;
+    console.log(`[Theta Agent] Agent connected from ${remoteAddr} with token ${token.substring(0, 8)}...`);
+
+    agentManager.registerAgent(token, ws, remoteAddr);
+
+    ws.on('message', (message) => {
+      try {
+        const data = JSON.parse(message);
+        if (!data || typeof data.type !== 'string') return;
+
+        const payload = data.payload || {};
+
+        switch (data.type) {
+          case 'discovery':
+            agentManager.handleDiscovery(token, payload);
+            if (app.io) app.io.emit('agent.discovery', { token, payload });
+            break;
+          case 'telemetry':
+            agentManager.handleTelemetry(token, payload);
+            if (app.io) app.io.emit('agent.telemetry', { token, payload });
+            break;
+          case 'heartbeat':
+            agentManager.handleHeartbeat(token, payload, ws);
+            break;
+          case 'response':
+            agentManager.handleResponse(token, payload);
+            if (app.io) app.io.emit('agent.response', { token, payload });
+            break;
+          default:
+            console.log(`[Theta Agent] Received message type '${data.type}' from ${token}`);
+        }
+      } catch (err) {
+        console.error("[Theta Agent] Error parsing message:", err);
+      }
+    });
+
+    ws.on('close', () => {
+      console.log(`[Theta Agent] Agent disconnected (${token})`);
+      agentManager.unregisterAgent(token, ws);
+    });
+
+    // Send initial welcome/config payload
+    try {
+      ws.send(JSON.stringify({
+        type: 'config',
+        payload: {
+          message: 'Connected to SSO Manager C2',
+          protocol_version: '1.1.0'
+        }
+      }));
+    } catch (e) {}
+  });
+};

nodejs/routes/api_conf.js

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+const router = require('express').Router();
+const baoConf = require('@simpleworkjs/bao-conf');
+const permission = require('../utils/permission');
+const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
+
+router.use(async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_admin']);
+    next();
+  } catch(err) {
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+// Secret fields stored inside secret/sso-manager/conf. These are NEVER returned
+// in cleartext by GET /api/conf (masked to MASK below) and, on save, a blank or
+// mask-valued submission preserves the stored value so an admin editing an
+// unrelated field (e.g. the From address) doesn't have to re-enter — or leak —
+// the SMTP password / OAuth JWT secret. Mirrors the plugin-secrets discipline.
+const MASK = '********';
+const SECRET_PATHS = [
+	['smtp', 'pass'],
+	['oauth', 'jwtSecret'],
+	['voipms', 'password'],
+];
+
+function maskSecrets(obj) {
+	const out = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(obj));
+	for (const [grp, key] of SECRET_PATHS) {
+		if (out[grp] && out[grp][key]) out[grp][key] = MASK;
+	}
+	return out;
+}
+
+router.get('/', async (req, res) => {
+  const editable = maskSecrets({
+    smtp: conf.smtp || {},
+    discovery: conf.discovery || {},
+    oauth: conf.oauth || {},
+    voipms: conf.voipms || {}
+  });
+  res.json(editable);
+});
+
+// Shallow-per-key merge of `src` into the live conf object (matches the old
+// conf_manager.applyConf behaviour: nested objects are spread, not deep-merged,
+// so call-time conf readers see saved values without a restart).
+function applyToLiveConf(src) {
+  if (!src) return;
+  for (const key of Object.keys(src)) {
+    if (typeof src[key] === 'object' && src[key] !== null && !Array.isArray(src[key])) {
+      conf[key] = { ...(conf[key] || {}), ...src[key] };
+    } else {
+      conf[key] = src[key];
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+router.post('/', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const existing = await baoConf.get('sso-manager/conf') || {};
+    const incoming = req.body || {};
+
+    // Preserve secret fields the admin left blank (or left showing the mask):
+    // drop them from the incoming merge so the stored value survives. Only a
+    // genuinely new, non-blank, non-mask value overwrites.
+    for (const [grp, key] of SECRET_PATHS) {
+      if (incoming[grp] && incoming[grp][key] !== undefined) {
+        const submitted = incoming[grp][key];
+        if (submitted === '' || submitted === MASK) delete incoming[grp][key];
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Deep merge incoming into existing
+    for (const key of Object.keys(incoming)) {
+      if (typeof incoming[key] === 'object' && incoming[key] !== null && !Array.isArray(incoming[key])) {
+        existing[key] = { ...(existing[key] || {}), ...incoming[key] };
+      } else {
+        existing[key] = incoming[key];
+      }
+    }
+    await baoConf.set('sso-manager/conf', existing);
+    // Reflect the saved values in the live conf immediately (the next boot's
+    // bao-conf.init() would pick them up too, but this keeps running readers
+    // current without a restart, as the old conf_manager did). `existing`
+    // carries the preserved secret values, so live conf keeps them too.
+    applyToLiveConf(existing);
+    res.json({ success: true });
+  } catch(err) {
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+router.get('/proxy', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const proxyConf = await baoConf.get('proxy/conf') || {};
+    const editable = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(proxyConf));
+    if (editable.oidc && editable.oidc.clientSecret) editable.oidc.clientSecret = MASK;
+    if (editable.ldap && editable.ldap.bindPassword) editable.ldap.bindPassword = MASK;
+    res.json(editable);
+  } catch(err) {
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+router.post('/proxy', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const existing = await baoConf.get('proxy/conf') || {};
+    const incoming = req.body || {};
+
+    if (incoming.oidc && incoming.oidc.clientSecret !== undefined) {
+      if (incoming.oidc.clientSecret === '' || incoming.oidc.clientSecret === MASK) delete incoming.oidc.clientSecret;
+    }
+    if (incoming.ldap && incoming.ldap.bindPassword !== undefined) {
+      if (incoming.ldap.bindPassword === '' || incoming.ldap.bindPassword === MASK) delete incoming.ldap.bindPassword;
+    }
+
+    for (const key of Object.keys(incoming)) {
+      if (typeof incoming[key] === 'object' && incoming[key] !== null && !Array.isArray(incoming[key])) {
+        existing[key] = { ...(existing[key] || {}), ...incoming[key] };
+      } else {
+        existing[key] = incoming[key];
+      }
+    }
+    await baoConf.set('proxy/conf', existing);
+    res.json({ success: true });
+  } catch(err) {
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+// Send a test email to verify SMTP configuration
+router.post('/test-email', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const { to, subject, body } = req.body || {};
+    if (!to) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Recipient email address is required' });
+    }
+
+    // Use the email model to send the test message
+    const Email = require('../models/email');
+    const testSubject = subject || 'SSO Manager Test Email';
+    const testBody = body || `<p>This is a test email from SSO Manager.</p><p>If you received this, your SMTP configuration is working correctly.</p><p>Sent at: ${new Date().toISOString()}</p>`;
+
+    await Email.send(to, testSubject, testBody);
+    res.json({ success: true, message: `Test email sent to ${to}` });
+  } catch(err) {
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+// Send a test SMS to verify VoIP.ms configuration
+router.post('/test-sms', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const { to, message } = req.body || {};
+    if (!to) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Recipient phone number is required' });
+    }
+
+    const voipmsConf = conf.voipms || {};
+    if (!voipmsConf.username || !voipmsConf.password || !voipmsConf.did) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'VoIP.ms credentials not configured. Please configure username, DID, and password in the SMS tab.' });
+    }
+
+    const testMessage = message || `SSO Manager Test SMS: This is a test message from ${conf.name}. If you received this, your VoIP.ms configuration is working correctly.`;
+
+    // VoIP.ms SMS API endpoint
+    const voipmsApiUrl = 'https://api.voip.ms/v1.0';
+    const authHeader = Buffer.from(`${voipmsConf.username}:${voipmsConf.password}`).toString('base64');
+
+    const response = await fetch(`${voipmsApiUrl}/sms/send`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: {
+        'Authorization': `Basic ${authHeader}`,
+        'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
+      },
+      body: new URLSearchParams({
+        did: voipmsConf.did,
+        to: to,
+        message: testMessage
+      })
+    });
+
+    const result = await response.json();
+    if (result.status === 'success') {
+      res.json({ success: true, message: `Test SMS sent to ${to}` });
+    } else {
+      res.status(400).json({ error: `VoIP.ms API error: ${result.message || 'Unknown error'}` });
+    }
+  } catch(err) {
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;

nodejs/routes/api_directory_admin.js

@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+'use strict';
+const router = require('express').Router();
+const permission = require('../utils/permission');
+const { Resource, ResourceEdge, ResourceGroup } = require('../models/resource');
+const { Group } = require('../models/group_ldap');
+const { User } = require('../models/user_ldap');
+const { cnFromDn } = require('../utils/user_groups');
+const { projectResources } = require('@simpleworkjs/directory-schema');
+
+const SUPER_ADMIN_GROUP = permission.SUPER_ADMIN_GROUP;
+const groups = require('../utils/groups');
+
+// Make `childCn` a member of `parentCn`, i.e. everyone in the child is
+// transitively in the parent. Idempotent and non-fatal: "already a member" is
+// the goal state, and a missing group (e.g. god_admin absent on a
+// directory seeded by an older entrypoint) is a reason to skip, not to fail the
+// caller's real work.
+async function nestGroup(childCn, parentCn) {
+  try {
+    const parent = await Group.get(parentCn);
+    const child = await Group.get(childCn);
+    if (await Group.wouldCycle(parentCn, child.dn)) {
+      console.error(`nestGroup: refusing ${childCn} -> ${parentCn} (would create a cycle)`);
+      return;
+    }
+    await parent.addMember({ dn: child.dn });
+  } catch (err) {
+    const benign = err.name === 'TypeOrValueExistsError' || err.code === 20 || err.name === 'GroupNotFound';
+    if (!benign) console.error(`nestGroup: ${childCn} -> ${parentCn} failed:`, err.message);
+  }
+}
+
+// ── Group-model provisioning (docs/GROUPS.md) ───────────────────────────────
+// The directory is the single place groups are created, as a projection of the
+// resource graph. These helpers materialize the group-inheritance lattice for
+// a resource so it exists in LDAP as well as in the resolver (utils/groups.js).
+// All of them are idempotent, so calling them again for a resource a newer
+// release is backfilling is a no-op.
+
+// Map a directory resource kind onto a group-model kind (GROUPS.md §2).
+// host -> host; service -> app (services/consoles are the group model's "apps");
+// site gets site-level groups (handled separately); oauth/container get no
+// per-resource groups (oauth clients hang off their owning service).
+function groupKind(resource) {
+  if (resource.kind === 'host') return 'host';
+  if (resource.kind === 'service') return 'app';
+  return null;
+}
+
+// Create a groupOfNames if it doesn't already exist. Idempotent; `ownerDn`
+// seeds the mandatory first member. Returns true when created.
+async function ensureGroup(name, ownerDn, description) {
+  try {
+    await Group.add({ name, owner: ownerDn, description });
+    return true;
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err.name !== 'EntryAlreadyExistsError' && err.code !== 68) {
+      console.error(`ensureGroup: failed to create ${name}:`, err);
+    }
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+// Link a group to a resource only if that link doesn't already exist. The
+// ResourceGroup table has no unique constraint on (resourceId, groupCn), so a
+// naive create on every Directory self-heal (which runs ensureSiteGroups /
+// provisionResourceGroups on each load) was accumulating duplicate links -- the
+// "groups appear 3x under a resource" bug. Always check first.
+async function ensureResourceGroup(resourceId, groupCn, accessLevel) {
+  const existing = await ResourceGroup.list({ where: { resourceId, groupCn } });
+  if (existing.length) return existing[0];
+  return ResourceGroup.create({ resourceId, groupCn, accessLevel });
+}
+
+// Provision the site-level groups + the aggregates the per-resource groups nest
+// into. Idempotent -- called on every directory list so a site seeded by an
+// older release gets its groups without a rebuild:
+//
+//   god_admin -> {site}_super_admin
+//   {site}_super_admin -> {site}_hosts_admin, {site}_apps_admin
+//   {site}_hosts_admin -> {site}_hosts_access ; {site}_apps_admin -> {site}_apps_access
+//
+// `{site}_everyone` is created for completeness; it has implicit membership and
+// is granted to a resource as a grantee, never enumerated.
+async function ensureSiteGroups(siteSlug, ownerDn, siteName, siteResourceId) {
+  if (!siteSlug) return;
+
+  // Link a site group to the site resource (so it shows + is member-manageable
+  // on the site's modal). Idempotent. Admin groups link as owner; access/meta
+  // groups as member.
+  const link = async (cn, isAdmin) => {
+    if (!siteResourceId) return;
+    await ensureResourceGroup(siteResourceId, cn, isAdmin ? 'owner' : 'member');
+  };
+
+  const sAdmin = groups.siteSuperAdminCns(siteSlug);
+  await ensureGroup(sAdmin, ownerDn, `Site admin for ${siteName || siteSlug}`);
+  await link(sAdmin, true);
+  // The kind-scoped aggregates are CREATED here (per-resource groups nest into
+  // them), but are NOT linked to the site resource: a site carries only the god
+  // and site-wide groups (S_super_admin, S_everyone), per the user's model. The
+  // aggregates have no modal home; site-wide access is granted via S_super_admin
+  // and per-resource access via the host/app groups.
+  for (const kind of ['host', 'app']) {
+    await ensureGroup(groups.aggregateGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, 'admin'), ownerDn, `Admin on all ${kind}s at ${siteSlug}`);
+    await ensureGroup(groups.aggregateGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, 'access'), ownerDn, `Access to all ${kind}s at ${siteSlug}`);
+  }
+  await ensureGroup(groups.siteEveryoneCns(siteSlug), ownerDn, `All users at ${siteSlug}`);
+  await link(groups.siteEveryoneCns(siteSlug), false);
+  // god_admin is the global group; surface it on the site modal so its members
+  // can be managed from the Directory (it has no home on a single resource).
+  await link(groups.GOD_ADMIN, true);
+
+  // Wire the lattice as nesting so LDAP-level consumers (SSSD, sudo, anything
+  // binding directly) resolve it transitively, not just utils/permission.js.
+  // nestGroup(child, parent) makes child a member of parent -- membership flows
+  // child -> parent ("up"), so a group's members inherit what its parents hold.
+  await nestGroup(groups.GOD_ADMIN, sAdmin); // god admins are site admins everywhere
+  for (const kind of ['host', 'app']) {
+    const aggAdmin = groups.aggregateGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, 'admin');
+    const aggAccess = groups.aggregateGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, 'access');
+    await nestGroup(sAdmin, aggAdmin);        // site admins administer all hosts/apps
+    await nestGroup(aggAdmin, aggAccess);     // site admin implies site access
+  }
+}
+
+// Provision the per-resource groups for a host/app and nest them into the site
+// aggregates (so a site/aggregate admin reaches this resource by membership).
+// Group names follow docs/GROUPS.md §2: `{site}_{kind}_{nameSlug}_{level}` where
+// nameSlug is the resource name with the kind prefix stripped (`host_theta-env` ->
+// `theta-env`). `kind` (host/app) both goes in the name and selects the aggregate:
+//
+//   {site}_{kind}_{slug}_admin  -> {site}_{kind}_{slug}_access
+//   {site}_{kind}_{slug}_admin  -> {site}_{kind}s_admin    (aggregate)
+//   {site}_{kind}_{slug}_access -> {site}_{kind}s_access   (aggregate)
+//   god_admin                   -> {site}_{kind}_{slug}_admin  (global super admin)
+async function provisionResourceGroups(resource, kind, siteSlug, ownerDn) {
+  const nameSlug = groups.resourceNameSlug(resource.slug);
+  const accessCn = groups.resourceGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, nameSlug, 'access');
+  const adminCn = groups.resourceGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, nameSlug, 'admin');
+
+  await ensureGroup(accessCn, ownerDn, `Access group for ${resource.name}`);
+  await ensureGroup(adminCn, ownerDn, `Admin group for ${resource.name}`);
+
+  // Link both groups to the resource so the Directory can show/revoke them.
+  await ensureResourceGroup(resource.id, accessCn, 'member');
+  await ensureResourceGroup(resource.id, adminCn, 'owner');
+
+  await nestGroup(adminCn, accessCn); // administering implies using
+  await nestGroup(adminCn, groups.aggregateGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, 'admin'));  // aggregate admin reaches this resource
+  await nestGroup(accessCn, groups.aggregateGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, 'access')); // aggregate access reaches this resource
+  await nestGroup(SUPER_ADMIN_GROUP, adminCn); // global super admin
+}
+
+// The group CNs it is valid to associate with a given resource (docs/GROUPS.md
+// §2/§3). This is what "force the correct naming convention" means: a group
+// linked to a resource must be one that parses for consumers -- the resource's
+// own specific groups, its site's aggregates, site-level groups, or the global
+// god_admin. Returns a Set of the fixed valid CNs plus a RegExp for opaque
+// capability groups following the same shapes.
+function validGroupCnsForResource(resource, siteSlug) {
+  const valid = new Set();
+  // A site resource only carries god_admin (added by the route) + the site-wide
+  // groups (S_super_admin, S_everyone). The kind-scoped host/app aggregates and
+  // specific groups belong to host/app resources, not to the site.
+  if (resource.kind === 'site') {
+    valid.add(groups.siteSuperAdminCns(siteSlug));
+    valid.add(groups.siteEveryoneCns(siteSlug));
+    return { valid, capRe: new RegExp(`^${siteSlug}_super_admin$|^${siteSlug}_everyone$`) };
+  }
+  const kind = groupKind(resource); // 'host'|'app'|null
+  if (kind) {
+    const nameSlug = groups.resourceNameSlug(resource.slug);
+    valid.add(groups.resourceGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, nameSlug, 'admin'));
+    valid.add(groups.resourceGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, nameSlug, 'access'));
+    valid.add(groups.aggregateGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, 'admin'));
+    valid.add(groups.aggregateGroupCns(siteSlug, kind, 'access'));
+    valid.add(groups.siteSuperAdminCns(siteSlug));
+    valid.add(groups.siteEveryoneCns(siteSlug));
+    return { valid, capRe: new RegExp(`^${siteSlug}_${kind}_${nameSlug}_[a-z0-9-]+$|^${siteSlug}_${kind}s_[a-z0-9-]+$`) };
+  }
+  // oauth/container etc. — only the global god_admin makes sense to pin here.
+  valid.add(groups.siteSuperAdminCns(siteSlug));
+  return { valid, capRe: null };
+}
+
+// Require the admin group
+router.use(async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_directory_admin', 'app_sso_admin']);
+    next();
+  } catch(err) {
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+// --- Resources ---
+router.get('/resources', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    let resources = await Resource.list();
+    resources = resources.filter(r => {
+      const isAuto = r.metadata?.discovery_sources?.length > 0 && !r.metadata.discovery_sources.includes('manual');
+      const isManaged = r.metadata?.managed === true;
+      return !isAuto || isManaged;
+    });
+    // Even admins never receive secret metadata (e.g. client_secret_hash) over
+    // the wire; projectResources strips it unconditionally.
+
+    // Self-heal the group model (docs/GROUPS.md): ensure every site has its
+    // site-level groups (S_super_admin, S_hosts_*, S_apps_*, S_everyone) + the
+    // aggregates, and every host/app resource has its per-resource groups nested
+    // into them. Idempotent, so this is a cheap no-op once present -- it's what
+    // backfills a directory seeded by an older release without a rebuild.
+    // Never fails the list.
+    const sites = resources.filter(r => r.kind === 'site');
+    await Promise.all(sites.map(site =>
+      ensureSiteGroups(site.slug, req.user.dn, site.name, site.id)
+        .catch(err => console.error(`ensureSiteGroups(${site.slug}) failed:`, err.message))
+    ));
+    const siteByResource = new Map();
+    for (const site of sites) siteByResource.set(site.id, site.slug);
+    const siteOf = async (r) => {
+      const direct = siteByResource.get(r.id);
+      if (direct) return direct;
+      // findAncestorSiteSlug returns the site's full slug (`site_local`) -- the
+      // group-model builders take it verbatim, so do NOT strip the `site_` prefix.
+      return await Resource.findAncestorSiteSlug(r.id).catch(() => null);
+    };
+    await Promise.all(resources.map(async (r) => {
+      const gKind = groupKind(r);
+      if (!gKind) return;
+      const siteSlug = await siteOf(r);
+      if (!siteSlug) return;
+      await provisionResourceGroups(r, gKind, siteSlug, req.user.dn)
+        .catch(err => console.error(`provisionResourceGroups(${r.slug}) failed:`, err.message));
+    }));
+
+    res.json({ results: projectResources(resources, { fullMetadata: true }) });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+router.post('/resources', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    if (!req.body.hostId && req.body.parentSlug) {
+      const parents = await Resource.list({ where: { slug: req.body.parentSlug } });
+      if (parents.length > 0) req.body.hostId = parents[0].id;
+    }
+    
+    if (req.body.kind === 'host' && !req.body.hostId) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Hosts must have a parent Site or Host' });
+    }
+    if (req.body.kind === 'service' && !req.body.hostId) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Services must have a parent Host' });
+    }
+    if (req.body.kind === 'oauth' && !req.body.hostId) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'OAuth Integrations must have a parent Service' });
+    }
+    
+    req.body.owner = req.body.owner || req.user.uid;
+
+    const now = Date.now();
+    req.body.created_by = req.body.created_by || req.user.uid;
+    req.body.created_on = now;
+    req.body.updated_by = req.user.uid;
+    req.body.updated_on = now;
+
+    let r;
+    if (req.body.kind === 'oauth') {
+      const { OAuthClient } = require('../models/oauth_client');
+      // Pass created_by explicitly for the wrapper (overrides the generic
+      // assignment above -- this is OAuthClient-wrapper-specific behavior).
+      req.body.created_by = req.body.owner;
+      // In the UI we might pass slug, but OAuthClient wrapper expects name
+      r = await OAuthClient.add(req.body);
+    } else {
+      r = await Resource.create(req.body);
+    }
+
+    if ((r.kind === 'host' || r.kind === 'service' || r.kind === 'oauth') && req.body.hostId) {
+      await ResourceEdge.create({ parentId: req.body.hostId, childId: r.id, relation: r.kind === 'oauth' ? 'oauth' : 'hosts' });
+    }
+
+    // ── Group provisioning (docs/GROUPS.md) ───────────────────────────────
+    // Materialize the group-model for the new resource. Site resources get the
+    // site-level groups; host/app resources get their per-resource groups nested
+    // into the site aggregates. Idempotent -- safe for a resource created by an
+    // older release. A provisioning failure must not fail resource creation: the
+    // resource already exists and the groups are repairable (re-run ensures them).
+    //
+    // `siteSlug` is the site resource's slug verbatim (`site_local`) -- the
+    // group-model builders treat it as opaque (docs/GROUPS.md §3) and re-apply
+    // the kind prefix themselves.
+    const gKind = groupKind(r);
+    const ancestorSite = await Resource.findAncestorSiteSlug(r.id);
+    if (r.kind === 'site') {
+      await ensureSiteGroups(r.slug, req.user.dn, r.name, r.id);
+    } else if (gKind && ancestorSite) {
+      await ensureSiteGroups(ancestorSite, req.user.dn, r.name); // backfill site tier if missing
+      await provisionResourceGroups(r, gKind, ancestorSite, req.user.dn);
+    }
+
+    res.json({ results: r });
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err.name === 'SequelizeUniqueConstraintError') {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'A resource with this slug already exists.' });
+    }
+    if (err.name === 'SequelizeValidationError') {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message });
+    }
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+router.put('/resources/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    // Validate before loading anything -- a rejected body should never have
+    // touched the store.
+    if (req.body.kind === 'host' && !req.body.hostId) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Hosts must have a parent Site or Host' });
+    }
+    if (req.body.kind === 'service' && !req.body.hostId) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Services must have a parent Host' });
+    }
+    if (req.body.kind === 'oauth' && !req.body.hostId) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'OAuth Integrations must have a parent Service' });
+    }
+
+    // OAuthClient is a wrapper over the same `resource` row, but its .update()
+    // handles the oauth-specific body fields (redirect_uris, scopes,
+    // token_lifetime) that a bare Resource would drop into metadata unvalidated.
+    const { OAuthClient } = require('../models/oauth_client');
+    const model = req.body.kind === 'oauth' ? OAuthClient : Resource;
+    const r = await model.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!r) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+
+    req.body.updated_by = req.user.uid;
+    req.body.updated_on = Date.now();
+
+    const updated = await r.update(req.body);
+
+    if ((updated.kind === 'host' || updated.kind === 'service' || updated.kind === 'oauth') && req.body.hostId !== undefined) {
+      const existingEdges = await ResourceEdge.list({ where: { childId: r.id } });
+      for (const e of existingEdges) {
+        if (e.relation === 'hosts' || e.relation === 'oauth') await e.delete();
+      }
+      if (req.body.hostId) {
+        await ResourceEdge.create({ parentId: req.body.hostId, childId: r.id, relation: updated.kind === 'oauth' ? 'oauth' : 'hosts' });
+      }
+    }
+    
+    res.json({ results: updated });
+  } catch (err) {
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+router.post('/resources/:id/rotate-secret', async (req, res, next) => {
+    try {
+        const { OAuthClient } = require('../models/oauth_client');
+        const client = await OAuthClient.get(req.params.id);
+        const secret = await client.rotateSecret();
+        res.json({ secret });
+    } catch (err) {
+        next(err);
+    }
+});
+
+router.post('/resources/:id/service-token', async (req, res, next) => {
+    try {
+        const { ServiceToken } = require('../models/token');
+        const token = await ServiceToken.issue(req.params.id, req.user.uid);
+        res.json({ results: { token: token.token } });
+    } catch (err) {
+        next(err);
+    }
+});
+
+router.delete('/resources/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const r = await Resource.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!r) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    // Clear the dependents FIRST. There is no transaction here, so ordering is
+    // the only thing protecting us: if a dependent delete throws after the
+    // resource row is gone, the leftovers are edges/links pointing at a
+    // nonexistent id -- invisible in the UI and poisonous to getGraph(). Failing
+    // with the resource still present is the recoverable direction (retry the
+    // delete); the caller sees the error either way.
+    const edgesParent = await ResourceEdge.list({ where: { parentId: req.params.id } });
+    const edgesChild = await ResourceEdge.list({ where: { childId: req.params.id } });
+    const groups = await ResourceGroup.list({ where: { resourceId: req.params.id } });
+    for (const e of [...edgesParent, ...edgesChild]) await e.delete();
+    for (const g of groups) await g.delete();
+    await r.delete();
+    res.json({ results: true });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// --- Edges ---
+router.get('/edges', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const edges = await ResourceEdge.list();
+    res.json({ results: edges });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+router.post('/edges', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const edge = await ResourceEdge.create(req.body);
+    res.json({ results: edge });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+router.delete('/edges/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const edge = await ResourceEdge.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!edge) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    await edge.delete();
+    res.json({ results: true });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// --- Groups ---
+router.get('/groups', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const groups = await ResourceGroup.list();
+    res.json({ results: groups });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+router.post('/groups', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const { resourceId, groupCn } = req.body;
+    if (!resourceId || !groupCn) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'resourceId and groupCn are required' });
+
+    // Enforce the group-model naming convention (docs/GROUPS.md §3). The CN must
+    // be a valid group for this resource; reject free-form names so the groups
+    // consumers read are always parseable. god_admin is always allowed (it is
+    // the global group and is managed from a site's modal).
+    const resource = await Resource.get(resourceId);
+    // Full site slug verbatim (`site_local`) -- the builders take it as-is. A
+    // site resource's own slug is its site; a host/app uses its ancestor site.
+    const siteSlug = resource && resource.kind === 'site'
+      ? resource.slug
+      : await Resource.findAncestorSiteSlug(resourceId);
+    if (resource && siteSlug && groupCn !== groups.GOD_ADMIN) {
+      const { valid, capRe } = validGroupCnsForResource(resource, siteSlug);
+      if (!valid.has(groupCn) && !(capRe && capRe.test(groupCn))) {
+        const err = new Error(`"${groupCn}" is not a valid group for this ${resource.kind}. Use the resource's own groups, a site aggregate, a site-level group, or god_admin (e.g. ${[...valid].join(', ')}).`);
+        err.status = 400;
+        throw err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    const g = await ensureResourceGroup(req.body.resourceId, groupCn, req.body.accessLevel);
+    res.json({ results: g });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+router.delete('/groups/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const g = await ResourceGroup.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!g) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    await g.delete();
+    res.json({ results: true });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// --- Access visibility ---
+//
+// The two questions an access-control pane has to answer, neither of which the
+// directory could answer before: "who can reach this resource" (a column on the
+// table, rather than three clicks into a modal) and "what can this user reach"
+// (which had no UI at all). Both are joins of the same two sets, so both are
+// served from one cached Group.listDetail() rather than a lookup per row.
+
+// dn -> uid, so member DNs can be reported as the uids admins actually think in.
+async function dnToUidMap() {
+  const users = await User.listDetail();
+  return new Map(users.map(u => [String(u.dn).toLowerCase(), u.uid]));
+}
+
+// GET /access-summary — { resourceId: { groups: [...], memberCount } }
+router.get('/access-summary', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const [links, groups, uidByDn] = await Promise.all([
+      ResourceGroup.list(),
+      Group.listDetail(),
+      dnToUidMap(),
+    ]);
+
+    const groupByCn = new Map(groups.map(g => [g.cn, g]));
+    const summary = {};
+
+    for (const link of links) {
+      const group = groupByCn.get(link.groupCn);
+      // A link whose LDAP group has been deleted out from under it: report it
+      // rather than skipping, since a dangling link grants nothing and the
+      // admin needs to see that it is dead.
+      //
+      // Counts come from the transitive closure, not from `member`. Reading the
+      // attribute would report only who is listed on the group, missing anyone
+      // who reaches it through a nested group -- and since god_admin is
+      // nested into every resource's _admin group, that is not an edge case.
+      let members = [];
+      if (group) {
+        const eff = await Group.effectiveMembers(link.groupCn);
+        members = eff.effective.map(dn => uidByDn.get(String(dn).toLowerCase()) || cnFromDn(dn));
+      }
+
+      const entry = summary[link.resourceId] || (summary[link.resourceId] = { groups: [], members: [] });
+      entry.groups.push({
+        cn: link.groupCn,
+        accessLevel: link.accessLevel,
+        exists: !!group,
+        memberCount: members.length,
+      });
+      for (const uid of members) {
+        if (!entry.members.includes(uid)) entry.members.push(uid);
+      }
+    }
+
+    for (const id of Object.keys(summary)) {
+      summary[id].memberCount = summary[id].members.length;
+    }
+
+    res.json({ results: summary });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// GET /user-access/:uid — every resource a given user can reach, and via which
+// group. This is the reverse lookup; previously an admin could only see their
+// own access, via /api/discovery/me.
+router.get('/user-access/:uid', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const user = await User.get({ uid: req.params.uid });
+    if (!user) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'User not found' });
+
+    const dn = String(user.dn).toLowerCase();
+    const groups = await Group.listDetail();
+    const memberOf = groups
+      .filter(g => [].concat(g.member || []).some(m => String(m).toLowerCase() === dn))
+      .map(g => g.cn);
+
+    const [links, resources] = await Promise.all([ResourceGroup.list(), Resource.list()]);
+    const byId = new Map(resources.map(r => [r.id, r]));
+
+    const results = [];
+    for (const link of links) {
+      if (!memberOf.includes(link.groupCn)) continue;
+      const resource = byId.get(link.resourceId);
+      if (!resource) continue;
+      results.push({
+        id: resource.id,
+        name: resource.name,
+        slug: resource.slug,
+        kind: resource.kind,
+        groupCn: link.groupCn,
+        accessLevel: link.accessLevel,
+      });
+    }
+
+    res.json({ results: { uid: user.uid, groups: memberOf, resources: results } });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// Tail the last `lines` lines of a log file without shelling out. Reads at most
+// the trailing MAX_TAIL_BYTES so an unrotated multi-GB log can't blow up the
+// heap. A missing/unreadable file is normal (the log only exists once slapd has
+// written to it), so it yields '' rather than an error.
+const MAX_TAIL_BYTES = 256 * 1024;
+
+async function tailFile(filePath, lines = 100) {
+  const fs = require('fs/promises');
+  let fh;
+  try {
+    fh = await fs.open(filePath, 'r');
+    const { size } = await fh.stat();
+    const start = Math.max(0, size - MAX_TAIL_BYTES);
+    const buf = Buffer.alloc(Math.min(size, MAX_TAIL_BYTES));
+    await fh.read(buf, 0, buf.length, start);
+    const text = buf.toString('utf8');
+    // A partial first line when we started mid-file; drop it.
+    const rows = (start > 0 ? text.slice(text.indexOf('\n') + 1) : text).split('\n');
+    return rows.slice(-lines).join('\n');
+  } catch (err) {
+    return '';
+  } finally {
+    if (fh) await fh.close().catch(() => {});
+  }
+}
+
+router.get('/audit-logs', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const [ldap, oauth, audit] = await Promise.all([
+      tailFile('/var/lib/ldap/slapd.log'),
+      tailFile('/var/lib/ldap/oauth.log'),
+      tailFile('/var/lib/ldap/auditlog.ldif'),
+    ]);
+    res.json({ results: { ldap, oauth, audit } });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;

nodejs/routes/api_metrics.js

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+'use strict';
+const router = require('express').Router();
+const permission = require('../utils/permission');
+const metrics = require('../utils/metrics');
+
+// /api/metrics/overview
+router.get('/overview', async (req, res, next) => {
+    try {
+        await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_admin']);
+        
+        const topIps = await metrics.getTopN('metrics:failed_ips', 7, 5);
+        const topUsers = await metrics.getTopN('metrics:failed_users', 7, 5);
+        const topServices = await metrics.getTopN('metrics:service_usage', 7, 5);
+        
+        res.json({ results: { ips: topIps, users: topUsers, services: topServices } });
+    } catch(e) {
+        next(e);
+    }
+});
+
+// /api/metrics/user/:uid
+router.get('/user/:uid', async (req, res, next) => {
+    try {
+        // Can only view if admin or self
+        if (req.user.uid !== req.params.uid) {
+            await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_admin']);
+        }
+        
+        // Failed logins for user is hard if we didn't track it by user, but wait, we did! metrics:failed_users:YYYY-MM-DD
+        // However, we didn't track failed IPs per user. We tracked failed_users as a sorted set.
+        // To get the user's failures, we just query their score from the union.
+        
+        // Wait, for services we have user_service_usage:<uid>:<date>. No, in metrics.js I wrote:
+        // `metrics:user_service_usage:${username}:${date}`
+        
+        const topServices = await metrics.getTopN('metrics:user_service_usage', 7, 5, req.params.uid);
+        
+        res.json({ results: { services: topServices } });
+    } catch(e) {
+        next(e);
+    }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;

nodejs/routes/api_plugins.js

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Plugin instances API — the loadable, configurable, multi-copy plugin system.
+//
+// Replaces the old routes/plugins.js (which only toggled cron/enabled on static
+// config via a Redis hash). Here every plugin is a PluginInstance row (see
+// models/plugin_instance.js) with its own schedule and its secrets in OpenBao
+// (utils/plugin_secrets.js), created/edited/loaded/unloaded through this API.
+//
+// Gated router-wide to the same admin groups as the directory admin API, so
+// existing directory admins keep access. Secrets are never returned in
+// cleartext — only masked (`********`) — and never persisted in the DB.
+
+const router = require('express').Router();
+const permission = require('../utils/permission');
+const registry = require('../services/plugin_registry');
+const pluginSecrets = require('../utils/plugin_secrets');
+const { PluginInstance, STATUS } = require('../models/plugin_instance');
+const { scheduleInstance, unscheduleInstance, runInstanceNow } = require('../services/scheduler');
+
+const SLUG_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$/;
+
+// Derive a stable, unique slug from an instance name when the caller didn't
+// supply one. Lowercases, collapses non-alnum runs to a single hyphen, trims,
+// and prefixes `plugin-` if the result would otherwise start with a character
+// SLUG_RE rejects. `isTaken(slug)` is consulted for uniqueness (a DB lookup);
+// on collision we append `-2`, `-3`, … up to MAX_TRIES, then give up.
+function slugify(name) {
+  let s = String(name || '').toLowerCase().trim();
+  s = s.replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, '-').replace(/^-+|-+$/g, '');
+  if (!s) s = 'plugin';
+  if (!/^[a-z0-9]/.test(s)) s = 'plugin-' + s;
+  return s.slice(0, 64);
+}
+
+async function makeSlug(name, isTaken) {
+  const base = slugify(name);
+  if (!await isTaken(base)) return base;
+  for (let i = 2; i <= 16; i++) {
+    const cand = `${base}-${i}`.slice(0, 64);
+    if (!await isTaken(cand)) return cand;
+  }
+  return null; // exhausted
+}
+
+// Same gate as the directory admin API: app_sso_admin or app_sso_directory_admin
+// (app_super_admin is always allowed by permission.byGroup).
+router.use(async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_directory_admin', 'app_sso_admin']);
+    next();
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// Plain object for the wire, with masked secret values attached under
+// `secrets` and the run-state fields surfaced. The DB row never holds secrets.
+async function serialize(instance) {
+  const obj = instance.toJSON ? instance.toJSON() : { ...instance };
+  const secrets = await pluginSecrets.read(instance.id).catch(() => ({}));
+  obj.secrets = registry.mask(instance.pluginType, secrets);
+  return obj;
+}
+
+// Validate a create/update payload against a plugin type's configSchema.
+// Returns an error string or null. `flat` is the merged config + secret values
+// (the UI sends one flat object; the API splits it).
+function validateFields(type, flat) {
+  const required = registry.requiredKeys(type);
+  for (const key of required) {
+    const v = flat && flat[key];
+    if (v === undefined || v === null || v === '') {
+      return `Missing required field: ${key}`;
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+// --- Plugin types (for the create-instance picker + form) ---
+router.get('/types', (req, res) => {
+  res.json({ results: registry.getTypes() });
+});
+
+// --- List instances ---
+router.get('/', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const instances = await PluginInstance.list();
+    const out = [];
+    for (const inst of instances) out.push(await serialize(inst));
+    res.json({ results: out });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+router.get('/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const inst = await PluginInstance.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!inst) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    res.json({ results: await serialize(inst) });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// --- Create instance ---
+router.post('/', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const { pluginType, name, slug, cron } = req.body;
+    if (!pluginType) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'pluginType is required' });
+    if (!registry.getManifest(pluginType)) return res.status(400).json({ error: `Unknown plugin type: ${pluginType}` });
+    if (!name) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'name is required' });
+    // Slug is optional: derive it from the name when absent. When supplied,
+    // validate it (admins editing via API may still pass one explicitly).
+    let finalSlug = slug;
+    if (finalSlug) {
+      if (!SLUG_RE.test(finalSlug)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'slug must be lowercase letters/digits/_/- (max 64)' });
+    } else {
+      finalSlug = await makeSlug(name, async (s) => !!(await PluginInstance.getBySlug(s)));
+      if (!finalSlug) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Could not generate a unique slug from the name; supply one explicitly.' });
+    }
+    if (cron !== undefined && (typeof cron !== 'string' || !cron.trim())) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'cron must be a non-empty string' });
+
+    // `config` from the client is a flat object of all field values (secret +
+    // non-secret). Split it: non-secret -> DB, secret -> OpenBao.
+    const flat = (req.body.config && typeof req.body.config === 'object') ? req.body.config : {};
+    const fieldErr = validateFields(pluginType, flat);
+    if (fieldErr) return res.status(400).json({ error: fieldErr });
+
+    const manifest = registry.getManifest(pluginType);
+    const { config, secrets } = registry.splitConfig(pluginType, flat);
+    const enabled = req.body.enabled !== false; // default true
+    const now = Date.now();
+
+    const instance = await PluginInstance.create({
+      pluginType,
+      category: manifest.category,
+      name,
+      slug: finalSlug,
+      enabled,
+      cron: cron || '0 * * * *',
+      config,
+      created_by: req.user.uid,
+      created_on: now,
+      updated_by: req.user.uid,
+      updated_on: now
+    });
+
+    try {
+      await pluginSecrets.write(instance.id, secrets);
+    } catch (err) {
+      // Most likely the sso-broker policy lacks secret/plugins/* — the
+      // operator needs theta-suite >= v1.30.1. Delete the row so a failed
+      // secret write doesn't strand a half-created instance.
+      await instance.delete().catch(() => {});
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: `Failed to store plugin secrets in OpenBao: ${err.message}. Re-run ./setup.sh with theta-suite >= v1.30.1.` });
+    }
+
+    if (enabled) {
+      await scheduleInstance(instance);
+      await runInstanceNow(instance.id);
+    }
+    res.json({ results: await serialize(instance) });
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err.name === 'SequelizeUniqueConstraintError') {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'A plugin instance with this slug already exists.' });
+    }
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+// --- Update instance (name/cron/enabled/non-secret config) ---
+router.put('/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const inst = await PluginInstance.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!inst) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    if (!registry.getManifest(inst.pluginType)) return res.status(400).json({ error: `Plugin type ${inst.pluginType} is no longer installed` });
+
+    const updates = {};
+    if (req.body.name !== undefined) updates.name = req.body.name;
+    if (req.body.cron !== undefined) {
+      if (typeof req.body.cron !== 'string' || !req.body.cron.trim()) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'cron must be a non-empty string' });
+      updates.cron = req.body.cron;
+    }
+    if (req.body.enabled !== undefined) updates.enabled = !!req.body.enabled;
+
+    // Non-secret config: split the client's flat config so secret fields are
+    // never written to the DB. Secrets are changed via PUT /:id/secrets.
+    if (req.body.config !== undefined && typeof req.body.config === 'object') {
+      const { config } = registry.splitConfig(inst.pluginType, req.body.config);
+      updates.config = config;
+    }
+
+    updates.updated_by = req.user.uid;
+    updates.updated_on = Date.now();
+
+    const updated = await inst.update(updates);
+
+    // Re-schedule if the schedule-relevant fields moved.
+    if (updates.cron !== undefined || updates.enabled !== undefined) {
+      await scheduleInstance(updated);
+    }
+    res.json({ results: await serialize(updated) });
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err.name === 'SequelizeUniqueConstraintError') {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'A plugin instance with this slug already exists.' });
+    }
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+// --- Update secrets only ---
+router.put('/:id/secrets', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const inst = await PluginInstance.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!inst) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    if (!registry.getManifest(inst.pluginType)) return res.status(400).json({ error: `Plugin type ${inst.pluginType} is no longer installed` });
+
+    // Keep only declared secret fields; pluginSecrets.write drops blank/MASK
+    // values so an unchanged masked field is a no-op.
+    const { secrets } = registry.splitConfig(inst.pluginType, req.body || {});
+    await pluginSecrets.write(inst.id, secrets);
+    await inst.update({ updated_by: req.user.uid, updated_on: Date.now() });
+    res.json({ results: true });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// --- Test (validate) ---
+router.post('/:id/test', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const inst = await PluginInstance.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!inst) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    const mod = registry.getModule(inst.pluginType);
+    if (typeof mod.validate !== 'function') return res.json({ ok: true, note: 'no validate defined' });
+    const cfg = await pluginSecrets.mergeForRun(inst);
+    const result = await mod.validate(cfg);
+    if (result && result.ok) return res.json(result);
+    return res.status(400).json(result || { ok: false, error: 'validation failed' });
+  } catch (err) {
+    return res.status(400).json({ ok: false, error: err.message });
+  }
+});
+
+// --- Load (enable + schedule + run now) ---
+router.post('/:id/load', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const inst = await PluginInstance.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!inst) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    const updated = await inst.update({ enabled: true, updated_by: req.user.uid, updated_on: Date.now() });
+    await scheduleInstance(updated);
+    await runInstanceNow(updated.id);
+    res.json({ results: await serialize(updated) });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// --- Unload (unschedule + disable) ---
+router.post('/:id/unload', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const inst = await PluginInstance.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!inst) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    await unscheduleInstance(inst.id);
+    const updated = await inst.update({ enabled: false, updated_by: req.user.uid, updated_on: Date.now() });
+    res.json({ results: await serialize(updated) });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// --- Run now (regardless of enabled) ---
+router.post('/:id/run', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const inst = await PluginInstance.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!inst) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    await runInstanceNow(inst.id);
+    res.json({ results: true });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// --- Last-run status ---
+router.get('/:id/runs', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const inst = await PluginInstance.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!inst) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    res.json({ results: { lastRunAt: inst.lastRunAt, lastStatus: inst.lastStatus, lastError: inst.lastError, lastLog: inst.lastLog } });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// --- Delete (unschedule + remove secrets + delete row) ---
+router.delete('/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const inst = await PluginInstance.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!inst) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    await unscheduleInstance(inst.id);
+    await pluginSecrets.remove(inst.id); // best-effort
+    await inst.delete();
+    res.json({ results: true });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;

nodejs/routes/api_shared_secrets.js

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Shared-secrets API.
+//
+// A shared secret is metadata in the DB (SharedSecret + SharedSecretGrant) with
+// its DATA in OpenBao at secret/shared/<ownerUid>/<slug> (KV-v2). The owner has
+// full R/W/list on their own secret/shared/<ownerUid>/* subtree; each grantee's
+// OpenBao policy content is edited to add read on the exact shared path (see
+// vault_broker.js grantSharedSecret/revokeSharedSecret). Enforcement is entirely
+// the OpenBao ACL — the broker's policy reconciliation makes a grant effective
+// immediately, with no token re-mint.
+//
+// Reads of the secret DATA are intentionally NOT proxied here: the UI fetches
+// them through the existing /api/vault proxy using the requester's own session
+// token, so OpenBao ACL enforces read access per-request. This router handles
+// metadata CRUD + grant management; KV writes (create/update/delete) are made
+// server-side using the acting user's scoped token.
+
+const express = require('express');
+const baoConf = require('@simpleworkjs/bao-conf');
+const permission = require('../utils/permission');
+const { SharedSecret } = require('../models/shared_secret');
+const { SharedSecretGrant } = require('../models/shared_secret_grant');
+const vaultBroker = require('../utils/vault_broker');
+
+const ADMIN_GROUPS = ['app_sso_admin', 'app_super_admin', 'app_sso_directory_admin'];
+// Allow hyphens AND underscores (matching the plugin-instance slug convention);
+// only reject values that can't be a sane secret path segment (spaces, slashes,
+// leading non-alnum, too long).
+const SLUG_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$/;
+
+const router = express.Router();
+
+// Machine/service tokens cannot manage shared secrets (mirrors scopeGuard on the
+// /api/vault proxy — personal, per-user secret management only).
+router.use((req, res, next) => {
+	if (req.user && req.user.isMachine) {
+		return res.status(403).json({ error: 'machine tokens cannot manage shared secrets' });
+	}
+	next();
+});
+
+async function isAdmin(user) {
+	try { await permission.byGroup(user, ADMIN_GROUPS); return true; }
+	catch (e) { return false; }
+}
+
+// Scoped OpenBao token for an actor, used for server-side KV writes. Owner uses
+// their own token (R/W on secret/shared/<ownerUid>/*); an admin uses the
+// sso-admin token (R/W on secret/*).
+async function actorToken(user, ownerUid) {
+	if (user.uid === ownerUid) return vaultBroker.getOrCreateUserToken(ownerUid);
+	if (await isAdmin(user)) return vaultBroker.getOrCreateAdminToken(user.uid);
+	return null;
+}
+
+// Does this user manage the given shared secret? Owner or admin.
+async function canManage(user, secret) {
+	if (user.uid === secret.ownerUid) return true;
+	return isAdmin(user);
+}
+
+async function loadSecret(req, res) {
+	const secret = await SharedSecret.get(req.params.id);
+	if (!secret) { res.status(404).json({ error: 'not found' }); return null; }
+	return secret;
+}
+
+// ── List: mine + shared-with-me ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+router.get('/', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const uid = req.user.uid;
+		const mine = await SharedSecret.list({ where: { ownerUid: uid } });
+		const grants = await SharedSecretGrant.listForGrantee('user', uid);
+		const granteeSecretIds = [...new Set(grants.map(g => g.secretId))];
+		const granted = granteeSecretIds.length
+			? await SharedSecret.list({ where: { id: { in: granteeSecretIds } } }) : [];
+		const byId = new Map(mine.map(s => [s.id, { role: 'owner', ...s }]));
+		for (const g of granted) {
+			if (byId.has(g.id)) continue; // already owner
+			byId.set(g.id, { role: 'grantee', ...g });
+		}
+		// The `{ role, ...s }` spread above copies only own properties, so the
+		// instance method `path()` is dropped -- call the static builder instead.
+		res.json({ items: [...byId.values()].map(s => ({ id: s.id, slug: s.slug, ownerUid: s.ownerUid, description: s.description, path: SharedSecret.pathFor(s.ownerUid, s.slug), role: s.role })) });
+	} catch (e) { next(e); }
+});
+
+// ── Create ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+router.post('/', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const uid = req.user.uid;
+		const slug = String(req.body.slug || '').trim().toLowerCase();
+		if (!SLUG_RE.test(slug)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'slug must be lowercase letters/digits/hyphens/underscores, 1-64 chars' });
+		const description = String(req.body.description || '').trim();
+		const data = (req.body.data && typeof req.body.data === 'object') ? req.body.data : {};
+
+		if (await SharedSecret.getBySlug(slug)) {
+			return res.status(409).json({ error: `a shared secret named '${slug}' already exists` });
+		}
+		const token = await actorToken(req.user, uid);
+		if (!token) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'not allowed' });
+		const path = SharedSecret.pathFor(uid, slug);
+		await baoConf.set(path, data, { token });
+
+		const secret = await SharedSecret.create({
+			slug, ownerUid: uid, description,
+			created_by: uid, created_on: Date.now(), updated_by: uid, updated_on: Date.now(),
+		});
+		res.status(201).json({ id: secret.id, slug, ownerUid: uid, description, path, role: 'owner' });
+	} catch (e) { next(e); }
+});
+
+// ── Detail (metadata; data is read via /api/vault proxy) ────────────────────
+router.get('/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const secret = await loadSecret(req, res);
+		if (!secret) return;
+		const uid = req.user.uid;
+		const admin = await isAdmin(req.user);
+		const grantee = (await SharedSecretGrant.listForGrantee('user', uid)).some(g => g.secretId === secret.id);
+		if (!admin && uid !== secret.ownerUid && !grantee) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'not shared with you' });
+		const grants = await SharedSecretGrant.list({ where: { secretId: secret.id } });
+		res.json({ id: secret.id, slug: secret.slug, ownerUid: secret.ownerUid, description: secret.description, path: secret.path(), role: uid === secret.ownerUid ? 'owner' : (admin ? 'admin' : 'grantee'), grants: grants.map(g => ({ id: g.id, granteeType: g.granteeType, granteeId: g.granteeId, capability: g.capability })) });
+	} catch (e) { next(e); }
+});
+
+// ── Update data / description ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+router.put('/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const secret = await loadSecret(req, res);
+		if (!secret) return;
+		if (!(await canManage(req.user, secret))) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'only the owner (or admin) can edit a shared secret' });
+		const token = await actorToken(req.user, secret.ownerUid);
+		const update = {};
+		if (req.body && typeof req.body.data === 'object') {
+			await baoConf.set(secret.path(), req.body.data, { token });
+		}
+		if (req.body && req.body.description !== undefined) {
+			update.description = String(req.body.description).trim();
+		}
+		if (Object.keys(update).length) {
+			update.updated_by = req.user.uid;
+			update.updated_on = Date.now();
+			await secret.update(update);
+		}
+		res.json({ id: secret.id, slug: secret.slug, ownerUid: secret.ownerUid, description: secret.description, path: secret.path() });
+	} catch (e) { next(e); }
+});
+
+// ── Delete (KV + DB row + all grants) ───────────────────────────────────────
+router.delete('/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const secret = await loadSecret(req, res);
+		if (!secret) return;
+		if (!(await canManage(req.user, secret))) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'only the owner (or admin) can delete a shared secret' });
+		const token = await actorToken(req.user, secret.ownerUid);
+		// Revoke all grants first so grantees' policies drop the path.
+		const grants = await SharedSecretGrant.list({ where: { secretId: secret.id } });
+		for (const g of grants) await vaultBroker.revokeSharedSecret(g.id, req.user.uid);
+		// Delete the KV data (metadata delete removes all versions), then the row.
+		try { await baoConf.request('DELETE', `secret/metadata/${secret.path()}`, undefined, { token }); } catch (e) { /* best-effort */ }
+		await secret.delete();
+		res.status(204).end();
+	} catch (e) { next(e); }
+});
+
+// ── Grants: list ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+router.get('/:id/grants', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const secret = await loadSecret(req, res);
+		if (!secret) return;
+		if (!(await canManage(req.user, secret))) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'only the owner (or admin) can manage grants' });
+		const grants = await SharedSecretGrant.list({ where: { secretId: secret.id } });
+		res.json({ grants: grants.map(g => ({ id: g.id, granteeType: g.granteeType, granteeId: g.granteeId, capability: g.capability })) });
+	} catch (e) { next(e); }
+});
+
+// ── Grants: create ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+router.post('/:id/grants', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const secret = await loadSecret(req, res);
+		if (!secret) return;
+		if (!(await canManage(req.user, secret))) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'only the owner (or admin) can manage grants' });
+		const granteeType = String(req.body.granteeType || '').trim();
+		const granteeId = String(req.body.granteeId || '').trim();
+		if (!['user', 'app'].includes(granteeType)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'granteeType must be user or app' });
+		if (!granteeId) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'granteeId is required' });
+		if (granteeId === secret.ownerUid && granteeType === 'user') {
+			return res.status(400).json({ error: 'the owner already has access' });
+		}
+		// Idempotent: skip if the grant already exists.
+		const existing = (await SharedSecretGrant.list({ where: { secretId: secret.id, granteeType, granteeId } }))[0];
+		if (existing) return res.json({ id: existing.id, granteeType, granteeId, capability: existing.capability });
+		const grant = await vaultBroker.grantSharedSecret(secret.id, granteeType, granteeId, req.user.uid);
+		res.status(201).json({ id: grant.id, granteeType, granteeId, capability: grant.capability });
+	} catch (e) { next(e); }
+});
+
+// ── Grants: revoke ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+router.delete('/:id/grants/:grantId', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const secret = await loadSecret(req, res);
+		if (!secret) return;
+		if (!(await canManage(req.user, secret))) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'only the owner (or admin) can manage grants' });
+		const grant = await SharedSecretGrant.get(req.params.grantId);
+		if (!grant || grant.secretId !== secret.id) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'grant not found' });
+		await vaultBroker.revokeSharedSecret(grant.id, req.user.uid);
+		res.status(204).end();
+	} catch (e) { next(e); }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;

nodejs/routes/auth.js

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ const middleware = require('../middleware/auth');
 const rateLimit = require('../middleware/rate_limit');
 const permission = require('../utils/permission');
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
+const metrics = require('../utils/metrics');
 
 async function findUserByLogin(login) {
 	try {
@@ -37,12 +38,16 @@ router.get('/username-suggestions', async function(req, res, next) {
 router.post('/login', rateLimit.login, async function(req, res, next){
 	try{
 		let auth = await Auth.login(req.body);
+		metrics.recordServiceUsage('SSO Web UI', req.body.uid);
 		return res.json({
 			login: true,
 			token: auth.token.token,
 			message:`${req.body.uid} logged in!`,
 		});
 	}catch(error){
+		if (error.name === 'LDAPLoginFailed' || error.status === 401 || error.name === 'UserNotFound') {
+			metrics.recordFailedLogin(req.ip, req.body.uid);
+		}
 		next(error);
 	}
 });
@@ -198,7 +203,7 @@ router.post('/impersonate/:uid', middleware.auth, async function(req, res, next)
 		const target = await User.get(req.params.uid);
 
 		// Clean up any existing impersonation for this target
-		const existing = await ImpersonationToken.listDetail({ target_uid: target.uid });
+		const existing = await ImpersonationToken.list({ where: { target_uid: target.uid } });
 		for (const old of existing) {
 			if (old.is_valid && !old.isExpired) {
 				try { await target.removeTempPassword(old.temp_hash); } catch(_) {}
@@ -232,7 +237,7 @@ router.delete('/impersonate/:uid', middleware.auth, async function(req, res, nex
 		await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_admin']);
 
 		const target = await User.get(req.params.uid);
-		const existing = await ImpersonationToken.listDetail({ target_uid: target.uid });
+		const existing = await ImpersonationToken.list({ where: { target_uid: target.uid } });
 
 		let revoked = 0;
 		for (const token of existing) {

nodejs/routes/autoRouter.js

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+const express = require('express');
+
+// Parses arguments according to the exposed method config.
+// Extended to support { from: 'user' } which injects `req.user.dn` (LDAP integration).
+function extractArgs(req, cfg) {
+  const args = cfg.args;
+  if (!args) return [];
+  if (args.from === 'user') return [req.user.dn];
+  
+  const source = args.from === 'params' ? req.params
+    : args.from === 'query' ? req.query
+      : req.body;
+      
+  if (Array.isArray(args.names)) return args.names.map(name => source[name]);
+  return [source || {}];
+}
+
+// A mini-auto-router that reads `static exposedMethods` from a @simpleworkjs/orm Model
+// and maps them directly into Express endpoints.
+function autoRouter(Model) {
+  const router = express.Router();
+
+  if (Model.getExposedMethods) {
+    for (const cfg of Model.getExposedMethods()) {
+      router[cfg.verb](cfg.routePath, async function(req, res, next) {
+        try {
+          // In a full implementation, we'd load the instance if cfg.kind === 'instance'.
+          // For now, our methods are all static class methods.
+          const target = Model;
+          const result = await target[cfg.method](...extractArgs(req, cfg));
+          res.json(result);
+        } catch (error) {
+          next(error);
+        }
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  
+  return router;
+}
+
+module.exports = autoRouter;

nodejs/routes/conf.js

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+const router = require('express').Router();
+const permission = require('../utils/permission');
+
+router.use(async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_admin']);
+    next();
+  } catch(err) {
+    next(err);
+  }
+});
+
+router.get('/', (req, res) => {
+  res.render('conf', {
+    title: 'Configuration',
+    user: req.user
+  });
+});
+
+module.exports = router;

nodejs/routes/discovery.js

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Public directory discovery API. Mounted at /api/discovery (app.js, before
+// the 404 catcher). Every response uses the `{ results }` envelope and the
+// security projection from @simpleworkjs/directory-schema, so secrets (e.g. an
+// OAuth client's client_secret_hash) never leave the server and non-admins only
+// see the public metadata allowlist.
+//
+// This replaces the autoRouter mount (which returned bare arrays — the shape
+// jump-host's `data.results || []` silently collapsed to `[]`, so no user could
+// bridge) and absorbs the dead /me handler that used to live in
+// routes/api_discovery.js (mounted after the 404, so unreachable).
+//
+// Group CNs come from utils/user_groups — `req.user` has `memberOf` (DNs) and
+// no `.groups`, so reading `.groups` off it directly yields [] for every human
+// caller. See that file for what that silently broke.
+
+const router = require('express').Router();
+const { Resource, ResourceGroup } = require('../models/resource');
+const { withGroups } = require('../utils/user_groups');
+const {
+	envelope,
+	projectResource,
+	projectResources,
+	isDirectoryAdmin,
+} = require('@simpleworkjs/directory-schema');
+
+// Resolve the caller's groups once per request and hand back the projection
+// flag. Every handler needs both, and both are wrong if taken off req.user raw.
+async function callerView(req) {
+	const user = await withGroups(req.user);
+	return { user, fullMetadata: isDirectoryAdmin(user) };
+}
+
+// GET /api/discovery/resources[?kind=&group=&parent=]
+router.get('/resources', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const { fullMetadata } = await callerView(req);
+		const resources = await Resource.search(req.query);
+		res.json(envelope(projectResources(resources, { fullMetadata })));
+	} catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// GET /api/discovery/resources/:slug
+router.get('/resources/:slug', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const { fullMetadata } = await callerView(req);
+		const resource = await Resource.getBySlug(req.params.slug);
+		// parents/children are edges (no secrets); project only the resource body.
+		const projected = projectResource(resource, { fullMetadata });
+		projected.parents = resource.parents;
+		projected.children = resource.children;
+		res.json(envelope(projected));
+	} catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// GET /api/discovery/graph
+router.get('/graph', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const { fullMetadata } = await callerView(req);
+		const graph = await Resource.getGraph();
+		res.json(envelope({
+			resources: projectResources(graph.resources, { fullMetadata }),
+			edges: graph.edges,
+			updated_on: graph.updated_on
+		}));
+	} catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// GET /api/discovery/me
+// Returns the resources the current caller can reach. Machines see only their
+// own resource; humans get the union of their LDAP groups' resources plus
+// anything flagged isPublic.
+router.get('/me', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const { user, fullMetadata } = await callerView(req);
+		let accessible;
+		if (req.user && req.user.isMachine) {
+			accessible = await Resource.list({ where: { id: req.resourceId } });
+		} else {
+			const ids = new Set();
+			if (user.groups.length) {
+				const rgs = await ResourceGroup.list({ where: { groupCn: { in: user.groups } } });
+				for (const rg of rgs) ids.add(rg.resourceId);
+			}
+			const all = await Resource.list();
+			accessible = all.filter(r => {
+				const isAuto = r.metadata?.discovery_sources?.length > 0 && !r.metadata.discovery_sources.includes('manual');
+				const isManaged = r.metadata?.managed === true;
+				if (isAuto && !isManaged) return false;
+				return ids.has(r.id) || (r.metadata && r.metadata.isPublic);
+			});
+		}
+		// resolvedAddress is the whole point of /me ("how do I reach it") and a
+		// service inherits it from its host, so it must be computed here rather
+		// than left to each caller to guess at address || ip.
+		accessible = await Resource.withResolvedAddress(accessible);
+		res.json(envelope(projectResources(accessible, { fullMetadata })));
+	} catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// GET /api/discovery/access/:uid[/:slug]
+// Answers per-user access for a machine caller (e.g. jump-host).
+router.get(['/access/:uid', '/access/:uid/:slug'], async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const { fullMetadata } = await callerView(req);
+		if (!req.user || (!req.user.isMachine && !fullMetadata)) {
+			return res.status(403).json(envelope({ error: 'Only machine identities or admins may query access for other users.' }));
+		}
+		const { User } = require('../models/user_ldap');
+		const { groupCns } = require('../utils/user_groups');
+		
+		const targetUser = await User.get(req.params.uid).catch(() => null);
+		if (!targetUser) return res.status(404).json(envelope({ error: 'User not found' }));
+
+		const groups = await groupCns(targetUser);
+		const ids = new Set();
+		if (groups.length) {
+			const rgs = await ResourceGroup.list({ where: { groupCn: { in: groups } } });
+			for (const rg of rgs) ids.add(rg.resourceId);
+		}
+		
+		let all = await Resource.list();
+		if (req.params.slug) all = all.filter(r => r.slug === req.params.slug);
+
+		let accessible = all.filter(r => {
+			const isAuto = r.metadata?.discovery_sources?.length > 0 && !r.metadata.discovery_sources.includes('manual');
+			const isManaged = r.metadata?.managed === true;
+			if (isAuto && !isManaged) return false;
+			return ids.has(r.id) || (r.metadata && r.metadata.isPublic);
+		});
+		
+		accessible = await Resource.withResolvedAddress(accessible);
+		res.json(envelope(projectResources(accessible, { fullMetadata })));
+	} catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// POST /api/discovery/sync
+// Used by external agents (e.g. ldap-client) to push discovery data.
+router.post('/sync', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const { DiscoveryReconciler } = require('../services/discovery_reconciler');
+		// Assuming the caller provides a source name and payload
+		const source = req.body.source || 'agent';
+		await DiscoveryReconciler.reconcile(source, req.body.payload || req.body);
+		res.json(envelope({ success: true }));
+	} catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// POST /api/discovery/promote/:slug
+// Promotes an unmanaged device to managed by creating its LDAP groups.
+router.post('/promote/:slug', async (req, res, next) => {
+	try {
+		const resource = await Resource.getBySlug(req.params.slug);
+		if (!resource) return res.status(404).json(envelope({ error: 'Not found' }));
+		
+		const { Group } = require('../models/group_ldap');
+		
+		const accessGroup = `${resource.slug}_access`;
+		const adminGroup = `${resource.slug}_admin`;
+		
+		// Create groups if they don't exist
+		try { await Group.get(accessGroup); } catch (e) {
+			if (e.status === 404) await Group.add({ name: accessGroup, description: `Access to ${resource.name}`, owner: req.user.dn });
+			else throw e;
+		}
+		try { await Group.get(adminGroup); } catch (e) {
+			if (e.status === 404) await Group.add({ name: adminGroup, description: `Admin access to ${resource.name}`, owner: req.user.dn });
+			else throw e;
+		}
+		
+		// Link them
+		const crypto = require('crypto');
+		await ResourceGroup.create({
+			id: crypto.randomUUID(),
+			resourceId: resource.id,
+			groupCn: accessGroup,
+			accessLevel: 'user'
+		});
+		await ResourceGroup.create({
+			id: crypto.randomUUID(),
+			resourceId: resource.id,
+			groupCn: adminGroup,
+			accessLevel: 'admin'
+		});
+		
+		const meta = resource.metadata || {};
+		meta.managed = true;
+		// `Resource.update` is not a static — `update` is an instance method
+		// (@simpleworkjs/orm). Load a fresh instance and call it on that.
+		const inst = await Resource.get(resource.id);
+		await inst.update({ metadata: meta });
+
+		res.json(envelope({ success: true, groups: [accessGroup, adminGroup] }));
+	} catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;

nodejs/routes/docs.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const fs = require('fs');
 const path = require('path');
 const router = require('express').Router();
 const {marked} = require('marked');
+const xss = require('xss');
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
 const buildInfo = require('../utils/build_info');
 const rateLimit = require('../middleware/rate_limit');
@@ -32,6 +33,11 @@ const DOCS = {
 	accounts:        {title: 'Accounts, Groups & Managers', file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/concepts-accounts.md')},
 	'oauth-apps':    {title: 'Connecting Apps (SSO)',   file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/concepts-oauth-apps.md')},
 	'api-tokens':    {title: 'API Tokens',              file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/concepts-api-tokens.md')},
+	directory:       {title: 'Directory & Inventory',   file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/directory.md')},
+	agents:          {title: 'Plugins',                file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/plugins.md')},
+	plugins:         {title: 'Plugins',                file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/plugins.md')},
+	vault:           {title: 'Vault Secrets',           file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/vault.md')},
+	groups:          {title: 'Groups & Permissions',   file: path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/groups.md')},
 
 	overview:        {title: 'Overview',        file: path.join(__dirname, '../../README.md')},
 	changelog:       {title: 'Changelog',       file: path.join(__dirname, '../../CHANGELOG.md')},
@@ -49,7 +55,7 @@ const docList = Object.entries(DOCS).map(([slug, d]) => ({slug, title: d.title})
 // only resolves correctly on GitHub. Serve that same folder here and rewrite
 // the rendered markup to point at it absolutely, so the images work when
 // read from /docs/overview too.
-router.use('/images', require('express').static(path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/images')));
+router.use('/docs/images', require('express').static(path.join(__dirname, '../../docs/images')));
 function fixImagePaths(html) {
 	return html.replace(/(["(])docs\/images\//g, '$1/docs/images/');
 }
@@ -131,7 +137,7 @@ router.get('/:slug', function(req, res, next) {
 			docs: docList,
 			currentSlug: req.params.slug,
 			docTitle: doc.title,
-			docHtml: fixDocLinks(fixImagePaths(marked(content))),
+			docHtml: xss(fixDocLinks(fixImagePaths(marked(content)))),
 		});
 	} catch (error) {
 		next(error);

nodejs/routes/group.js

@@ -43,6 +43,87 @@ router.get('/:name', async function(req, res, next){
 	}
 });
 
+// ── Nested groups ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// A groupOfNames `member` may be any DN, including another group's, which is
+// how nesting is stored. These routes are mounted before /:group/:uid so the
+// literal "nested"/"effective" path segments are not swallowed by that
+// wildcard, which would otherwise try to resolve them as a uid.
+
+// GET /api/group/:group/effective — who this group actually grants, split into
+// directly-listed users, the groups nested into it, and the full transitive set
+// of users. The UI shows "3 direct, 12 effective"; a plain member read cannot
+// answer that, and on a server with nestgroup it silently returns the expanded
+// list with no indication which entries are direct.
+router.get('/:group/effective', async function(req, res, next){
+	try{
+		return res.json({ results: await Group.effectiveMembers(req.params.group) });
+	}catch(error){
+		next(error);
+	}
+});
+
+// PUT /api/group/:group/nested/:child — nest :child inside :group.
+router.put('/:group/nested/:child', async function(req, res, next){
+	try{
+		await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_admin'], [req.params.group]);
+
+		const parent = await Group.get(req.params.group);
+		const child  = await Group.get(req.params.child);
+
+		if(parent.dn === child.dn){
+			return res.status(400).json({message: 'A group cannot contain itself.'});
+		}
+		// Refuse rather than rely on the resolver's depth cap: a cycle makes
+		// "who is in this group" unanswerable, and the cap would quietly return
+		// a truncated answer instead of an error anyone would notice.
+		if(await Group.wouldCycle(req.params.group, child.dn)){
+			return res.status(409).json({
+				message: `"${req.params.child}" already contains "${req.params.group}" — nesting them would create a loop.`
+			});
+		}
+
+		const results = await parent.addMember({dn: child.dn});
+		User.clearCache();
+		return res.json({
+			results,
+			message: `Nested ${req.params.child} inside ${req.params.group}.`
+		});
+	}catch(error){
+		if(error.name === 'TypeOrValueExistsError' || error.code === 20){
+			return res.status(409).json({message: `"${req.params.child}" is already nested in "${req.params.group}".`});
+		}
+		next(error);
+	}
+});
+
+// DELETE /api/group/:group/nested/:child — un-nest.
+router.delete('/:group/nested/:child', async function(req, res, next){
+	try{
+		await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_admin'], [req.params.group]);
+
+		const parent = await Group.get(req.params.group);
+		const child  = await Group.get(req.params.child);
+		const results = await parent.removeMember({dn: child.dn});
+		User.clearCache();
+		return res.json({
+			results,
+			message: `Removed ${req.params.child} from ${req.params.group}.`
+		});
+	}catch(error){
+		// groupOfNames requires at least one member, so emptying a group is a
+		// schema violation rather than a permission problem. Surfacing the raw
+		// error as a 500 makes it look like a bug in the server; it is really a
+		// "you cannot do that, and here is why" -- the same reason the last user
+		// cannot be removed from a group either.
+		if(error.name === 'ObjectClassViolationError' || error.code === 65){
+			return res.status(409).json({
+				message: `"${req.params.child}" is the only member of "${req.params.group}". A group must keep at least one member — add another first.`
+			});
+		}
+		next(error);
+	}
+});
+
 router.put('/owner/:group/:uid', async function(req, res, next){
 	try{
 
@@ -82,11 +163,25 @@ router.put('/:group/:uid', async function(req, res, next){
 
 		var group = await Group.get(req.params.group);
 		var user = await User.get(req.params.uid);
+		const results = await group.addMember(user);
+		// Group membership feeds directly into cached-User-derived state
+		// (isServiceAccount, isAdmin, group-gated nav/UI) -- without this,
+		// a membership change here is invisible for up to the cache's TTL.
+		User.clearCache();
 		return res.json({
-			results: await group.addMember(user),
+			results,
 			message: `Added user ${req.params.uid} to ${req.params.group} group.`
 		});
 	}catch(error){
+		// Already a member -- surfaced as a plain 500 before, which read as a
+		// server fault for what is really a no-op. Common in practice because
+		// groupOfNames needs at least one member, so whoever creates a group is
+		// seeded into it and is then "added" again by the obvious next click.
+		if(error.name === 'TypeOrValueExistsError' || error.code === 20){
+			return res.status(409).json({
+				message: `"${req.params.uid}" is already a member of "${req.params.group}".`
+			});
+		}
 		next(error);
 	}
 });
@@ -98,8 +193,10 @@ router.delete('/:group/:uid', async function(req, res, next){
 
 		var group = await Group.get(req.params.group);
 		var user = await User.get(req.params.uid);
+		const results = await group.removeMember(user);
+		User.clearCache();
 		return res.json({
-			results: await group.removeMember(user),
+			results,
 			message: `Removed user ${req.params.uid} from ${req.params.group} group.`
 		});
 	}catch(error){

nodejs/routes/index.js

@@ -5,38 +5,39 @@ var express = require('express');
 var router = express.Router();
 const moment = require('moment');
 const {marked} = require('marked');
+const xss = require('xss');
 const {InviteToken, PasswordResetToken} = require('./../models/token');
 const {Tos} = require('../models/tos');
 const conf = require('@simpleworkjs/conf');
 const buildInfo = require('../utils/build_info');
+const { mountStaticModules } = require('@simpleworkjs/app-stack');
 
 const values ={
   title: conf.environment !== 'production' ? `dev` : '',
   titleIcon: conf.environment !== 'production' ? `<i class="fa-brands fa-dev"></i>` : '',
   name: conf.name,
   logo: conf.logo,
+  // Connection conventions the catalog needs to render "how to reach this"
+  // (conf/base.js `directory`). Safe to expose: a jump-host name and a default
+  // port are public connection info, not credentials.
+  directoryConf: {
+    jumpHost: (conf.directory && conf.directory.jumpHost) || '',
+    defaultSshPort: (conf.directory && conf.directory.defaultSshPort) || 22,
+  },
   ...buildInfo,
 }
 
 // List of front end node modules to be served
-const frontEndModules = ['bootstrap', 'mustache', 'jquery', '@fortawesome',
-  'moment', '@popper', 'jq-repeat',
-];
-
-// Server front end modules
-// https://stackoverflow.com/a/55700773/3140931
 // Vendor libraries only change when package versions are bumped (a rebuild),
 // so they're safe to cache aggressively; ETag/Last-Modified (on by default)
-// still cover that rare case with a cheap 304 instead of a stale asset.
-frontEndModules.forEach(dep => {
-  router.use(`/static-modules/${dep}`, express.static(path.join(__dirname, `../node_modules/${dep}`), {maxAge: '7d'}))
+// still cover that rare case with a cheap 304 instead of a stale asset. The
+// app's own JS/CSS/img from public/ gets a shorter maxAge since it changes on
+// every deploy and isn't cache-busted/fingerprinted.
+mountStaticModules(router, {
+  root: path.join(__dirname, '..'),
+  deps: ['bootstrap', 'mustache', 'jquery', '@fortawesome', 'moment', '@popper', 'jq-repeat', '@simpleworkjs/frontend'],
 });
 
-// Have express server static content( images, CSS, browser JS) from the public
-// local folder. Shorter maxAge than /static-modules since this is the app's
-// own JS/CSS, which changes on every deploy and isn't cache-busted/fingerprinted.
-router.use('/static', express.static(path.join(__dirname, '../public'), {maxAge: '1h'}))
-
 // Public health endpoint for container/orchestration healthchecks.
 // Mounted at / (no auth) in app.js, so this is intentionally unauthenticated.
 router.get('/health', function(req, res) {
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ router.get('/health', function(req, res) {
 router.get('/tos', async function(req, res, next) {
   try {
     const tos = await Tos.getCurrent();
-    res.render('tos', {...values, tosHtml: marked(tos.content), tosUpdatedOnFmt: moment(tos.updated_on, 'x').format('MMMM YYYY')});
+    res.render('tos', {...values, tosHtml: xss(marked(tos.content)), tosUpdatedOnFmt: moment(tos.updated_on, 'x').format('MMMM YYYY')});
   } catch (error) {
     next(error);
   }
@@ -54,27 +55,78 @@ router.get('/tos', async function(req, res, next) {
 
 // Admin dashboard (stats + recent/inactive users) and Notifications
 // (broadcast + history) merged into one page.
-router.get('/dashboard', function(req, res) {
-  res.render('dashboard', {...values});
+router.get('/overview', function(req, res) {
+  res.render('overview', {...values});
 });
 
-router.get('/admin', (req, res) => res.redirect(301, '/dashboard'));
-router.get('/notifications', (req, res) => res.redirect(301, '/dashboard'));
+router.get('/admin', (req, res) => res.redirect(301, '/overview'));
+router.get('/notifications', (req, res) => res.redirect(301, '/overview'));
+router.get('/dashboard', (req, res) => res.redirect(301, '/overview'));
+router.get('/executive', (req, res) => res.redirect(301, '/overview'));
 
-router.get('/invites', function(req, res) {
-  res.render('invites', {...values});
+router.get('/conf', function(req, res) {
+  // Admin-only Configuration page. The view renders the shell for anyone
+  // (like /users, /directory, etc.); the client gates access with
+  // app.auth.forceLogin(['admin','app_sso_admin']) and the /api/conf endpoint
+  // enforces app_sso_admin server-side. The previous server-side
+  // permission.byGroup(req.user,…) 401'd on a browser navigation because this
+  // app's auth-token is a header set by client JS (localStorage), not a
+  // cookie — so req.user is undefined on a plain page load.
+  res.render('conf', {...values});
 });
 
+router.get('/directory', function(req, res) {
+  res.render('directory', {...values});
+});
+
+router.get('/discovery', function(req, res, next) {
+  res.redirect('/directory');
+});
+
+router.get('/plugins', function(req, res, next) {
+  res.redirect('/directory');
+});
+
+router.get('/vault', function(req, res) {
+  // Personal per-user secrets (secret/users/<uid>/*) for everyone; admins get
+  // free-form access across all of secret/ plus an Apps tab to mint scoped
+  // tokens for external apps. The view renders the shell for any logged-in
+  // user; the client gates login via app.auth.forceLogin() and derives the
+  // admin/namespace scope from /api/user/me. The /api/vault proxy enforces the
+  // same scoping server-side (scopeGuard + the token's own OpenBao policy), so
+  // the client-derived scope is only cosmetic. vaultAddr is the only
+  // server-rendered value (it's a non-user-specific env var); uid + isAdmin
+  // are resolved client-side to avoid the header-vs-navigation auth mismatch.
+  res.render('vault', {
+    ...values,
+    vaultAddr: process.env.VAULT_ADDR || 'http://openbao:8200',
+  });
+});
+
+// Linkable deep-link to a single resource's modal, e.g. from the resource
+// modal's app.modal `url` option. Mirrors /users/:uid below: no server-side
+// use of :slug at all -- the client reads location.pathname itself and opens
+// the matching resource's modal once the page's own data has loaded.
+router.get('/directory/:slug', function(req, res) {
+  res.render('directory', {...values});
+});
+
+// Route removed since it's now in directory
+
 router.get('/onboarding', async function(req, res, next) {
   try {
     const tos = await Tos.getCurrent();
-    res.render('onboarding', {...values, tosHtml: marked(tos.content)});
+    res.render('onboarding', {...values, tosHtml: xss(marked(tos.content))});
   } catch (error) {
     next(error);
   }
 });
 
 router.get('/', async function(req, res, next) {
+  res.render('landing', {...values});
+});
+
+router.get('/profile', async function(req, res, next) {
   res.render('profile', {...values});
 });
 
@@ -92,7 +144,14 @@ router.get('/login', async function(req, res, next) {
 // hardcoded in a doc, so they're always right for *this* deployment.
 router.get('/integrations', function(req, res, next) {
   const issuer = ((conf.oauth && conf.oauth.issuer) || `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}`).replace(/\/$/, '');
-  const ldapHost = issuer.replace(/^https?:\/\//, '').replace(/:\d+$/, '');
+  // The public-facing host (from the OAuth issuer). Used for OIDC links.
+  const issuerHost = issuer.replace(/^https?:\/\//, '').replace(/:\d+$/, '');
+
+  // The hostname advertised for direct LDAPS binds may be a separate,
+  // internal-only name so admins don't have to port-forward 636 publicly.
+  // Defaults to the issuer host to preserve prior behavior.
+  const ldapsHost = (conf.ldap && conf.ldap.ldapsHost) || issuerHost;
+  const ldapsPort = Number((conf.ldap && conf.ldap.ldapsPort) || 636) || 636;
 
   const userBase = (conf.ldap && conf.ldap.userBase) || 'ou=people,dc=example,dc=com';
   const groupBase = (conf.ldap && conf.ldap.groupBase) || 'ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com';
@@ -105,8 +164,9 @@ router.get('/integrations', function(req, res, next) {
     ...values,
     issuer,
     discoveryUrl: `${issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`,
-    ldapHost,
-    ldapsUrl: `ldaps://${ldapHost}:636`,
+    ldapHost: ldapsHost,
+    ldapsUrl: `ldaps://${ldapsHost}:${ldapsPort}`,
+    ldapsHostExplicit: !!(conf.ldap && conf.ldap.ldapsHost),
     baseDn,
     userBase,
     groupBase,
@@ -128,14 +188,12 @@ router.get('/users/:uid', function(req, res, next) {
   res.render('profile', {...values});
 });
 
-router.get('/groups', function(req, res, next) {
-  res.render('groups', {...values});
-});
-
 router.get('/token', function(req, res, next) {
   res.render('token', {...values});
 });
 
+
+
             
 router.get('/login/resetpassword/:token', async function(req, res, next){
 	let token = await PasswordResetToken.get(req.params.token);

nodejs/routes/oauth_client.js

@@ -45,8 +45,11 @@ router.post('/', async function(req, res, next) {
 
 		const client = await OAuthClient.add(req.body);
 
+		const result = client.toJSON ? client.toJSON() : { ...client };
+		result.client_id = client.client_id || client.id;
+
 		return res.json({
-			results: client,
+			results: result,
 			client_secret: client._raw_secret,
 			message: `OAuth client '${client.name}' created. Save the client secret — it will not be shown again.`,
 		});
@@ -94,7 +97,7 @@ router.delete('/:client_id', async function(req, res, next) {
 		await permission.byGroup(req.user, [ADMIN_GROUP]);
 
 		const client = await OAuthClient.get(req.params.client_id);
-		await client.remove();
+		await client.delete();
 
 		return res.json({
 			client_id: req.params.client_id,

nodejs/routes/token.js

@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ router.get('/', async function(req, res, next){
 
 router.get('/:name', async function(req, res, next){
 	try{
+		// ORM models: list() on the redis adapter always returns full rows;
+		// detail is handled by serialization (isPrivate fields are excluded).
 		return res.json({
-			results:  await tokens[req.params.name][req.query.detail ? "listDetail" : "list"]()
+			results:  await tokens[req.params.name].list()
 		});
 	}catch(error){
 		next(error);
@@ -34,9 +36,13 @@ router.get('/:name', async function(req, res, next){
 
 router.get('/:name/:token', async function(req, res, next){
 	try{
-		return res.json({
-			results:  await tokens[req.params.name].get(req.params.token)
-		});
+		const result = await tokens[req.params.name].get(req.params.token);
+		if (!result) {
+			const error = new Error('Token not found');
+			error.status = 404;
+			throw error;
+		}
+		return res.json({ results: result });
 	}catch(error){
 		next(error);
 	}

nodejs/routes/user.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const router = require('express').Router();
 const {User} = require('../models/user');
 const {Group} = require('../models/group_ldap');
 const permission = require('../utils/permission');
+const {groupCns} = require('../utils/user_groups');
 const {UserVerification} = require('../models/verification');
 const {InviteToken} = require('../models/token');
 
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ router.post('/', async function(req, res, next){
 			}
 		}
 
-		return res.json({results: user});
+		return res.json({results: user, message: `User ${user.uid} created.`});
 	}catch(error){
 		next(error);
 	}
@@ -74,7 +75,30 @@ router.delete('/:uid', async function(req, res, next){
 
 router.get('/me', async function(req, res, next){
 	try{
-		return res.json(await User.get({uid: req.user.uid}));
+		const user = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(await User.get({uid: req.user.uid})));
+
+		// The shared client framework gates the UI on a single effective-rights
+		// flag (the OIDC-client apps send the same key). Here "admin" means
+		// membership in app_sso_admin or the cross-app app_super_admin group.
+		//
+		// Resolved via groupCns rather than read off `memberOf` directly: with
+		// nested groups, memberOf is only transitive when the directory carries
+		// the nestgroup overlay. Against a server without it, an admin who holds
+		// the group through nesting would get isAdmin=false here and silently
+		// lose the whole admin UI -- while still passing every server-side
+		// permission check, which resolves nesting properly. groupCns gives the
+		// same answer in both modes.
+		const groups = await groupCns(user);
+		user.groups = groups;
+		// Console admin under the group model (docs/GROUPS.md §11): god_admin,
+		// a site super admin, the SSO-as-app admin ({site}_app_sso_admin), or the
+		// legacy app_sso_admin/app_super_admin during migration.
+		user.isAdmin = groups.some((g) =>
+			g === 'app_sso_admin' || g === 'app_super_admin' ||
+			g === 'god_admin' || g === permission.SUPER_ADMIN_GROUP ||
+			g.endsWith('_super_admin') || g.endsWith('_app_sso_admin'));
+
+		return res.json(user);
 	}catch(error){
 		next(error);
 	}
@@ -97,7 +121,7 @@ router.put('/password', async function(req, res, next){
 		const verif = await UserVerification.getOrCreate(req.user.uid);
 		await verif.update({ password_must_change: false });
 		User.clearCache();
-		return res.json({results: result});
+		return res.json({results: result, message: 'Password changed.'});
 	}catch(error){
 		next(error);
 	}
@@ -231,7 +255,7 @@ router.get('/invite', async function(req, res, next){
 	try{
 		await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_admin', 'app_sso_invite']);
 		const isAdmin = await permission.byGroup(req.user, ['app_sso_admin']).then(() => true).catch(() => false);
-		const all = await InviteToken.listDetail();
+		const all = await InviteToken.list();
 		const visible = isAdmin ? all : all.filter(t => t.created_by === req.user.uid);
 		const results = visible.map(t => ({ token: t.token, ...t }));
 		return res.json({ results });

nodejs/routes/webhook.js

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+const router = require('express').Router();
+const { Webhook } = require('../models/webhook');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+
+// GET /api/webhooks
+router.get('/', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const hooks = await Webhook.list();
+    res.json({ results: hooks });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// POST /api/webhooks
+router.post('/', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const { name, url, events, secret } = req.body;
+    const hook = await Webhook.create({
+      id: crypto.randomUUID(),
+      name, url, events, secret,
+      created_on: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
+    });
+    res.json({ results: hook });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+// DELETE /api/webhooks/:id
+router.delete('/:id', async (req, res, next) => {
+  try {
+    const hook = await Webhook.get(req.params.id);
+    if (!hook) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
+    await hook.delete();
+    res.json({ success: true });
+  } catch (err) { next(err); }
+});
+
+module.exports = router;

nodejs/services/discovery_reconciler.js

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+const { Resource, ResourceEdge, ResourceGroup } = require('../models/resource');
+const { WebhookEmitter } = require('./webhook_emitter');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+
+class DiscoveryReconciler {
+  static async reconcile(sourceName, payload) {
+    const { resources = [], edges = [] } = payload;
+    let newDevices = 0;
+
+    for (const res of resources) {
+      if (!res.metadata) res.metadata = {};
+      res._originalSlug = res.slug; // Keep track for edge mapping
+      
+      let existing = null;
+      const normalizeMac = (m) => (m || '').toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-f0-9]/g, '');
+      const normalizeHost = (h) => (h || '').toLowerCase().split('.')[0].trim();
+
+      const allRes = await Resource.list();
+
+      // 1. Attempt matching by MAC (highest precision)
+      if (res.metadata.interfaces && res.metadata.interfaces.length > 0) {
+        const macs = res.metadata.interfaces.map(i => normalizeMac(i.mac)).filter(m => m.length === 12);
+        if (macs.length > 0) {
+          existing = allRes.find(r => 
+            r.metadata && (
+              (r.metadata.macAddress && macs.includes(normalizeMac(r.metadata.macAddress))) ||
+              (r.metadata.interfaces && r.metadata.interfaces.some(i => macs.includes(normalizeMac(i.mac))))
+            )
+          );
+        }
+      }
+
+      // 2. Fallback matching by IP address
+      let ipsToMatch = [];
+      if (res.metadata.interfaces) {
+        ipsToMatch = res.metadata.interfaces.map(i => i.ip).filter(i => !!i);
+      }
+      if (res.metadata.ip) ipsToMatch.push(res.metadata.ip);
+      if (res.metadata.address) {
+        res.metadata.address.split(',').forEach(a => ipsToMatch.push(a.trim()));
+      }
+      ipsToMatch = [...new Set(ipsToMatch.filter(Boolean))];
+
+      if (!existing && ipsToMatch.length > 0) {
+        existing = allRes.find(r => {
+          if (!r.metadata) return false;
+          if (r.metadata.ip && ipsToMatch.includes(r.metadata.ip)) return true;
+          if (r.metadata.address) {
+            const addrs = r.metadata.address.split(',').map(a => a.trim());
+            if (addrs.some(a => ipsToMatch.includes(a))) return true;
+          }
+          if (r.metadata.interfaces && r.metadata.interfaces.some(i => ipsToMatch.includes(i.ip))) return true;
+          return false;
+        });
+      }
+
+      // 3. Fallback matching by Slug, Name, or Base Hostname
+      if (!existing && (res.slug || res.name)) {
+        const inputName = normalizeHost(res.name || res.slug);
+        existing = allRes.find(r => {
+          if (res.slug && r.slug === res.slug) return true;
+          if (res.name && r.name && r.name.toLowerCase() === res.name.toLowerCase()) return true;
+          if (inputName && r.name && normalizeHost(r.name) === inputName) return true;
+          if (inputName && r.slug && normalizeHost(r.slug) === inputName) return true;
+          return false;
+        });
+      }
+
+      if (existing) {
+        // Merge metadata
+        const mergedMeta = { ...existing.metadata, ...res.metadata };
+        
+        // Merge interfaces cleanly
+        if (res.metadata.interfaces) {
+          const existingIntfs = existing.metadata.interfaces || [];
+          const newIntfs = res.metadata.interfaces;
+          // Simple union based on mac or ip
+          for (const ni of newIntfs) {
+            const idx = existingIntfs.findIndex(ei => 
+              (ni.mac && ei.mac && ei.mac.toLowerCase() === ni.mac.toLowerCase()) || 
+              (ni.ip && ei.ip && ei.ip === ni.ip)
+            );
+            if (idx >= 0) existingIntfs[idx] = { ...existingIntfs[idx], ...ni };
+            else existingIntfs.push(ni);
+          }
+          mergedMeta.interfaces = existingIntfs;
+        }
+
+        // Add discovery source
+        const sources = new Set(mergedMeta.discovery_sources || []);
+        sources.add(sourceName);
+        mergedMeta.discovery_sources = [...sources];
+        
+        mergedMeta.last_seen = Date.now();
+        
+        const isIp = (str) => /^(?:[0-9]{1,3}\\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}$/.test(str || '');
+        let bestName = existing.name;
+        if (res.name && (!bestName || isIp(bestName) || res.name.length > bestName.length && !isIp(res.name))) {
+          bestName = res.name;
+        }
+
+        await existing.update({
+          name: bestName,
+          description: res.description || existing.description,
+          metadata: mergedMeta,
+          updated_on: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
+        });
+        res._actualId = existing.id;
+      } else {
+        // Create new
+        const sources = new Set([sourceName]);
+        res.metadata.discovery_sources = [...sources];
+        res.metadata.last_seen = Date.now();
+        
+        const slug = res.slug || `${res.kind}-${crypto.randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`;
+        
+        const created = await Resource.create({
+          id: crypto.randomUUID(),
+          kind: res.kind || 'unmanaged_device',
+          name: res.name || slug,
+          slug: slug,
+          metadata: res.metadata,
+          created_on: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
+        });
+        
+        newDevices++;
+        res._actualId = created.id; // Map original slug to actual ID
+        WebhookEmitter.emit('discovery.new_device', created.toJSON());
+      }
+    }
+    
+    // Now process edges
+    const allRes = await Resource.list();
+    const existingEdges = await ResourceEdge.list();
+    
+    for (const edge of edges) {
+      // Find parent ID. It might be in the current payload (mapped to _actualId) or in DB by slug
+      let parentId = null;
+      const parentResInPayload = resources.find(r => r._originalSlug === edge.parentSlug);
+      if (parentResInPayload && parentResInPayload._actualId) {
+        parentId = parentResInPayload._actualId;
+      } else {
+        const parentResInDb = allRes.find(r => r.slug === edge.parentSlug);
+        if (parentResInDb) parentId = parentResInDb.id;
+      }
+      
+      // Find child ID
+      let childId = null;
+      const childResInPayload = resources.find(r => r._originalSlug === edge.childSlug);
+      if (childResInPayload && childResInPayload._actualId) {
+        childId = childResInPayload._actualId;
+      } else {
+        const childResInDb = allRes.find(r => r.slug === edge.childSlug);
+        if (childResInDb) childId = childResInDb.id;
+      }
+      
+      if (parentId && childId) {
+        const edgeExists = existingEdges.find(e => e.parentId === parentId && e.childId === childId && e.relation === edge.relation);
+        if (!edgeExists) {
+          await ResourceEdge.create({
+            id: crypto.randomUUID(),
+            parentId,
+            childId,
+            relation: edge.relation
+          });
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    
+    if (newDevices > 0) {
+      console.log(`[DiscoveryReconciler] Source ${sourceName} discovered ${newDevices} new devices.`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  static async garbageCollect(staleMs = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000) {
+    const allRes = await Resource.list();
+    const cutoff = Date.now() - staleMs;
+    let archived = 0;
+
+    for (const res of allRes) {
+      const meta = res.metadata || {};
+      const sources = meta.discovery_sources || [];
+      // Only garbage collect things that are exclusively auto-discovered
+      if (sources.length > 0 && !sources.includes('manual')) {
+        if (meta.last_seen && meta.last_seen < cutoff && meta.lifecycle_state !== 'archived') {
+          meta.lifecycle_state = 'archived';
+          await res.update({ metadata: meta, updated_on: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) });
+          archived++;
+          WebhookEmitter.emit('discovery.device_archived', res.toJSON());
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (archived > 0) console.log(`[DiscoveryReconciler] Garbage collected ${archived} stale devices.`);
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { DiscoveryReconciler };

nodejs/services/ldap_monitor.js

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+'use strict';
+const fs = require('fs');
+const { spawn } = require('child_process');
+const metrics = require('../utils/metrics');
+
+function startLdapMonitor() {
+    const logFile = '/var/lib/ldap/slapd.log';
+    if (!fs.existsSync(logFile)) {
+        setTimeout(startLdapMonitor, 5000);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    const tail = spawn('tail', ['-F', logFile]);
+    const connections = {}; // connID -> { ip, uid }
+
+    tail.stdout.on('data', (data) => {
+        const lines = data.toString().split('\n');
+        for (const line of lines) {
+            if (!line.trim()) continue;
+            
+            const connMatch = line.match(/conn=(\d+)/);
+            if (!connMatch) continue;
+            const conn = connMatch[1];
+            
+            if (!connections[conn]) {
+                connections[conn] = {};
+            }
+
+            const ipMatch = line.match(/ACCEPT from IP=([^:]+)/);
+            if (ipMatch) {
+                connections[conn].ip = ipMatch[1];
+            }
+
+            const bindMatch = line.match(/BIND dn="uid=([^,]+)/i) || line.match(/BIND dn="cn=([^,]+)/i);
+            if (bindMatch) {
+                connections[conn].uid = bindMatch[1];
+            }
+
+            const resultMatch = line.match(/RESULT tag=\d+ err=(\d+)/);
+            if (resultMatch) {
+                const errCode = parseInt(resultMatch[1], 10);
+                const { ip, uid } = connections[conn];
+                if (errCode === 0 && uid) {
+                    metrics.recordServiceUsage('LDAP Direct', uid);
+                } else if (errCode === 49 || errCode === 32) {
+                    metrics.recordFailedLogin(ip, uid);
+                }
+            }
+            
+            if (line.includes('closed') || line.includes('UNBIND')) {
+                delete connections[conn];
+            }
+        }
+    });
+
+    tail.on('error', (err) => {
+        console.error('Failed to start LDAP monitor', err);
+    });
+}
+
+startLdapMonitor();

nodejs/services/plugin_registry.js

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Plugin type registry.
+//
+// A **plugin type** is a module under nodejs/plugins/<category>/<type>.js
+// exporting a manifest:
+//
+//   { type, category, name, description, configSchema[], validate(), run() }
+//
+// `configSchema` is an array of field descriptors that drive the admin UI form
+// and API validation. Fields with `secret: true` are stored in OpenBao
+// (secret/plugins/<instance-id>/conf via utils/plugin_secrets.js); all other
+// field values live in the PluginInstance DB row's `config` JSON column.
+//
+// `run(cfg)` does the work; the discovery plugins keep their historical
+// `discover(cfg)` name and add `run` as an alias (the loader uses `run`).
+//
+// A **plugin instance** (models/plugin_instance.js) is a configured, loadable
+// copy of a type — you can have several of the same type. This registry only
+// knows about *types*; instances live in the DB.
+//
+// The scan happens once at require time (the set of installed .js files does
+// not change without a redeploy). Runtime load/unload is per-instance, not
+// per-type — adding a new plugin type still needs a restart.
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const pluginsRoot = path.join(__dirname, '../plugins');
+const MASK = '********';
+
+// type -> module. Built once.
+const _modules = new Map();
+// type -> manifest summary (a safe, serializable subset for the UI/API).
+const _summaries = [];
+
+function loadAll() {
+  _modules.clear();
+  _summaries.length = 0;
+  if (!fs.existsSync(pluginsRoot)) return;
+  for (const category of fs.readdirSync(pluginsRoot)) {
+    const catDir = path.join(pluginsRoot, category);
+    const stat = fs.statSync(catDir);
+    if (!stat.isDirectory()) continue;
+    for (const file of fs.readdirSync(catDir)) {
+      if (!file.endsWith('.js')) continue;
+      const type = path.basename(file, '.js');
+      // require fresh-ish: a plugin file should be idempotent to load. Clear
+      // from the cache so a future re-scan (e.g. in tests) picks up edits.
+      const full = path.join(catDir, file);
+      delete require.cache[require.resolve(full)];
+      const mod = require(full);
+      // Backfill manifest defaults so older plugins (only exporting discover)
+      // still register with a usable summary.
+      const manifest = {
+        type: mod.type || type,
+        category: mod.category || category,
+        name: mod.name || type,
+        description: mod.description || '',
+        configSchema: Array.isArray(mod.configSchema) ? mod.configSchema : [],
+        validate: typeof mod.validate === 'function' ? mod.validate : null,
+        run: typeof mod.run === 'function' ? mod.run
+          : typeof mod.discover === 'function' ? mod.discover : null
+      };
+      _modules.set(manifest.type, { mod, manifest });
+      _summaries.push({
+        type: manifest.type,
+        category: manifest.category,
+        name: manifest.name,
+        description: manifest.description,
+        configSchema: manifest.configSchema
+      });
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+loadAll();
+
+// All registered plugin types, as serializable summaries (no functions).
+// Used by GET /api/plugins/types to build the "New Plugin" picker + form.
+function getTypes() {
+  return _summaries.map(s => ({ ...s }));
+}
+
+// The raw module for a type (has run/validate/discover). Throws if unknown.
+function getModule(type) {
+  const entry = _modules.get(type);
+  if (!entry) {
+    const err = new Error(`Unknown plugin type: ${type}`);
+    err.status = 400;
+    throw err;
+  }
+  return entry.mod;
+}
+
+// The manifest summary for a type. Returns null if unknown (callers gate on
+// this to validate a pluginType before creating an instance).
+function getManifest(type) {
+  const entry = _modules.get(type);
+  return entry ? entry.manifest : null;
+}
+
+// Keys of the secret fields in a type's configSchema.
+function secretKeys(type) {
+  const m = getManifest(type);
+  if (!m) return [];
+  return m.configSchema.filter(f => f.secret).map(f => f.key);
+}
+
+// Non-secret field keys in a type's configSchema.
+function publicKeys(type) {
+  const m = getManifest(type);
+  if (!m) return [];
+  return m.configSchema.filter(f => !f.secret).map(f => f.key);
+}
+
+// All declared field keys (secret + non-secret) — for required-field validation.
+function fieldKeys(type) {
+  const m = getManifest(type);
+  if (!m) return [];
+  return m.configSchema.map(f => f.key);
+}
+
+// Required field keys.
+function requiredKeys(type) {
+  const m = getManifest(type);
+  if (!m) return [];
+  return m.configSchema.filter(f => f.required).map(f => f.key);
+}
+
+// Replace each present secret value with MASK, keeping the keys so the UI can
+// render a prefilled (masked) password field. Non-secret values are passed
+// through unchanged. `values` is a plain object of field->value.
+function mask(type, values) {
+  if (!values || typeof values !== 'object') return values;
+  const sk = new Set(secretKeys(type));
+  const out = {};
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(values)) {
+    out[k] = sk.has(k) && v ? MASK : v;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+// Split a flat {field: value} object (as the UI/API sends it) into non-secret
+// config (for the DB row) and secret values (for OpenBao). Unknown keys are
+// dropped — only declared configSchema fields are kept.
+function splitConfig(type, flat) {
+  const manifest = getManifest(type);
+  const config = {};
+  const secrets = {};
+  if (!manifest || !flat) return { config, secrets };
+  for (const f of manifest.configSchema) {
+    if (!(f.key in flat)) continue;
+    if (f.secret) secrets[f.key] = flat[f.key];
+    else config[f.key] = flat[f.key];
+  }
+  return { config, secrets };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  getTypes,
+  getModule,
+  getManifest,
+  secretKeys,
+  publicKeys,
+  fieldKeys,
+  requiredKeys,
+  mask,
+  splitConfig,
+  // for tests
+  _reload: loadAll
+};

nodejs/services/scheduler.js

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Discovery / plugin scheduler.
+//
+// Generalized from the one-shot discovery-plugin loader: plugin *types* live
+// under nodejs/plugins/<category>/<type>.js (see services/plugin_registry.js),
+// and configured, loadable/unloadable *instances* live in the PluginInstance
+// table (models/plugin_instance.js). This module schedules enabled instances
+// on cron via BullMQ JobSchedulers and runs them in a Worker.
+//
+// Each instance owns a stable JobScheduler id (`plugin:<instanceId>`) so load/
+// unload can add/remove a single schedule without disturbing the others —
+// `upsertJobScheduler`/`removeJobScheduler` (BullMQ v6) take that id directly.
+//
+// Per-instance secrets are merged in from OpenBao (utils/plugin_secrets.js) at
+// run time; the plugin's run()/discover() receives the combined non-secret
+// config + secret values as a single `config` object, exactly as the legacy
+// static-config path did.
+
+const { Queue, Worker } = require('bullmq');
+const { DiscoveryReconciler } = require('./discovery_reconciler');
+const pluginRegistry = require('./plugin_registry');
+const pluginSecrets = require('../utils/plugin_secrets');
+const { PluginInstance, STATUS } = require('../models/plugin_instance');
+const Redis = require('ioredis');
+
+// Ensure Redis connection works for BullMQ
+const redisOpts = { maxRetriesPerRequest: null };
+const connection = new Redis(process.env.REDIS_URL || 'redis://127.0.0.1:6379', redisOpts);
+
+const discoveryQueue = new Queue('discovery', { connection });
+
+const RUN = 'run_plugin';
+const GC = 'garbage_collect';
+function pluginSchedulerId(id) { return `plugin:${id}`; }
+
+const worker = new Worker('discovery', async job => {
+  if (job.name === RUN) {
+    await runPluginJob(job.data && job.data.instanceId);
+  } else if (job.name === GC) {
+    console.log('[Scheduler] Running garbage collection');
+    await DiscoveryReconciler.garbageCollect();
+  }
+}, { connection });
+
+// Run one plugin instance. Loads the row (skip silently if it was deleted or
+// disabled after the job was enqueued), merges its OpenBao secrets into its
+// config, calls the plugin's run()/discover(), and — for discovery plugins —
+// reconciles the result into the resource graph under the instance's slug.
+// Bookkeeping (lastRunAt/lastStatus/lastError) is stamped on the row so the UI
+// can show run state without querying BullMQ.
+async function runPluginJob(instanceId) {
+  if (!instanceId) { console.warn('[Scheduler] run_plugin job with no instanceId'); return; }
+  const instance = await PluginInstance.get(instanceId);
+  if (!instance) { console.warn(`[Scheduler] instance ${instanceId} gone — skipping`); return; }
+  if (!instance.enabled) { console.warn(`[Scheduler] instance ${instance.slug} (${instanceId}) disabled — skipping`); return; }
+
+  let mod;
+  try { mod = pluginRegistry.getModule(instance.pluginType); }
+  catch (err) {
+    console.error(`[Scheduler] instance ${instance.slug}: type ${instance.pluginType} unavailable:`, err.message);
+    await instance.update({ lastRunAt: Date.now(), lastStatus: STATUS.ERROR, lastError: `plugin type unavailable: ${instance.pluginType}` });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const runFn = mod.run || mod.discover;
+  if (typeof runFn !== 'function') {
+    console.error(`[Scheduler] instance ${instance.slug}: type ${instance.pluginType} has no run()/discover()`);
+    await instance.update({ lastRunAt: Date.now(), lastStatus: STATUS.ERROR, lastError: 'plugin type has no run()/discover()' });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  console.log(`[Scheduler] Running plugin: ${instance.slug} (${instance.pluginType})`);
+  await instance.update({ lastRunAt: Date.now(), lastStatus: STATUS.RUNNING, lastError: null, lastLog: null });
+  let logs = [];
+  try {
+    const cfg = await pluginSecrets.mergeForRun(instance);
+    cfg.log = (msg) => {
+      logs.push(`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${msg}`);
+      console.log(`[Plugin ${instance.slug}] ${msg}`);
+      if (logs.length > 1000) logs.shift();
+    };
+    const payload = await runFn(cfg);
+    if (instance.category === 'discovery') {
+      await DiscoveryReconciler.reconcile(instance.slug, payload);
+    }
+    await instance.update({ lastStatus: STATUS.OK, lastError: null, lastLog: logs.join('\n') });
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error(`[Scheduler] Plugin ${instance.slug} failed:`, err.message);
+    await instance.update({ lastStatus: STATUS.ERROR, lastError: String(err.message || err), lastLog: logs.join('\n') });
+  }
+}
+
+// Schedule one instance: upsert a repeatable JobScheduler keyed by its id. Does
+// NOT trigger an immediate run — call runInstanceNow(id) separately for that
+// (used on boot and on "load"). Safe to call repeatedly (upsert is idempotent
+// and will update the cron if it changed).
+async function scheduleInstance(instance) {
+  if (!instance || !instance.id) return;
+  if (!instance.enabled) { await unscheduleInstance(instance.id); return; }
+  const cron = instance.cron || '0 * * * *';
+  await discoveryQueue.upsertJobScheduler(pluginSchedulerId(instance.id), { pattern: cron }, {
+    name: RUN,
+    data: { instanceId: instance.id }
+  });
+  console.log(`[Scheduler] Scheduled instance ${instance.slug} with cron ${cron}`);
+}
+
+// Remove an instance's repeatable schedule. No-op if it had none.
+async function unscheduleInstance(id) {
+  if (!id) return;
+  try { await discoveryQueue.removeJobScheduler(pluginSchedulerId(id)); }
+  catch (err) { /* missing scheduler is fine */ }
+}
+
+// Enqueue a single immediate run for an instance (the "Run now" button / boot
+// kick). Runs once regardless of enabled, on top of any schedule.
+async function runInstanceNow(id) {
+  if (!id) return;
+  await discoveryQueue.add(RUN, { instanceId: id });
+}
+
+// One-time legacy migration: if the PluginInstance table is empty AND
+// conf.discovery.plugins has entries (the old static-config shape), seed one
+// instance per configured type and copy its secret fields into OpenBao. After
+// the first boot, the table is non-empty and the static config is ignored.
+// Idempotent (guarded by the empty-table check).
+async function migrateLegacyPlugins(discoveryConfig) {
+  const existing = await PluginInstance.list();
+  if (existing && existing.length) return;
+
+  const legacy = discoveryConfig && discoveryConfig.plugins;
+  if (!legacy || typeof legacy !== 'object') return;
+  const names = Object.keys(legacy);
+  if (!names.length) return;
+
+  console.log(`[Scheduler] Migrating ${names.length} legacy discovery plugin(s) to instances…`);
+  for (const name of names) {
+    const entry = legacy[name] || {};
+    const manifest = pluginRegistry.getManifest(name);
+    if (!manifest) {
+      console.warn(`[Scheduler] legacy plugin '${name}' has no registered type — skipping`);
+      continue;
+    }
+    // splitConfig keeps only declared configSchema fields and separates secret
+    // from non-secret. Legacy `enabled`/`cron` are not in configSchema, so they
+    // are dropped here and read from the entry directly below.
+    const { config, secrets } = pluginRegistry.splitConfig(name, entry);
+    const instance = await PluginInstance.create({
+      pluginType: name,
+      category: manifest.category,
+      name: manifest.name,
+      slug: name,
+      enabled: entry.enabled !== false,
+      cron: entry.cron || '0 * * * *',
+      config,
+      created_by: 'legacy-migration'
+    });
+    try {
+      await pluginSecrets.write(instance.id, secrets);
+      console.log(`[Scheduler] migrated '${name}' -> instance ${instance.id} (slug ${instance.slug})`);
+    } catch (err) {
+      // The instance row exists; if we can't write secrets (e.g. the sso-broker
+      // policy predates theta-suite v1.30.1) the operator gets a clear error
+      // from the API on edit, and the instance still runs with its non-secret
+      // config. Don't delete the row — the operator just needs to re-run
+      // setup.sh and edit/save the secrets.
+      console.error(`[Scheduler] migrated '${name}' row but FAILED to write secrets:`, err.message);
+      await instance.update({ lastStatus: STATUS.ERROR, lastError: `secret migration failed: ${err.message}` });
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Boot-time initialization: clear stale schedulers, schedule garbage collection,
+// migrate any legacy static-config plugins, then schedule every enabled
+// instance and kick one immediate run for each.
+async function initScheduler(discoveryConfig) {
+  // Clear stale plugin/gc schedulers from a previous boot. Other-named
+  // schedulers (none in this app) are left alone.
+  try {
+    const schedulers = await discoveryQueue.getJobSchedulers();
+    for (const s of schedulers) {
+      if (s.name === RUN || s.name === GC) {
+        await discoveryQueue.removeJobScheduler(s.key || s.id);
+      }
+    }
+  } catch (e) {
+    console.log('[Scheduler] Could not clear old job schedulers:', e.message);
+  }
+
+  // Daily garbage collection of stale discovery resources.
+  await discoveryQueue.upsertJobScheduler(GC, { pattern: '0 0 * * *' }, { name: GC, data: {} });
+
+  try {
+    await migrateLegacyPlugins(discoveryConfig);
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error('[Scheduler] legacy migration failed:', err.message);
+  }
+
+  const enabled = await PluginInstance.listEnabled();
+  for (const instance of enabled) {
+    await scheduleInstance(instance);
+    await runInstanceNow(instance.id); // boot kick
+  }
+  console.log(`[Scheduler] initialized — ${enabled.length} instance(s) scheduled`);
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  initScheduler,
+  scheduleInstance,
+  unscheduleInstance,
+  runInstanceNow,
+  discoveryQueue,
+  connection
+};

nodejs/services/webhook_emitter.js

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+const { Webhook } = require('../models/webhook');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const fetch = require('node-fetch');
+
+class WebhookEmitter {
+  static async emit(event, payload) {
+    try {
+      const hooks = await Webhook.list({ where: { isActive: true } });
+      const matched = hooks.filter(h => !h.events || h.events.length === 0 || h.events.includes(event));
+      
+      for (const hook of matched) {
+        this.sendPayload(hook, event, payload).catch(err => console.error(`Webhook ${hook.name} failed:`, err.message));
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      console.error('Error emitting webhook:', e);
+    }
+  }
+
+  static async sendPayload(hook, event, payload) {
+    const body = JSON.stringify({ event, payload, timestamp: Date.now() });
+    const headers = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };
+    
+    if (hook.secret) {
+      const signature = crypto.createHmac('sha256', hook.secret).update(body).digest('hex');
+      headers['X-Theta-Signature'] = signature;
+    }
+
+    const res = await fetch(hook.url, { method: 'POST', body, headers, timeout: 5000 });
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      throw new Error(`Status ${res.status}`);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { WebhookEmitter };

nodejs/test-orm.js

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+const { init } = require('@simpleworkjs/orm');
+const { Resource, ResourceEdge, ResourceGroup } = require('./models/resource');
+
+async function test() {
+  try {
+    const models = await init({
+      conf: {
+        orm: {
+          dialect: 'sqlite',
+          storage: ':memory:', // Test in memory
+          logging: false
+        }
+      },
+      models: [Resource, ResourceEdge, ResourceGroup]
+    });
+
+    console.log('ORM initialized successfully!');
+    
+    const r1 = await models.Resource.create({
+      kind: 'proxmox_node',
+      name: 'pve1',
+      slug: 'pve1',
+      metadata: { ip: '10.0.0.1' }
+    });
+    
+    const r2 = await models.Resource.create({
+      kind: 'container',
+      name: 'ct101',
+      slug: 'ct101',
+      metadata: { ip: '10.0.0.2' }
+    });
+
+    await models.ResourceEdge.create({
+      parentId: r1.id,
+      childId: r2.id,
+      relation: 'hosts'
+    });
+
+    const edges = await models.ResourceEdge.list();
+    console.log('Edges:', JSON.stringify(edges, null, 2));
+    
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error('Failed:', err);
+  }
+}
+
+test();